APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, John Earl Scales, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder with a concurrent three-year term for the attempted aggravated robbery conviction. On direct appeal this Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. State v. John Earl Scales, No. 01C01-9709-CR-00412 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville Feb. 24, 1999), 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 168, at *28. On November 20, 2000, Scales filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On December 19, 2000, the post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. From that dismissal the appellant perfected the instant appeal. We find that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing the appellant's claims regarding the alleged ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel on the grounds of waiver or previous determination. Moreover, we find that the post-conviction court's order indicating that such allegations do not state "colorable claims" does not set forth with sufficient specificity the court's findings with regard to the allegations concerning the alleged ineffectiveness of appellate counsel. We therefore remand this case for entry of an appropriate order in accordance with this opinion.

Defendant, Robert Andrew Lewis, pled guilty to two counts of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, first offense, in the General Sessions Court of Knox County. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of confinement for 11 months and 29 days, with all but 10 days of the sentences suspended. In addition, the trial court suspended Defendant's driving privileges for one year, and ordered him to pay a fine of $350.00 and attend DUI school. Within one year, a violation of probation warrant was issued, alleging that Defendant was driving on a revoked license, arrested for DUI, and had failed to complete DUI school. The General Sessions Court of Knox County revoked Defendant's probation and reinstated his sentences for both offenses. Defendant appealed to the Criminal Court of Knox County. On the date that his case was to be heard, Defendant's trial counsel did not appear in court. As a result, the criminal court dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute and affirmed the judgment of the Knox County General Sessions Court revoking Defendant's probation. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the criminal court and remand this case for a de novo hearing on the probation revocation warrant.

Petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, petitioner alleges (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, (3) he was unconstitutionally denied bail, and (4) the indictment against him for first degree murder was unconstitutionally amended. We grant petitioner a delayed appeal, and we stay further proceedings on his remaining post-conviction claims.

The appellant, Christopher Lynn Brabson, was convicted by a jury in the McMinn County Criminal Court of one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The jury also assessed a fine of $80,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant alleges: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred in sentencing, and (3) the jury imposed an excessive fine. We affirm the judgment of the trial court but reduce the fine to $25,000.

The Sevier County Grand Jury returned a two count presentment alleging the defendant committed a vehicular homicide by intoxication for the death of one victim and a vehicular assault by intoxication for the serious bodily injury of another victim. The defendant pled guilty to the amended charges of vehicular homicide by recklessness and aggravated assault by recklessness for agreed concurrent sentences of six years and three years, respectively, with the issue of alternative sentencing to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced the defendant to split confinement and ordered the defendant to serve nine months "day-for-day" in the county jail with the remainder of his six-year effective sentence on supervised probation. In this appeal, the defendant alleges he should have received community corrections, or alternatively, he received excessive confinement. We conclude the trial court improperly ordered the defendant to serve his nine months of confinement "day-for-day," thereby depriving him of the opportunity to earn good conduct credits. We remand for deletion of the day-for-day requirement; however, we affirm the trial court in all other respects.

A Hamilton County jury found the defendant guilty of DUI, third offense. On appeal, the sole issue is whether the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant to present testimony from a local health department nurse regarding the health department's procedures for storing and transporting blood samples, which are procured by the local health department for reasons unrelated to blood alcohol testing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On October 19, 2000, the Defendant entered "best interest" guilty pleas to two counts of child abuse and neglect and three counts of indecent exposure. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received five sentences of 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75%. The plea agreement apparently contemplated a hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a split sentence on the first count with three months to be served on county work release and the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. The court ordered each of the remaining sentences to be served on probation and consecutive to the split sentence, for an effective sentence of five years. It is from this order the Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Terry DeWayne Ogle, indicted for one count of aggravated assault, was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Janet Huffine Dykes, was convicted by a jury of one count of reckless aggravated assault and one count of aggravated child abuse through neglect. The trial court merged the assault conviction into the child abuse conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I standard offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals as of right, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in support of her convictions. We find the evidence is not sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction of aggravated child abuse through neglect and therefore reverse that conviction. We find the evidence sufficient to support the reckless aggravated assault conviction, and affirm that conviction. Because the Defendant was not sentenced for reckless aggravated assault, we remand this case for sentencing on the Defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault.

