APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

On November 24, 1998, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant for one count of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated assault. Following a subsequent jury trial, the Defendant was convicted on both counts. On September 30, 1998, after a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender to serve thirty years incarceration for the aggravated robbery consecutively to fifteen years for the aggravated assault. The court also ordered both sentences served consecutively to a sentence for which the Defendant was on parole. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider robbery and theft as lesser-included offenses of aggravated robbery and that the trial court should have instructed the jury to consider reckless endangerment, reckless aggravated assault and simple assault as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.as lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court., we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1999, a Shelby County jury found the Defendant guilty of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to eight years incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the gun alleged to have been used in the robbery; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing testimony by the victim concerning the death of the victim's mother; (4) whether the trial court improperly instructed the jury; and (5) whether the cumulative effect of errors at trial warrants a new trial. Having reviewed the record, we find no error and accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that the granting or denial of a mistrial is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that a trial court should grant a mistrial only when it is of “manifest necessity.” I would add that the burden of establishing a “manifest necessity” is upon the appellant. State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).

Petitioner appeals the denial by the trial court of his writ of habeas corpus and writ of certiorari. Petitioner contended in his petition that he previously pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Madison County to the offenses of facilitation of first degree murder, conspiracy to commit especially aggravated robbery, and arson, and received an effective sentence of 60 years. He further contended that court did not have jurisdiction to try him as an adult; his rights to double jeopardy were violated as a result of his transfer to the Criminal Court; and he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, he claims the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without appointing counsel, without conducting a hearing, and by failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

William Butler Bolling appeals from the Sullivan County Criminal Court's determination that he serve his plea bargained, effective two-year sentence for gambling crimes in the Department of Correction. He claims he should have received some form of alternative sentencing, preferably probation, for his felony conviction. Because Bolling has failed to demonstrate the error of the trial court's determination, we affirm.

The defendant appeals and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. After review, we hold that the evidence is sufficient; therefore, we affirm the defendant's conviction.

The petitioner, Jerry L. Luster, appeals pro se the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petition was filed in the wrong county, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the request for habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, a construction company payroll clerk, was convicted of fourteen counts of forgery, Class E felonies, and one count of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, for utilizing her position at the company to write and cash invalid checks on her employer's account. She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years on each forgery conviction, and six years on the theft conviction, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of six years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of her prior crimes to be admitted at trial, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support her convictions. After a careful review, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the State to impeach the defendant's credibility by questioning her about her prior convictions, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II multiple offender to nine years incarceration in the state penitentiary. The Defendant now appeals, arguing that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict him of aggravated assault. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, Defendants were convicted of one count of attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and two counts of possession of methamphetamine. The trial court sentenced each Defendant to three (3) years in the Department of Correction for attempt to manufacture methamphetamine and eleven (11) months and twenty-nine (29) days for possession of methamphetamine. In this appeal as of right, Defendants assert that the trial court erred as to whether Defendant, Sammy Wilson, gave Investigator Markin consent to search his truck. From our review of the transcript of the motion to suppress, the trial record, briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Eric D. Thomas, pled guilty to four counts of robbery and was sentenced to six years for each conviction. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively, which ruling the Defendant now appeals. The judgment of the trial court ordering the Defendant's sentences to run consecutively is reversed, and this matter is remanded for resentencing on the issue of consecutive sentences.

The defendant, Rhonda Grills, was convicted of facilitation of the felony rape of a child less than 13 years of age. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of 10 years. The defendant was fined $25,000.00. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Because the evidence is adequate to support the facilitation of the rape of a child, the judgment is affirmed.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to eleven years incarceration. The defendant now appeals and raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial when a detective improperly testified that the Defendant was “well known for home invasions,” (2) whether the state failed to disclose fingerprint evidence in a timely fashion, and (3) whether sufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for aggravated robbery. Finding that the trial court erred in denying the motion to declare a mistrial, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Ricky Eugene Cofer, was convicted of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a Range II sentence of 15 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant contends that his indictment for aggravated robbery was legally insufficient; that the evidence was insufficient to convict; and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The judgment is affirmed.

