APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Terrance Deshone Kinnie, was convicted of second degree murder. After a sentencing hearing the Defendant was sentenced to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Stanley Dotson, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to first degree felony murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. He contends that his guilty plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel in that his trial attorneys (1) failed to challenge statements that the petitioner gave to the police incident to his illegal arrest; (2) failed to challenge statements that the petitioner gave to the police while he was being illegally detained; (3) failed to challenge statements that the petitioner gave to the police involuntarily; and (4) failed to investigate and develop an alibi defense. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Evelyn C. Bostic, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of facilitation of possession of more than .5 gram of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant specifically reserved a certified question of law regarding the sufficiency of the affidavit underlying the search warrant issued in this case. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the appellant's conviction.

This is a Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order sustaining in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police. The defendant, who is totally deaf, is charged with first degree murder and aggravated arson. On the morning after the residential fire that claimed the victim's life, a deputy sheriff entered the defendant's home, tapped him on the shoulder to awaken him, and asked, via gestures and a written note, that the defendant accompany him to the sheriff's department for questioning. Investigators at the department interviewed the defendant and took his statement through an interpreter of American Sign Language. The defendant argued that the statement should be suppressed on two grounds: (1) that it was the fruit of an unlawful seizure, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) that it was taken without adequate Miranda warnings, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Finding that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the deputy to the sheriff's department, but that he was in custody at the department and that the State failed to prove that he had been given an adequate Miranda warning, the trial court denied the motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, but granted it on Fifth Amendment grounds. The State appeals that portion of the trial court's order sustaining the motion on Fifth Amendment grounds, and the defendant appeals that portion of the order denying the motion on Fourth Amendment grounds. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a bench trial, the appellant, Randall P. Baker, was convicted of one count of failure to appear, a class E felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a career offender to six years incarceration. On appeal, the appellant contests the trial court's order mandating that his sentence be served consecutively to another sentence not yet served. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises out of a series of armed robberies of gas stations in several counties along Interstate 40. The Defendant, John George, and two codefendants were arrested in Humphreys County, Tennessee. The Defendant gave a statement to police after his arrest confessing his role in robberies in both Humphreys and Dickson counties. Subsequently, the Defendant pled guilty to a charge of aggravated robbery in Humphreys County and was sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. In the case before us, the Defendant also entered a guilty plea to aggravated robbery and felony theft arising out of a robbery in Dickson County. After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to nine years for the aggravated robbery and four years for the felony theft to be served concurrently. However, the trial court ordered the sentence to be served consecutively to the Defendant's sentence for aggravated robbery in Humphreys County. The Defendant now appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court. The Defendant contends that the trial court (1) improperly imposed a sentence above the minimum and (2) improperly ordered that the sentence for aggravated robbery to be served consecutively to the Humphreys County sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court setting the length of the sentences for aggravated robbery and theft. We remand for further proceedings on the consecutive sentence issue.

The Petitioner pleaded guilty to felony possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine for the purpose of sale and delivery, a Class C felony, and to violating the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender's Act, a Class E felony. For the felony possession conviction, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range III, persistent offender to ten years incarceration to be served at forty-five percent. For the motor vehicle habitual offender conviction, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II, multiple offender to three years incarceration to be served at thirty-five percent. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently, but consecutive to sentences for four prior convictions. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that his plea was constitutionally defective because he was inadequately represented and that his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently entered. The trial court denied relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of the second-degree murder of his wife, Imja Xhaferi, the defendant, Drini D. Xhaferi, appeals and claims the trial court erred in not instructing the jury as to voluntary manslaughter, in not suppressing evidence seized by military authorities, and in admitting evidence of the defendant's prior assaults of the victim. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael W. Cooper, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of aggravated assault. His plea agreement provided that he would be sentenced as a Range II offender; however, the length and manner of service of his sentences were left for the trial court's determination. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years incarceration for each offense, to be served consecutively. The Defendant now appeals, contending that the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor; that the trial court erred in sentencing him to equivalent terms for each offense in spite of finding fewer enhancement factors applicable to the aggravated assault; and that the trial court erred in ordering his sentences to run consecutively. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alfio Orlando Lewis, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of attempted second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two aggravated assault convictions into the two attempted second degree murder convictions. The Defendant was sentenced to 12 years to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction on each of the attempted second degree murder convictions for an effective sentence of 24 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) the trial court erroneously prevented him from testifying that a fellow inmate confessed to the crime, and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On June 23, 1999, the defendant, Vinson Taylor, pled guilty to the sale of cocaine in excess of .5 grams, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years. Almost ten months later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal from an order denying post-conviction relief, this court granted a delayed appeal based upon the failure of trial counsel to file a timely appeal. Vinson Taylor v. State, No. W2000-01991-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2001). In this delayed appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court should have granted alternative sentencing. The judgment is affirmed.

