APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Darrell E. Braddock, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The petitioner, James Lavell Carrethers, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder, a Class A felony. He contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cecil Moss, filed two motions in Dickson County Circuit Court requesting pretrial jail credits and sentencing credits on his two convictions for sale of cocaine and the trial court denied both motions. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying him jail credit. We hold that this case is not properly before this court because no appeal as of right exists from the trial court's dismissal of the motions, and we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Calvin J. Grissette, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's order dismissing his November 2, 2004 petition for post-conviction relief that challenged his 2003 convictions of second degree murder and attempt to commit second degree murder. In his petition, the petitioner claimed infirmity in his convictions due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the record supports the post-conviction court's denial of relief, we affirm.

The petitioner, William Binkley, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of attempted first degree murder and reckless endangerment, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective twenty-five-year sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief, and the petitioner appealed. The State argues that the appeal should be dismissed because the petitioner filed his post-conviction petition outside the one-year statute of limitations. We conclude that the case should be remanded in order for the post-conviction court to determine whether the petition was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations. Regarding the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we hold that the post-conviction court properly ruled that the petitioner did not receive the ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Petitioner, Patrick Stewart, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Petitioner, Basil Marceaux, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his motion to suppress evidence against him. The State has filed a motion requesting that the Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the appeal is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The state appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court's suppression of statements made by the defendant at the defendant's second sentencing hearing. It claims that despite its failure during discovery to give the defendant notice of his statements, the trial court abused its discretion in suppressing the state's evidence, which it contends is the most drastic measure available and should only be employed when no other appropriate remedy exists. The state argues that granting the defendant a continuance would have been an appropriate remedy. We conclude the trial court erred in suppressing the statements and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, William Chase, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the post-conviction court erred by concluding that it was without jurisdiction to consider the petition, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.

The petitioner, Robert Roysden, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Aggrieved of the Davidson County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation, the defendant, James Edward Long, appeals. He presents two issues on appeal: (1) whether the state adequately informed the defendant of the factual basis for the revocation and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the order of the Criminal Court.

The petitioner, Randolph Jennings, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentence of seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) his trial counsel failed to raise the issue that the state suppressed favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963); (2) his trial counsel failed to explain his constitutional right to testify pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999); and (3) his appellate counsel failed to advise him of his right to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court in a timely manner. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, grant a delayed appeal, and stay further proceedings pending the delayed appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court.

A Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Tom Anderson, of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon and animal cruelty. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of one year for the reckless endangerment conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the animal cruelty conviction. The trial court ordered the appellant to serve forty-five days in confinement on consecutive weekends and the remainder of his sentences on probation. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to testify about two prior incidents in which the victim's dog acted aggressively. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Patricia Ann Starkey, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but seven days suspended. As a condition of her guilty plea, she sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the trial court erred in denying the evidence obtained as the result of her allegedly unlawful arrest. However, upon review of the record, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly preserve a question of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Malinda L. Mason, was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence, fifth offense, and sentenced to twenty-one months in the county workhouse as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant's sole issue on appeal challenges the trial court's denial of her request for a mistrial. When this case was originally before this court, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Subsequently, Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to the supreme court. On August 22, 2005, the supreme court granted the application and remanded to this Court for reconsideration in light of Walsh v. State, 166 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2005). After reviewing this case in light of Walsh, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, John Whittington, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence, third offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be suspended to probation after the service of 120 days of confinement. As part of the plea agreement, the
defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The stated question is "whether belching during the [twenty] minute observation period invalidated the results of the breath test." The judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Vivian Braxton, pled guilty to one count of theft between ten and sixty thousand dollars, a Class C felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to three years to be served as follows: six months in the County Workhouse with the remainder suspended, and three years of probation to follow the confinement.  The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court erred in declining her request for judicial diversion; denying her request for full probation; and in ordering her to serve six months day-for-day in confinement. We modify the Defendant’s sentence insofar as removing any requirement that she serve her period of confinement day-for-day. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Germaine McKenzie, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of the offense of second degree murder. As a result of the conviction, the appellant was sentenced to twenty-four years, to be served at one hundred percent incarceration. The appellant appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Lucille Richardson, with the trial court’s permission, filed an interlocutory appeal, and, pursuant to the appellant’s Rule 9 application, this Court agreed to review the appellant’s appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of pretrial diversion. After reviewing the record as a whole, we
conclude that the trial court erred in denying pretrial diversion. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Waldo Wiggins, Jr., was convicted in the Tipton County Circuit Court of first degree murder. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court denied both petitions, and the petitioner now appeals.  Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Israel Allen Jackson, appeals the order of the Dickson County Circuit Court revoking his suspended sentences. In November 2004, Jackson received an effective eight-year sentence, which was suspended following his guilty pleas to three counts of Class C felony sale of cocaine. The eight-year sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a two-year term of probation, stemming from a prior drug conviction which Jackson was still serving at the time of his guilty pleas. In December 2004, a probation violation warrant was issued alleging that Jackson had violated numerous conditions of probation. Following a revocation hearing, Jackson was found in violation of probation, and his effective eight-year suspended sentence was revoked with reinstatement of his sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Jackson argues that the trial court was without authority to revoke his effective eight-year sentence as the sentence had not yet "begun to run." Additionally, he argues that the trial court erred in finding him in violation of probation. Finding these assertions without merit, the order of revocation is affirmed.

The defendant, Randall K. Bishop, was indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony. A jury convicted the defendant of facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced to three years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. After careful review, we find the evidence sufficient and affirm the conviction.

A Rutherford County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, David Bartley Bell, of driving under the influence, third offense, and violation of the implied consent law. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing the stop was not based on reasonable suspicion. After a suppression hearing, the trial court dismissed the charges against the defendant because the arresting officer was not present to testify. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the charges against the defendant. After our review, we reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. It is my view, however, that the trial court erred by giving the nature of circumstances definition of "knowingly" and the result of conduct definition of "intentionally" in its instructions to the jury. As indicated by the majority, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
 

Knowingly means that a person acts knowingly with respect to the conduct or circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist. The requirement of knowingly is also established if shown that the defendant acted intentionally.

Intentionally means that a person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of the conduct or the result of the conduct when it's the person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct.

The petitioner, Torris Benson, was convicted in 1987 of robbery and aggravated assault and sentenced to life in prison as a habitual criminal. In a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, he claimed his habitual criminal sentence is illegal and void because the prior judgments on which the sentence was based were unsigned. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this timely appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal.