APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Deadrick Pigg, was convicted in the Criminal Court of Davidson County of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine.¹ After a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced to serve eight years in the Department of Correction. In his appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict because the verdict was based solely on uncorroborated accomplice testimony and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach the Defendant with evidence of past convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant appeals from a bench trial where he was found guilty of one count of assault and one count of aggravated assault. Sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction of aggravated assault. The ineffective assistance of counsel claim is wholly unsubstantiated. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.

This matter is before us on the court’s own motion to correct errors associated with entries of an order on rehearing, opinion and judgment on October 15, 2001. A brief procedural history is in order to understand the basis for the court’s action in the instant order. On July 11, 2001, this court entered an opinion and judgment in this case. The defendant thereafter moved for rehearing, and we granted his motion on August 14, 2001. On October 15, 2001, we entered an order which addressed the merits of the defendant’s rehearing issue. That order also contained the following language, “The judgment previously entered is WITHDRAWN and is RE-ENTERED as of the entry of this order.” (Emphasis in original.) Although that order directed the withdrawal and reentry of the judgment, both the opinion and the judgment of July 11 were withdrawn and reentered on that date. The withdrawal and reentry of the opinion was in error. Moreover, that erroneous action prompted the accrual of additional costs.

The defendant, Tony Williams, appeals the trial court's denial of pretrial diversion after a petition for certiorari from the decision of the district attorney. In this discretionary appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the single issue presented for review is whether the denial of pretrial diversion qualified as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion. The judgment denying relief is affirmed.

Petitioner appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following his guilty plea to second degree murder for which he received a sentence of 15 years. He contends his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, and he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state contends the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. We conclude the petition was barred by the statute of limitations and is otherwise without merit. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for theft of property valued less than $1000 but greater than $500, a Class E felony, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was indicted for premeditated first degree murder, convicted of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder, and sentenced to 25 years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant alleges: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the state failed to provide him with exculpatory evidence; (3) the state destroyed evidence, thereby depriving him of due process; and (4) the trial court erroneously failed to grant a continuance or mistrial when a witness became ill and was unavailable to testify. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles Mitchell, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree murder and resulting sentence of life without parole. First, he contends that his mental condition prevented him from knowingly and intelligently entering his guilty plea. Second, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense attorneys (1) did not seek to suppress statements that the petitioner gave to police soon after he murdered his wife; (2) did not use diminished mental capacity in his defense; (3) induced him to plead guilty by telling him that the state had filed a notice to seek the death penalty when no such notice had been filed; and (4) failed to request a more detailed mental evaluation of him. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition.

The defendant was convicted by a jury on one count of sale of marijuana, a Class E felony, and one count of possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the sale of marijuana conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted rebuttal testimony regarding an undisclosed, out-of-court statement made by the defendant; and (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on simple possession of marijuana as a lesser-included offense. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude (1) the evidence is sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) the failure of the state to disclose the out-of-court statement made during the defendant's interrogation violated Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A); and (3) the trial court erroneously failed to instruct the jury on simple possession of marijuana as a lesser-included offense. The conviction for sale of marijuana is reversed; the conviction for possession of cocaine is affirmed; and this matter is remanded for a new trial on the sale of marijuana.

The Appellant, Billy Joe Henderson, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief without the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. Henderson is currently serving a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction pursuant to his 1998 conviction for first degree murder. Following a review of the record, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition. Because Henderson in part states a "colorable claim," the case is remanded for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing.

The Appellant, Scott Bradley Price, was convicted of child rape, a class A felony, following a Knox County jury trial. The trial court sentenced Price, as a range I offender, to twenty-one (21) years in the Department of Correction. In his sole issue on appeal, Price argues that the trial court erred in the length of sentence because the mitigating factors outweighed the enhancement factors and, therefore, his sentence should have been reduced below the midpoint range of twenty (20) years. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael T. Meghreblian, is serving a seven and one-half year sentence in the Department of Correction as a result of his Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of aggravated assault. On appeal, he complains that the trial court erred (1) in determining the length of his Range II sentence and (2) in denying any form of alternative sentence. Because the record supports the trial court's determinations, we affirm.

