APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Brentnol Calvin James, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence of premeditation was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court erred by failing to provide a jury instruction on self-defense. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Monoleto D. Green, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his second petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we affirm.

After being indicted on multiple charges in two separate cases, Jamarea Dashon Alderson, Defendant, entered an open guilty plea to the offenses of aggravated assault, two counts of simple possession of marijuana, possession of oxycodone, possession of hydrocodone, and evading arrest.  The trial court denied alternative sentencing and sentenced Defendant to serve an effective sentence of five years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, ordering partial consecutive sentencing.  Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and ordering consecutive sentencing.  Defendant also challenges the trial court’s admission of testimony about pending charges during the sentencing hearing.  Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

The Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction
of resisting arrest. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-602(a) (“It is an offense for a person to
intentionally prevent or obstruct anyone known to the person to be a law enforcement
officer, or anyone acting in a law enforcement officer’s presence and at the officer’s
direction, from effecting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search of any person, including the
defendant, by using force against the law enforcement officer or another.”). The gravamen
of the Defendant’s challenge is not the sufficiency of the evidence offered to establish his
use of “force.” Instead, the Defendant asks us to focus on when the “force” occurred or
the Defendant’s pre- and post-arrest conduct. Because the State did not offer any evidence
of the Defendant’s use of force before his arrest, the Defendant argues, and I agree, that the
evidence supporting the resisting arrest conviction is insufficient as a matter of law.

Petitioner, Tracy L. Harris, pleaded guilty in Carroll County Circuit Court to first degree murder and aggravated rape and was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without parole. After unsuccessful challenges to his convictions and sentences in Tennessee and federal courts, Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (“The Act”), Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-301, et. seq., requesting DNA analysis on several items and samples taken from the crime scene. After the State responded in opposition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing and found that Petitioner had not met the statutory requirements of the Act. On appeal, Petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition. We conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing the petition, and we affirm.

The Defendant, Roderick Redmond, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2020) (subsequently amended) (rape of a child), 39-13- 504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of thirty years for rape of a child and ten years for aggravated sexual battery, for an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jaylon Hatch, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted premeditated first degree murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault in concert with two or more persons, a Class B felony; reckless endangerment by discharging a firearm into a habitation, a Class C felony; and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (first degree murder), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-13-103 (Supp. 2019) (reckless endangerment), 39-17-1324 (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended) (employing a firearm). The trial court imposed an effective twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was the perpetrator of the conviction offenses because they are based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joshua L. Hutcherson, pleaded guilty to four counts of vehicular assault, two counts of driving on a revoked license with a prior DUI, one count of leaving the scene of an accident with injuries, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, and one count of felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of fourteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in failing to apply an appropriate mitigating factor. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for corrected judgment forms.

The defendant, William Paul Climer, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated kidnapping and two counts of aggravated assault. On September 8, 2023, the defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated assault. Per the terms of his plea agreement, the defendant agreed to be sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Additionally, the State agreed to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping charge and the second count of aggravated assault. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a term of six years’ incarceration and imposed a fine of $2500. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in imposing a fine without making the appropriate findings. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing; however, the trial court failed to make the appropriate findings concerning the imposition of the $2500 fine, and therefore, we remand the matter to the trial court to determine if a fine is appropriate and make such findings as necessary.

The Defendant, David Alexander Hayes, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 39-16-602 (2018). The
Defendant was sentenced to ninety days’ probation. On appeal, he contends that the
evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Swafford, was convicted by a Hamblen County jury of especially
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and rape, for which he received an effective
sentence of fifty-five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is
insufficient to support his conviction of especially aggravated kidnapping and that the trial
court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the Defendant’s late wife.
After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Thor Lucas Coleman, of attempted first degree murder, aggravated assault by strangulation, aggravated assault by violating a restraining order, possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and unlawful possession of a weapon. The trial court sentenced him to a forty-five-year effective sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence against the victim; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted first degree murder. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Roger Trino Spencer, Jr., was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated robbery accomplished with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault by displaying a deadly weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged by a jury and sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective eighteen years’ confinement. The trial court also imposed an effective $15,000 fine and ordered Defendant to pay $971 in restitution. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the State failed to provide sufficient proof of his identity as the perpetrator of the offenses; the State’s improper comments during opening statement and closing argument entitle him to plain error relief; the trial court erred by failing to consider a validated risk and needs assessment in imposing his sentence; and the trial court erred by failing to consider his ability to pay in imposing fines and ordering restitution. Having reviewed the briefs and arguments of the parties and the record on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, a Cheatham County jury convicted Defendant, Jared A. Smith, of three counts of Rape of a Child, four counts of Aggravated Sexual Battery, and three counts of Incest, for which he received a total effective sentence of seventy-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of a police witness; (2) the State’s election of offenses was “vague, ambiguous and unsupported by the evidence,” in violation of his right to a unanimous jury verdict; and (3) the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on generic evidence.  Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. 

