APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully dissent. For those reasons expressed in State v. Vernon Dewayne Waller, No. M2001-02414-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Aug. 23, 2002), perm. to appeal granted, (Tenn. 2002), I find no error in the admission of the defendant's prior felony drug convictions for purposes of impeachment.

A Rhea County grand jury indicted the defendant on multiple sexual offense charges. At the conclusion of a trial, the defendant was acquitted of numerous offenses but found guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual battery (as lesser included offenses of aggravated rape). For each of these convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twelve years as a standard offender. The court then set these sentences to run concurrently. After unsuccessfully pursuing a new trial motion, the defendant brings this appeal, raising five issues. He avers 1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; 2) that the prosecutor committed reversible error by soliciting "unrelated crimes" evidence from a State witness; 3) that the prosecution committed reversible error by comments made in its closing argument; 4) that the trial court erred in failing to declare a not guilty verdict as to all counts after the jury indicated that this was its verdict; and 5) that the trial court erred in excessively sentencing the defendant. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we find it necessary to remand the defendant's aggravated sexual battery conviction under trial count two for resentencing consistent with this opinion. However, we find that none of the other issues merit reversal and, therefore, affirm the defendant's convictions and his aggravated assault sentence under count four of the indictment.

Myra S. Bikrev appeals from her Williamson County convictions of felony theft of property, coercion of a witness, and aggravated perjury. These convictions were imposed following findings of guilt at a jury trial, and Bikrev is presently serving an effective eight-year sentence involving both jail confinement and probation. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the propriety of the sentences she received. Her appellate arguments are not meritorious, and we affirm.

Petitioner appeals the dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief by the Giles County Circuit Court. She was originally convicted of premeditated first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, she contends the post-conviction court erred by finding she received the effective assistance of counsel and argues trial counsel was deficient in not filing a motion to suppress her confession. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of especially aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years incarceration pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement setting the maximum amount of time to be served at twenty years. The defendant contends her sentence is excessive and the trial court misapplied enhancement factors (4), (5), (6), and (10). We agree the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors, but the record supports the imposition of a twenty-year sentence, which is the maximum allowed by her plea agreement and the "presumptive sentence" provided by statute. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, after being allowed to represent himself at the sentencing hearing, proceeds pro se in appealing his especially aggravated robbery conviction and sentence of twenty-two years imprisonment. The defendant argues his right to a speedy trial was violated and argues he was subject to an unreasonable delay in sentencing. The defendant argues the trial court improperly denied the defendant's motion to sever the offenses. The defendant argues the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to recuse himself and contends the trial court erroneously allowed a witness to testify to injuries she sustained as a result of the robbery. The defendant argues the trial court improperly ruled the defendant was not entitled to be present during jury deliberations. The defendant argues the trial court frustrated his right to appeal by relieving his trial counsel prior to sentencing. The defendant argues he is the victim of a malicious prosecution. We conclude the trial court did not err and evidence supports the defendant's conviction of especially aggravated robbery. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner pled guilty to three Class B felony drug offenses. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court orally sentenced the Petitioner to ten years for each conviction with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other and to a prior four-year sentence, resulting in an effective sentence of ten years. After the sentence was imposed, the Petitioner asked that he be allowed to begin serving his sentence the following day. The trial court granted the Petitioner's request, with the condition that if he did not report as ordered, two of the sentences would run consecutively. The next day, the Petitioner failed to report, and the trial court entered judgments in which two of the Petitioner's sentences were consecutive, resulting in an effective sentence of twenty years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, contending that his plea was unlawfully induced, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his sentences were illegal. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Concluding that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the Petitioner's due process rights, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Teron McKenley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally pled guilty to especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft over $1,000 and received an effective sentence of fifteen years. He contends the post-conviction court erred in disallowing the introduction of the victim's medical records at his post-conviction hearing and in failing to find that ineffective assistance of counsel led to an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant was convicted, along with her co-defendant husband, of child abuse and neglect, a Class D felony, and sentenced to four years probation. She appeals, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and that any neglect that did occur was the result of mistakes in parenting skills, such mistake vitiating any knowing abuse. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and that he received the effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Bruce Marvin Vann, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence. In this appeal of right, the defendant presents five issues for review: (1) whether the indictment sufficiently described the offense of aggravated assault; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to act as thirteenth juror; (4) whether the trial court erred by allowing prior convictions as impeachment evidence; and (5) whether the trial court erred by refusing to apply a mitigating circumstance. The judgment is affirmed.

