APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pro se petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition seeking error coram nobis relief.1 Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Servadio M. Boyd, was convicted on a plea of guilty of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell before the Davidson County Criminal Court in 2014. As part of his plea agreement with the State, Defendant agreed to an eight-year sentence with the manner of service to be decided by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. Prior to his sentencing hearing, however, Defendant left the jurisdiction. He was then arrested and convicted of dealing in cocaine and conspiracy to commit dealing in cocaine in the Vanderburgh Circuit Court of Indiana, for which he received a sentence of thirteen years’ incarceration. Based upon his failure to appear at his sentencing hearing in Davidson County, the trial court issued an arrest warrant and lodged a detainer against Defendant. In 2019, Defendant filed, in the Davidson County Criminal Court, a motion to dismiss the detainer, arguing that the charges against him should be dismissed with prejudice based on an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. Following a hearing and briefing by the parties, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and dismissed the case against Defendant. The State appealed. Following a thorough review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Ambreia Tavaris Washington, was convicted in a bifurcated trial by a Madison County jury of attempted first degree murder where the victim suffered serious bodily injury (count one), unlawful employment of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count two), three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence (counts three, four, and five), unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony drug offense (count six), and two counts of unlawfully employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of a dangerous felony (counts seven and eight). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sixty-three-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that because there was insufficient evidence of serious bodily injury, his conviction in count one should be reduced to attempted first degree murder without the serious bodily injury sentencing enhancement, and that the trial court erred in imposing discretionary consecutive sentencing. Following review of the entire record, oral arguments, briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce appeal, the husband challenges the trial court’s classification of real estate as marital property and
its ruling regarding dissipation of the marital estate. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

A tenured teacher sought judicial review of her reprimand and one-day suspension. The chancery court modified the discipline imposed by the director of schools. Because we conclude that the teacher did not timely petition for judicial review, we vacate the judgment with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A Dyer County jury found the Defendant, Gerald Myers, guilty of attempted second degree murder and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions because he acted in self-defense. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment,
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Petitioner, Daniel Ward, was convicted of ten counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to fifty-four years of incarceration, and this court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. The post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing, and Petitioner now timely appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Denver Christian Smith, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal
Court jury of first degree felony murder, attempted second degree murder, and attempted
carjacking. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree
murder), 39-13-210 (2014) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder), 39-13-404
(2018) (carjacking), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt). On appeal, the Defendant
contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress
his statements to the police and (2) no reasonable trier of fact could find that the Defendant
failed to establish his insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a dispute over recovery under the Tennessee uninsured/underinsured motorist statutory scheme. The plaintiffs initiated a lawsuit against the defendant driver and served notice on their own insurance carrier. The plaintiffs also served notice on the insurance carrier covering the borrowed vehicle that the plaintiffs had been utilizing when the accident occurred. The plaintiffs’ insurer entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs for $50,000 each, an amount that equaled the policy limit of the uninsured motorist coverage provided in the policy covering the borrowed vehicle. The defendant driver’s insurer also entered into a settlement with the plaintiffs, paying them $30,000 each. The uninsured motorist carrier covering the borrowed vehicle filed a motion for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance carrier upon concluding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-1201(b)(3)(D) and the policy covering the borrowed vehicle limited the plaintiffs’ recovery via judgment to an amount no greater than the policy providing the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage. Plaintiffs have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Defendant, Hollie Whipple, pled guilty to especially aggravated burglary, aggravated
assault by use of a deadly weapon, and aggravated assault in connection with her
perpetration of a home invasion in Fayette County. After a sentencing hearing, the trial
court imposed an effective sentence of ten years’ incarceration at 100% service rate. She
argues on appeal that her sentence is excessive and the trial court erred in denying
probation. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Terrance Holliday, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by denying his
motion for recusal and by finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Based
on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Larry E. Orozco, was originally convicted of two counts of attempted
second-degree murder, two counts of unlawful employment of a firearm during an attempt
to commit a dangerous felony, and seven counts of reckless endangerment committed with
a deadly weapon, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-one years’
imprisonment. This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal; however, appellate
review of his sentence was waived because the record did not include the sentencing
hearing transcript. The Defendant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court granted a delayed appeal. The
Defendant now challenges the consecutive nature of his sentence and contends the trial
court erred in finding that he was a dangerous offender, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-
115(b)(4), and in failing to make the necessary findings pursuant to State v. Wilkerson,
905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995). Upon our review, we detect clerical errors in the judgments
and remand for entry of corrected judgments in counts 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, and 19. In all
other respects, we affirm.

The Petitioner, acting pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Upon our review, we affirm.

