APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant appeals his convictions for first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, tampering with or fabricating evidence and unlawful possession of a weapon. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence based on accomplice testimony, the issue whether Brian Morrow was in fact an accomplice, the admission of graphic photographs of the decedent, and the actions of the trial judge as thirteenth juror. We affirm the judgment of trial court.

The petitioner, Javier Soto-Hurtado, appeals from the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. In this appeal of right, the petitioner contends that his conviction for sexual battery is void. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Rita Davis, pled guilty to one count of failure to appear, a class E felony, and was sentenced as a career offender to six years confinement. No direct appeal of her sentence was taken. Davis then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, requesting (1) a delayed direct appeal of her sentence; and (2) that her conviction be vacated upon grounds: (a) that her guilty plea was involuntarily entered based upon ineffective assistance of counsel; and (b) that her conviction was obtained in violation of "constitutional due process rights."

After review, we find that the post-conviction court's consolidation of issue (1), granting the direct appeal of her sentence, and issue (2), the collateral review of Davis' challenge to her conviction through post-conviction process, conflicts with our previous holding in Gibson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 47 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). Thus, consistent with Gibson, we reverse and remand issue (2) with instructions that Davis' collateral attack of her conviction be dismissed without prejudice. With respect to issue (1), we grant review of Davis' six-year sentence. After review, we find this issue is without merit and affirm her sentence as imposed.

Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions of attempted burglary and possession of burglary tools. We affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The Petitioner/Appellee, Danny W. Hobbs, filed a petition for post conviction relief in the Criminal Court of Sullivan County. The petition was filed after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted post-conviction relief and the State appeals. After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Following Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, this Court granted his application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App.  P. 10 to determine whether a second trial on the matter of guilt for attempted first degree murder, an offense charged in Defendant’s first trial but upon which the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict, would violate principles of double jeopardy. After a review of the facts and relevant law, we dismiss the count of the presentment charging attempted first degree murder and remand this case for sentencing on his conviction for aggravated assault.

The defendant, Colico Walls, was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range III sentence of 15 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to identity. The judgment is affirmed.

The Defendant, Michael Hill, pled guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and submitted sentencing for determination by the trial court. Included within the sentencing was a determination by the trial court as to whether or not Defendant's prior convictions for DUI could be used to sentence him as a multiple DUI offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403. The trial court determined that at least two of the prior DUI convictions could be used to sentence Defendant as a multiple third DUI offender. Defendant was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with all but 180 days suspended, and he was fined $3,500.00. On appeal, Defendant argues that all of the prior convictions for DUI were imposed more than ten years prior to his conviction for DUI in this case, and that he should be sentenced as a first offender. We agree, and reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a sentencing hearing as a DUI first offender.

The Appellant, Nicholas J. Johnson, presents for review a certified question of law. Johnson pled guilty to two counts of possession of Schedule I drugs for resale, one count of possession of Schedule IV drugs for resale, and simple possession. Johnson received an effective ten (10)-year Community Corrections sentence, and was ordered to serve one hundred and fifty (150) days, day for day, in the Williamson County Workhouse. As part of his plea, Johnson explicitly reserved, with the consent of the trial court and the State, a certified question of law challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. After review, we find that the question was not properly certified because it fails to clearly identify the scope and limits of the legal issue reserved. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Appellant, Richard W. Herrell, a.k.a. Ricky Herrell, was indicted by a Dickson County Grand Jury for vandalism resulting in personal property damage of $500 to $1,000. Following a bench trial, Herrell was found guilty of the indicted charge and received a two-year suspended sentence. On appeal, Herrell raises one issue for our review: Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Daniel O. Connelly, appeals from his conviction of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) imposed after a bench trial in the Dickson County Circuit Court. He claims on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in overruling a pretrial motion to suppress any evidence that the state garnered following the defendant's warrantless arrest. After hearing oral arguments and reviewing the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the conviction.

The petitioner, Lucious Allen,¹ pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to four felony offenses and was sentenced to a total effective sentence of eight years with the sentence running concurrently to a previously imposed federal sentence. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging involuntary guilty pleas and that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose concurrent sentencing. On appeal, the petitioner disputes the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief without the appointment of counsel and without an evidentiary hearing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this case to the post-conviction court for appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Charles E. Jones, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is not sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of first degree murder. Following a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction, and (2) the trial court erroneously failed to charge simple robbery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and the defendant affirmatively acquiesced in the trial court's failure to charge simple robbery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Stephen E. Cline, pled guilty in the Overton County Criminal Court to four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery, and the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of four years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court granted the appellant judicial diversion and placed him on probation for four years. Subsequently, the appellant was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) and failing to comply with the implied consent law. A warrant for revocation of probation and judicial diversion was issued alleging the foregoing offenses and contending that the appellant had fraudulently obtained a controlled substance. Pursuant to a hearing, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and entered judgments of conviction for all four counts of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the appellant violated his probation and judicial diversion; (2) whether the trial court violated the appellant's right to confrontation in admitting hearsay statements during the hearing; (3) whether the trial court violated the appellant's due process rights by failing to bifurcate the probation revocation proceedings; and (4) whether the trial court erred in failing to consider all of the proof before forming an opinion on the case. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Patrick D. Paris, appeals from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony into evidence as an excited utterance. We affirm the judgments of conviction.

The defendant, David Glenn Ayers, was convicted of driving under the influence, second offense. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days with release eligibility after service of 75%. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, argues that the trial court should have set aside the verdict as thirteenth juror, and contends that the sentence is excessive. The judgment is affirmed.

The Petitioner was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to twenty-five years incarceration. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his attorney at trial was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant pursuant to his plea agreement to two concurrent ten-year sentences. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his request that he serve his sentence on community corrections. Because we conclude that the sentence imposed is adequately supported by the record, and that the trial court did not err by refusing to allow the Defendant to serve his sentence on community corrections, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals the trial court's revocation of her probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Stanley Boxley, was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and to a consecutive ten year term for the attempted aggravated robbery. In this appeal as of right the Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by ruling that the State could introduce evidence of threats against the accomplice witnesses if the Defendant inquired into the prosecution's recommendation that they receive probation. Finding the evidence insufficient to corroborate the accomplices' testimony, we reverse the Defendant's convictions and dismiss.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the defendant of driving under the influence of an intoxicant. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in a local workhouse. The court required the defendant to serve forty-eight hours and allowed the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence on probation. The defendant subsequently moved for a new trial and then amended his motion. The trial court denied his amended motion, and the defendant appeals this denial, alleging that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that they could consider this refusal as evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. After reviewing the record and applicable case law, we find that these issues lack merit and therefore affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for new trial.

The Defendant, Quentin D. Armstrong, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. The trial court merged the second count into the first and sentenced the Defendant to six years. In his appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated assault and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury concerning self-defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his consecutive sentences totaling 29 years for two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. He contends the trial court erred in setting the length of each sentence and in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James David Alder, appeals from his convictions and sentences which he received in the Franklin County Circuit Court. After a change of venue from Sequatchie County and a jury trial in Franklin County, the trial court imposed the following convictions and sentences: aggravated assault, ten years (Range II); kidnapping, ten years (Range II); and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, eleven months and 29 days (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court ordered the felony sentences to run consecutively to each other but concurrently with the misdemeanor, for an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant complains that the trial court erred (1) in refusing to grant a mistrial after the victim testified that she had obtained an order of protection against the defendant and (2) in imposing the sentences. After our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the lower court's felony judgments but vacate and modify the misdemeanor judgment.