APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Michael Lenard Hall appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court conviction of first degree murder of his ex-wife, Pamela Hall. He claims that insufficient evidence supports his conviction, that the jury instructions were flawed, and that the prosecution denied him a fair trial through improper questioning of witnesses and improper argument. Because we agree with the defendant that the state failed to present sufficient proof of premeditation, we modify the first degree murder conviction and impose a second degree murder conviction in its place. However, we are unpersuaded of error warranting a new trial. We remand for sentencing on the second degree murder conviction.

The defendant, Robert Simerly, appeals from his Johnson County Criminal Court conviction of first degree felony murder. On appeal, he claims: 1. The convicting evidence is insufficient. 2. The trial court erred in allowing evidence of non-testifying co-defendants' and accomplices' statements that inculpated the defendant. 3. The trial court erred in denying a mistrial when (a) an officer testified that, during pretrial questioning, the defendant requested an attorney, and (b) another witness testified that he had been threatened during the trial. 4. The trial court erred in the admission of expert testimony. 5. The trial court erred in the admission of a prejudicial videotape that depicted the deceased victim's face. 6. The trial court erred in excluding the defendant's proffered evidence of judgments of convictions of two state witnesses. 7. The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense. Discerning no reversible error in the proceedings below, we affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Harold Woodroof, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner failed to file his post-conviction petition within the one year statute of limitations. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief September 26, 2001. After holding a hearing on the petition, the trial court denied the petition. The petitioner appealed the trial court's decision. We have reviewed the petitioner's many issues, including allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and entry of an involuntary guilty plea, and we affirm the trial court's decision to deny the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Allen R. Carlton, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Kevin Tate, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner, Eddie Dean Hall, pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and received concurrent sentences of life without parole. No direct appeal was taken. Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Petitioner appeals from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition relating to his convictions for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and attempted second degree murder. On appeal, the petitioner contends: (1) the state withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) the state failed to correct perjured testimony at trial; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of an aggravated burglary; criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony; aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. The trial court merged the conviction for criminally negligent homicide with the conviction for first degree murder, and the defendant received concurrent sentences of life for the first degree murder conviction, four years for the aggravated burglary conviction, three years for the aggravated assault conviction, and one year for the reckless endangerment conviction. He raises two interrelated issues on appeal: whether the evidence was sufficient to support his felony murder conviction and whether the aggravated burglary count of the indictment was fatally defective for failing to name a victim for the underlying intended assault, thereby invalidating his convictions for aggravated burglary and first degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After being indicted on two counts of rape by force, two counts of rape, two counts of incest, and one count of sexual battery, the appellant, Darrell Davon King, pled guilty to two counts of rape, for which he received two, concurrent eight-year sentences at 100% service. The manner of the service of the sentences was left open. The trial court subsequently ordered the appellant to serve the sentences in incarceration. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying him probation or community corrections. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to state on the record its reasons for denying probation and/or a community corrections sentence. As a result we REVERSE the trial court's sentencing order and REMAND with directions that the trial court make specific findings of fact with respect to its sentencing determinations

The defendant, James Anthony Hill, was convicted of possession of a weapon in a penal institution, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to the lesser-included offense of possession of a prohibited weapon; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Joey Thomas Holland, appeals the judgment of the Robertson County Circuit Court denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. Holland was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery of his minor son. Holland alleges that his convictions should be set aside because the victim recanted his trial testimony. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the decision of the trial court denying the petition.

The defendant, Jared Singleton, entered pleas of guilt to forgery, a Class E felony, and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. After denying the defendant's request for judicial diversion under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of two years for the forgery and six months for the criminal impersonation. Probation was to be granted after service of 30 days in the county workhouse. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying judicial diversion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the defendant is granted judicial diversion. The cause is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of conditions of the probationary term.

The Petitioner, Roger T. Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner fails to assert a cognizable claim for which habeas corpus relief may be granted. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Troy D. Billingsley, pled guilty to Driving After Being Declared an Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender, Felony Driving Under the Influence of an Intoxicant ("DUI") and Failure to Appear in the Circuit Court for Moore County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of fifteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence was excessive and contrary to law. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, James Lee Foreman, II, of two counts of rape, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to ten years in confinement. The defendant appeals, claiming that his sentence is excessive. Having determined that we lack jurisdiction in the case, the defendant's appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Carlos Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Williams acknowledges that the instant petition was not timely filed; however, he alleges that a prior petition was timely delivered to the appropriate prison  official for filing but apparently never received by the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk. For this reason, we find it necessary to vacate the post-conviction court's ruling and remand for a determination of whether Williams’ prior petition was timely filed.

The petitioner, Tony G. Smith, appeals as of right from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court holding that his petition for post-conviction relief was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissing the petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner is seeking relief from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and stalking and his effective twenty-nine-year sentence. The petitioner contends that the trial court erred in its finding that the petitioner did not allege any circumstances that would qualify as an exception to the one-year statute of limitations for filing post-conviction relief. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition

The Defendant, Latasha Atkins, appeals her jury conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, contending the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Whether properly assigned or not this court may consider plain error upon the record under Rule 52(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Ogle, 666 S.W.2d 58 (Tenn. 1984). Before an error may be so recognized, it must be “plain” and must affect a “substantial right” of the accused. The word “plain” is synonymous with “clear” or equivalently “obvious.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Plain error is not merely error that is conspicuous, but especially egregious error that strikes at the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See State v. Wooden, 658 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). In State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), this court defined “substantial right” as a right of “fundamental proportions in the indictment process, a right to the proof of every element of the offense and . . . constitutional in nature.” In that case, this court established five factors to be applied in determining whether an error is plain:

(a) The record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;
(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;
(c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;
(d) the accused [must not have waived] the issue for tactical reasons; and
(e) consideration of the error must be "necessary to do substantial justice."

Id. at 641-42. Our supreme court characterized the Adkisson test as a “clear and meaningful standard” and emphasized that each of the five factors must be present before an error qualifies as plain error. State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000).

The defendant was convicted of third offense driving under the influence (DUI) and driving on a revoked license. He contends on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the deputy did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop, and (3) the deputy's mention of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test during his testimony entitled the defendant to a mistrial. Concluding that no reversible error occurred, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a judicial diversion revocation hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction in accordance with the terms of his plea agreement which had been negotiated at the time Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant without conducting a sentencing hearing. Defendant now appeals his sentence of confinement arguing that the terms of his plea agreement called for a probated sentence in the event his judicial diversion was subsequently revoked. Alternatively, Defendant argues that the terms of his plea agreement did not survive the revocation of his judicial diversion, and the trial court should have conducted a sentencing hearing prior to imposing Defendant's sentence. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to report to his probation officer as a condition of bond pending appeal. Following a thorough review of the record in this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Nelson Keith Foster, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, without affording Petitioner an evidentiary hearing. In his petition, Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to relief from his three convictions for violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act (HMVO) due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court dismissed the petition because Petitioner had argued in his direct appeal from the convictions that he was entitled to relief because he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction trial court.

The defendant, Douglas Marshall Mathis, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, he contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient; (2) that the trial court erred by giving an irrelevant definition of "knowing" as a part of the instructions to the jury; (3) that the prosecutor's comments during closing argument were improper; (4) that he was denied the right to a fair and impartial jury; and (5) that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Roger V. Alexander, pled guilty to one count of possession of anhydrous ammonia, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, alleging that the trial court should have sentenced him to Community Corrections. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.