APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Both Petitioners appeal from the post-conviction court's denial of their post-conviction relief petitions. The Petitioners claim ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal for failing to object to an erroneous jury instruction and failing to raise the erroneous jury instruction in their direct appeal. The post-conviction court found the jury instruction to be erroneous; however, it denied relief. After a thorough review, we conclude that the jury instruction was erroneous and prejudicial to the Petitioners and find that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the erroneous jury instruction at trial and for failing to raise it on direct appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court's denial of relief and remand the Petitioners' cases to the trial court for new trials on the issues of aggravated arson.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated criminal trespass, attempted aggravated assault, and two counts of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days for aggravated criminal trespass, two years for attempted aggravated assault, and one year each for both counts of felony reckless endangerment. The defendant was granted probation after service of 120 days. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

The petitioner was sentenced to an effective ten-year sentence on December 13, 1990, and on December 20, 1991, he received an additional two-year sentence for felony escape, to be served consecutively to his original sentences. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was being illegally restrained because, by his calculations, his sentence had expired. The post-conviction court denied the petition, as well as a subsequent petition to rehear, and the petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying the petition.

The petitioner was originally convicted by a Carroll County jury of the sale of a controlled substance.  The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief, which was denied by the post-conviction court. In this appeal as a matter of right, the petitioner contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, James Byron Transou, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The issues presented for review are (1) whether the petitioner was denied his constitutional right to self-representation; (2) whether the denial of a motion for continuance is a basis for relief; (3) whether the election on the charge made by the state is a basis for relief; and (4) whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Brenda Redwine, after pleading guilty to possession of Schedule II drugs and simple possession of marijuana, properly reserved a certified question of law for our review. The Johnson County Criminal Court denied her motion to suppress a search warrant that was issued on January 6, 1999. The defendant asserts, by certified question of law, that the search warrant was not properly issued because the affidavit that was the basis for the warrant contained material misrepresentation by the officer. After review, we affirm the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress.

The petitioner, Gregory Hatton, sought post-conviction relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective, that his guilty pleas were not knowing and voluntary, and that his sentence is illegal. The trial court concluded that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. Insofar as an illegal sentence is subject to correction at any time, the trial court's dismissal of the petitioner's illegal sentence claim was erroneous. Because, however, the petitioner is not entitled to relief on that claim, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Ricky A. Burks was convicted by a Davidson County jury of the first-degree murder of his wife. The trial court granted Burks' motion for judgment of acquittal and entered a judgment for second-degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Burks, as a range II offender, to forty years confinement in the Department of Correction. Burks now appeals both the judgment of conviction and the sentence entered by the Davidson County Criminal Court, challenging the trial court's (1) denial of his motions to suppress; (2) admission of prior bad acts of the defendant; (3) jury instructions regarding prior bad acts; (4) admission of autopsy photographs of the victim; (5) refusal to instruct on the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide; (6) finding that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of second-degree murder; and (7) imposition of the maximum sentence of forty years. The State cross-appeals challenging the trial court's ruling in reducing the jury's verdict of first-degree murder to that of second-degree murder. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant appeals his conviction for murder in the first degree and the sentence of death imposed by the jury.1 This opinion is delivered in two parts, with a separate opinion addressing Part II.
In Part I of this opinion we address the following issues:

(1) Admission of evidence regarding his escape attempts;
(2) Shackling of his feet and hands;
(3) Prohibition of mitigation evidence at sentencing;
(4) Admission of his statement to police;
(5) Propriety of the prosecutor’s closing argument;
(6) Unconstitutionality of the death penalty; and
(7) Proportionality of sentence of death.

After careful review, we affirm the conviction for murder in the first degree.  In Part II of this opinion, Judge Williams sets forth his minority position on the following issues:

(1) Application of the (i)(2) aggravating factor in the imposition of the death penalty; and (2) Cumulative effect of errors.

The position of the majority on the issues addressed in Part II is set forth in the separate opinion filed by Judge Witt, in which Judge Hayes has joined. The majority concludes that the verdict is enigmatic and uncertain, requiring reversal of the sentence of death and re-sentencing.

This separate opinion addresses issues relative to the sentencing phase of the trial, as well as the defendant’s cumulative error issue. Expressed herein are the views of the majority, consisting of Judge Hayes and Judge Witt. The minority view of Judge Williams is expressed in his lead opinion.

