APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Brian Roberson, appeals the denial of a Rule 35(b) “Motion for Correction of Sentence” by the Williamson County Criminal Court. This motion arose from a plea entered on January 14, 1998, by the appellant pursuant to an agreed disposition under Rule 11(e)(1)(C), Tenn. R. Crim. P. After pleading guilty to two counts sale of cocaine, a Class B felony, and one count sale of cocaine, a Class C felony, the trial court, in accordance with the plea agreement, imposed a sentence of eight years for each Class B felony and a sentence of three years for the Class C felony. Apparently, the appellant was serving outstanding sentences of 17.5 years at the time he pled guilty to the current charges. The instant eight year sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with the outstanding sentences of 17.5 years. However, the three year sentence for the Class C felony was ordered to run consecutively to the outstanding sentences for an effective sentence of 20.5 years. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to correct or reduce his three year sentence for the sale of cocaine.
 

Based upon our review of the entire record, i.e., the video transcripts, briefs, and argument of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R.

The Petitioner, James E. Martin, appeals as of right the trial court’s dismissal of his petition fo r writ of habeas corpus relief. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

The defendant was charged with vandalism, three counts of aggravated assault, and two counts of assault. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to vandalism and two counts of aggravated assault, receiving a sentence of one year on the vandalism count and four years on each aggravated assault count, to be served concurrently. Following a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service, the trial court denied probation. The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying probation because it perceived inconsistencies in the defendant’s statements and did not allow the defendant to clarify the evidence through his statutory right of allocution prior to sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Otis J. Wickfall, ap peals as of right his conviction for first degree murder in the Shelby County Crimina l Court. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. In this appeal, Defendant raises the following issues:  I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal based on the evidence presented by the State;  II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of the victim’s blood-staine d shirt to show the trajectory and angle of the bullet;  III. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of a photograph of a recording label depicting the slang term for murder;  IV. Whether the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of California Penal Code section 187 defining murder; and V. Whether the trial court erred in its jury ins tructions.  After a careful review of the reco rd, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court.

The defendant, James Clay Romines, appeals as of right from a ruling of the Blount County Criminal Court revoking his probation. The defendant presents one issue for appellate review: whether the trial court erred by ordering the defendant to serve eleven days in jail as punishment for a second violation of probation. After a review of the record, briefs of the parties, and appropriate law, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Paul Carr Moss, Jr., was indicted for the first degree murder of his wife, Peggy Ann Moss. He was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of twenty-five years. The defendant was fined $50,000.00.

The Defendant, Barry Waddell, appeals as of right from his conviction in the Davidson County Crimina l Court. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two (2) counts of rape of a child (Counts 1 and 2) and two (2) counts of aggravated sexual battery (Counts 3 and 4). Defendant was sentenced to twenty-five (25) years for each count of rape of a child and ten (10) years for each count of aggravated sexual battery, with all sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of seventy (70) years. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly sentenced him to the maximum period of incarceration for his rape of a child convictions and erred in ordering his sentences to be served consecutively. We affirm in pa rt, and reverse and modify in part.