APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Shawn Sheeks (“Decedent”) and Paul Slate (“Mr. Slate”) co-owned and managed several business entities. Following Decedent’s untimely death, Mr. Slate, acting on behalf of the businesses they co-owned, filed a Verified Claim against Decedent’s estate in the Chancery Court (Probate Division) for Montgomery County seeking an accounting and damages of $382,207.48. Shortly thereafter, Janet Sheeks (“Ms. Sheeks”), Decedent’s widow and the Administratrix of the Decedent’s estate, filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (hereinafter “the Business Court”) on behalf of herself and Decedent’s estate against Mr. Slate seeking an accounting and to windup and dissolve the business entities. Mr. Slate filed a counterclaim against the estate and Ms. Slate, as well as cross-claims against the business entities, seeking an accounting and payment for debts allegedly owed to him. While the Claim in the Probate Court was held in abeyance, all claims by and among the parties in the Business Court were tried. In a detailed and thorough final order, the Business Court ordered dissolution of the business entities and allocated the distribution of the assets among the parties after applying offsets and credits. No one appealed the judgment from the Business Court. Thereafter, the Administratrix of the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment in this Probate Court proceeding contending the Claim should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata. The Probate Court granted the motion and summarily dismissed the Claim on the ground of res judicata finding that the Claim was not a separate and distinct cause of action from the Business Court action, that the underlying facts at issue were the same in both lawsuits, and that the Claim could have, and should have, been litigated in the Business Court action. We affirm.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Marc Anthony Crowder, of first-degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The defendant also contends the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Joseph Ervin Bobo, the Defendant, was convicted by a Knox County jury of one count of conspiracy to possess three hundred grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell and one count of conspiracy to possess twenty-six grams or more of cocaine with the intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell. See T.C.A §§39-17-417 (a)(4), (c), (j)(2021Supp.) (subsequently amended) (possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell);39-12-103 (2025) (conspiracy). The Defendant alleges that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing. The State responds that the Defendant’s appeal should be dismissed because this court does not have jurisdiction as no valid notice of appeal was filed. We dismiss the appeal.

This appeal involves a complaint to quiet title and for injunctive relief and damages
stemming from a boundary line dispute. The defendant, a farming corporation, executed a
deed containing a written description that included an 11.28-acre area of land which lies
along the southern border of its property. The plaintiffs became aware of the deed and
filed this action, alleging that they owned the 11.28 acres at issue. Both parties claimed to
have paid taxes on the disputed area for many years. The plaintiffs had their property
surveyed, and the surveyor determined that they owned the disputed area. The farm had
its property surveyed twice. Those surveyors agreed the farm owned the disputed area.
The chancery court found that both parties had paid taxes on the disputed area for at least
the preceding 20 years. The chancery court also determined that the surveys provided by
the defendant farm accurately reflected the boundary line at issue and found it owned the
disputed area. The court also made an alternative holding that the farm had acquired the
disputed property by adverse possession. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This appeal arises out of a divorce proceeding. Appellant and appellee married in 2007. Appellee filed the current divorce action in the trial court on February 8, 2021. The parties entered into a reconciliation agreement suspending the divorce proceeding on July 24, 2023. The trial court set aside this agreement on July 19, 2024 at appellee’s request. A trial was held on November 4, 2024. The trial court ordered the parties divorced on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct by appellant; divided the marital estate; entered a permanent parenting plan designating appellee as primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children; and awarded appellee child support, transitional alimony, and attorney’s fees. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Anthony Todd Ghormley, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his convictions and his effective 105-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In May 2024, the Petitioner, Laura Naomi Clifton, pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual
exploitation of a minor via electronic means, and the trial court entered the agreed sentence
of concurrent two-year sentences, to be served at 30%. The plea agreement specified that
the Petitioner would not be placed on the sex offender registry. After serving her sentence,
the Petitioner was placed on the sex offender registry and forced to comply with its
requirements. Accordingly, she filed a petition for post-conviction relief. During the
hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court offered her time to consider her options.
She went to the parking lot to consider the matter and, while she was outside, the postconviction
court dismissed her petition for failure to prosecute. The Petitioner asked the
post-conviction court to reconsider, and it denied her request. After a review of the record,
we reverse the post-conviction court’s judgment, and we remand the case for a hearing
during which the Petitioner should be given the opportunity to pursue her petition for postconviction
relief.

Petitioner, Jeremy James Dalton, appeals from the Fentress County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis as untimely. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, Joshua Cortez Moten, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; evading arrest in a
motor vehicle, a Class D felony; and possession of ANPP, a Schedule II controlled
substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of nine years at 85% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Horace Palmer Williamson, III, was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder, two counts of first-degree premeditated murder,1 two counts of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of felon in possession of a weapon. The jury imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on the murder counts, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty-five years on the remaining counts. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Cortez Moten, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court
jury of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class B felony; evading arrest in a
motor vehicle, a Class D felony; and possession of ANPP, a Schedule II controlled
substance, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective
term of nine years at 85% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative
sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The parties in the underlying action are a plaintiff hospital, Springfield Health Services, LLC, d/b/a TriStar NorthCrest Medical Center (“NorthCrest”), and defendant dialysis services company, Sanderling Renal Services-USA, LLC (“Sanderling”). Sanderling and NorthCrest executed a contract wherein Sanderling agreed to provide dialysis and telehealth services to patients at NorthCreston a fee schedule. A disagreement arose between the parties over which party was responsible for securing payments from third-party providers, and Sanderling terminated the parties’ agreement as a result. Sanderling then submitted a demand for arbitration to the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (“JAMS”) pursuant to the arbitration provision in the parties’ contract. After the arbitrator delivered an award in favor of NorthCrest, Sanderling filed a notice of appeal pursuant to the JAMS optional appeals procedure, relying on language in the parties’ contract providing that the parties had “reserve[d]the right to contest the arbitrator’s decision and to appeal from any award.” NorthCrest objected to application of the JAMS optional appellate procedures, arguing that the contested phrase was not an agreement to submit to the JAMS appellate process but instead reserved only the parties’ statutory right to judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision. JAMS appointed an appellate arbitration panel, who dismissed the JAMS appeal due to NorthCrest’s objection, noting that the JAMS optional appellate procedures required both parties to agree to the appeal in writing. NorthCrest then filed an application for confirmation of the arbitration award in the trial court, to which Sanderling filed a response in opposition and a motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the JAMS appellate procedures. Deferring to the JAMS panel’s decision to dismiss the appeal, the trial court denied Sanderling’s motion to compel appellate arbitration and confirmed the arbitration award in NorthCrest’s favor. Sanderling has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This matter is before the Court upon motion of the Defendant, James Patrick Spain, for review of the trial court’s order denying his “Motion to Reconsider Bond.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 8; Tenn. Code. Ann. § 40-11-144. The State opposes.

