APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Damonta M. Meneese, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding his petition untimely.  Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the dismissal.

The defendant, Arthur M. Stewart, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original four-year sentence in confinement.  Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the revocation of the defendant’s probation but reverse the trial court’s imposition of the original sentence and remand for the trial court to make findings concerning the consequence imposed for the revocation in accordance with State v. Craig Dagnan, --- S.W.3d ---, 2022 WL 627247 (Tenn. Mar. 4, 2022). 

Defendant, Alain Benitez, appeals his convictions for two counts of first degree felony murder and two counts of robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences.  Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence messages sent between Defendant and his girlfriend through Facebook Messenger; (3) the trial court erred in admitting “forensic evidence”; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.  Upon review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but reverse the imposition of consecutive sentencing and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.  The new sentencing hearing is limited to consideration of the factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), to determine the propriety of consecutive sentencing. 

Defendant, Noah Cassidy Higgins, pled guilty as a Range I standard offender to vehicular homicide by recklessness with the sentence to be determined by the trial court.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and probation and sentenced Defendant to five years’ incarceration with a thirty percent release eligibility.  Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly denied judicial diversion; (2) improperly denied probation; (3) considered facts outside the record; and (4) erred in applying and balancing certain enhancement and mitigating factors.  Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Antywan Eugene Savely, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  More specifically, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present any proof on his behalf.  Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jackie Dean Miller, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and two counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-403 (2018) (subsequently repealed, replaced by § 39-14-1003 (Supp. 2021)) (aggravated burglary), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft), 39-14-105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft).  The trial court merged the theft convictions and imposed an effective ten-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that:  (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) he was denied a fair trial because jurors may have seen the Defendant in a sheriff’s car, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Marcus Roshone Perry, Defendant, appeals his convictions for two counts of premeditated first degree murder, one count of first degree felony murder, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm, claiming that the trial court erred (1) in admitting hearsay evidence, (2) in admitting discoverable evidence that was not provided to Defendant, and (3) by empaneling a jury which was not representative of Defendant’s peers.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

William Cole Nicholson, Petitioner, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, and this court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal.  State v. William Cole Nicholson, No. M2017-01761-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4203549, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2018), no perm. app. filed.  Petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition and an amended petition through counsel, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.  The post-conviction court denied the petition, and Petitioner now appeals.  Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Quincy Lamont Collins, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for one count each of attempted first degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged, and he received an effective sentence of 31 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; that the trial court should have suppressed the gun located as a result of information obtained during Defendant’s interrogation; that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight; and that his convictions for attempted first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault violate double jeopardy. Following our careful review of the record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder, the defendant, Brandon Scott Donaldson, appeals. He alleges error in the composition of the jury, arguing that the venire did not represent a fair cross-section of the community and that the State improperly used a peremptory challenge to strike an African American. He claims error in both the admission and exclusion of evidence, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a sonogram photograph and by excluding text messages sent by the victim, certain of the victim’s medical records, and prior consistent statements of a defense witness. He also asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after a State’s witness offered improper testimony. He asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during closing argument. He claims error in the jury instructions provided by the trial court, arguing that the trial court incorrectly defined the offense of voluntary manslaughter and that the sequential jury instruction essentially barred the jury from adequately considering voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of second degree murder. The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the total effective sentence. Finally, he asserts that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Sean Matthew Houser, pled guilty in the Grainger County Circuit Court to driving under the influence (DUI) per se, a Class A misdemeanor. As a condition of his plea, he reserved two certified questions of law regarding the admissibility of his warrantless blood alcohol test. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the certified questions do not comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) because they are too broad. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

I concur with the majority’s conclusion to dismiss the Defendant’s appeal. However, I would dismiss the appeal on the basis that the certified questions are not dispositive because even if the results of the Defendant’s warrantless blood draw were suppressed, other sufficient evidence exists upon which the Defendant could be convicted of DUI.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Marcus Willingham, of ten counts of rape of a child and two counts of solicitation of sexual exploitation of a child, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted pornographic material found on his electronic devices and that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.  

