APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant was convicted in general sessions court of Driving While Under the Influence and “Refusal to Submit.” He appealed his convictions and sentences to the Criminal Court for Shelby County. The Defendant failed to appear for his initial court hearing in criminal court, and a capias was issued for his arrest. The Defendant was arrested on the capias, posted bond, and subsequently appeared one hour late for a hearing in criminal court. The criminal court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to general sessions court for the execution of the original judgments. This appeal ensued, in which the Defendant argues (and the State concedes) that the criminal court erred by dismissing the appeal and remanding the case to general sessions court. We agree and reverse the judgment of the criminal court.

The petitioner, Donald Mitchell Green, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to aggravated robbery, failure to appear, and theft. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition and the petitioner appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Barry L. Armistead appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's revocation of his probationary sentences. He claims that the lower court erred in revoking probation because the state failed to prove a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Because we disagree, we affirm the lower court's judgment.

The defendant, Charles Wade Smith, III, was convicted by a Perry County jury of second degree murder for the shooting death of his father. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to seventeen years of incarceration. The defendant now appeals contending that: (1) he was deprived of the opportunity to present exculpatory evidence; (2) the trial court erred in not giving a jury instruction regarding the relevance of the Defendant's intoxication to negate his culpable mental state; and (3) the evidence presented is insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Jerome Butler, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Davidson County Criminal Court, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner contests this ruling on appeal. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Doris M. Dennison, pled guilty in the Union County Criminal Court to five counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received an eight-year sentence for each conviction with the issue of concurrent or consecutive sentencing to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve counts one through four consecutively to each other but concurrently with count five for an effective sentence of thirty-two years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Albert D. Wilson, II, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and was sentenced to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The appellant reserved two certified questions of law relating to the propriety of the search of his motel room. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Kenneth Nolan Humphries, appeals the trial court's revocation of probation. Defendant was separately indicted for three counts of Class D theft. On September 17, 1993, Defendant entered guilty pleas to all three charges, and the trial court sentenced him to serve three consecutive sentences of four years each and ordered him to pay restitution. Defendant's sentences were suspended, and he was placed on probation for twelve years. A probation violation warrant was filed and later amended. The revocation warrant was dismissed, and the trial court ordered Defendant to complete a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program. Subsequently, a second probation violation warrant was filed and later amended to include additional allegations. On April 16, 1997, Defendant pled guilty to two more charges of theft and received two six-year sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to Defendant's previous twelve-year sentence, for a total effective sentence of eighteen years. The trial court ordered that Defendant's sentence be supervised by the Community Alternatives to Prison Program (CAPP), to expire on April 16, 2015. A warrant for violation of CAPP was filed. Defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence on regular probation. A fourth probation violation warrant was filed. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant had violated the conditions of probation and ordered Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals the trial court's decision. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part.

A Sevier County jury convicted the Defendant of driving under the influence and failure to carry a driver's license. The trial court sentenced him to ninety days of incarceration, followed by supervised probation, and suspended his license for two years. He now appeals, claiming: (1) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress all evidence gained as a result of his traffic stop; and (2) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the results of his breathalyzer test. In the event that this Court finds that either the traffic stop was unconstitutional or the breathalyzer test was inadmissable, then, the Defendant contends, the remaining evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At a joint trial, a Hawkins County jury convicted each Defendant of numerous drug-related offenses. The same jury also convicted Defendant Wolfe of tampering with evidence and convicted Defendant Barnett of two theft offenses. Wolfe received an effective sentence of five years of incarceration, and Barnett's effective sentence was twelve years of incarceration. On appeal, both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a Sequatchie County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder for shooting his wife's boyfriend to death outside a gasoline station and convenience store. Because the State did not seek either the death penalty or life without parole, the trial court automatically sentenced him to life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises essentially three issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence enhanced versions of the store surveillance videotape of the shooting; and (3) whether the trial court erred in its jury instructions on intentionally and knowingly. Following our review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for premeditated murder, the trial court did not err in admitting the videotapes, and any deficiency in the jury instructions constituted harmless error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Ralph Lamar Williams, of four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; one count of rape, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to life without parole for each conviction. The defendant appeals, claiming that the prosecutor improperly suggested to the jury during closing argument that the defense bore the burden of establishing the defendant's innocence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, James Ruben Conyers, was convicted by a jury in the Houston County Circuit Court of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an effective sentence of eighty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises numerous issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of evidence, the sufficiency of the indictment, the jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we find no merit to the appellant's contentions. However, we recognize as plain error that the appellant's conviction for especially aggravated burglary was prohibited under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d) (1997). Accordingly, we modify the conviction to aggravated burglary and reduce the appellant's sentence for this conviction to ten years incarceration, for a total effective sentence of eighty years.