Defendant, Nicholas Alberts, appeals his convictions for three counts of possession with intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture a controlled substance; seven counts of various firearm offenses; and one count of failure to maintain his lane of travel—convictions for which he received an effective sentence of thirty-two years. On appeal, Defendant’s sole challenge is to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop, arguing that police lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. After review, we conclude that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and affirm Defendant’s convictions.

The pro se Petitioner, Thomas N. Allen, appeals the habeas corpus court’s summary
dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus for failure to state a cognizable
claim for relief. Specifically, the Petitioner alleges that his life sentence for first degree
murder is illegal and his judgment of conviction is void because (1) the trial court’s
comments regarding parole eligibility were in direct contravention of the relevant statute
and (2) the statutory sentencing scheme for persons convicted of first degree murder
rendered his sentence unfairly disparate and in direct contravention to the purposes and
principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“the Sentencing
Act”). He further claims that the habeas corpus court erred by failing to appoint him
counsel despite the Petitioner’s indigent status. After review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason White, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, he contends that the
indictment, which charged him with conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with the
intent to sell and deliver within a drug-free school zone, was fatally defective, which
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction and rendered the judgments void. Based upon our
review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. The trial court found multiple
grounds for termination and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. We affirm.

Parents, on behalf of their deceased child, filed a health care liability action against an obstetrician, alleging that the infant’s death was the result of negligent medical treatment during delivery. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the parents argue that the trial court erred in: (1) limiting the testimony of their causation expert and excluding his exhibits and demonstrative aids; (2) denying a motion in limine to prohibit a line of questioning and argument by the defense; (3) excluding evidence of the suspension of the defendant’s medical license; (4) refusing a request for a special jury instruction on informed consent; and (5) declining to grant a new trial based on misconduct of defense counsel during closing argument. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Dusty Mink, was indicted by the Knox County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, assault, unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and evading arrest. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to sever the offenses, and the count charging unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon was tried separately.1 A jury convicted Defendant of unlawful possession of a weapon, and the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant raises seven issues: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon; 2) whether the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s two motions for continuance based on the unavailability of expert witnesses; 3) whether the trial court erred by excluding a defense expert absent proof of Defendant’s drug use; 4) whether the trial court should have given the jury a Ferguson instruction; 5) whether the State’s closing argument was improper; 6) whether the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors entitles Defendant to relief; and 7) whether the trial court erred in classifying Defendant as a Range III offender. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Billy Joe Baggett, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Alfonvo Montell Johnson, appeals his Bradley County Criminal Court jury convictions of facilitation of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, evidence tampering, abuse of a corpse, and attempted abuse of a corpse, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support certain of his convictions and that the absence of an election with regard to the charge of evidence tampering entitles him to a new trial on that offense. Because the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions of abuse of a corpse and attempted abuse of a corpse, we reverse those convictions and dismiss the charges. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Defendant, Christopher Strater Falls, appeals from his convictions for first degree felony murder and theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to establish a theft of the victim’s vehicle or that he was the perpetrator of the victim’s murder. The Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain hearsay statements made by the victim, including large portions of a four-page letter she had authored expressing her fear of the Defendant and her desire to end their relationship, as well as pointing toward him as a suspect in the event of her death, under the “then existing state of mind” exception of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(3). After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Keith Richardson, appeals his Perry County Circuit Court convictions of five counts each of statutory rape by an authority figure and incest, four counts of rape, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count each of continuous sexual abuse of a child, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction of aggravated rape, (2) he did not properly waive his right to a jury trial pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 23, and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we remand the Defendant’s judgments of conviction for rape in count 21and statutory rape in count 22for the entry of corrected judgments. We otherwise discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant and Appellee agreed ona permanent parenting planthat provided for equal parenting timeof their minorchildafter their divorce.Appellee later sought to relocate with the childto pursue an employment opportunityin Georgia.One hundred four days after Appellee filed a relocation petition, Appellant filedan answer opposing the relocation. Thetrialcourt permitted the relocationand struck Appellant’s opposition because it was filedafter the expiration of the thirty-day period set forth inTennesseeCode Annotated section 36-6-108.The courtamended the parties’ parenting accordingly.Onappeal, Appellantargues the trial court erred in striking his response as untimely.We affirm thejudgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Mena Mekhaen Boutrous, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion for due process tolling of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s statute of limitations. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to due process tolling because his mental health issues rendered him incompetent during the one-year limitations period. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.