Loring Justice (“Justice”) filed a complaint against Kim Nelson (“Nelson”); David Valone (“Valone”) and the Law
Office of David Valone (collectively, “Valone Defendants”); and Martha Meares (“Meares”), and Meares and
Associates and/or Meares and Dillard (collectively, “Meares Defendants”), (collectively, “Defendants”) in the
Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). Justice alleged, inter alia, wrongful execution of judgment and
abuse of process. Nelson filed a motion to classify Justice’s action as an abusive civil action (“ACA”) pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-41-101, et seq. The Trial Court granted Nelson’s ACA motion, and Justice appealed. Having
reviewed the evidence, we affirm, albeit for somewhat different reasons than provided by the Trial Court.

This appeal concerns a dispute over insurance coverage. After a fire loss, the insured brought a breach of contract claim against her insurer. The insurer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the insured was not entitled to coverage for additional living expenses because she did not have an insurable interest in the property and that the insured’s contents coverage claim was precluded under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The insured appeals. We reverse and remand.

The prisoner in this case filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis long after expiration of the one-year limitations period and sought tolling of the statute of limitations. The petition was filed under the tolling exception to the coram nobis statute of limitations adopted by this Court in Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001). The coram nobis court held a hearing on whether to toll the statute of limitations. It accepted the factual allegations in the coram nobis petition as true, but determined that the new evidence did not show that the petitioner was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted, so he was not entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition as untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the coram nobis court on the tolling exception, reversed the dismissal for untimeliness, and remanded for a hearing on the allegations in the petition. On appeal, we hold that if a petition for a writ of error coram nobis is not timely filed and seeks tolling of the statute of limitations, it must be based on new evidence, discovered after expiration of the limitations period, that clearly and convincingly shows that the petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime, i.e., that the petitioner did not commit the crime. To obtain tolling of the coram nobis statute of limitations, the prisoner must file the petition no more than one year after he discovers the new evidence of actual innocence. From our review of the record, we agree with the analysis and conclusion of the coram nobis court and find no error. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and affirm the decision of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition as untimely.

Petitioner, John David Smartt, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claims that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to prepare him to testify and failing to object to testimony concerning a recorded phone call between the victim (“J.S.”)¹ and Petitioner. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I agree with the majority that the trial court correctly dismissed Mr. Clardy’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis without conducting a hearing on the merits because the petition was untimely and was not entitled to tolling. I also agree with the majority that the trial court handled and decided this case exactly as it should have. Thus, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

In this parental termination case, the paternal grandparents filed a petition to terminate the
mother’s parental rights to her four children, alleging several grounds for termination. The
trial court found that one ground for termination had been proven and that termination of
the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Based on these findings,
the court terminated the mother’s parental rights. The mother appeals. We affirm the trial
court’s finding that the termination ground of abandonment by wanton disregard pursuant
to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv)(c) has been proven and that
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Accordingly,
we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s dismissal of a complaint for race discrimination for failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

The plaintiff filed a health care liability action without a certificate of good faith. When the defendant moved to dismiss, the plaintiff asserted that the certificate was unnecessary because the common knowledge exception applied. He also contended that his noncompliance should be excused based on the defendant’s failure to timely provide medical records and/or for extraordinary cause. The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and dismissed the action with prejudice. We affirm.

The trial court entered a permanent parenting plan in 2014 that governed the parties’ custody arrangement for nine years. In 2022, the child’s father petitioned the juvenile court for a modification of the parenting plan. During the pendency of the modification petition, he also filed a motion for a restraining order to prevent the child’s mother from removing the parties’ daughter from his custody, which was granted. After a hearing on the modification petition, the court found a material change in circumstances had occurred warranting modification and that modification of the custody arrangement was in the child’s best interest. We affirm.

In 2020, the Petitioner, Ronnie Dale Whitener, pleaded guilty to one count of the sale of and one count of the possession of less than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, as well as one count of theft and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of ten years of incarceration. In March 2023, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which is not included in the record. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

In this divorce action, the wife contends that the trial court inequitably divided the parties’
marital estate. The trial court awarded the husband the divorce on the ground of
irreconcilable differences, classified the parties’ assets as separate or marital, and then
divided the parties’ marital estate. The court also determined that an award of alimony to
the wife was not appropriate and further denied the wife’s motion for civil contempt. This
appeal by the wife followed. Due to the wife’s failure to file a table that lists “all properties
and debts considered by the trial court, including: (1) all separate property, (2) all marital
property, and (3) all separate and marital debts,” as required by Court of Appeals Rule 7,
along with other deficiencies in the wife’s brief, we conclude that she has waived her issues
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.