Petitioner, Rico Eugene Mallard, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 1999 especially aggravated robbery conviction, for which he was sentenced to twenty-two years’ incarceration to be served consecutively to his life sentence for first degree murder. The post-conviction court found that State v. Booker, 656 S.W.3d 49 (Tenn. 2022), did not establish a new constitutional right applicable to Petitioner’s case, and therefore, the statute of limitations was not tolled, and the petition was time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Timothy Dion Wells, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court
jury of second degree murder, for which he is serving a twenty-two-year sentence as a
Range I offender. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2018). On appeal, he contends that: (1)
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in various
evidentiary rulings, (3) he is entitled to a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of
multiple trial errors, and (4) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

Defendant, Desmond Lanier Hatchett, was convicted by a Knox County jury of evading
arrest with risk of death or injury, driving while his license was revoked, reckless driving,
violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the window tint law. The trial
court imposed an effective sentence of six years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing
that the trial court erred in imposing a six-year sentence for evading arrest with risk of
death or injury. Upon review of the entire record, briefs and oral arguments of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Ricky Hunt, pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, along with two amended petitions. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the post-conviction petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explain the corroboration requirement regarding accomplice testimony and for failing to help him file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because trial counsel failed to advise him that his sentence was required to be served at 100%. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

After three days of a Dickson County jury trial, the Defendant, Mendy Powell Neal, who was charged with the first degree premeditated and felony murder of her husband and the aggravated arson of their home, entered a North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), best interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, in exchange for the dismissal of the felony murder and aggravated arson counts of the presentment and an agreed range of three to four years, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentence. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, determined that she was not a suitable candidate for probation or other alternative sentencing, and sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to four years at 30% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following the denial of what the Defendant styled as a “Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court treated as a Rule 35 motion for a reduction in sentence, the Defendant filed an untimely appeal to this court in which she argues that the trial court erred in both the length and manner of service of the sentence. Based on our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not warrant that the timely notice of appeal requirement be waived for the Defendant’s attempt to appeal the trial court’s original sentencing determinations. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion by declining to reduce or modify the sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Calvin Dwight Butler, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor. As a
condition of his plea, the defendant agreed to a sentence of six years with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court
ordered the defendant to serve his six-year sentence incarcerated with the Tennessee
Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in
sentencing the defendant to a term of confinement. Upon our review of the record and the
parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Defendant, Joshua Anthony Williams, alias, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to statutory rape. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant was to receive a four-year sentence as a Range II offender to be served on probation following one year of confinement, and the trial court was to determine whether to grant judicial diversion and whether to require the Defendant to register as a sexual offender. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, extending the diversionary period to six years, and placed the Defendant on the sexual offender registry during the diversionary period. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in placing him on the sexual offender registry. We conclude that the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 and that the Defendant failed to satisfy the requirements for extraordinary relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Antonio M. Starnes, guilty of first degree premeditated murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus seventeen years and six months. On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in issuing a flight instruction; and (3) the trial court failed to properly poll the jury. We remand for entry of judgments reflecting the trial court’s dismissal of Counts 2, 4, 5, and 6. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, John Monzell Banks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Steven Alexander Greene, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, a Class
A felony, especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, especially aggravated burglary,
a Class B felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-
210 (2018) (second degree murder), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-
14-404 (2018) (subsequently amended) (especially aggravated burglary), 39-16-503
(2018) (tampering with evidence). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to
determine the length of the sentences, and the court imposed an effective sentence of
twenty-five years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by applying
the mitigating factors before applying the enhancement factors when imposing the
Defendant’s sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Cedric Jones, appeals the Criminal Court for Johnson County’s summary
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that the
sentence and fines imposed against him were excessive, the trial judge and jurors should
have been disqualified, his prosecution was a violation of double jeopardy, the indictment
against him was defective, and the judgments were facially void. The State contends that
the grounds raised are not cognizable under habeas corpus and that the indictment vested
the trial court with jurisdiction to render its judgment. Based on our review, we affirm the
habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.