APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Mandel Benton, who was originally charged with statutory rape, was convicted of attempted statutory rape. The trial court imposed a sentence of one hundred and eighty days to be served in the county jail. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. The judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Gary Lee Silcox, was convicted of criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault, and theft of property valued over $1000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for criminally negligent homicide; and (2) the trial court improperly ordered that the Defendant's sentences run consecutively. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Cortez D. Hubbard, appeals the sentencing decision of the Shelby County Criminal Court which resulted in the imposition of an effective eight-year sentence of incarceration. On appeal, Hubbard challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, James Rimmer, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the issues and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant, Thomas Allen Franks, II, was convicted of aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, evading arrest, and resisting arrest. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of ten years for aggravated burglary and six years for aggravated assault. There were concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days each for misdemeanor evading arrest and resisting arrest. The effective sentence is, therefore, sixteen years. In this appeal as of right, the single issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred by declining to grant a continuance or other relief when the state filed notice of its intent to use impeaching convictions just before the beginning of the trial. The judgments are affirmed.

The defendant, Gregory Mullins, was convicted of two counts of violating the vehicle registration law, two counts of driving on a suspended license, two counts of criminal impersonation, one count of speeding, one count of misdemeanor evading arrest, and one count of felony evading arrest. The trial court imposed a Range III, career offender sentence of six years for the felony evading arrest offense; concurrent terms of forty-five days for each of the driving on a suspended license offenses; eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor evading arrest offense; and forty-five days for each of the criminal impersonation offenses. In addition, the defendant was fined $50 for each of the vehicle registration offenses; $50 for the speeding offense; $500 for each of the driving on a suspended license offenses; $3,000 for the felony evading arrest offense;  $2,500 for the misdemeanor evading arrest offense; $500 for one of the impersonation offenses; and $250 for the remaining impersonation offense. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is not sufficient to support several of his convictions and that the dual convictions for misdemeanor evading arrest and felony evading arrest violate principles of double jeopardy. Because the convictions for felony and misdemeanor evading arrest violate the principles of double jeopardy, the conviction for misdemeanor evading arrest must be merged into the conviction for felony evading arrest. Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Samuel T. Cravens, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of two counts of vehicular assault and one count of assault. The defendant argues on appeal that the evidence fails to support the convictions because the witness testimony upon which the convictions are based is inherently impossible and irreconcilable with the physical evidence and because the state failed to prove that the defendant's intoxication was the proximate cause of the victims' injuries. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the convictions and, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgments.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Lawrence Ralph, Sr., was convicted of failure to display a driver's license, a Class C misdemeanor; resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and simple possession of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of thirty days for his failure to display a driver's license conviction, six months for his resisting arrest conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his simple possession conviction, for an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. The trial court suspended all but 120 days of Defendant's effective sentence, and placed Defendant on probation. Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for simple possession. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for resisting arrest and failure to display a driver's license; and (3) the trial court erred in determining the percentage of Defendant's effective sentence which must be served in confinement. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Robertson County Circuit Court convicted the defendant, Larry Dale Driver, of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, following a bench trial. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with probation following 180 days in jail. On appeal, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by denying him judicial diversion. We affirm the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s decision finding the evidence sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for violating the vehicle registration law, speeding, driving on a suspended license, and felony evading arrest. I respectfully disagree that principles of double jeopardy under Tennessee’s constitution require the merger of the Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor evading arrest with his felony evading arrest conviction.

The defendant, John Dillihunt, was convicted of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class B felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years in the Department of Correction to be served at 100% and fined $7500. On appeal, although the defendant raises four issues, we believe they can be condensed into one: whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

Petitioner, Lloyd Earl Williams, filed his second petition for writ of habeas corpus relief in the Lake County Circuit Court, attacking judgments of conviction entered against him in the Washington County Criminal Court. In 1993, Petitioner was convicted and sentenced in abstentia, following a jury trial, of sale of cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and one count of conspiracy to sell cocaine, with an effective sentence of fifty-four (54) years. He was taken into custody in 2001. A petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed for not being filed within the applicable statute of limitations. His first petition for writ of habeas corpus attacked the convictions based upon his being tried and sentenced in abstentia. Dismissal of that petition was affirmed on appeal. See Lloyd Earl Williams v. State, No. W2003-02348-CCA-R3-HC, 2004 WL 948370 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 29, 2004), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. September 2, 2004). In this second petition for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner alleges that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the sentences were imposed, both as to length and consecutive service, by a judge and not the jury in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 125 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). The trial court summarily dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner challenges the denial of his post-conviction petition, which asserted various instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings; therefore, we affirm.