Defendant, Kenneth Griffin, was found guilty of burglary (Class D) and theft (Class D) following a bench trial. He was sentenced as a career offender on each conviction to twelve (12) years incarceration, and the sentences were ordered to be served consecutively. The Defendant, with counsel, appealed the conviction raising the sole issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. This court affirmed. State v. Kenneth S. Griffin, C.C.A. No. 03C01-9811-CR-00406, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1316, Knox County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Dec. 27, 1999). Subsequently, Defendant timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, apparently among other issues, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal because appellate counsel did not raise as an issue the consecutive sentencing ordered by the trial court. The post-conviction court, in a written order, granted Defendant a "delayed appeal" as "authorized under TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED SECTION. 40-30-213." The post-conviction court's order limited the delayed appeal to the sole issue "of the correctness of [defendant's] sentence." However, the post-conviction court, while impliedly finding ineffective assistance of counsel for not raising the sentencing issue on direct appeal, made no finding that the Petitioner was prejudiced by the deficient representation. In any event, we find that the granting of a delayed appeal from the original conviction is not authorized by statute, and accordingly, this appeal from the sentence imposed in the original convictions is dismissed.

The defendant was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of especially aggravated robbery and felony murder. She timely appealed, arguing that the State had failed to show that statements she gave while a juvenile were admissible, that the trial court erred in not instructing as to lesser-included offenses or that the jury must find whether felony murder was a "natural and probable consequence" of especially aggravated robbery, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner/appellant, Franklin Parton, filed a pro se "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" in the Knox County Criminal Court, which was dismissed by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for treatment of the petition as a petition for writ of error coram nobis. This motion was also summarily denied by the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

On May 21, 1999, Gary Leon Cureton, the Petitioner and Appellant, pled guilty in the Greene County Criminal Court to two counts of rape and two counts of sexual battery and waived his right to appeal. Following the guilty plea, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve seventeen years incarceration. On May 25, 2000, the Greene County Court Clerk received a post-conviction petition from the incarcerated pro se Petitioner and stamped the document to indicate that it had been filed on that date. On June 2, 2000 the trial court issued a preliminary order dismissing the petition on the ground that it was not timely filed. On June 12, the trial court received a pro se motion to reconsider the dismissal of the petition, but the trial court denied the motion on June 19, 2000. On August 2, 2000, this Court ordered the trial court to address the Petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel, and the trial court subsequently appointed counsel to assist with the Petitioner's appeal. The Petitioner appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition and subsequent denial of his motion to reconsider, arguing that he carried his burden of proving that the petition was timely filed. Because the Petitioner was never afforded an opportunity to prove that he timely filed his petition, we remand for a hearing to determine whether the Petitioner's petition was timely filed.

The grand jury for Monroe County charged the defendant with one count of possession of cocaine with intent to resell and one count of felony evading arrest. The defendant went to trial, and the jury acquitted him of the narcotics offense but found him guilty of Class D evading arrest. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to five years incarceration in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the state's misuse of his post-arrest silence, the flight instruction given to the jury, and his classification as a Range II offender. Unpersuaded by the defendant's contentions, we affirm the trial court's judgment and sentence.

The petitioner appeals his denial of post-conviction relief and asserts that the post-conviction court incorrectly found that he received effective assistance of counsel and, thus, knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the admission of three alleged hearsay statements and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is Defendant, Sharon Leming's, second appeal as of right to this Court. See State v. Leming, 3 S.W.3d 7 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998). In both Defendant's first and second trial, a Humphreys County jury convicted her of premeditated first degree murder. After the Defendant's initial appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial due to the erroneous admission of testimony regarding statements made by the victim as to his fear of the Defendant. Following a second trial, the Defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this second appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review:1) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Defendant was mentally competent to stand trial; 2) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant of first degree murder; 3) whether the trial court erroneously admitted statements by the Defendant that she would kill her husband before she would allow him to leave her; 4) whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony that the Defendant had stated that she needed a gun to protect herself from friends of the deceased; and 5) whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's request for a mistrial, when the trial court declined to instruct the jury that a sentence of life with the possibility of parole would require that the Defendant serve a minimum of fifty-one years. Based upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.