APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, Estevenico Chandler, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated criminal trespass and theft of property and was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of eleven months and twentynine days on unsupervised probation. Following a hearing on a violation of probation warrant, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of the two consecutive sentences in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Louis Bernard Williams, III, was convicted of felony evidence tampering, a Class C felony, and three respective counts of simple possession of marijuana, cocaine, and hydrocodone, Class A misdemeanors. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-503, -17-408, -17-415, -17-418. On appeal, the pro se Defendant contends that (1) his residence was improperly searched because the search warrant listed the incorrect address; (2) the evidence obtained in that search should be retroactively suppressed because the Defendant was not convicted of the offense alleged in the search warrant; (3) the evidence should have been suppressed because the confidential informant referenced in the search warrant affidavit was not identified and did not testify at trial; and (4) the trial court should have recused itself due to showing bias against the Defendant by denying his motion to suppress and the court’s imposition of an incorrect release eligibility in two previous cases. We affirm.

I concur in Judge McMullen’s opinion and only write separately to respectfully address Judge Holloway’s view expressed in his dissenting opinion that the trial court need not establish installment terms for the payment of restitution for the judgment to be complete and final.

Defendant, Delvon J. White, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence of incarceration in two cases, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not either reinstating his probation or ordering a sentence of split confinement followed by modified conditions of probation to address his mental health and substance abuse. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Johnny Summers Cavin, entered guilty pleas to burglary and theft of property valued more than $2,500 but less than $10,000. He also entered guilty pleas to unrelated charges from a separate case. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent sentences of two years and six months each on supervised probation, to be served consecutively to the sentences he received in an unrelated probation violation case. In a subsequent restitution hearing, the trial court ordered him to pay a total of $5,500 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to impose restitution and that, alternatively, the trial court erred in setting the restitution amount at $5,500, asserting that the victim’s pecuniary loss was not substantiated by evidence and that the amount is unreasonable based on the Defendant’s income. Upon review, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of the instant case, and the appeal is dismissed.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that this court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of this case.

The Defendant, Destiny Hall, was convicted at trial of evading arrest through the use of a motor vehicle, and she received a
one-year sentence, suspended to probation supervised by community corrections after service of thirty days in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Deon Smith, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, auto burglary, and theft, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Meredith Muse Thompson, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to making a false police report, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-16-502 (2018).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years’ probation.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Donte R. Swainer, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2018 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court improperly determined that the petition was time-barred.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Harry Pearson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, were convicted of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder and received life sentences on each count. On appeal, they raise the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support their convictions, specifically whether the co-defendant’s testimony was reliable and sufficiently corroborated; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s Ferguson violation by failing to preserve the photographic lineups shown to the witnesses and the co-defendant’s cell phone taken upon his arrest; (3) whether the trial court erred by not granting a new trial because the State committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose all inconsistent statements made by the co-defendant during proffer sessions; (4) whether the trial court committed error when it sua sponte prohibited the introduction of the printout of the co-defendant’s message to his girlfriend implicating himself in the murders, and in so doing, made an improper comment on the evidence; and (5) whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury by including the language “or either of them” throughout the jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusions that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Defendant Laronda Turner’s convictions and that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by co-defendant Demarco Hawkins. Because the record shows that Hawkins’ accomplice testimony implicating Defendant Turner was not sufficiently corroborated, I believe that Defendant Turner’s three convictions for first degree premeditated murder should be reversed and that these charges should be dismissed. In addition, because the record demonstrates that the State violated Brady in failing to disclose the inconsistent statements made by Hawkins during several proffer sessions with the prosecution prior to trial, I am of the opinion that the trial court erred in denying a new trial to both Defendant Turner and Defendant Thomas on this basis. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the trial court, dismiss the charges against Defendant Turner, and remand the case for a new trial for Defendant Thomas.

The Defendant, William Jesse Clouse, pleaded guilty in the Putnam County Criminal Court to three counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-106 (2018) (subsequently amended).  The trial court imposed an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for split confinement.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

The Defendant-Appellant, Anthony Eugene Reed, was convicted by a Sequatchie County jury of theft of property valued over $10,000, to wit: a Jeep Wrangler, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103, and sentenced to seven years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for theft because the State failed to establish his intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property; and (2) the prosecution made improper comments during closing arguments which indirectly commented on his decision not to testify in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cassius Dominique Ivory, appeals his Rutherford County Circuit Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, arguing that the State failed to disclose a preferential agreement with a witness, that the State failed to produce certain pretrial statements, that the trial court failed to merge certain offenses, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions.  Because the record establishes that the State did not fail to disclose a preferential agreement or pretrial statements, the trial court properly merged the offenses, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Lawrence County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Simon Dean Porter, for aggravated rape of a child and aggravated child abuse of his sixteen-month-old son. A jury convicted the Defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eighty-five years. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-531, 39-15-402(a)(1). On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) proof connecting him to these offenses; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Monroe County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Robert Charles Atkins, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced the Appellant to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, contending that the State failed to establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime or, in the alternative, that he acted with premeditation. The Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing a State’s witness to testify regarding threats he received prior to trial to explain his nervous demeanor in court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Clark Derrick Frazier, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Terrance B. Smith, appeals the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he challenged his life sentence resulting from his first degree murder conviction for an offense that occurred in 1998. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 2012, the Defendant, David Herl, entered a guilty plea to theft of property valued over $1,000, and he received a sentence of four years, suspended to probation. On July 2, 2013, a warrant was issued, alleging that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation. The warrant was not served on the Defendant until September 18, 2020. The Defendant moved to dismiss the prosecution, asserting that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The trial court refused to dismiss the proceedings, found the Defendant to have violated the terms of his probation, and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the charges. We conclude that the Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Robert Brooks, was convicted of reckless endangerment, aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of assault. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment to be served consecutively to Defendant’s effective ten-year sentence for aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated assault, and assault. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery and that the trial court erred by denying his peremptory challenge to strike Juror 7. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Corey Paul Terry, pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary in 2010, two counts of aggravated burglary in 2011, and tampering with evidence in 2018. Due to various prior probation violations, the Defendant was serving an effective six years on probation for all the offenses in 2019 when he was charged with violating his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated the terms of his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court lacked substantial evidence to find that he violated the conditions of his probation and that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him to confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Banks, pleaded guilty to first degree murder and aggravated cruelty to animals, and he received an effective life sentence. He filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, asserting that his life sentence is illegal because it is equivalent to a sentence of life without parole or a sentence of death. The trial court summarily denied relief, and the Defendant appeals. Because the Defendant did not raise a colorable claim for relief under Rule 36.1, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.