APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Tommy Taylor, Defendant, was sentenced in Case No. RD 10835 to one year in split confinement followed by service of the balance of the sentence on community corrections. Defendant violated the rules of the institution where he was confined by being involved in two violent incidents with another inmate and one violent incident with a guard. The State moved to revoke Defendant’s community corrections sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked Defendant’s community corrections sentence and ordered Defendant to serve his original sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Lynn Frank Bristol, Defendant, was indicted by the Coffee County Grand Jury for “sexual battery and rape of a child” for incidents involving his step-daughter. Nearly three years later, and three days prior to trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to reflect a charge of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and to amend the dates encompassed in the indictment in both Count One and Count Two. Defendant objected to the amendment and asked for a continuance. The trial court allowed the State to amend the indictment and denied a continuance. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual battery in Count One and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count Two. Defendant was sentenced to ten years for each conviction and the trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years to be served at 100 percent. Defendant appeals, arguing: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment; (2) that the trial court erred by denying a continuance; (3) that the trial court improperly relied on State v. Qualls, 482 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2016), for a variety of reasons, including failing to give an enhanced unanimity instruction; (4) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; and (5) that the sentence is excessive. Because we determine that the trial court erred by failing to submit the complete written charge to the jury, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(c), the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial.

The Defendant, Aaron Evan Perry, was convicted by a jury of three counts of fraudulent use of a credit card of an amount of $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105(a)(1), -118(b). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to time served. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that a Belk department store loss prevention manager acted as an agent of the State when he seized the Defendant’s identification card and credit card, that the police conducted a pretextual traffic stop of the Defendant to investigate the Belk incident, and that the warrantless search of his vehicle was not justified as a search incident to arrest or inventory search; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by admitting information generated by a hand-held credit card scanner without an adequate foundation; and (4) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card instead of fraudulent use of a credit card. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions and that reversible error occurred when the trial court mistakenly instructed the jury on the elements of illegal possession of a credit card. As a result, we remand the case for the entry of amended judgments reflecting the new conviction offenses of attempted theft, a Class B misdemeanor. In addition, in the interest of judicial economy, we modify the sentence in each count to reflect concurrent sentences of six months and apply to the Defendant’s two years of jail credit to satisfy his sentences.

The defendant, Carlos Dewatherdo Ferguson, Jr., appeals his Hardin County Circuit Court jury convictions of second degree murder and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss; the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to the State’s duty to preserve evidence; and the trial court erred by imposing a mid-range sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Kevion McDonald, Defendant, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of both counts as charged in the indictment. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of thirty-one years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. Defendant initiated this appeal, arguing that the trial court: (1) improperly admitted a photographic lineup into evidence; (2) committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the definition of premeditation; and (3) improperly sentenced Defendant to twenty-five years in incarceration for attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with the definition of premeditation, an element of the offense of attempted first degree murder. However, we find the error harmless because the proof of premeditation was overwhelming. As a result, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

In 2020, the Defendant, Rickey Benson, filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36.1 seeking to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily denied the Defendant’s motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Jimmie Liddell, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; and one count of solicitation of aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-528 (2018) (solicitation of a person under eighteen years of age). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 110 years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Honaker, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his guilty plea hearing. Upon our review of the record, arguments of the parties, and pertinent authorities, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Adam Moates, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Lafaris Brown, was charged in two separate indictments with one count each of unlawful possession of a firearm and criminal gang offense enhancement. Case No. 114910, offense date January 6, 2019, was tried by jury on September 16, 2019, and Case No. 115023, offense date October 24, 2018, was tried in a bench trial on October 17, 2019. In both cases, which are consolidated on appeal, Defendant was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a firearm. He was acquitted of the criminal gang offense enhancement count in Case No. 114910, and the trial court dismissed the criminal gang offense enhancement count in Case No. 115023. On appeal, Defendant argues (1) in Case No. 115023, that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress; (2) in Case No. 114910, (a) that the trial court erred by denying a jury instruction on a necessity defense, and (b) improper prosecutorial argument; and (3) in both cases, that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in Case No. 11490; however, we determine that, in Case No. 115023, law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. Thus, we reverse the judgment of conviction in Case No. 115023.

