APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Vernon West appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. West collaterally attacks his conviction for second degree murder upon the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever, for failing to investigate the case and for failing to call two witnesses to testify at trial. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief.

Defendant was convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class B felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. In addition, defendant entered a guilty plea to felony possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender, and received concurrent sentences of twelve years, eleven months and twenty-nine days, and two years respectively. Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying his request for a severance of defendants; (3) whether the trial court erred in excluding the prior recorded testimony of his co-defendant; (4) whether the trial court improperly allowed the arresting officer to testify as to his opinion regarding the veracity of co-defendant's admission; (5) whether the jury pool was tainted by statements of a potential juror; and (6) whether the state improperly exercised its peremptory challenges. Upon our review of the record, we find defendant's allegations to be without merit; thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant appeals from the revocation of his probation, contending that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tiffany R. Weatherspoon, pled guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to the Class B felony of unlawful possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. She received the agreed-upon sentence of eight years, as a Range I offender, and a $2,000 fine. The trial court denied alternative sentencing and ordered that the defendant be incarcerated. She appealed, arguing that the court erred in denying alternative sentencing. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the trial court.

The petitioner, who is currently in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, entered pleas of guilty in 1974 in the Shelby County Criminal Court to the offenses of assault and battery with intent to rape and attempt to commit a felony, to wit: crime against nature. In 2000, he filed a petition to vacate and set aside these sentences, claiming that his pleas of guilty were not voluntary, that his counsel had been ineffective, and that he was innocent of the charges. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition as untimely, the statute of limitations having expired before it was filed; and the petitioner timely appealed. Based upon our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminally negligent homicide and aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of two years for the homicide charge and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse charge. In this appeal as a matter of right, the defendant alleges (1) he was incompetent to stand trial, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty verdict for aggravated child abuse. The defendant was indicted in count one for aggravated child abuse by treating the child in a manner so as to inflict injury; the defendant was indicted in count two for aggravated child abuse by neglecting the child so as to adversely affect his health and welfare; the jury was instructed to consider count two only if the defendant was found not guilty of count one; the jury found guilt only as to count one; the jury never returned a verdict on count two; and the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict under count one. Although the evidence overwhelmingly establishes guilt of aggravated child abuse by neglect as alleged in count two, the jury's failure to return a verdict on this count requires a remand for retrial on count two. We affirm the conviction for criminally negligent homicide.

The petitioner appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for delayed appeal regarding his petition for post-conviction relief. We remand the case to the trial court.

Robert Ervin, also known as Muhammad Jabbar, was convicted of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Ervin raises one issue for our review: Whether the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the verdict. After review, we find the evidence sufficient and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner appeals from the Dyer County Circuit Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1994, the petitioner was tried and convicted of first degree murder in the perpetration of a felony and aggravated burglary. His convictions were affirmed, after which he timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, juror misconduct because an alternate juror had lied during voir dire about not knowing the petitioner, insufficient evidence to support the felony-murder conviction, and suppression of exculpatory evidence. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petitioner's request for post-conviction relief.

The defendant, after being convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, appeals his conviction and asserts that the trial court erred in three respects: (1) the trial court incorrectly allowed testimony from three witnesses attacking the defendant's reputation for truthfulness; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to question the defendant about a prior felony conviction; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing testimony about a prior statement made by the defendant. After review, we affirm the trial court's rulings in all respects.

This is an appeal from defendant's conviction for second degree murder for which he received a sentence of twenty-three years and six months. In this appeal, defendant presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict; and (2) whether the trial court erred in defining the mental state of "knowing" for the offense of second degree murder. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict; however, we conclude the jury charge constituted plain error by failing to instruct on the applicable definition of "knowing." Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.

The defendant, Robert D. Walsh, was convicted after a jury trial in the Shelby County Criminal court of the aggravated sexual battery of a foster child who was in his care. He appeals this conviction, alleging various errors in evidentiary admissions, impermissible comment on the evidence by the trial court, and improper sentencing. We modify the defendant's sentence to Range I classification and remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment form. Otherwise, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant's conviction for first degree murder during perpetration of robbery was reversed by this court in 1998. The defendant was subsequently retried, again convicted of first degree murder during the perpetration of a robbery, and sentenced to life imprisonment. This appeal followed, whereby the defendant alleges the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, and the trial court erroneously admitted the audio recording and transcript of the victim's phone call to 911. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.

