APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Donnie W. Foulks, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court, citing Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202(c) (1997), determined that the petitioner had previously filed a petition for post-conviction relief and was therefore precluded from seeking relief in a second proceeding. Concluding that the post-conviction court failed to consider that the petitioner's first post-conviction petition was not resolved on the merits, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, a former employee of the Shelby County Criminal Court Clerk's office, pled guilty to two counts of public servant accepting a bribe, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-102, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of three years on each count, but suspended all but ninety days of the sentence, to be served on weekends at the county workhouse. The defendant was also placed on probation for three years, ordered to perform 300 hours of community service, and assessed a $1000 fine for each count. She argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her judicial diversion or full probation. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant seeks appellate review of his motion to clarify the prior judgments of the trial court. We dismiss the appeal because the record does not reflect any order of the trial court concerning the motion.

As a result of his guilty plea to one count of attempted rape of a child, the appellant, Steven D. Fish, was sentenced to eight years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with thirty days to be served in confinement and the balance served on supervised probation. After the appellant began serving his probationary sentence, a probation violation warrant was issued. Subsequent to a probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that the appellant had violated the terms of his probation and ordered the appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant alleges that the trial court erred in revoking his probation. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court directing the clerk of that court to apply the defendant's funds, which were obtained through an attachment directed to the Metro Trustee, to the defendant's fines and court costs. We conclude the state improperly sought to enjoin enforcement of the chancery court's order relating to the distribution of these funds by seeking an injunction in the criminal court. We further conclude the funds were held by the Metro Trustee in custodia legis for the chancery court and were not subject to attachment.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the criminal court.

With all due respect to my colleagues, I must dissent. After review of the record, I find that the Davidson County Chancery Court never obtained jurisdiction of the approximately $102,000 seized by the Drug Task Force and deposited with the Metro Trustee. The following chronological history is critical to this finding:

The Sullivan County Grand Jury charged the defendant with one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver and with two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant subsequently entered an Alford plea to one count of possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and to one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense and ordered that the sentences run consecutively. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the defendant serve his sentence for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance in the county jail followed by service of his sentence for possession of drug paraphernalia on supervised probation. The defendant appeals the denial of alternative sentencing with regard to his sentence for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance. Finding no error in the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant pled guilty to three Class C felony drug offenses. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for each offense and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively for an effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the lengths, the manner of service, and the consecutive nature of the sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant appeals his conviction by a jury for the offense of arson and the resulting five-year sentence. The issues presented for our review are: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing an investigator to testify as an expert in arson investigation; (3) whether the trial court erred in not dismissing the indictment based upon the state's failure to provide proper discovery; and (4) whether the trial court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement factor. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Erwin Scott Patterson, entered pleas of guilt to three counts of vehicular assault, reckless endangerment, and violation of the driver's license law. A charge of driving under the influence of an intoxicant was dismissed. The trial court imposed a sentence of four years for one count of vehicular assault, two years for the remaining vehicular assault convictions, two years for reckless endangerment, and 30 days for violation of the driver's license law. An application for alternative sentencing was denied. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the four-year sentence for vehicular assault was excessive and that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. The judgments are affirmed as modified.

The defendant contests his conviction and sentence for aggravated sexual battery. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the seven-year-old victim was competent to testify, venue was properly established, proper chain of custody for the DNA evidence was established, and the amendment of the indictment was proper. Accordingly, we affirm the defendant's conviction. A review of the defendant's sentence reveals the trial court misapplied enhancing factor (8). There being two enhancing factors and one mitigating factor applicable to the defendant's sentence, the judgment is modified from the maximum of twelve years to eleven years.

James L. Carrethers appeals his second-degree murder conviction. He was found guilty of that offense by a Davidson County Jury. He is presently serving an eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction for the crime. In this direct appeal, he claims that the evidence does not sufficiently support the conviction and that the lower court erred in denying a motion to suppress his inculpatory, pretrial statements. Because we are unconvinced of error in either respect, we affirm.

The Appellant, Michael George Medina, appeals his conviction by a Smith County jury finding him guilty of first-degree murder. On appeal, Medina challenges (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, as it relates to the element of premeditation, and (2) the trial court's ruling which he asserts interfered with the defense's order of proof, thus, "forcing a premature election on defendant's right to testify." After review, we find no error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He was originally convicted of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery and received an effective life sentence. He now contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his jury trial. We conclude otherwise and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Clayton Eugene Turner, brings this appeal from the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The Defendant was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, incest, and assault. He argues two issues in this appeal: (1) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and (2) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant's post-conviction request for the appointment of experts in the fields of DNA analysis and the transmission of infectious diseases. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jonathan Thornton, was convicted of one count of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and one count of theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of two years and 11 months and 29 days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and (3) that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. Because the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence, the defendant's sentence is modified to a sentence of split confinement with nine months to be served in confinement and the balance to be served on probation.

The petitioner, Natasha W. Cornett, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. The issues presented for our review are (1) whether the petitioner properly waived her right to a jury trial at sentencing; (2) whether her guilty pleas to three counts of first degree murder, one count of attempted first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of theft over $1,000 were knowingly and voluntarily entered; and (3) whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The Williamson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant for one count of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine for resale, a Class B felony, and for one count of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine and marijuana obtained during his arrest, alleging that the search of his car was unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. A Williamson County jury convicted the defendant of the charged offenses. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the cocaine and marijuana obtained pursuant to his arrest. Concluding that the search of the defendant's car was constitutional, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief concerning petitioner's conviction for aggravated kidnapping. The sole issue in this appeal is whether the petitioner was deprived of effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel, during the trial of the case, "opened the door" to the state's introduction of evidence of defendant's prior arrests. We agree with the post-conviction court's finding that petitioner failed to establish prejudice; thus, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.