APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jimmy Wayne Green, was indicted for theft of property and two counts of assault. In accordance with a plea agreement, he submitted a best interest plea to one count of assault in exchange for the State dismissing the other count of assault and the theft charge. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, thirty days of which was to be served in confinement with the remainder to be served on probation. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jim Corbett Corder, was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Demond Gardner, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After appointing the Petitioner counsel and holding a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner filed this appeal, contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Richard Madkins, filed a February 2005 Davidson County Criminal Court petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 jury-tried conviction of especially aggravated robbery, for which he was originally sentenced to a term of 60 years and re-sentenced in 2003 to a term of 25 years. Before the habeas corpus court, the petitioner argued that he was illegally re-sentenced because the 1994 jury verdict and conviction were void and because, instead of re-sentencing, he should have been immediately released from custody. Following a hearing, the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and we affirm.

The Petitioner, Donte Montgomery, pled guilty to one count of possession with the intent to sell more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and the trial judge imposed a sentence of six years in the workhouse as a standard offender. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed by the post-conviction court after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was not voluntarily entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jikinte Lashane Morris, was convicted of sale of a schedule II drug, fined $3,000, and sentenced to eleven years and nine months as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the jury access, as part of its deliberations, to the surveillance video introduced as evidence at trial. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding the surveillance video. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Zachary V. Henning, was convicted at a jury trial in Lauderdale County Circuit Court of aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10.000.  He was sentenced, as a Range I offender, to 10 years for aggravated robbery, three years for aggravated assault, and two years for theft of property. The trial court merged the conviction of aggravated assault with the aggravated robbery conviction and imposed the theft sentence to run concurrently with that for aggravated robbery, for an effective sentence of 10 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and complains that his sentence is excessive. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts but that multiple convictions for aggravated robbery and theft violate double jeopardy protections. Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction judgments for aggravated assault and theft are vacated, and the jury’s “guilty verdict” for the theft is merged into the judgment of conviction of aggravated robbery. The defendant’s aggravated robbery sentence is affirmed, and we remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Frank Lee Tate, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and incest, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, career offender, to concurrent sentences of sixty years for his aggravated rape conviction and fifteen years for his incest conviction. In his pro se appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and his classification as a career offender for sentencing purposes. The State argues on appeal that the trial court erred in not sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after finding that Defendant was a repeat violent offender. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and his sentence for his incest conviction. We set aside the sentence for aggravated rape, and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing on the sole issue of whether Defendant should be sentenced as a repeat violent offender or as a career offender for his aggravated rape conviction.

The Defendant, Marvin D. Nance, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the State failed to elect a set of facts upon which it was relying to sustain his convictions; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial after the State made allegedly improper argument; (4) the State committed a discovery violation; and (5) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Timothy Jowers, pled guilty to robbery and possession of contraband in a penal facility. As part of the plea agreement, the trial court approved a concurrent sentence of five years for each conviction. The appellant was ordered to complete a six-month inpatient treatment program for drug and alcohol abuse prior to serving the balance of his sentence on probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued against the appellant, alleging that he failed to complete the six-month program as required by the trial court. The appellant filed a motion to revoke his own probation, asserting that he was incarcerated in Oklahoma serving a five-year sentence for a conviction in that state and admitting to the probation violation. The trial court denied the motion to revoke probation because the warrant had not yet been served on the appellant due to his incarceration in Oklahoma. After the warrant was finally served on the appellant, an amended probation violation warrant was filed and served on the appellant. The trial court held a hearing on the matter, revoked the appellant’s probation, and awarded the appellant jail credits for time served in Tennessee prior to his plea and for time served in incarceration after service of the probation violation warrant. On appeal, the appellant complains that the trial court improperly denied retroactive jail credits for time served in Oklahoma.