The defendant was convicted by a Shelby County jury of theft of property valued greater than $10,000 and forgery. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of 15 years for theft as a persistent offender and six years for forgery as a career offender. In this appeal as a matter of right, defendant alleges (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support the convictions, and (2) his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Bobby J. Hughes, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for the offense of attempted second degree murder. He was subsequently tried by jury and found guilty of attempted second degree murder. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing into evidence four photographs of the victim's wounds; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to identify the Defendant from a photograph during trial; (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the State to question the Defendant about prior convictions after defense counsel concluded redirect examination; and (5) that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter. We conclude that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense was plain error and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant's conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

Defendant, Bryan Herman Dowdy, appeals his jury convictions for vehicular homicide by intoxication, two counts of vehicular assault, and felony evading arrest. He was sentenced to eight years and six months for vehicular homicide, two years for each of the vehicular assaults, and two years for felony evading arrest, with an effective sentence of ten years and six months. In this appeal, he raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether items from his vehicle were improperly admitted; (3) whether his blood alcohol test result was improperly admitted into evidence; (4) whether the underlying DUI charge should have been severed; (5) whether he was improperly denied access to an officer's personnel file during cross-examination; (6) whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to use their "common sense;" and (7) whether his sentence was excessive. After our review of the record, we find all issues to be without merit and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Larry M. Grigsby entered guilty pleas to one count of promoting prostitution and two counts of criminal simulation. The manner of service, including entitlement to probation and/or Community Corrections, was submitted to the trial court. The trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing based upon Grigsby's extensive prior criminal history and the failure of previous measures less restrictive than total confinement. On appeal, Grigsby argues that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence. After review, we conclude that the record supports the trial court's sentencing decision. The judgment, accordingly, is affirmed.

The Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed for post-conviction relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied relief. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant was convicted by a jury of introducing drugs into a penal institution. She was sentenced to three years incarceration, suspended after ninety days. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and her term of confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. Appellant pled guilty to especially aggravated kidnapping and criminal attempt to commit first degree murder. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, he received concurrent twenty-eight-year sentences to be served concurrently with his federal sentence, but consecutively to a thirty-year state sentence for aggravated robbery. Thereafter, appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging his trial counsel failed to provide effective representation and that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty. The post-conviction court denied relief. We conclude trial counsel provided effective representation, and the appellant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. Thus, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, John Ruff, appeals the dismissal without prejudice of the charges against him. He asks this Court to enter an order dismissing his case with prejudice. We hold that the trial court properly dismissed the charges against the Defendant without prejudice; thus, we affirm the action of the trial court.

I concur with the majority’s rationale that led to the conclusion that the charges were properly dismissed below without prejudice. However, I also agree with the majority’s statements about the unavailability of a Rule 3 appeal in this case. Because no appeal as a matter of right is
availed to the defendant under Rule 3, I would conclude that this court is without jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s issue with respect to the dismissal of charges without prejudice. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(b). Although the practical result is the same in that the action of the trial court is not being reversed, I would dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his “petition to correct illegal judgment/sentence.” Finding no basis for a rightful appeal or a discretionary appeal via the common law writ of certiorari, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Donald Craig Miller, pled guilty to burglary, Class D felony, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement wherein he was to receive a sentence of four (4) years, with the manner of the service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court following the sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted the four-year sentence, but ordered three and one-half years incarceration, followed by service of four years in Community Corrections in a "split-confinement" sentence. Subsequently, the Defendant filed a "Motion for Clarification of Judgment Order" which was denied by the trial court following a hearing. The Defendant filed a notice of appeal. We hold that this matter should be treated as a petition for common law writ of certiorari rather than a Rule 3, T.R.A.P. appeal, and reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner filed a post-conviction petition for relief from his conviction for aggravated child abuse, arguing that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (2) his due process rights were violated because he was not present during voir dire; and, (3) he was denied his constitutional right to testify in his own behalf. After the post-conviction court denied his petition, the petitioner appealed to this court. We affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.