APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was indicted for one count of first degree murder during the perpetration of an attempted robbery and one count of premeditated first degree murder. A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of felony murder in count one and the lesser-included offense of second degree murder in count two. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the conviction for felony murder, and the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, the defendant alleges: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erroneously neglected to charge the jury on the offenses of second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, reckless homicide, and criminally negligent homicide as lesser-included offenses of felony murder; and (3) the trial court failed to perform its duties as the "thirteenth juror." After a thorough review of the record, we conclude the trial court erred by failing to charge lesser-included offenses of felony murder. We affirm the guilty verdict for second degree murder; we reverse the conviction for felony murder and remand that count for a new trial with special instructions relating to the second degree murder verdict.

I agree with the majority opinion except that I would hold that the defendant’s dual convictions for the especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery of Larry Smith do not violate due process. I would, therefore, affirm the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction.

In these consolidated appeals, the Appellant, Jaxie Raymond Jones, has appealed from orders of the criminal courts of Washington County and Johnson County. His "Motion For Order Directing Joe C. Crumley, 1st Judicial District Attorney General To Produce To Jaxie Raymond Jones, A Copy Of The Entire Case File Of Case No. 14189" was denied. Subsequently, a motion to "alter or amend judgment" was also denied, with the trial court imposing sanctions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-801 through -818. Upon review of the entire record, we affirm the judgments of each trial court insofar as each order denies the motion. However, we reverse the order of the Johnson County Criminal Court insofar as it imposes sanctions pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 41-21-801 through -818.

The Defendant, Mack A. O'Baner, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support a finding of guilty of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a consolidated trial, an Obion County Jury convicted Defendant Roger Neal James of the delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. The jury convicted Defendant George Osborne Wade of the sale of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. The trial court sentenced Defendant James to twenty-five years incarceration and Defendant Wade to twenty-three years incarceration. Both Defendants now appeal. Defendant James contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the admission at trial of evidence concerning a second drug transaction that took place after the transaction in this case, and the length of his sentence. Defendant Wade also contests the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. In addition, he argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a continuance of the case and that the Drug-Free School Zone Act is unconstitutional as applied to his case. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence. In this appeal, the defendant alleges (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction; (2) the trial judge erroneously allowed the arresting officer to opine the defendant's blood alcohol level was greater than .10%; and (3) the trial court erroneously failed to charge adult driving while impaired as a lesser-included offense of DUI. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Quantreal Underwood, was convicted of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated robbery. He received a Range I sentence of twenty-five years for the murder conviction and two concurrent eight year terms for the robbery convictions. His convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. State v. Quantreal Underwood, No. 02C01-9604-CR-00120, 1997 Tenn. Crim. App. Lexis 1018 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson Oct. 9, 1997). The appellant filed a post-conviction petition in May, 1999, wherein he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective and thus deficient within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. That petition was denied, and the appellant now brings the instant appeal. We have reviewed the record and find no error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendants, Donald Richard Harmon, Jr., and Charles Leonard Golden were convicted of theft over $1,000.00 but less than $10,000.00. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, 105(3).The trial court imposed Range I, two-year sentences for each defendant. Each has appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging as error the limitation of cross-examination of a state witness. The defendant Harmon argues that he should have been granted an alternative sentence.  The cause is remanded as to the sentencing of the defendant Harmon; otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. The complaints against trial counsel were as to their alleged failure to prepare adequately for trial, to interview and present certain witnesses, and to present an adequate defense. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

The Defendant, Eric Brooks, pled guilty to the sale of a controlled substance and received a sentence of twelve years to be served on Community Corrections. The Defendant was subsequently arrested and his case officer filed an affidavit indicating that his arrest constituted a violation of his Community Corrections program. A hearing was held, at which the Defendant was represented by counsel, and the trial judge revoked the Defendant's Community Corrections sentence, re-sentencing him to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the trial court eventually dismissed summarily. The Defendant now appeals from that dismissal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The juvenile defendant, fifteen-year-old James Noble Page, was tried as an adult for second degree murder and convicted as charged by a Montgomery County jury. The specific issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the "knowing" mens rea element of second degree murder. The trial court instructed the jury that the "knowing" element of second degree murder could be established by defendant's awareness "(1) that his conduct is of a particular nature; or (2) that a particular circumstance exists; or (3) that the conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result." (Emphasis added). The state concedes the instruction was error but contends it was harmless. We conclude second degree murder is a result-of-conduct offense; allowing the jury to convict based upon awareness of the nature of the conduct or circumstances surrounding the conduct erroneously lessens the state's burden of proof for this offense; the error in the jury charge was not harmless under the facts of this case; and the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

