APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Rita Davis, appeals the trial court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner entered an open plea of guilty to felony failure to appear, a charge apparently stemming from another case in which Petitioner was charged with possession of a schedule II narcotic for resale, a Class B felony. Petitioner was convicted by a jury on the drug possession charge, and on August 18, 1999, she was sentenced on both convictions. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for relief from her conviction and sentence in the failure to appear case. The trial court denied post-conviction relief, but granted a delayed appeal. Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence, but reversed the denial of post-conviction relief, remanding the case for dismissal of the petition without prejudice. Petitioner filed another post-conviction petition, alleging that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that her plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. In this direct appeal, Petitioner challenges the trial court’s denial of her petition. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Everet L. McNeil, entered guilty pleas to possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of marijuana, and simple possession of cocaine. The Shelby County trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective three-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a State appeal. The grand jury indicted the Defendants, William Timothy Carter and Virginia Darlean Carter, on several counts relating to the manufacture and possession of various drugs and the possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court granted the Defendants' motion to suppress evidence based upon an illegal residential search. On appeal, the State contends the trial court erred in granting the Defendants' motion to suppress. We conclude that even if the officers made an unlawful entry into the residence, the evidence was subsequently seized pursuant to a valid search warrant which was not based upon any observations made during the alleged unlawful entry. Because the independent source doctrine applies, the seizure of evidence was proper. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Steven D. Tarter, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to multiple offenses and received a total effective sentence of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In his initial brief filed with the assistance of retained counsel, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner’s plea of guilty was voluntary and knowing and in finding that Petitioner’s trial counsel rendered effective assistance of counsel during the interval between Petitioner’s first and second trial and during plea negotiations. After the filing of his initial brief, this Court granted Petitioner’s counsel leave to withdraw as counsel and denied Petitioner’s motion for the appointment of substitute counsel. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider post-judgment facts pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and a pro se supplemental brief. In his brief, Petitioner alleges that his post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court based its findings on erroneous facts. Petitioner requests that this Court remand the matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing as to factual matters not presented at Petitioner’s post-conviction proceeding. For the reasons discussed herein, we deny Petitioner’s motion to consider post-judgment facts and affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner of first degree murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Defendant's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Douglas Lee Overall, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twelve years for the aggravated kidnapping conviction, twelve years for the aggravated assault conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State appeals contending the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to receive jail credit from an unrelated charge against the 150-day mandatory minimum sentence he received in his plea to sixth offense D.U.I. Also, the State alleges error in the trial court modifying the defendant's payment plan for paying fines and costs to less than the defendant agreed to pay when the trial court accepted the defendant's plea agreement. We conclude it was error to allow this defendant to receive any jail credit toward his mandatory minimum of 150 days for his sixth D.U.I. offense where the credit accumulated on an unrelated charge. We further conclude the trial court was within its discretion to modify the payment plan, not the overall fine, upon determining the defendant did not have the ability to pay. We reverse in part and affirm in part the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Antonio Vantress Brown,¹ appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally pled guilty to various offenses and received an effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering his guilty pleas; and (2) his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Edrian Rice,1 pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell, the unlawful carrying of a weapon with the intent to go armed, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of ten years in confinement as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) his sentence is excessive; and (2) the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

As a result of a jury trial in Shelby County, the Defendant, Andrea Spencer, stands convicted of one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of sexual battery. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighty-four years as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in refusing to sever the offenses; (2) dual aggravated kidnapping convictions violate double jeopardy principles; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we vacate one of the Defendant’s two aggravated kidnapping convictions due to a double jeopardy violation. In addition, because certain enhancement factors were wrongfully applied, we reduce the Defendant’s sentence for sexual battery by one year and one of his sentences for aggravated burglary by three years, thereby reducing the Defendant’s effective sentence to eighty years. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Curtis E. Wells, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to robbery, a Class C felony. The plea agreement provided that the appellant would receive a sentence of six years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve one year at one hundred percent (100%) in the Williamson County Jail, with the remainder of the sentence to be suspended and served on intensive probation. On appeal, the appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not granting total probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Elmore Lewis Baker, Jr., pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to eight offenses: counts one through four, delivery of a Schedule VI controlled substance, a Class E felony; count five, possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; count six, possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony; and counts seven and eight, delivery of drug paraphernalia, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year on counts one through three, two years on count four, eleven months and twenty-nine days on count five, two years on count six, one year on count seven, and two years on count eight. The plea agreement stipulated the sentences were to run concurrently, and the trial court determined that the sentences should be served as ninety days in jail and the remainder on probation. The defendant appeals, claiming that his sentences are excessive and that he should have received full probation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Prior to this appeal, the petitioner, Joseph Shepherd, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in one proceeding, and, in a separate proceeding, he was convicted of felony murder and aggravated assault. He is currently serving a life sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, raising several issues, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief in both cases and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for aggravated gambling promotion. The trial judge denied the defendant's preliminary motion to suppress certain evidence, and a Davidson County jury found the defendant guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to two years of probation, a $1,000 fine, and five hours of unpaid community service per month for twenty-four months. He now appeals claiming: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress physical evidence gathered during and incriminating statements made as a result of a warrantless search; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated gambling promotion. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Barbara Sue Moore, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to theft of property valued $60,000 or more, a Class B felony, and theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received concurrent sentences of eight and two years, respectively, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for alternative sentences and ordered that she serve her sentences in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that she serve her sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dickson County jury convicted the defendant, Robert Kern Holloway, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and he was sentenced to forty years to be served at 100% as a violent offender. On appeal, he argues: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the mens rea element of second degree murder; and the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on his pro se motion for a new trial which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant's conviction but vacate its ruling as to the pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his post-conviction relief petition based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. He argues: (1) due process required the post-conviction court to hear his petition because of his attorney’s inaction even though it was filed outside the statute of limitations; and, regardless, (2) his convictions should be set aside because they are based on void indictments. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Oscar C. Wells, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The appellant received a total effective sentence of life plus ten years. On appeal, the appellant challenges his arrest without a warrant and the trial court’s failure to suppress the appellant’s statement which was taken after his arrest. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury found the defendant guilty of criminally negligent homicide. The trial court sentenced her as a mitigated offender to .9 years of unsupervised probation. The defendant appeals her conviction and alleges that the trial court erroneously allowed the improper admission of evidence regarding child restraint laws and insufficient evidence to support a conviction. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Elbert M. Marable, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Rutherford County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Marable pled guilty to aggravated assault and was sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range I offender. On appeal, Marable presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether his plea was voluntarily and intelligently entered and (2) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After consideration of the entire record, we conclude that Marable's plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered. Accordingly, his conviction for aggravated assault is vacated and this case is remanded to the trial court.

The Defendant, Guadalupe Steven Mendez, was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to terms of twenty-four years for the aggravated rape and ten years for the sexual exploitation. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to a prior sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the aggravated rape conviction, and further complains that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the Defendant, Reginald Derell Baldon, of three counts of burglary, three counts of vandalism over $1,000, one count of theft over $1,000, one count of vandalism over $500, and four counts of misdemeanor theft stemming from three separate break-ins. He was sentenced to an effective term of twenty years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the State failed to provide proper discovery pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16; (3) the trial court erred in denying a motion for mistrial due to the prosecutor’s reference to the Defendant’s failure to testify; and (4) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on aggravated criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of burglary. We also address whether lost evidence deprived the Defendant of a fair trial. We modify the judgment on one of the vandalism convictions to properly reflect the jury’s verdict, although this modification does not change the effective sentence of twenty years. Otherwise, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.