APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Randy David Miles, was convicted by a Franklin County Circuit Court jury of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, for his participation with a codefendant, Gary Allen Phillips, Jr., in grabbing a woman from the street in Northern Alabama and transporting her by car to the defendant's grandmother's abandoned farmhouse in Huntland, Tennessee, where the defendant raped her while his codefendant watched. The defendant was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of eleven years, nine months for the aggravated kidnapping conviction and twenty-four years, six months for each of the aggravated rape convictions, for an effective sentence of twenty-four years, six months. His Tennessee sentences were ordered to be served concurrently to his Alabama sentence for kidnapping. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the State's failure to make a proper election of offenses, and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Following our review, we conclude that one of the aggravated rape convictions is invalid because the facts upon which the State relied to support the separate convictions constitute only one offense. Accordingly, we reverse one of the defendant's convictions for aggravated rape. We affirm the judgments as to the other aggravated rape conviction and the aggravated kidnapping conviction but modify the sentences to twenty-two years and nine years, respectively.

On May 1, 2003, the defendant, Worley K. Henry, was convicted by a Sullivan County jury of theft of property valued at less than $500, possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, and tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days each for the theft and possession convictions and six years for the tampering with evidence conviction. The theft and evidence tampering sentences were to run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the possession sentence. The defendant appealed his convictions for theft of property valued at less than $500 and tampering with evidence. He has alleged that the evidence is insufficient to support verdicts of guilty for these offenses. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Raymond Roger Jones, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's dismissal of his pro se combined motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, petition for writ of error coram nobis, and petition for DNA analysis. Petitioner was convicted by a jury in the Knox County Criminal Court of two counts of first degree murder. He received consecutive life sentences. This Court affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See State v. Jones, 735 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Washington County Criminal Court. The trial court dismissed the petition, and this Court affirmed. See Raymond Roger Jones v. State, No. 03C01-9102-CR-00068, 1991 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 584, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 26, 1991), perm. to app. denied (Tenn. 1992). On June 22, 2001, Petitioner filed a pro se motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, alleging that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), established a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application to his case. Petitioner subsequently filed a supplemental request for DNA analysis. The trial court dismissed the motion and denied Petitioner's request for DNA Analysis. Petitioner appeals. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor assault and the refusal of the trial court to impose an alternative sentence of judicial diversion or full probation. After review, we reverse the conviction for the trial court’s failure to instruct on self-defense. In the event of further appellate review, we have considered all issues raised on appeal. The cause is remanded for a new trial.

The petitioner, Vincent Hatch, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the postconviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel and in denying his request to represent himself at the post-conviction proceeding. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Ambreco Shaw, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, for shooting a man to death at a Memphis public housing development. The trial court sentenced him as a standard, violent offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction, applying four enhancement factors to increase his sentence from the presumptive twenty-year midpoint in the range. In a timely filed appeal to this court, the defendant raised as his sole issue whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. However, following the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___ , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), which was released during the pendency of this appeal, the defendant sought and received permission from this court to raise as an additional issue the impact of the Blakely decision on the sentencing imposed in his case. Based on our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction and that two of the four enhancement factors were appropriately applied under Blakely. We further conclude that the applicable factors justify the enhanced sentence in the case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the majority opinion. I have chosen to write separately to express concern over two issues that appear from the record and that are not addressed by either party. Admittedly, the record is unclear but the majority opinion concludes that the petitioner originally filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, that counsel was appointed, and that the petition was summarily dismissed in August of 1998. In February of 2001, the petitioner again filed a pro se motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, which was granted by the post-conviction court. I found nothing in the record that would support the reopening of the petitioner's original post-conviction relief petition. Next, it appears that the petitioner was appointed counsel and on the second day of the hearing, the petitioner filed a pro se amended petition for post-conviction relief and was allowed an additional day in which to present evidence. This procedure appears to be in conflict with the holdings of our supreme court in State v. William Lee Burkhart, 541 S.W.2d 365. The petitioner in the instant case did not have a constitutional right to participate in propria persona and, simultaneously, be represented by participating counsel.

Petitioner, Donavan Edward Daniel, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, as amended, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing (1) to raise the legality of Petitioner’s detention as an issue in his motion to suppress; (2) to demonstrate a particularized need for expert services and timely present the affidavit of the proposed expert to the trial court; and (3) to request a mistrial or curative instruction when two prospective jurors stated during voir dire that they were familiar with Petitioner’s juvenile record and family background.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s request for post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Wayne Davidson, was convicted in the Meigs County Criminal Court of second degree burglary. Upon being found by a jury to be an habitual criminal, the petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed in the Davidson County Circuit Court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the statutes under which he received a life sentence were unconstitutional. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Billy Wayne Quillen, pled guilty to two counts of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by fraud and was placed on judicial diversion for two years. His diversion was subsequently revoked, and the trial court reinstated his original two-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence at 100% without release eligibility, and the State agrees. Based upon our review, we modify the defendant's sentence to reflect release eligibility after service of 30% of the two-year sentence.