The Wilson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. Following the trial court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence, the Defendant pled guilty, reserving a certified question of law. The issues before us on appeal are: (1) whether the certified question of law is dispositive of this case; and, if so (2) whether police had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's vehicle; and (3) whether the police had probable cause to take the Defendant into custody and to search the Defendant's vehicle. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Marcus Johnson, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of felony murder and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and twenty years for each especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the twenty-year sentences to run consecutive to each other, and one twenty-year sentence to run concurrent with the life sentence, and the other to run consecutive with the life sentence. In this appeal as of right, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress incriminating statements made by Defendant to the police; (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the weight to be given to the supplemental jury charge. After a review of the record, we affirm Defendant's conviction for felony murder. We conclude, however, that the constitutional protections against double jeopardy require reversal of one of Defendant's convictions for especially aggravated robbery. Accordingly, we affirm one of Defendant's especially aggravated robbery convictions. We modify the other especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated assault and remand for resentencing, for the reasons stated herein.

The Polk County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for three counts of vehicular homicide, four counts of aggravated assault, and twelve counts of failure to stop a school bus at a railroad crossing. The Defendant filed an application for pretrial diversion, and the trial court ordered that a pretrial diversion report be completed. Upon completion of the report, the Assistant District Attorney General denied the application, and the Defendant appealed to the District Attorney General, who also denied the application. The trial court granted a writ of certiorari and, thereafter, affirmed the District Attorney General's decision. The Defendant sought, and was granted, permission to take an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We granted the Defendant's application for interlocutory review to address the Defendant's contention that the State abused its discretion by denying her application for pretrial diversion. After a thorough consideration of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gary S. Johnson, pled guilty to vehicular homicide, a Class B felony, on August 6, 1996. The trial judge originally sentenced him to twelve years of house arrest and community corrections. The State appealed, and this Court vacated the sentence because the Defendant was not eligible for community corrections. Upon re-sentencing the Defendant was ordered to serve ten years of incarceration. The Defendant did not immediately appeal, but filed a timely Motion for a Modification and/or Reduction of Sentence. Prior to the trial court ruling on the motion, the Defendant filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied both the Defendant's motion and the Petition for Post Conviction Relief on June 12, 2002. The sole issue for appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, John Lee Bellamy, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; failure to appear, a Class E felony; driving under the influence, second offense, and leaving the scene of an accident, Class A misdemeanors; and driving on a revoked license, second offense, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of four years, eight months, twenty-nine days. The defendant appeals the trial court's ordering him to serve his two-year, nine-month-sentence for the reckless aggravated assault conviction and consecutive one-year sentence for the failure to appear conviction in confinement. He claims that he should have received alternative sentences or, at most, sentences of split confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Carroll County jury convicted the Defendant of manufacturing the controlled substance methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to four years and six months of incarceration. The Defendant now appeals, contending the following: (1) that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the conviction; and (2) that the jury’s indication on the special verdict form showed its confusion with regard to the trial court’s instructions rendering the  verdict unsustainable or, in the alternative, constituting “plain error.”  Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the trial court's suppression of twenty-five rocks of cocaine seized from the defendant. Because the trial court "did not feel comfortable" in elaborating the reason why the evidence should be suppressed, we remand for the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction relief petition following his nolo contendere pleas to aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and evading arrest. He contends his trial counsel did not provide him with effective assistance when he entered into the plea agreement. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court found the defendant, Tim Mattingly, violated the terms of his ten-year community corrections sentence. It ordered him to serve three years "day for day" in the county jail before serving the remainder of his ten-year sentence on community corrections. In this appeal, the defendant argues the trial court acted without authority in imposing this sentence. We conclude the trial court imposed an illegal sentence and remand for further proceedings.

On May 21, 2001, the appellant, Gary W. Young, pleaded guilty to sale of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance within a thousand feet of a school. He received concurrent twenty-one year sentences for each count. As part of the plea agreement the appellant attempted to reserve a certified question of law to be presented on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 37(b)(2)(i). This question concerns the propriety of a search. On June 19, 2001, the appellant also attempted to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f). The trial court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea based on this Court's holding in State v. Hall, 983 S.W.2d 710 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998 overruled by State v. Green, 106 S.W.3d 646 2003)). This appeal followed. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to properly certify an appeal to this Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), and this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider the trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to suppress. However, the appeal of the denied motion to withdraw a guilty plea is properly before this court, and this case must be remanded for consideration of the motion in view of the Tennessee Supreme Court decision in State v. Greene, 106 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2003), which overruled State v. Hall. Finally, the allegation concerning the legality of the appellant's sentences, which has been raised for the first time on appeal, may be presented to the trial court on remand for consideration as a ground to allow withdrawal of the plea

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery. He argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his divorce attorney, who thereafter became his initial trial attorney, failed to attend a polygraph examination and advise petitioner of the protocol, limitations, and requirements necessary to complete the examination. The petitioner further asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his second trial attorney because this attorney was unprepared to argue a motion to suppress and failed to adequately investigate factual allegations, review juvenile court records, call critical witnesses, pursue leads that would have established a conspiracy by the petitioner's wife to wrongfully prosecute him, and let the petitioner review the brief filed on direct appeal. Based upon our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.