Javier Alexander Rivas (“Defendant Rivas”) and Hayden S. Fryer (“Defendant Fryer”) (or collectively “the Defendants”) were each convicted by a Davidson County jury for first degree felony murder, first degree premediated murder, attempted aggravated burglary, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, burglary of an automobile, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and two counts of attempted first degree murder, for which the trial court sentenced both Defendant Rivas and Defendant Fryer to a total effective sentence of life plus fifty-two years. On appeal, Defendant Rivas argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of offenses; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Fryer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to his convictions for first degree premeditated murder and attempted aggravated burglary. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Damon Johnson, of second-degree murder, and the trial court imposed a sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, argues the trial court improperly commented on his right not to testify, and asserts the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jarod Marges Phillips, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because his claim was based on a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court that established a new rule of constitutional law. Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for seeking review of a dismissal of a motion to reopen a post-conviction petition, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Javarius Deshawn Baugh, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first-degree premeditated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Stephen Gerard Smith, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault, attempted aggravated assault, and three counts of domestic assault for offenses committed against his wife, and he received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. He sought and was denied post-conviction relief based on numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he alleges that he received ineffective assistance when trial counsel: (1) gave deficient advice regarding a plea offer; (2) failed to challenge a prospective juror; (3) argued in closing argument that the Petitioner was guilty of the misdemeanor offenses; (4) failed to object to testimony referring to the Petitioner’s prior incarceration; (5) failed to object to the prosecutor’s comment on the victim’s credibility; (6) failed to call witnesses; and (7) failed to interview witnesses. Because we conclude that the Petitioner has not established either deficiency or prejudice for each claim, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Jonathan Michael Bass, pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more, but less than $10,000, two counts of theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $2,500, one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or less, three counts of “doctor shopping,” and three counts of prescription drug fraud. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of eight years to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering partial consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Jaleen Genard Allen, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of a kidnapping, especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2018) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-305 (2018) (especially aggravated kidnapping), 39-17-1324 (2018) (subsequently amended) (firearm violation). The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and to six years for the firearm violation. The court ordered consecutive service, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus thirty-one years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Marvin Maurice DeBerry, of driving after having been declared a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”) and of three misdemeanor offenses not presented for appellate review. After his conviction but prior to his sentencing, an amendment to the statute that was the basis of his MVHO conviction went into effect, so that the Defendant’s conduct was no longer criminalized and, concomitantly, triggered no penalty. The trial court, after initially sentencing the Defendant to serve five years, modified the Defendant’s judgment to reflect that he was to be subjected to no penalty. On appeal, we are called to determine whether the Defendant may benefit from the savings statute in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112. We hold that the savings statute applies because Legislature’s act of removing punishment for the offense constitutes a lesser penalty. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment reducing the Defendant’s sentence.

Defendant-Appellant, Stacy Ann Givens, was indicted by a Henderson County grand jury of filing a false police report in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-502, a Class D felony, and misuse of 911 in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 7-86-316, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of both offenses. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to five years’ imprisonment for the filing a false police report conviction and thirty days’ imprisonment for the misuse of 911 conviction, to be served concurrently. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the filing a false police report conviction, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the Defendant an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Braxton Levar Taylor, of second-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm for which he received an effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying two, pre-trial motions to suppress the victim’s dying declaration, wherein the victim named the defendant as his shooter, and a photographic lineup which contained his picture and resulted in two witness identifications. The defendant also argues the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction concerning the victim’s dying declaration and in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Alexander R. Carino, Petitioner, appeals the summary dismissal of his 2020 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief which challenged his 2010 convictions for two counts of second degree murder. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Elgene K. Porter, acting pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his “Motion to Correct and/or Amend Sentence” pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Upon our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Timothy Leon Ledford, pleaded guilty to eleven counts of aggravated assault, and he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-four years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant challenges his sentence by arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, denying him alternative sentencing, and ordering consecutive sentencing. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Jimmie Dean Roy, pled guilty to five counts of identity theft and one count of identity theft trafficking, and he conceded that he violated the terms of his probation with respect to his prior convictions for three counts of burglary of an automobile and one count of theft of property valued over $1,000. The Defendant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement, and the trial court stayed the execution of the sentence and granted the Defendant a furlough to the drug court program. The Defendant subsequently fled the state. Following his arrest, the drug court removed him from the program, and the trial court ordered his sentences into execution. On appeal, the Defendant challenges his removal from the drug court program and argues that he was not afforded due process protections during the removal hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Russell Wheeler, Jr., of attempted aggravated statutory rape, attempted solicitation of a minor, and disorderly conduct. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his attempted aggravated statutory rape and attempted solicitation of a minor convictions. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in failing to merge his convictions and in ordering a sentence of confinement without requiring a psychosexual evaluation or properly considering the appropriate factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to the defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated statutory rape and disorderly conduct. However, we vacate the defendant’s conviction for attempted solicitation of a minor because the defendant was convicted of a crime which does not exist. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.