APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, David L. Groom, pled guilty to driving under the influence, reserving a certified question of law. On appeal, the defendant contends, pursuant to the certified question of law, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence resulting from an unlawful arrest or seizure. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Johnnie C. Weems, pled nolo contendere to three separate counts of Class C felony vehicular homicide, was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years on each count to run concurrently, and was denied alternative sentencing. On appeal, he contends the sentences are excessive and the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Rhea Jackson, was convicted by a jury of aggravated burglary, robbery, misdemeanor theft, attempted rape, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of thirty-four years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises eight issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony concerning fingerprints; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony about the victim's response to a photographic line-up; (4) whether the Defendant was entitled to a mistrial due to statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument; (5) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions; (6) whether the conviction for aggravated kidnapping violates due process under State v. Anthony; (7) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury concerning lesser-included offenses; and (8) whether the Defendant's sentences are excessive. Because the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury on all of the lesser-included offenses of the indicted offenses of robbery and aggravated rape, we reverse and remand for retrial the Defendant's convictions of robbery and rape. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lauderdale County jury convicted the defendant, Michael Lewis, of reckless aggravated assault. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in conducting an ex parte hearing outside the presence of the defendant and his attorney; (3) the trial court erred in permitting a witness to testify to statements made by the co-defendant; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence a letter allegedly written by the victim; and (5) the trial court erred in permitting the defendant to represent himself. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant challenges the revocation of his probation by the Sumner County Criminal Court. We affirm.

In a four-count indictment, Defendant, Wallace Jones, was charged with statutory rape, sexual battery, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, and exhibition of material harmful to a minor. He applied for pre-trial diversion, which the district attorney general declined to grant. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Defendant's request to be placed on pre-trial diversion. Defendant filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which was granted by the trial court and this court. On appeal, the State concedes that the district attorney abused his discretion and that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and this case remanded to the district attorney general to properly consider all facts pursuant to State v. Bell, 69 S.W.3d 171 (Tenn. 2002). We agree. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the district attorney general to consider and weigh all relevant factors to the pre-trial diversion determination. Furthermore, we conclude that the trial judge should be recused from further proceedings in this matter.

The petitioner, Isaac Milholen, was convicted in 1997 of rape of a child and incest and sentenced to twenty-three years and eight years, respectively. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed his petition because he had brought an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his direct appeal, and he now appeals that dismissal. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The appellant, Rachel N. Bennett, pled guilty in the Williamson County Circuit Court to eighteen felony offenses. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of nine years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contests the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Boyd L. Jones, III, pled guilty to possession of marijuana. As part of his plea agreement, he expressly reserved with the consent of the trial court and the State the right to appeal three related certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i). The certified questions of law stem from the trial court's denial of the Defendant's motion to suppress. The central issue in this appeal is whether law enforcement officers violated the Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they entered his residence without a search warrant and detained him until they obtained written consent to search from the lessee of the residence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The post-conviction court granted each of the petitioners post-conviction relief on the grounds that the state had violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose an exculpatory FBI laboratory report and an exculpatory witness statement. In this appeal of right, the state contends (1) that Harper's petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) that the trial court erred by permitting the petitioners to amend their petitions and allege new grounds after a remand from this court; (3) that the trial court erred by determining that the state suppressed the FBI laboratory reports and a witness statement; and (4) that Hutchison received the effective assistance of counsel at trial, an alternative ground for relief asserted by Hutchison. In response to the state's appeal, the petitioners assert that the trial court erred by excluding from evidence the affidavit of a juror which would demonstrate that the FBI lab reports would have created reasonable doubt. The judgment is affirmed.

The appellant, Homer Frank Beavers, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated assault and one count of assault. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a standard Range I offender to a total effective sentence of five years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court denied the appellant's request for probation and the appellant appealed to this court. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of violation of an habitual motor vehicle offender order, a Class E felony, and sentenced to two years as a Range I, standard offender in the Department of Correction. He argues on appeal that the trial court improperly set his sentence at the maximum by failing to give adequate weight to applicable mitigating factors and erred in denying his request for full probation or other alternative sentencing. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Christopher A. Davis, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The jury sentenced the Appellant to death for each of the first degree murder convictions. The Appellant presents the following issues in this appeal as of right: (1) The trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to disqualify the Davidson County District Attorney General's office from prosecuting the case; (2) the trial court erred by not granting the Appellant's motion to prohibit the State from relying upon the Appellant's prior murder conviction as an aggravating circumstance, because the conviction was for a crime committed while the Appellant was a juvenile; (3) the trial court erred by not suppressing the statement the Appellant made to police; (4) the trial court erred by denying defense counsel's motion to be allowed to withdraw from representing the Appellant; (5) the trial court erred by granting the State's motion to require the Appellant to supply the State information concerning mental health expert testimony to be presented during the sentencing phase of the trial; (6) the trial court erred by allowing a physician who did not perform the autopsy to testify concerning the autopsy and evidence obtained in connection therewith; (7) the trial court erred in allowing victim impact evidence to be introduced; (8) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (9) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; (10) that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding that the aggravating factors were established beyond a reasonable doubt; (11) that Tennessee's death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional in several instances; (12) that the trial court erred in allowing certain cross-examination of defense witnesses; and (13) that the cumulative effect of errors made at trial denied the Appellant a fair trial in violation of his due process rights. Based on our review of the record on appeal, we affirm both the Appellant's convictions and the sentences imposed.

The defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of an intoxicant with a blood alcohol content of .10% or more, third offense. On appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of other crimes committed by the defendant; (2) the trial court erred in barring testimony of the arresting officer that he opined the defendant's blood alcohol content was rising at the time of the blood withdrawal; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction because the state presented no evidence extrapolating his .12% test result back to the time he was driving. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Robert Johnson, was found guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court of forgery and was sentenced to six years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contests evidentiary rulings of the trial court and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Concluding that the appellant's arguments have no merit, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Robert Dallis Payne, appeals the order of the Hickman County Circuit Court summarily dismissing his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record before this Court, we conclude that the Appellant has failed to perfect his application for permission to appeal in accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

The defendants, Leon J. Robins and Tabatha R. White, both were convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In their appeals, they argue that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their convictions for first degree murder; the trial court should have instructed as to the lesser offenses of voluntary manslaughter and facilitation to commit voluntary manslaughter; evidence of a photographic lineup was improperly admitted; and the trial court improperly admitted Robins' mugshots as exhibits and improperly limited the cross-examination of a prosecution witness as to prior bad acts. Based upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Jerry Lee Miller, Sr. appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's imposition of incarcerative sentencing for his effective five-year sentence for two counts of statutory rape. Miller pleaded guilty to the offenses as a Range II offender, and the manner of service of the sentence was reserved for the lower court's determination. Miller posits on appeal that he should have been afforded a sentence involving either split confinement or straight probation. We disagree, however, and affirm.

The petitioner, Gabriel Bryan Baggett, pled guilty to second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, receiving sentences of fifty years and twenty-five years, respectively, at 100%. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas of guilty were involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and this appeal followed. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The petitioner, Delbert Lee Harris, was convicted in the Dickson County Circuit Court of aggravated assault, rape, rape of a child, and attempted sexual battery. The petitioner was ultimately sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, complaining that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that several errors occurred during trial. The postconviction court partially granted the petition and dismissed the remainder of the petitioner’s issues.  The petitioner and the State timely appealed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in all respects except for the dismissal of the rape conviction.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant of robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years' incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury by failing to limit the definition of "property" in its instruction to the jury; (2) that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence at the sentencing hearing a transcript of a prior trial; and (3) that his sentence is excessive. Finding no error by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The appellant, Darrell W. Smith, pled guilty in the Franklin County Circuit Court to evading arrest and operating a motor vehicle in violation of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act, both Class E felonies. The parties agreed that the appellant would be sentenced on each conviction to one year and one day with the sentences to be served consecutively. The manner of service of the sentences was to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the appellant to serve 120 days in the county jail, with the balance of the sentences to be served in the community corrections program. On appeal, the appellant challenges the period of confinement. After reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's upholding of the district attorney general's denial of her application for pretrial diversion. She argues that the district attorney general erred in not considering all required factors in the diversion denial and the trial court erred in taking testimony, upon which it relied in upholding the denial of diversion. Based upon our review, we reverse the order of the trial court denying pretrial diversion and remand for a reconsideration by the district attorney general of the defendant's diversion application.

The defendant's probation was revoked after his house was searched and a twelve-gauge shotgun was found inside. The defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to revoke his probation. The defendant contends the rules of probation and a police report were improperly admitted into evidence. Because the trial court is only required to find a violation of probation by a preponderance of the evidence, we affirm the trial court's revocation of probation.

An Obion County grand jury indicted the defendant, Justin Genel Hill, of two counts of first degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. In a separate indictment, Clarence Carnell Gaston, Miqwon Deon Leach, and Mario Deangelo Thomas were also charged with crimes arising out of the same criminal episode. The defendant and these three men were tried in a single jury trial. The jury found Gaston, Leach, and Thomas guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, second degree murder, and first degree felony murder and found the defendant guilty of facilitation to commit second degree murder. See State v. Clarence Carnell Gaston, No. W2001-02046-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 261941, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Feb. 7, 2003). For the defendant's conviction, the trial court sentenced him to serve a ten-year sentence in the Department of Corrections. The defendant now brings this appeal of his conviction, alleging that the evidence introduced at trial is insufficient to support his conviction. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we find that the defendant's allegation lacks merit and accordingly affirm the defendant's conviction.