The petitioner, Bryan Hanley, was convicted by a jury in the Hickman County Circuit Court of one count of first degree murder and one count of theft of property over $1000. The petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the murder conviction and to three years incarceration for the theft conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a post-conviction petition alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In May of 1993, the Appellant, Bobby Vincent Blackmon, was indicted by a Sumner County grand jury for one count of class A felony possession of cocaine over 300 grams stemming from his involvement in a "reverse sting" drug operation. He was subsequently convicted in February of 1995. In 1998, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Blackmon a new trial. See State v. Bobby Vincent Blackmon, 984 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1998).

In November of 1999, Blackmon was re-tried and again convicted of the offense of possession with the intent to sell over 300 grams of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing on May 17, 2000, the trial court sentenced Blackmon to thirty-eight years as a Range II offender and ordered his sentence be served consecutive to a prior first-degree murder conviction.

On appeal, the following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether Blackmon was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow Blackmon to assert an "outrageous government conduct" defense, an entrapment defense and/or an impossibility defense; (3) whether the indictment in this case was fatally defective; and (4) whether the sentence was excessive. After review, we find no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence is affirmed.

The Defendant, Oscar Gomez, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and theft under five hundred dollars. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to a concurrent term of six months for the theft. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence of premeditated murder is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner,Wayne Miles, appeals as of right from the trial court's dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner argues that he is being illegally detained because his convictions are void. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

The petitioner, Oudon Panyanouvong, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. After the appointment of post-conviction counsel,the petitioner expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney and ultimately refused to proceed with the evidentiary hearing. The issue is whether the trial court's summary dismissal was erroneous. Because the petitioner was not afforded the opportunity to proceed pro se and was not specifically admonished of the perils of pro se representation, the judgment of dismissal is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

I concur in the majority opinion, except I question whether a post-conviction petitioner has a right to self-representation at his or her will. In this respect, I view this court’s statements in Cole v. State, 798 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), regarding a common law right to self-representation as dicta; self-representation was certainly not an issue in the appeal.

The defendant appeals his conviction of violating the motor vehicle habitual offender law. Because we find that his motor vehicle offender status was terminated before he was discovered driving a motor vehicle, we conclude that the convicting evidence was insufficient. We reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

J.D. Landers appeals from the Perry County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He seeks to set aside his conviction and guilty plea because he was not provided the effective assistance of counsel and did not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently enter his guilty plea. Because the trial court properly dismissed the petition, we affirm.

The Defendant, Burita A. Winebarger, was charged in an arrest warrant with the offense of theft of property less than $500.00 in value. She pled guilty to the offense in the General Sessions Court of Sullivan County. The General Sessions Court sentenced her to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days, with all but thirty days suspended. Defendant filed a timely appeal to the Criminal Court of Sullivan County. On the date that the case was set for "announcement" in criminal court, Defendant was approximately one hour late in arriving at court. The criminal court dismissed the appeal for "failure to prosecute" and remanded the case to the General Sessions Court of Sullivan County for "execution of the sentence." The Defendant filed a timely appeal to this court. After a review of the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the criminal court and remand for a sentencing hearing de novo.

Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI"), fourth or subsequent offense, driving while license revoked, and child endangerment. In this appeal, Defendant challenges all convictions on the ground that the trial court's refusal to bifurcate the trial proceedings violated her right to a fair trial. Defendant also argues that recently amended Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a)(1) is unconstitutional and that her sentence is excessive. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse Defendant's convictions and remand this case for a new trial.

The defendant, Pamela Sue King, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury on one count of first degree premeditated murder. She was subsequently convicted by a jury of second degree murder, and was sentenced by the trial court to twenty-three years incarceration at 100% as a violent offender. Following the denial of her motion for a new trial, she filed a timely appeal to this court, raising two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support her conviction for second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to use a dictionary in its deliberations. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Thomas T. Cummings, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to second degree murder. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent (100%), in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner timely filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because his attorney erroneously advised him that he would be required to serve only eighty-five percent (85%) of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole and that his sentence could be reduced an additional fifteen percent (15%) for "good behavior." On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's conclusion that he received effective assistance of counsel. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant appeals his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, tampering with or fabricating evidence and unlawful possession of a weapon. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence based on accomplice testimony, the issue whether Brian Morrow was in fact an accomplice, the admission of graphic photographs of the decedent, and the actions of the trial judge as thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgment of trial court.