APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court found the defendant, Michael N. Smith, guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an investigatory stop. Following our review, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Antowan Antonio Williams, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated robbery. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve a 2.7 year probationary sentence as a mitigated offender but denied the defendant's request for judicial diversion. The defendant now brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court's denial of judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeffery Allen Hopkins, appeals his Tipton County convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, arising from the December 20, 2003 shooting death of Ricky Lumpkin. The defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction and 20 years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support these convictions. Unpersuaded that the state’s evidence was legally insufficient, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Michael Shane Holt, pled guilty to three counts of money laundering and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three concurrent terms of eight years. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty pleas were constitutionally infirm and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his pleas. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Wayne E. Mitchell, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant does not challenge the length of his sentence. In this appeal,
Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated robbery; (2) that the indictment fails to state an offense; and (3) that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged offense occurred prior to the return of the indictment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, John Thomas Bingham, was convicted by jury of possession of contraband (marijuana) in a penal institution, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to five years six months for this conviction. The trial court ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Maurice Garrett, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Garrett argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Richard A. Childress, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Originally indicted for second degree murder, Defendant, Jermaine Nelson, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced him to serve ten (10) years in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is that the trial court erred when it sentenced him as a Range II offender. We agree, and affirm the conviction, but reverse the sentence and remand for an amended judgment imposing a Range I sentence of six (6) years.

This is a direct appeal as of right from a jury conviction of aggravated rape and criminal exposure of another to HIV. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of twenty-five years and six years, for an effective sentence of thirty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant raises only one issue: there is insufficient evidence to find him guilty of the two offenses for which he was convicted. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Rodney Buford, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for especially aggravated burglary and six years for aggravated burglary for an effective thirty-one year sentence. On appeal, Buford argues: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a bill of particulars; and (2) that his sentences are excessive, and the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction and resulting sentences.

Aggrieved of her convictions of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver and of simple possession of marijuana, the defendant, Gloria A. Porter, appeals. Because we have determined that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse and remand the case to the trial court for dismissal of the charges.

The petitioner, Montea Wilson, aka Marcus Floyd, was convicted by a jury of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery in 2000. The jury sentenced the petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the felony murder conviction, and the trial court merged the
attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction with the felony murder conviction. This Court affirmed the petitioner’s convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Montea Wilson, No. W2000-00748-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 925255 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2002), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 4, 2002). The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, among other things. The petition was amended by counsel. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court refused to let the petitioner’s attorney question trial counsel about his requests for jury instructions on lesser-included offenses, determining that the issue was waived or previously determined. At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the post-conviction court improperly concluded that several of the petitioner’s issues were waived or previously determined, denying the petitioner a full and fair hearing on the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we remand the matter for a full and fair hearing on the issues presented in the post-conviction petition.

The defendant, James Rowe Hudson, was declared a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender in Carroll County by default judgment. Several weeks later, he was charged in Henry County with driving while a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-616(a).  The defendant then filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure in Carroll County to set aside the original order. The motion was denied. Ultimately, the defendant was convicted in Henry County and received a Range I, two-year sentence. In this appeal of right, the following issues have been presented for our review: (1) whether the trial court of Carroll County properly denied the motion to set aside the order declaring the defendant to be a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction in Henry County for violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act; and (3) whether the trial court of Henry County imposed an excessive sentence. The judgment of the Carroll County Circuit Court denying the defendant's motion to set aside the order declaring him to be a Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender is reversed and the order is set aside. Because the conviction in Henry County is based upon the Carroll County order, the conviction must be reversed and the charge dismissed.

The Defendant, Denny Finney, pled guilty to misdemeanor simple possession of a schedule VI substance, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts against him. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended, except for six months to serve in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant's sentence.

The defendant, Edward M. Patterson, pled nolo contendere to possession of drug paraphernalia and criminal trespass and received respective sentences of sixty and thirty days, both suspended. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law as to whether there was adequate reasonable suspicion to support a seizure of his person. Because we find the certified question is not dispositive of the charges, we dismiss the appeal.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the length and consecutive nature of his sentences on three counts of sexual battery. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the enhanced sentences were justified based upon the defendant's prior criminal behavior; (2) the mitigating factors, even if applied, would not have lessened the enhanced sentence; and (3) the defendant's consecutive sentence was proper based upon the predatory nature of his conduct and the residual psychological effects incurred by the minor victim. Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

I agree that if the allegations and assertions contained in the petition are correct, the Defendant’s sentences appear to be in direct contravention to Tennessee’s sentencing act and are therefore illegal and void. However, because the Defendant’s habeas corpus petition was summarily dismissed without a hearing, I would remand the case to the habeas court for a determination of whether the sentences are indeed void.

The petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that: (1) he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel, and (2) the post-conviction court and the district attorney general erred in failing to comply with the Post Conviction Procedure Act, which caused him prejudice. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Dickey L. Cotton, appeals the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his Pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Donnie Glenn Thompson, was indicted for one count of stalking his former wife, Kimberly McClinsey. The Defendant subsequently submitted an application for pretrial diversion on this charge, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105. The district attorney general denied the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion. The Defendant sought review by the trial court, and the trial court found no abuse of discretion by the district attorney general. The Defendant now appeals from the trial court’s ruling. Finding that the district attorney general abused his discretion in analyzing the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the district attorney general for further consideration.

The defendant, Jeffery Scott Sherrill, pleaded guilty to second degree murder. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve a 25-year sentence as a Range I violent offender. Aggrieved of his sentence, the defendant brings the instant appeal challenging his sentence as excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Xavier S. Todd, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the Petitioner is statutorily prohibited from seeking state habeas corpus relief as he is in federal custody and is being restrained under an order of a federal court. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State's motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has appealed the trial court's order summarily dismissing the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, the petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by failing to appoint counsel and that the trial court erred by charging the jury with reckless endangerment as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Upon a review of the record in this case we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.