APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder and the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon for shooting a man to death in an automobile shop. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder. Specifically, the defendant contends that the State failed to offer sufficient proof of the victim's cause of death. In support of his claim, he argues that the autopsy report, which states the cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds, was improperly admitted into evidence, that the medical examiner never directly testified that the victim died of gunshot wounds, and that no other evidence was presented to prove cause of death. After a thorough review, we conclude that the defendant waived any objection to the admission of the autopsy report by his failure to object at trial, and further, that sufficient evidence, other than the autopsy report, was presented to show that the victim died as the result of gunshot wounds. Consequently, the evidence at trial was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied the Appellant/Petitioner's post-conviction petition? After a review of the record in this cause, the briefs of the parties and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his jury conviction of aggravated robbery, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After a careful review, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition.

Defendant, the attorney for the Dyer Industrial Development Board, was convicted by a Gibson County jury of theft over $60,000 and theft over $1,000. On appeal, he contends the evidence was insufficient to establish guilt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we hold that the record supports the post-conviction court's finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to obtain the 911 tape; was not ineffective in preparing a defense; was not ineffective for failing to introduce fingernail samples taken from the petitioner; and was not ineffective for failing to adequately develop the victim's mother as a suspect.

The petitioner appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, raising the sole issue of whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree murder for shooting his wife to death, and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner asserted a number of grounds for relief, including ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding, with regards to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that many of the petitioner's allegations did not constitute a deficiency in counsel's performance, and further, that the petitioner had failed to meet his burden of showing that any of the alleged deficiencies of counsel prejudiced the outcome of his case. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court as to the effect of trial counsel's misplacing of photographs which were not located until after the trial and the post-conviction hearing and remand for an additional hearing. As to the other issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James L. Roberson, was charged with attempted second degree murder for the repeated stabbing of a female acquaintance and was convicted of the offense, following a bench trial. He testified that he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the offense and could not remember what had happened. He appealed the conviction, arguing that, as the result of his mental state, the proof was insufficient to sustain the conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that it was error for the post-conviction court to dismiss his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of felony murder, two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count of especially aggravated burglary. In a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner alleged that his trial counsel induced him to plead guilty just prior to the start of trial by showing him a videotape of a television show chronicling the final hours of a death row inmate's life. After appointing counsel, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, ruling that the petition failed to present a colorable claim for relief. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The co-defendants, Leonard Edward Baugh, Jr., Damian Lamar Owes, and Marquez Donnell Crenshaw, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury on one count of especially aggravated robbery, five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated assault. Baugh was additionally indicted on one count of resisting arrest and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The counts of aggravated assault were later dismissed. Following their joint trial, all co-defendants were found guilty of especially aggravated robbery, five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. Baugh was also convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon. On appeal, each of the co-defendants challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, arguing that the State failed to offer sufficient proof of identity. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. The matter is remanded to the trial court for correction of clerical errors in the judgments.

The defendant challenges his conviction for attempted first degree murder, contending that the evidence was insufficient, the trial court should have granted a change of venue due to pervasive pretrial publicity, the trial court should have accepted the jury's statement that it could not return a unanimous verdict after it revealed its numerical division, and the jury was tainted by extraneous information. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Having been indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury on three counts of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery, the petitioner pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the remaining counts were dismissed. In this appeal, petitioner raises three issues: (1) whether he received effective assistance of counsel; (2) whether the State and the trial court should have requested forensic psychological evaluation of the petitioner and a competency hearing; and (3) whether his plea was constitutionally valid. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The defendant was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree murder. Following a two-day jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. A sentencing hearing was held on September 29, 1999, at the conclusion of which the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-one years at 100% for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and ten years for the attempted second degree murder conviction. The sentences were ordered served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant presents three issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and attempted second degree murder; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on certain lesser-included offenses; and (3) whether the sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the entire record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Pittman, was convicted of aggravated robbery. He was subsequently sentenced to twenty years incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that his prior convictions for robbery and theft were admissible to impeach his credibility should he elect to testify. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the Defendant's prior convictions were admissible. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Paul Dennis Reid, Jr. was found guilty by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. Reid’s convictions stem from the execution style murders of two Captain D’s employees and the especially aggravated robbery of one of the employees. The jury returned a sentence of death for each of the homicides based upon its finding of three aggravating factors, i.e., (i)(2), prior violent felony; (i)(6), murder committed for the purpose of avoiding prosecution; and (i)(7), murder committed during commission of robbery. The Davidson County Criminal Court subsequently imposed a twenty-five-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to the two death sentences.  In this appeal as of right, Reid presents numerous issues for our review, including (1) issues arising from suppressed evidence; (2) challenges to the selection of jurors; (3) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence; (4) the admission and exclusion of evidence at both the guilt and penalty phases; (5) the propriety of the prosecution’s closing argument during the guilt phase; (6) the failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses; (7) the trial court’s act of holding court into late hours of the evening without cause; (8) the admissibility in general and the introduction of specific victim impact evidence; (9) prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; (10) the propriety of the jury instructions; (11) whether application of the (i)(7) aggravator violates State v. Middlebrooks; (12)
the propriety of a twenty-five-year sentence for especially aggravated robbery; (13) the constitutionality of Tennessee’s death penalty statutes; and (14) whether the sentences of death imposed by the jury are proportionate sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Reid’s convictions for two counts of first-degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. Additionally, we affirm the imposition of the sentences of death and the accompanying sentence for especially aggravated robbery.

