APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Qawi Nur, a/k/a/ Darrius James, was indicted on one count of first degree felony murder and one count of first degree premeditated murder. The State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder in count one and second degree murder in count two. The trial court merged Defendant’s second degree murder conviction into his first degree felony murder conviction. The jury sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his first degree murder conviction. The sole issue raised on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clarence Carnell Gaston, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he challenged his 2001 convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and conspiracy to commit second degree murder. See State v. Clarence Carnell Gaston, No. W2001-02046-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Feb. 7, 2003) (affirming the petitioner’s convictions and sentences), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2003). After appointing counsel, the post-conviction court conducted a hearing on May 24, 2004. Following the hearing, the court denied post-conviction relief. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant, Daniel Blake, stands convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, attempt to leave the scene of an accident, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, and he is serving an effective sentence of 25 years. He has appealed his aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood-alcohol content was above .20 percent and that he had previously been convicted of DUI. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and affirm
the judgment.

The defendant, Daniel Blake, stands convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide, attempt to leave the scene of an accident, and driving on a revoked or suspended license, and he is serving an effective sentence of 25 years. He has appealed his aggravated vehicular homicide conviction and claims that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his blood-alcohol content was above .20 percent and that he had previously been convicted of DUI. After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction and affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Patrick John Marshall, entered pleas of guilt to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of marijuana in exchange for an effective sentence of twelve years, to be served on community corrections. The trial court later revoked the community corrections sentence and, after a sentencing hearing, imposed a Range II sentence of twenty years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Eddrick Johnson, originally charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a Range II sentence of seven years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that he was improperly sentenced as a Range II offender. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Rickie Reed, appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Kent Ousley, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.  The single issue presented for review is whether the petition was properly dismissed. The judgment is affirmed.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury found the appellant, LeShaun Norwood, guilty of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction (DOC). In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his confession to police, and (3) that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Wesley Earl Brown, was convicted of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twenty-five years for each rape conviction, to be served consecutively, and ten years for each sexual battery conviction, to be served concurrently but consecutively to the rape convictions, for a total effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tyrone D. Conley, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to second degree murder, and he was sentenced to twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a "Constitutional Challenge to Vacate Invalid Sentence." The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that if the document was a petition for post-conviction relief, it was time-barred. Further, the trial court determined that if the document was a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner did not allege that his judgment was void. On appeal, the petitioner contests the trial court's dismissal of his petition. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was indicted for evading arrest, a Class E felony, in count one; for carjacking, a Class B felony, in count two; for reckless endangerment of Officer Billy Moyer, a Class E felony, in count three; for reckless endangerment of Officer Joe MacLeod, a Class E felony, in count four; for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, subsequent offense, a Class A misdemeanor, in count five; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, in count six. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of Class E felony evading arrest, carjacking, reckless endangerment of Officer Moyer, and driving on a revoked license in counts one, two, three and five. Defendant was found not guilty of reckless endangerment of Officer MacLeod and resisting arrest in counts four and six. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to two years for the felony evading arrest conviction, twelve years for the carjacking conviction, two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for carjacking and reckless endangerment, and that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on robbery and theft of property as lesser included offenses of carjacking. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Gregory Christopher Fleenor, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and fifteen years respectively. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Raymond A. Clark, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition/petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal
Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery (a Class B felony). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of robbery (a Class C felony) and was sentenced as a career offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. Upon the grant of a delayed appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the identification evidence; and (2) whether his confession was sufficiently corroborated so as to establish the corpus delicti. After careful review of the record, the briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael D. McDade, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary and he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Cedrick Konard Mitchell, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his appeal, Petitioner contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation and entry of Petitioner's best interest guilty plea to the charges of assault and driving on a suspended license, and that his guilty plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered into. After a careful review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the result reached by the majority. It is my view, however, that the petitioner is not attacking the revocation of his probation, which, as the majority correctly points out, is not permitted. It is my understanding that the petitioner claims that he would not have entered guilty pleas to the two misdemeanor charges if he had known that he was not eligible for boot camp. He also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to determine in advance of his plea that it was the policy of the Department of Correction to arbitrarily exclude from boot camp those offenders who had originally been charged with aggravated robbery by the use of a deadly weapon.

The Defendant, William E. Pewitt, pled guilty to one count of theft over $1000.00, one count of burglary, and one count of theft over $500.00. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of two years, and the Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it denied him alternative sentencing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mario Antoine Leggs, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In addition, he asserts that the ruling in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), renders his sentences invalid. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The appellant, Scott McClain, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to driving under the influence (DUI) with a blood alcohol content greater than .20. He received a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the Washington County Jail. As a condition of his plea, the appellant reserved certified questions of law concerning the suppression of the results of his blood alcohol test. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Mark Ray Delashmit, entered pleas of guilt to manufacturing methamphetamine, a Schedule II drug, and to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. The trial court imposed concurrent, four-year sentences in a community corrections program. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The question that has been certified for review by the trial court is "[w]hether the search warrant executed upon Defendant’s residence was supported by probable cause. Specifically, whether there is an adequate showing of the reliability and credibility of the informant." The judgments are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Harold Lindell Scharkley, filed a petition for post-conviction relief contending that his guilty pleas were involuntary and unknowing because he received ineffective assistance of counsel and because the trial court failed to follow the requirements of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) declining a curative instruction following a witness' characterization of the petitioner as "a robber;" (2) failing to object to the untimely disclosure of audiotapes containing statements made by the petitioner to a key prosecution witness; (3) failing to argue that the term "recklessly" was statutorily inapplicable to the petitioner, and because the term was included in the indictment, failing to get a jury instruction on reckless homicide. Upon review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Chris Edward Porter, appeals the sentencing decision of the Marshall County Circuit Court which resulted in the imposition of an effective ten-year sentence of incarceration. On appeal, Porter challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.