The defendant was convicted of two counts of rape of a child pursuant to a jury trial. He was charged with a total of four counts of rape of a child, with two counts per indictment. The trial court consolidated these two indictments for trial. However, the trial court dismissed one indictment due to certain improprieties that occurred during the testimony of one of the victims. For the aforementioned convictions, the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve an aggregate sentence of forty years, which was comprised of two consecutive twenty-year sentences. The defendant now brings the instant appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the defendant's conviction, the trial court's decision to consolidate the defendant's two indictments, and the trial court's failure to declare a mistrial at the close of the prosecutor's closing argument. After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court improperly consolidated the two indictments for trial and therefore reverse and remand this case for a new trial.

A Davidson County grand jury indicted the defendant on one count of class A felony aggravated child abuse. A trial jury subsequently convicted him as charged. For this conviction the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to serve twenty-one years. He next unsuccessfully pursued a motion for a judgment of acquittal or in the alternative a new trial. Through this appeal the defendant continues to assert that the trial court erred in not properly instructing the jury on lesser-included offenses and by admitting contested medical testimony. While the second contention merits no relief, we must reverse the conviction and remand the matter based upon error in instructing lesser-included offenses.

Appellant, Gregory Thompson, was convicted for the first degree murder of Brenda Lane. The murder occurred on January 1, 1985. The jury imposed the death penalty. Our supreme court affirmed the conviction and sentence of death. State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239 (Tenn. 1989). Appellant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was denied by the trial court, and the trial court's denial was subsequently affirmed by our Court. Thompson v. State, 958 S.W.2d 156 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). Later, in 2001, Appellant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court dismissed without an evidentiary hearing because it was filed after expiration of the applicable one-year statute of limitations. This appeal followed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder and one count of possession of a prohibited weapon. The Defendant now appeals, asserting that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, we find no error and thus affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant of three counts of rape of a child and of two counts of rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-three years for each rape of a child conviction and to ten years for each rape conviction. All sentences were to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-three years. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that the trial court erred by not severing the offenses involving different victims, (2) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict the Defendant of the charged offenses, and (3) that the cumulative error during the proceedings deprived the Defendant of a fair trial and due process of law. Concluding that the trial court's failure to sever the offenses was error and that the error was not harmless, we reverse the judgments of the trial court, sever the offenses by victim, and remand for new trials.

The Appellant, Maurice Lashaun Nash, appeals his conviction by a Tipton County jury for facilitation of possession of marijuana, a schedule VI controlled substance, with intent to deliver, a class A misdemeanor. On appeal, Nash raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, and (2) whether the evidence in the record is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction. After a review of the record, we find plain error in the trial court's instruction to the jury charging the offense of facilitation, as this lesser offense was not fairly raised by the evidence. Accordingly, Nash's conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial upon the lesser offense of class A simple possession.

The petitioner, Gregory Fuller, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his felony cocaine possession conviction and resulting fifteen-year sentence. He contends that the trial court erred in denying relief, claiming that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a continuance. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellants, Robert Lee Goss and Carl W. Hale, were convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of first-degree murder and aggravated assault. They appeal as of right the judgment of the Lauderdale County Circuit Court denying their petitions for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Appellants argue that trial counsel were ineffective because they did not pursue a defense of insanity and/or diminished capacity. After review of the record, we find that the Appellants received the effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Marc A. Bland, appeals as of right the Lauderdale County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He contends that his judgments of conviction are void due to illegal sentences contained therein. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Chad Daniel Easterly, pled guilty to kidnapping and evading arrest. The plea agreement included an effective eight year sentence as a Range I standard offender. The Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his convictions were the result of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Giovanny Morpeau, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Wilson County Criminal Court. On November 2, 2001, the Appellant was arrested and charged with aggravated robbery. At the Appellant's initial appearance in the general sessions court on November 6, 2001, he was found indigent, bail was set at $50,000, and a preliminary hearing was scheduled for December 19, 2001. On November 29, 2001, the Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from confinement upon grounds that his continued confinement beyond ten days, without being afforded a preliminary hearing, violated Rule 5(d) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 On November 30, 2001, the Appellant’s habeas corpus petition was denied. On December 10, 2001, the Appellant filed notice of appeal. On December 19, 2001, the Appellant's preliminary hearing was conducted in the general sessions court at which time he was bound over to the next term of the grand jury. During the January 2002 session of the Wilson County Criminal Court, the Appellant was indicted by the grand jury on one count of aggravated robbery.

The defendant pled guilty to two counts of Class D felony theft over $1,000 and was sentenced to the community corrections program for an effective period of three years. The trial court subsequently revoked his community corrections sentence and resentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of four years on each count as a Range I standard offender, for an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends (1) the proof was insufficient to revoke his community corrections sentence; and (2) the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.