The Defendant, Kenneth Workman, pled guilty in the Giles County Circuit Court to aggravated burglary, Class D felony theft, and Class D felony vandalism. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective four-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction and ordered restitution in the amount of $5000.00. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the amount of restitution is excessive. After a review of the record, restitution is reduced from $5000.00 to $2750.00. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Fredrick L. Brown, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner claims that the concurrent life sentences he is serving for two first degree murder convictions are illegal and void because the second offense was committed while he was out on bail for the first offense and that, under these circumstances, Tennessee law mandates consecutive sentencing. A recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court compels our conclusion that summary dismissal was proper. The judgment of the Bledsoe County Circuit Court is affirmed.

The defendant, Charles A. Green, was convicted on his guilty pleas of three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The defendant, a Range I offender, received four-year sentences, with two counts to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. The effective sentence involved split confinement of one year in jail and seven years on probation. The trial court later found that the defendant had violated his probation by committing a new offense and revoked his probation. The defendant appeals, arguing that substantial evidence does not support that determination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tarrean Nuby, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery. On appeal, he alleges there was insufficient evidence for any rational jury to convict him of attempted first degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Artis Reese, was indicted on four counts of aggravated robbery, one count of possession of marijuana, and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. After a jury trial, the appellant was convicted of four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated criminal trespass. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged two of the aggravated robbery convictions into the other two aggravated robbery convictions and imposed consecutive eight-year sentences on the resulting two convictions for aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a concurrent sentence of six months for aggravated criminal trespass, resulting in an effective sentence of sixteen years. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal followed in which the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Chico McCracken, was convicted of one count of murder in the perpetration of a felony and one count of aggravated robbery. He petitioned for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the post-conviction petition, and we affirm that judgment.

A Franklin County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Dale Pickett, of first degree premeditated murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant claims (1) that he is entitled to a retrial because the State violated the rule of sequestration; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress his confessions; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to use a transcript, which had not been introduced into evidence, during deliberations; (4) that the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury a corpus delicti instruction; and (5) that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Finding no errors requiring reversal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Pierre Andre Brown, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Eric Carter, appeals the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Andre Neely, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After a review of the pleadings, the lower court’s order and the applicable law, this Court concludes that the lower court properly determined that the Petitioner’s claims were waived and properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s dismissal.

The defendant, Barry Brown, was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies.Two of the counts of aggravated robbery were merged, and the trial court imposed a thirty-year sentence on each conviction, to be served consecutively to each other for an effective sixty-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a persistent offender. The defendant appeals claiming that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; (2) the trial court erred in failing to suppress pretrial statements made by the defendant; and (3) the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion to consolidate. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State of Tennessee, through the Attorney General, requested rehearing of the opinion filed in this case on January 17, 2007, which reversed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing related to the allegation that the petitioner’s sentence was illegal due to an improper offender classification.

The Appellant, Anthony Bonds , was convicted by 1 a Shelby County jury of attempted especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Bonds raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of conviction.

The appellant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted on one count of stalking his ex-wife. The appellant applied for pretrial diversion, and this request was denied by the district attorney general.  The trial court denied the appellant’s petition for writ of certiorari, holding that the district attorney general had not abused his discretion by denying pretrial diversion. This Court accepted the appellant’s application for interlocutory appeal and issued a judgment in which we reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the issue for further consideration by the district attorney general.  The district attorney general denied the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion a second time.  The appellant filed a second petition for writ of certiorari, which the trial court again denied. We have accepted the appellant’s second application for interlocutory appeal. Because the district attorney general considered the proper criteria when evaluating the appellant’s application for pretrial diversion, including evidence favorable to the defendant and because he articulated sufficient grounds for denying the appellant’s request for pretrial diversion, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion

The State appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s granting the petitioner’s request for postconviction relief from his convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted second degree murder and effective sixty-two-year sentence. In this appeal, the State claims that the trial court erred by concluding (1) that the petitioner received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that the petitioner did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his right to a twelve-member jury verdict. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief and reverse the judgment of the trial court.