The Petitioner was indicted for three counts of aggravated robbery and convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of seventeen years, and on direct appeal, this Court modified his sentence to an effective sentence of fifteen years. The Tennessee Supreme Court denied permission to appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his attorneys failed to challenge two of his indictments prior to trial. Following a hearing, the trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Petitioner now appeals the trial court's denial of relief. We hold that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Indicted for aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of aggravated rape, and especially aggravated kidnapping, the defendant entered negotiated pleas of guilt to aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated rape, and especially aggravated kidnapping.  The remaining charges were dismissed. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to 12 years for the robbery, 25 years for each of the rapes, and 25 years for the kidnapping. The rape sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to one another and to the robbery sentence, for an effective sentence of 62 years. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that one of the aggravated rape convictions and the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction violate due process. He asserts that his sentences are excessive and should not have been ordered to be served consecutively. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

On April 30, 1996, the petitioner, Alan Hall, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and possession of burglary tools. The petitioner received a total effective sentence of life plus twelve years. Subsequently, on September 15, 1999, the trial court entered an order correcting the petitioner's judgment of conviction for especially aggravated robbery to reflect that the petitioner would serve one hundred percent (100%) of his sentence in confinement instead of thirty percent (30%) as was erroneously reflected on the original judgment. Within a year after the entry of the corrected judgment, the petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as being barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contests the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Darryl A. Larkins, of two counts of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted aggravated rape, and one count of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to serve an effective sentence of fifty-years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the Defendant of aggravated rape and attempted aggravated rape; 2) whether the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were obtained contrary to Tennessee law in State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991); and 3) whether the Defendant was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial and a fair and impartial jury, regardingthe aggravated burglary conviction. The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for re-sentencing on the offense of attempted aggravated rape.

The defendant, Judy K. Caruso, entered pleas of guilt to two counts of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property over $1,000. As a part of the plea agreement, the state agreed to dismiss two charges of possession of stolen property and one charge of misdemeanor vandalism. The defendant negotiated concurrent sentences of four years on the burglary convictions and two years on the theft convictions. The trial court denied a request for probation, ordered a 200-day jail sentence to be served day for day, and required the balance of the four-year sentence to be served in a Community Corrections program. In this appeal of right, the defendant claims that she should have been granted an alternative sentence involving immediate release. The judgment is affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the petitioner of two counts of child rape. For each of these offenses, he received a sentence of eighteen years, and the trial court ordered the sentences to be run consecutively. On direct appeal this Court modified the petitioner's sentences to sixteen and one half years each, resulting in an effective sentence of thirty-three years, but otherwise found the petitioner's claims merited no relief. Subsequently the petitioner filed a pro se post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Determining that the petitioner had raised a colorable claim, the trial court appointed counsel to represent him and later conducted an evidentiary hearing on the petition. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court filed an opinion denying the petition. From this denial the petitioner brings the instant appeal alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by inadequately advising the petitioner of the potential sentence he could receive should he elect to go to trial. However, following our review of the record, we find that the trial court correctly denied the petition, and we, therefore, affirm the lower court's decision.

The defendant appeals and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of vandalism. Specifically, he contends that the State's evidence failed to prove the amount of damage beyond a reasonable doubt to establish a felony. After review, we hold that the trial court properly calculated the value of the amount of damages done by the defendant and that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for felony vandalism.

The petitioner's conviction for rape was affirmed on direct appeal. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed that he received inadequate assistance of counsel at his trial. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Henry Ford Williams, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court's revocation of his community corrections sentence. The trial court accepted the defendant's guilty pleas to Class B felony possession of cocaine for resale and to Class C felony possession of cocaine. On September 16, 1993, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years, with eleven months and 29 days to be served in local confinement and the balance to be served in community corrections. On February 18, 2000, the state filed a community corrections revocation warrant. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and revoked the defendant's community corrections placement. From that order, the defendant has appealed to this court. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the action of the trial court..

The defendant appeals his conviction of the sale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years, three months in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and imposed a $2000 fine. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Noah J. Love, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to correct his sentence. The single issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly denied relief. Because the trial court had no jurisdiction to amend the sentence four years after the defendant had been transferred to the Department of Correction, the judgment is reversed.

The defendant contends that the State should be barred from revoking his Community Corrections sentence because no detainer was placed on him while he served a six-year prison sentence in North Carolina while his revocation warrant was pending in Tennessee and the State knew of his location. We conclude that the State was under no obligation to file a detainer against the defendant, and that the State was not time barred from proceeding with the Community Corrections revocation after the defendant's return to this state. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a state appeal from the suppression of evidence. The defendant was indicted for driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and leaving the scene of an accident. The defendant filed a motion to suppress which the trial court granted. In this appeal, the state alleges that the trial court erroneously concluded the defendant was unlawfully arrested, or, in the alternative, the order of suppression was overbroad. Upon review of the record, we modify the order of suppression to allow evidence gathered prior to the unlawful arrest. We remand for further proceedings.

I must dissent from the holding of the majority opinion in this case for the following reasons:

The petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was violated by his multiple sentences. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that the judgments of conviction were facially valid. We affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.