On June 23, 1999, the defendant, Vinson Taylor, pled guilty to the sale of cocaine in excess of .5 grams, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years. Almost ten months later, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal from an order denying post-conviction relief, this court granted a delayed appeal based upon the failure of trial counsel to file a timely appeal. Vinson Taylor v. State, No. W2000-01991-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2001). In this delayed appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court should have granted alternative sentencing. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court's denying him post-conviction relief from his 1998 conviction for the attempt to commit aggravated assault and ensuing twelve-year sentence as a career offender. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the conviction.

After a lengthy trial, a Rutherford County jury found the defendant, Kenneth Paul Dykas, guilty of first-degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery. Following a separate penalty trial on the first-degree murder conviction, the same jury sentenced the defendant to life without the possibility of parole, and the trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to eleven years on the conspiracy conviction and as a violent offender to 24 years on the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial-court- imposed sentences were ordered to run concurrently with one another but consecutively to the first- degree murder sentence. In this appeal, the defendant complains that the evidence is insufficient, that numerous errors in the jury selection process taint his convictions, that DNA test results were improperly admitted, that the state suppressed exculpatory evidence about its jailhouse informant who testified at trial, and that consecutive sentencing was not justified. After a comprehensive review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Frederick G. Anderson appeals his convictions of two counts of attempted aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary. He received his convictions at the conclusion of a jury trial in the Davidson County Criminal Court. Presently serving an effective nine-year sentence as a violent offender, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence in this appeal. Because we are unpersuaded by the defendant's claims, we affirm.

The defendant pled guilty to burglary (Count One), theft (Count Two), and vandalism (Count Three) and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to two (2) years for Count One and eleven months and twenty-nine days for both Count Two and Count Three. Counts Two and Three were to be served concurrently but consecutively to Count One. The judgment forms entered for each count indicated that the defendant was to receive 201 days of pretrial jail credit. Sixteen months after the final judgments were entered, the state moved the trial court to correct the original judgments pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. Thereafter, corrected judgments were entered for Counts Two and Three indicating that the defendant was to receive 0 days pretrial jail credit on those counts. Generally, a trial court loses jurisdiction to amend a judgment once it becomes final. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not make a finding as to whether there was a clerical mistake or mistake of law in the original judgments. Absent a finding that there was a clerical mistake, the trial court was without jurisdiction to alter the final judgments. Therefore, we reverse the judgments as corrected and remand to the trial court for determination of whether there was a clerical error in the original judgments.

Mario Ricky Orlando Printis appeals from his convictions of driving under the influence and evading arrest. He questions the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed Class D felony evading arrest, as opposed to the Class E form of that crime, and he complains that the trial court sentenced him too harshly. Because we are unpersuaded, we affirm the convictions and sentences imposed. Due to an omission from the DUI judgment form, however, we modify that judgment to correspond with the lower court's pronouncements at the sentencing hearing.

In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, he illegally pled guilty to second degree murder, and his guilty plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily. The trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm.

The petitioner was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. In his petition for post-conviction relief, he asserted that trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, following a hearing.  We affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Defendant was convicted of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine. On appeal, defendant submits that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and the trial court erred in not charging the jury on facilitation. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to uphold the conviction, and defendant was not entitled to an instruction on facilitation. We affirm.

The Defendant was indicted for two counts of promoting prostitution and for two counts of patronizing prostitution. Following a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempting to patronize prostitution, a Class C misdemeanor; sentenced to thirty days suspended; and fined $50.00 for each count. The Defendant now appeals, arguing the following: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) that the conduct by law enforcement in this case was so outrageous as to constitute a defense; (3) that a fatal variance exists between the indicted charges and the evidence presented at trial; (4) that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the audio and video tape evidence that was introduced at trial; and (5) that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's motion to seal the audio and video tape evidence in this case. Concluding that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charges against the Defendant.