APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Thomas E. Cowan, Jr., was found guilty of contempt. The trial court imposed a jail sentence of 10 days, six of which were suspended. In this appeal of right, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient; that the trial judge should not have acted as a witness; and that the sentence was excessive. Because the evidence was insufficient, the judgment is reversed and the cause dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of second degree murder and was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-one years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the appellant of second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial because of improper jury instructions characterizing the appellant's statement as a confession. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In July 1999, the Defendant pled guilty to evading arrest and possession of marijuana, both Class A misdemeanors, and received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days supervised probation. In December 1999, the Defendant was indicted for assault and aggravated criminal trespass, both of which are also Class A misdemeanors. In January 2000, a violation of probation warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging that he had violated his probation in the first two cases. In March 2000, the Defendant pled guilty to the assault and aggravated criminal trespass charges, and a combined sentencing hearing and probation violation hearing was held by the trial court. The trial court revoked the Defendant's probation in the first two cases and imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration. The court also imposed sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days incarceration in the second two cases, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sentences imposed in the first two cases. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentences of incarceration in each case. Because our review of the record reveals that the sentences were proper, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Matthew Patrick Frontera, pleaded guilty to criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. As part of his plea agreement, the Defendant attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law relating to the legality of his stop, detention and questioning by police officers. In this appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence obtained against him due to an unlawful stop and detention. He also argues that the trial court erred by sentencing him to serve six months in the county jail with release eligibility at seventy-five percent. Because the Defendant failed to properly reserve his issue concerning his stop and detention, we are unable to reach the merits of that issue. We affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner, King David Johnson, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The Appellant, Kelvin A. Taylor, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Weakley County Circuit Court. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Taylor entered a "best interest" plea to class D felony child abuse, and was sentenced to six years in the Department of Correction as a range II offender. In this collateral attack of his conviction, Taylor presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the general sessions court's revocation of his bond without a hearing and the resulting confinement prior to indictment violated double jeopardy and due process rights; and (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant appeals the judgment entered by the Circuit Court of Blount County revoking his community corrections sentence. The sole issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in ordering the defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in the penitentiary. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

In an indictment returned by the Morgan County Grand Jury, defendant, Charles R. Francis, was charged with fourth offense DUI. Count 1 of the indictment alleged that the triggering offense of DUI occurred on December 10, 1998. Count 2 of the indictment alleged that he had previously been convicted of DUI on three separate occasions in Morgan County, Tennessee. The defendant entered a "blind plea" to DUI, fourth offense, and sentencing was submitted to the trial court for a later hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ruled that defendant was convicted of the Class E felony of DUI, fourth offense, ordered a sentence of two (2) years, with service by split confinement of 150 days in the county jail, and the balance of the sentence to be served in the Community Corrections program. Asserting that he should have been sentenced for commission of a Class A misdemeanor DUI, fourth offense, rather than a Class E felony, defendant has appealed. The original judgment entered by the trial court reflected conviction of a Class A misdemeanor, but the judgment was later amended to reflect conviction of a Class E felony, in accord with the trial court's ruling at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. We affirm the amended judgment of the trial court.

The State appeals the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court suspending the appellee's sentences for aggravated robbery and granting the appellee probation for a term of twenty-four years. Following a review of the record and the State's brief, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant appeals the judgment of the trial court revoking her probation. She raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence supported the trial court's finding that she violated the terms of her probation by committing the offense of accessory after the fact; and (2) whether the trial court had the authority to order her to continue her supervised probation pending this appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find both issues have merit; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Terry A. Rogier, by means of an interlocutory appeal seeks review of the trial court's decision affirming the district attorney general's denial of pre-trial diversion. Rogier was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for the offenses of reckless endangerment, a class E felony, and reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor. After review, we find that the prosecutor failed to consider all the relevant factors in denying diversion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's finding that the prosecutor did not abuse his discretion and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

