APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Grundy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Joe Patrick, of two counts of rape of a child, and the trial court ordered an effective sentence of sixty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the trial court’s judgments. State v. Patrick, M2019-02026-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2102914, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2021), perm. app. denied. (Tenn. Feb. 10, 2022). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal requires us to determine whether the Tennessee Public Participation Act mandates dismissal of Appellants/Builders’ slander claim and whether the trial court properly awarded attorney’s fees. After Appellants filed a construction lien against Appellees/Homeowners’ property, Appellees filed a complaint against Appellants with the Tennessee Board of Licensing Contractors, wherein they asserted that Appellants did not have a valid Tennessee contractor’s license. After Appellees filed the instant lawsuit, Appellants filed a counter-complaint, asserting, as relevant here, a claim for defamation based on allegedly false statements made to the Board regarding Appellants’ licensure. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss Appellants’ slander claim. Appellees’ motion, which was predicated on the dismissal provision contained in the Tennessee Public Participation Act, asserted that Appellants’ defamation claim was filed in response to Appellees’ exercise of their constitutional right to free speech on a matter of public concern. The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for partial dismissal and awarded attorney’s fees. Appellants appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Ricky Burnette, was convicted by a Knox County jury of theft between $2,500 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and sentenced to twelve years’ incarceration as a career offender. In this direct appeal, he contends: (1) the trial court erred when it determined that his convictions from 1991were admissible for impeachment purposes; (2) the trial court improperly limited the testimony of a witness concerning an ongoing investigation, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting testimony regarding the contents of a stolen vehicle, (4) the trial court erred in failing to give a curative instruction after a witness referred to Defendant’s “classification,” (5) the trial court improperly bolstered the State’s expert witness by asking a hypothetical question, (6) the trial court improperly sustained an objection to the cross-examination of a State’s witness, (7) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight, and (8) the cumulative effect of these alleged errors entitles him to relief. Upon a review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Scott Bradley Price, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000 and was sentenced
by the trial court as a Range II offender to eight years in the Tennessee Department of
Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues
that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on unauthorized use of a vehicle as a
lesser-included offense. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s
verdict. We further conclude that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the
unauthorized use of a vehicle as a lesser-included offense, but that the failure to charge the
lesser-included offense was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no reasonable
jury would have convicted the Defendant of the lesser-included offense under the facts of
this case. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, Anthony Cartwright, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the Petitioner’s challenge to the amendment of his indictment does not state a cognizable ground for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In April of 2024, the Defendant, Justin James Cruger Wendricks, pleaded guilty to two
counts of evading arrest in a motor vehicle, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of
resisting arrest, and one count of driving on a suspended license, stipulating to the facts
contained in the warrant. The Defendant agreed to a sentence of eight years, suspended to
supervised probation after the service of twelve months of incarceration. In September of
2024, the trial court filed a probation violation warrant alleging that the Defendant had
absconded. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered
him to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant
contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement.
After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Martin B.Montemayor, pled guilty to second-degree murderand received a life imprisonment sentence without the possibility of parole. Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court in Rutherford County denied relief after a hearing, and Petitioner appealed to this Court. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition because (1) his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; (2)he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) he was incorrectly sentenced as a repeat violent offender. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Oscar Romero, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of rape, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-503 (2018) (subsequently amended). On appeal, he asserts that the proof is insufficient to sustain his conviction, that the trial court erred by excluding rebuttal evidence to impeach the victim, and that the court erred in its application of an enhancement factor during sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal, filed pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, from a clerk and master’s denial of a motion to recuse. Finding that the appeal of the clerk and master’s ruling should have gone to the Chancellor, we dismiss the appeal.

The plaintiff filed this lawsuit in circuit court against the University of Tennessee (at Martin), alleging twelve separate counts relating to the University’s handling of a charitable gift made by the plaintiff. The claims ranged from breach of contract to defamation to infliction of emotional distress, among others.The circuit court granted the University’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Tennessee Claims Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over suits against the Statefor the torts alleged by the plaintiff and any breach of contract claim. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

In protracted litigation concerning a dispute over church property, a new chancellor took office several years after a jury verdict, post-trial motions, and an order granting partial summary judgment. The new chancellor set aside the jury verdict and the summary judgment order. We have determined that, under the unique circumstances of this case, the trial court erred in setting aside the jury verdict and in setting aside the order granting partial summary judgment.Therefore, we reverse and remand.