The Petitioner, Antonio Bonds, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. The Petitioner filed this fourth petition for post-conviction relief over twenty years after his conviction, and the postconviction court summarily dismissed his petition on the ground that the statute of limitations barred its consideration of his claims. The Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The pro se Appellant, Daniel H. Jones, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s orders summarily dismissing his motions to recuse the trial judge and motion for relief from final judgment. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Quentin Dean Bird, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended).  The jury imposed sentences of life without the possibility of parole, which the trial court ordered to be served consecutively to each other.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) he was deprived of his right to equal protection under the law when the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror without articulating a valid race-neutral reason, (2) the trial court erred in admitting graphic autopsy photographs, (3) the sentence of life without parole for the murder of one of the victims was excessive and constituted double jeopardy because the facts used to establish the enhancement factor were also used to enhance the sentence for the murder of the second victim, and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences based upon its finding that the Defendant was a dangerous offender.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2015, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Bland, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On February 20, 2020, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging that newly discovered evidence exists. After a hearing on the petition, the coram nobis court issued an order denying the petition. The Petitioner appeals, arguing that the coram nobis court erred by denying relief. The Petitioner asserts that newly discovered evidence would have changed the outcome of the trial. After review, we affirm the coram nobis court’s judgment.

On October 12, 2018, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, David Johnson, of aggravated rape committed in February 2000, based on DNA evidence linking him to the crime. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that he is entitled to have the conviction reversed and dismissed because he was not timely indicted. He also argues that the State failed to establish the chain of custody of the DNA evidence. We conclude that the Defendant was timely indicted through a “John Doe” indictment and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the chain of custody was adequately established for the DNA evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

After being convicted of two counts of first degree murder, Tarence Nelson, Petitioner, sought a direct appeal and post-conviction relief. See State v. Tarence Nelson, No. W2011- 02222-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 12185279, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 16, 2013); Tarence Nelson v. State, No. W2017-02063-CCA-R3- PC, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 12, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 15, 2020). Petitioner was not successful in either appeal. Petitioner sought relief via the writ of error coram nobis while the post-conviction petition was pending. That petition was ultimately dismissed. Petitioner filed another petition for writ of error coram nobis. It was summarily dismissed on the basis that it was untimely. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the criminal court.

Defendant, Jeremiah Emery, entered open guilty pleas to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell (Count 1), one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 2), one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 3), two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 4 and 5), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (Count 6). The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of five years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying enhancement factors and ordering the maximum sentence for Counts 1 and 2, that the trial court erred in denying a probated sentence for Counts 1 and 2, and that the trial court erred in ordering Defendant to serve the conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony to be served after Counts 1 and 2. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After the dismissal of his petition for error coram nobis relief without a hearing, Curtis Keller, Petitioner, appealed. Upon review, we determine that the petition for relief was properly dismissed and affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, Oscar Smith, a death row inmate, appeals the trial court’s order denying his “Motion to Reopen Post-Conviction Proceedings and/or for Review under Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001.”  The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen and his DNA petition in the same order.  Petitioner has filed a notice of appeal (Docket No. M2022-00455-CCA-R3-PD) and an application for permission to appeal (Docket No. M2022-00460-CCA-R28-PD).  The Court hereby consolidates these two appeals under Docket No. M2022-00455-CCA-R3-PD.  The record has been filed and Petitioner, in addition to having filed an application for permission to appeal, has already filed his appellate brief.  Upon our review, we affirm the rulings of the trial court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

The Defendant, Justin Antonio McDowell, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of two counts of possession of more than 0.5 gram of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver within a drug-free zone, a Class A felony; possession of more than twenty-six grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture within a drug-free zone, a Class A felony; unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a violent felony, a Class B felony; and two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417(a), (c), (i) (possession of cocaine or methamphetamine) (2018) (subsequently amended); 39-17-1307(b)(1) (possession of a firearm after previously having been convicted of a violent felony); 39-17-1324(a) (possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony) (2018) (subsequently amended); 37-17-1324(g)(2) (increasing the penalty for unlawful possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, if the defendant had a prior felony conviction at the time of the present offense). The trial court merged two of the firearm convictions and imposed an effective thirty-year sentence, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained after his unlawful detention and a warrantless search of his car and motel room, (3) the trial court erred in admitting drug evidence because an unbroken chain of custody was not established, and (4) he is entitled to a sentence reduction due to post-sentencing changes to the drug-free zone sentence enhancement statute. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Mark Dewayne McMurry, was indicted for and pleaded guilty to robbery.  Prior to sentencing, Defendant moved to recuse the trial judge.  The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for recusal and, following a sentencing hearing, sentenced Defendant as a Range II multiple offender to serve 10 years in incarceration.  In this appeal as of right, Defendant challenges his sentence as excessive and argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for recusal.  Following our careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.