The appellant, Morris Jason Pepper, was convicted by a jury in the Lincoln County Circuit Court of one count of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to grant the appellant's motion to suppress. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of theft over $1,000.00 and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I standard offender to three years probation. The defendant appeals from the revocation of her probation, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Because we conclude that the record supports that trial court's decision to revoke the defendant's probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On April 29, 1999, the petitioner's status on community corrections was revoked and he was resentenced. On May 15, 2000, he filed a pro se post-conviction relief petition. The issue is whether the petition is time-barred by the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-202. Because the revocation and resentencing became final thirty days after its entry, which was May 29, 1999, as the State concedes, and we agree, the petition was timely filed. We reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The issue is how to compute the number of prior offenses available for consideration in determining multiple offender status pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-403(a)(3). We conclude to compute the number of prior convictions available for consideration, the court must first determine whether the defendant has any prior convictions occurring within ten years of the date of the instant conviction. If so, all prior convictions shall be counted occurring within twenty years of the date of the instant conviction provided no period greater than ten years has elapsed between any two preceding prior convictions. An example is contained in the opinion. We reverse the trial court’s order amending the indictment to charge third offense and reinstate the original indictment charging ninth offense driving under the influence.

The appellant, Robert G. Bean, challenges his conviction in the Williamson County Circuit Court of one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense. He presents the following issues for our determination: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's challenge for cause of prospective juror Thelma Woodard; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress the State's use at trial of the videotape of the traffic stop of the appellant's vehicle; (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on adult driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in using the appellant's 1996 conviction of DUI to enhance the appellant's sentence. Following a thorough review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of hindering a secured creditor, a Class E felony. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

he defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault with an agreed four-year sentence, and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court denied the defendant any alternative sentence and ordered that the defendant serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals the trial court's judgment denying him an alternative sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant entered a best-interest guilty plea in the Cocke County Criminal Court to one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated rape, and one count of criminal exposure to HIV. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the criminal exposure to HIV conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, as a violent offender to 24 years incarceration for one of the aggravated rape convictions, and as a multiple rapist to 24 years incarceration for the other aggravated rape conviction. The trial court ordered consecutive service of the sentences for an effective sentence of 78 years incarceration.  On appeal, the defendant takes issue with the length of the sentences and the consecutive service imposed. Based upon our review, we affirm the sentences imposed.

The defendant, William A. Tansil, appeals from his conviction for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), third offense, for which he received a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with all but one hundred fifty days being suspended. He contends that the trial court erred in finding him to be a third-time offender, arguing that the judgment for one of his prior convictions is void on its face. We affirm the trial court.

I join with the majority in concluding that the trial court was without authority to modify the defendant’s sentence after the sentence had expired. I write separately because I also find that the trial court was without authority to grant judicial diversion in this case even if the sentence had not expired. Absent appropriate legislation, the trial court is without authority to invent its own sentencing programs.

Petitioner appeals the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court held that the petition was time-barred by the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petition was filed timely, and reverse the decision of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Jon Goodale, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. The first conviction was merged into the felony murder conviction and the defendant was sentenced to life. The trial court then conducted a sentencing hearing and imposed a twenty-five year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery to be served consecutive to the life sentence. In his appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 3(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury concerning accessory after the fact as a lesser-included offense to all charges, and (3) the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery and sentence of eight years and six months, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing hearsay into evidence under the excited utterance exception; (3) the trial court erroneously failed to charge the jury on lesser-included offenses; and (4) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In July of 1999, a Fayette County Grand Jury indicted the appellant, Eric Terrell Glover, for the following offenses: (1) first-degree premeditated murder; (2) first-degree felony murder; (3) especially aggravated kidnapping; and (4) especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Glover was convicted on all charges and, in accordance with the jury's verdict, was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree premeditated murder. For his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery, Glover was sentenced, as a violent offender, to concurrent twenty year sentences on each charge, with these sentences running concurrently to his life sentence. On appeal, Glover challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions as a principal offender under a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another. He argues that the proof, at best, supports only the subordinate criminal responsibility of "facilitating." After review, we find no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.