The Tennessee Department of Revenue issued a business tax assessment against a companybased on the company’s gross receipts from sales of computer software, cloud hosting, and cloud-based services.The company challenged the assessment by filing a complaint in the chancery court. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted summaryjudgmentto the company, finding that the sales of computer software and cloud hosting were not subject to business tax. The court upheld the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s assessment of business tax against the company’s sales of cloud-based services. Lastly, the courtfound that the company was the prevailing party and awarded the company attorney’s fees pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1803(d). The Tennessee Department of Revenue appealed. Discerning that the court erred in its determination that the company’s cloud hosting sales were not subject to business tax, we reverse that portion of the court’s decision. Because this affects the attorney’s fees award, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

In this case, we determine whether prejudgment interest may be awarded in an action brought against a tortfeasor and defended by an uninsured motorist carrier under Tennessee’s Uninsured Motorist Act. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 56-7-1201–1206 (2016 & Supp. 2025). The trial court determined that Plaintiff Cinda Haddon could not recover prejudgment interest because her claim was for personal injury. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Ms. Haddon brought a contract action. Haddon v. Vanlier, No. M2023-01151-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 4590434, at *2–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. March 17, 2025). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals remanded this matter to the trial court for a determination of prejudgment interest. Id. at *5. Upon review, we find that this is a personal injury action. Because prejudgment interest is not available in a personal injury action, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court denying Ms. Haddon prejudgment interest.

Appellant was named conservator over her mother in 2019 over her sibling’s objection and posted a $25,000.00 surety bond in connection with the conservatorship. After several years in which accountings were approved by the trial court, a new judge was designated to preside over the case. The new trial judge refused to approve several of the expenses in the later accountings, finding that they were either not for the benefit of the ward or constituted payment to the conservator without prior court approval. As a result, the trial court ruled that the conservator was required to reimburse over $30,000.00 in expenses to the conservatorship account. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that these expenses were unauthorized and directing reimbursement, as well as in granting a judgment to the conservator’s surety for the amount it paid to reimburse the conservatorship account pursuant to the surety bond. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this matter involving alleged violations of federal and state wiretapping statutes,
evidence was presented to a jury during a two-day trial. Following the conclusion of the
trial, the jury deliberated and ultimately found in favor of the defendant. The trial court
entered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial. The trial court denied the
motion, and the plaintiffs timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, Bruce Bowen, for review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce his pretrial bond.  See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144.  The State opposes.  For the reasons discussed below, the Defendant’s motion is denied.

The Defendants, Tony Banks and Tyrone Banks, were both convicted of misdemeanor assault following a bench trial, and they each received sentences of ten months. On appeal, the Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and that the trial courterred by allowing a State’s witness to testify remotely through the use of a videoconferencing platform. After our review of the record and the applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joseph Trent McGregor, was convicted by a Carroll County Circuit Court
jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor; and
was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective term of four years in
the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant raises a single issue in this
appeal: whether the trial court erred in refusing the Defendant’s request for special jury
instructions on pretextual stops, unlawful detentions, and attempted unlawful arrests. We
conclude that the Defendant has waived our consideration of the issue based on the
inadequacy of his brief, which fails to provide any meaningful argument or appropriate
references to the record. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendants, EvelynD.Kennedy1and Christoper L. Kennedy, bring this consolidated appeal from their convictions for firstdegree felony murder and aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adultresulting in serious bodily injury,a Class B felony. SeeT.C.A. §§39-13-202(a)(2)(2018) (subsequently amended) (felony murder),39-15-508 (2025) (aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult resulting in serious bodily injury).
The trial court sentenced both Defendants toconcurrent terms oflife for their felony murder convictions and twelve years for their aggravated neglect convictions. On appeal, the Defendants contend that: (1) their convictions violate the ex post factoprotections of the State and federal constitutions and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting graphic autopsy photographs. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff/Appellant has filed an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, Section 2, seeking review of the Davidson County General Sessions Court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to recuse the General Sessions judge in a civil warrant proceeding against Defendant/Appellee.  We conclude this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a Rule 10B appeal from the General Sessions Court of Davidson County when it is not exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a court of record.  Accordingly, this appeal is transferred to the Circuit Court of Davidson County for disposition.

The Petitioner, Demetrice Livingston, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief from his second degree murder conviction. On appeal, the
Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition after
concluding that trial counsel provided effective assistance of counsel. After review,
we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant in this case, Jay Burroughs Chandler, was charged with fifty-four counts of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 by possessing material depicting a minor child engaged in sexual activity.  Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions to suppress, both of which the trial court denied.  After a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged.  The trial court subsequently imposed an effective sentence of one hundred years in prison.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying both of his motions to suppress and in sentencing him.  We affirm the Defendant’s convictions.  We vacate the Defendant’s sentence and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing.

A Maury County jury convicted Defendant, Ethan Allen Compton, of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence and unlawfully carrying or possessing a weapon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. On appeal, Defendant contends that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(f)(1)(A), which prohibits a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution on its face. Upon review, we conclude that Code section 39-17-1307(f)(1)(A) is constitutional on its face. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s analysis on three key points.

Defendant, Gerry Stitts, appeals from his jury convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.