The defendant pled guilty in Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of arson, a Class C felony, based on his setting fire to a rental house. According to a plea agreement with the State, he received a four-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. A sentencing hearing was held to determine the manner of service of his sentence and the amount and manner of payment of any restitution. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve his entire sentence in confinement in the workhouse and that he pay $10,000 in restitution to the victim. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying any alternative sentence and in ordering restitution in the amount of $10,000. Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the manner of service. As to restitution, we reverse and remand to the trial court.

I fully concur in Judge Hayes’s thorough, incisive opinion. With respect to a portion of the analysis of the especially aggravated robbery sentencing issues, I concur merely in the results.

The petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, later amended by appointed counsel, claiming that his 1999 pleas of guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court were involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner timely appealed, raising the same two issues. We affirm the judgments of the trial court dismissing the petition.

Defendant, Joseph Darryl Taylor, was convicted of attempt to commit sexual battery, attempt to commit rape, and aggravated kidnapping. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence adduced at trial concerning all three offenses was insufficient to find him guilty and that the trial court erred when it sentenced Defendant. Following a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in part and reverse in part.

This is an interlocutory appeal by the State pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Defendant, Alkita M. Odom, was indicted for the offenses of forgery and criminal simulation, each in the amount of $250,000. The indictment reflected that each offense was a Class B felony. Upon the Defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed the indictment to the extent that it reflected Class B felonies because the court found that for the crime to be anything other than Class E felonies, the Defendant would have had to have actually obtained goods or services. The court then granted the State's motion to amend the indictment to reflect Class E felonies for the purposes of appeal. The State argues on appeal that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment based on the grade of the offense charged. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the indictment and reinstate it as originally returned by the Grand Jury.

The Defendant, Kenneth Anderson, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation by the trial court. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration after finding that he had violated his probation. We find no error; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. He appealed the aggravated robbery convictions, arguing that the proof was insufficient to sustain the convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for resentencing as to the conviction for attempted aggravated robbery.

The Defendant, Frankie L. Richardson, appeals as of right from the revocation of his probation. He argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by revoking probation. We find no abuse of discretion; thus, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In his original trial, the Petitioner, Richard Lee Franklin, was convicted of first degree murder by a Cumberland County jury for the death of David Kirkland. Due to procedural errors at Petitioner's first trial, the trial court granted Petitioner's motion for a new trial. Petitioner was retried and the jury convicted him of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twenty-two years of incarceration. State v. Richard Lee Franklin, No. 03C01-9706-CR-00219, 1998 WL 458580, at *1, Cumberland County (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, August 10, 1998), perm. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1999). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was denied. In this appeal as of right, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in finding his trial counsel's performance to be effective. Specifically, the appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and present witnesses that would support a defense of self-defense; (2) for failing to discuss trial strategies and defenses with the Petitioner; and (3) for failing to request an instruction on self-defense. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William R. Stevens, was convicted of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery, arising out of the deaths of his wife and mother-in-law. For each of his murder convictions, he was sentenced to death. He now appeals as of right, raising the following eleven issues for our review: (1) whether it was error to limit the testimony of crime-scene expert Gregg McCrary; (2) whether it was error to exclude evidence which tended to show that Corey Milliken had an independent motive to commit the murders; (3) whether it was error to admit a redacted version of Sandi Stevens' diary; (4) whether the trial court failed to apply the hearsay and other evidentiary rules in an evenhanded manner; (5) whether the hearsay statements of Corey Milliken to Sarah Suttle should have been excluded as not being "in furtherance of the conspiracy"; (6) whether the cumulative effect of all errors at trial violated the Defendant's right to due process of law; (7) whether instructing the jury that it must agree unanimously in order to impose a life sentence and prohibiting it from being told the effect of a non-unanimous verdict violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (8) whether the Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(i)(4) aggravating circumstance fails to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (9) whether the failure to articulate meaningful standards for proportionality review mandated by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206 violates the Defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (10) whether the unlimited discretion vested in the prosecutor as to whether or not to seek the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (11) whether the death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After a thorough review of the record and the relevant legal authorities, we find no reversible error on the part of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant's convictions and his sentences of death.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal trespass, attempted aggravated assault, and two counts of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for aggravated criminal trespass, two years for attempted aggravated assault, and one year each for both counts of felony reckless endangerment. The defendant was granted probation after service of 120 days. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.