A Blount County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Anthony Pfahler, of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, violent offender to thirty-five years in the Department of Correction (DOC) for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years for the aggravated assault conviction to be served consecutively. In this delayed appeal, the defendant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his especially aggravated robbery conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his attorney's motion to withdraw; and (3) that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After being indicted for the sale of a controlled substance, the defendant filed an Affidavit of Indigency to obtain a court-appointed lawyer. The State dismissed the drug charges against the defendant and later charged the defendant with aggravated perjury, a Class D felony, regarding his answers to the trial court considering his request for a court-appointed lawyer. He was found guilty and sentenced as a Range I standard offender to two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with 180 days to serve and the balance on supervised probation. In this appeal, the defendant presents the following issues for review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict; (2) the trial court erred in requiring the defendant to go to trial without an attorney; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. This is a case of first impression in Tennessee regarding an aggravated perjury conviction for making false statements to the trial court when requesting a court-appointed lawyer. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of aggravated perjury. We conclude the trial court did not err in requiring the defendant to go to trial without an attorney.

The defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to eleven years for a Class B felony of selling a Schedule II controlled substance, instead of the presumptive minimum sentence of eight years. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to run consecutive to a sentence in another county. Absent a sentencing hearing transcript, we conclude the record is inadequate for appellate review, and we must presume the sentences imposed for the Class B felony are correct. Moreover, we note the judgment forms reflect the defendant was sentenced to eleven years on two additional Class C felony convictions of selling less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance. These sentences exceed the statutory range of punishment prescribed for Class C felonies and are illegal. We affirm the judgment from the trial court as related to the defendant's Class B felony convictions and remand the defendant's two Class C felony convictions for correction or for resentencing within the proper statutory range of punishment.

The petitioner, Michael Russo, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following the defendant's guilty pleas to the offenses of theft over $1,000 and burglary, both Class D felonies, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent three-year terms in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant posits that minimum, two-year terms of probation, Community Corrections, or split confinement are more appropriate measures. We disagree, however, and affirm.

The defendant, Robert Miller, who represented himself at trial, was convicted of vandalism over $500 and criminal trespass. After the trial, the defendant was appointed counsel. The trial court ordered concurrent sentences of two years and thirty days, respectively, with all but ten days suspended, to be served in community corrections. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel; (2) that the trial court erred by the omission of a jury instruction; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient. Because the defendant was denied the assistance of counsel at trial, the judgments of conviction are reversed and the causes are remanded for a new trial.

The petitioner, Richard Leonard Mendoza, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and that his guilty pleas were involuntary. Additionally, he insists that the post-conviction court erroneously denied funding for expert psychological services at the post-conviction level. After a thorough review of the record, we are unpersuaded that the post-conviction court's rulings, findings and conclusion are anything other than proper, and we affirm the judgment.

The Defendant, Garcia Flores Isidoro, filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied without a hearing as being untimely filed. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Buren E. Laney, convicted on his guilty plea to the offense of violation of an habitual traffic offender order, appeals from the lower court's imposition of a six-year incarcerative sentence. Because we disagree with Laney, a career offender, that the sentence imposed was improper, we affirm.

The Defendant appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's revocation of his probation. He contends that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Connie Parsons, pled guilty to two counts of criminal responsibility for facilitation of rape of a child and was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On September 17, 2001, the petitioner filed pro se in the Davidson County Circuit Court a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the trial court impermissibly interfered in the plea negotiations and, thus, her convictions were void. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Consuela P. Carter, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court's denial of full probation for her conviction for possessing with intent to sell less than one-half gram of cocaine, a Class C felony. She was sentenced to five years, with probation after serving nine months. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Guadalupe Arroyo, entered guilty pleas to two counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the appellant on each count to twelve years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentences and in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the convictions of vehicular homicide; however, finding error in the trial court's sentencing determinations, we remand for resentencing.