I concur in the majority opinion, but I believe one issue deserves further
discussion–sequential offense consideration jury instructions in cases involving a question of second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. The defendant’s concern is that requiring the jury to acquit on the greater offense before considering the lesser offense can cause a problem when it involves second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. I agree.

Petitioner, C.S.O. Norvell, Jr., filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, attacking his conviction for second degree murder in the Tipton County Circuit Court. The petition was summarily dismissed by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has appealed, arguing that his conviction is void because he received an illegal sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Earnest Gwen Humphrey, was convicted by a jury in the White County Criminal Court of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises multiple issues for our review, including challenges to the voir dire of the jury, the sufficiency of the evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and the jury instructions. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Wilson H. Tucker, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Hardeman County Circuit Court. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed.  Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, Marlon Avery Bussell, was indicted for first degree felony murder in count one, and for attempted especially aggravated robbery in count two. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, in count one, and of the lesser included offense of attempted robbery, a Class D felony, in count two. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years for his criminally negligent homicide conviction and four years for his attempted robbery conviction, and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The trial court denied Defendant's request that he be granted alternative sentencing, and ordered Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length of his sentences and the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. He does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Larry Vaughn, alias Demertruis Moore, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence by the Hamilton County Criminal Court. He argues that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support the revocation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Larry Walcott, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five and one-half years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises four issues: 1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to recuse itself; 2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to sequester the jury; 3) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction; and 4) whether the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. Finding no reversible error in the issues raised by the Defendant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Arthur T. Copeland, was convicted by a Blount County jury of one count of first degree premeditated murder. The jury found that the state proved one aggravating circumstance: The defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies involving violence to the person. Upon its further finding that the aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury sentenced the defendant to death. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence; the exclusion of jurors; an invalid indictment; the admission of certain testimony; the exclusion of expert testimony; his right to testify in his own defense; the denial of due process; the denial of his motion for continuance; the denial of his motion to suppress; error by the trial court during voir dire; the denial of a change of venue; prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument in the guilt and sentencing phases; discovery violations by the prosecution; error in allowing the introduction of certain photographs; denial of a request for a special jury instruction; the failure to charge the jury on a self-defense theory; the refusal to disqualify the district attorney's office; the refusal to excuse trial counsel from post-trial representation of the defendant; the failure to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; improper jury instructions; the denial of expert funding for development and use of mitigation evidence; the admission of photos of the victim; the cumulative effects of errors during the guilt and sentencing phases; and various constitutional challenges to the death penalty and to the statutory capital sentencing procedure in this state. After review, this court concludes that reversible error attended the trial court's response to defendant's decision not to testify and that the death penalty in this case is disproportionate to the particular offense. We therefore reverse the conviction and sentence.

Before the court is an appeal by the State as of right pursuant to Rule 3(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The defendant, Justin Paul Bruce, moved to suppress evidence seized during a search of his automobile. The trial judge concluded that the evidence had been illegally seized and granted the motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings.

The State has appealed to this Court pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure from an interlocutory order of the trial court suppressing evidence resulting from a search and seizure. The question presented for our review is whether the defendant had standing to contest the search of an outbuilding located on property near his premises. Upon review of the record, we affirm the trial court's findings that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the outbuilding but not in the area surrounding the outbuilding.

In 1992, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Leroy Hall, Jr., of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated arson, and it sentenced him to death for the first degree murder conviction. The trial court imposed a consecutive twenty-five year sentence for the aggravated arson conviction. On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentences. See State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 941 (1998). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended by appointed counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. The Petitioner appeals that judgment, contending that: (1) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial; (2) the post-conviction court erroneously denied the Petitioner's request for an expert attorney to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) the death sentence violates the Petitioner's rights under the federal and State constitutions and international law. After throughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Roger Gene Davis, stands convicted of aggravated assault and robbery, for which he was ordered to serve an effective six-year sentence. Aggrieved of his convictions and sentences, the defendant brings this instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.