The defendant, Nelson Troglin, was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial in the Bledsoe County Circuit Court. The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of twenty-three years. In this appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by ruling that Defendant's statement to the police was admissible as evidence during his trial; (3) whether comments made by the trial court during curative instructions to the jury constituted impermissible expressions of bias toward Defendant, effectively depriving him of his right to a fair trial; (4) whether the trial court erred when it excluded evidence that a person, not Defendant, had assaulted the victim on the day of his death, and when it allowed an expert to testify concerning evidence which was not revealed to Defendant during regular discovery; (5) whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (6) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Kirk Browne, was indicted on one count of public indecency. The Defendant sought pretrial diversion, which was denied by the State. Following several continuances, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. At the Defendant's request, the trial judge recused herself from the case. The case was transferred to Judge Jerry Beck. Judge Beck found that the Assistant District Attorney did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The Defendant now appeals, alleging numerous defects in the proceedings which culminated in his conviction. After a review of the evidence, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Henry County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of introducing drugs into a penal institution. The Defendant now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Charles E. Robinson, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post- conviction relief as time-barred. The petitioner asserts that, because he was unilaterally denied the opportunity for second-tier review of his conviction, due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded.

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the Department of Correction had wrongfully altered two judgment forms so as to require service of his sentences in prison rather than in the county workhouse. The trial court summarily denied the petition. Because the petitioner has failed to allege grounds that would warrant habeas corpus relief, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, John David White, was convicted by a jury in the Rutherford County Circuit Court for aggravated burglary, theft of property valued over $1,000, felony evading arrest, vandalism, and driving while his license was suspended. He was sentenced to a total of twenty-one years in the Department of Correction as a career offender. In this appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the trial court should have suppressed evidence obtained from the stop of his truck and (2) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury relative to flight from crime. We affirm the trial court.

The petitioner pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated robbery and received a ten year sentence of incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was neither knowing nor voluntary. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon a review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Barry Davis, was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See State v. Barry Davis, No. 02C01-9902-CC-00063, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 845 (Jackson, Aug. 19, 1999). The Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The trial court denied the Defendant's petition and this appeal followed. Finding no merit in the Defendant's allegations, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Terrance Deshone Kinnie, was convicted of second degree murder. After a sentencing hearing the Defendant was sentenced to twenty-three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael Stanley Dotson, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to first degree felony murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. He contends that his guilty plea resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel in that his trial attorneys (1) failed to challenge statements that the petitioner gave to the police incident to his illegal arrest; (2) failed to challenge statements that the petitioner gave to the police while he was being illegally detained; (3) failed to challenge statements that the petitioner gave to the police involuntarily; and (4) failed to investigate and develop an alibi defense. We affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The appellant, Evelyn C. Bostic, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to one count of facilitation of possession of more than .5 gram of cocaine with intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant to six years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant specifically reserved a certified question of law regarding the sufficiency of the affidavit underlying the search warrant issued in this case. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the appellant's conviction.

This is a Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order sustaining in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to suppress his statement to police. The defendant, who is totally deaf, is charged with first degree murder and aggravated arson. On the morning after the residential fire that claimed the victim's life, a deputy sheriff entered the defendant's home, tapped him on the shoulder to awaken him, and asked, via gestures and a written note, that the defendant accompany him to the sheriff's department for questioning. Investigators at the department interviewed the defendant and took his statement through an interpreter of American Sign Language. The defendant argued that the statement should be suppressed on two grounds: (1) that it was the fruit of an unlawful seizure, in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) that it was taken without adequate Miranda warnings, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Finding that the defendant voluntarily accompanied the deputy to the sheriff's department, but that he was in custody at the department and that the State failed to prove that he had been given an adequate Miranda warning, the trial court denied the motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, but granted it on Fifth Amendment grounds. The State appeals that portion of the trial court's order sustaining the motion on Fifth Amendment grounds, and the defendant appeals that portion of the order denying the motion on Fourth Amendment grounds. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.