Defendant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in Case No. 242704 in which Defendant alleged that the municipal ordinance supporting his conviction for reckless driving was unlawfully enacted. Defendant also appeals the trial court's order declaring him to be an habitual motor vehicle offender in Case No. 239641. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgments in Case Nos. 242704 and 239641.

Defendant, Stanley Craig Hughes, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. The State entered a nolle prosequi on the unlawful possession of a weapon charge, and Defendant was tried on the other charges. Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial. At the conclusion of Defendant’s second trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of aggravated assault and not guilty of the charge of second degree murder and both counts of reckless endangerment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court improperly applied enhancement factors and failed to consider mitigating factors in determining the length of Defendendant’s sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, George G. Faulkner, appeals the order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition fails to establish a cognizable claim for relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Wayne Bostic, was convicted of one count of delivery of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Defendant to five years confinement as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant does not appeal his sentence. Defendant does, however, appeal the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following a review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant was indicted on three counts of first degree murder, and a jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. On appeal, this Court reversed Defendant’s convictions and remanded for a new trial because of the inappropriate admission of certain evidence and the prosecutor’s reliance on the inadmissable evidence during closing argument. State v. Frankie E. Casteel, No. E1999-00076- CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 329538 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, April 5), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 2001). At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury again found Defendant guilty of three counts of first degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the Hamilton County District Attorney’s Office should have been disqualified from prosecuting Defendant in this case; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony; and (4) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s adopted admission through Marie Hill’s testimony. Following a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Tony Mabry, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel because she (1) failed to request a pre-trial voice line-up; (2) failed to cross-examine the victim about his prior statements to the police; and (3) failed to subpoena the police officer who took the victim’s initial statement to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Franklin D. Brooks, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for burglary, theft, and vandalism. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to serve seven years on community corrections. As a condition of his sentence, Defendant was ordered to complete the Lifelines program while incarcerated. Defendant appeals his sentence. We conclude that the trial court erred by sentencing Defendant to serve more than one year of his sentence of split confinement in continuous confinement. We also conclude that Defendant is entitled to receive credit for time served in confinement. Accordingly, we remand this case for entry of an Amended Judgment to allow credit for time served in confinement, and we modify the sentence, and order that Defendant be released from custody and placed on community corrections to serve the remainder of his sentence.

The Appellant, Bernie R. McGill, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Knox County Criminal Court. The post-conviction court concluded that it was without jurisdiction to review McGill's claims because the petition was filed outside the one-year limitation period. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The post-conviction court ordered a new trial relating to the petitioner’s felony murder conviction for which he was sentenced to life without parole, but denied him relief regarding his especially aggravated robbery conviction. The state appeals, contending the post-conviction court erred in granting relief based upon the trial court’s failure to charge second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of felony murder. The petitioner cross-appeals, asserting: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level; (2) he is entitled to relief based upon the results of DNA testing; (3) the trial court erred in failing to charge intoxication as a defense; (4) the trial court erred in admitting victim impact evidence and in failing to properly instruct the jury during the penalty phase; and (5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the prior violent felony aggravating circumstance. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Appellant, Freeman Antoine Hale, appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Criminal Court revoking his community corrections sentences. Hale pled guilty to aggravated burglary and possession of cocaine with intent to sell and received an effective three-year sentence. As a result of these convictions, he was placed on intensive probation but, following violations of release, he was resentenced to community corrections. Hale then proceeded to violate his community corrections agreement, and the trial court ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Hale asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the violations occurred. After review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Michael Addison, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Sanford and Sons Bail Bonds, Inc., the appellant, appeals from the trial court’s denial of relief from
final forfeiture of its bond. At the hearing set to determine whether final forfeiture of the bond
should occur, the appellant did not appear and the trial court entered a judgment against the appellant declaring final forfeiture. The appellant then sought relief from the final forfeiture judgment, pursuant to Rule 60.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11- 201(b), and sought a stay of execution of the judgment. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed in this matter, we are without jurisdiction to determine whether the trial court erred in entering a final forfeiture against the appellant based upon its claim under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-201(b). We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a stay of execution or relief under Rule 60.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court

The defendant, Novella Beard, appeals from a conviction for aggravated robbery on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence and alleged error concerning jurors’ questions of witnesses. We find no reversible error and affirm the conviction.

The Petitioner, Arzolia Charles Goines, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a ground for relief which would render the judgment void, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.