APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant in this case, Jay Burroughs Chandler, was charged with fifty-four counts of violating Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1003 by possessing material depicting a minor child engaged in sexual activity.  Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions to suppress, both of which the trial court denied.  After a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged.  The trial court subsequently imposed an effective sentence of one hundred years in prison.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying both of his motions to suppress and in sentencing him.  We affirm the Defendant’s convictions.  We vacate the Defendant’s sentence and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing.

This appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Appellees, finding that Appellant’s own inattention was the cause of her accident and that she was more than 50% at fault for her injuries.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Sharod Demon Greer, was convicted by a jury of aggravated sexual battery and assault by offensive touching, for which the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his aggravated sexual battery conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any touching of the victim was sexually motivated and (2) the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing when it imposed the maximum in-range sentence for aggravated sexual battery because it did not explain why the sentence was more justly deserved than a lesser sentence. After review, we affirm.

Defendant, Gerry Stitts, appeals from his jury convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

The Defendant, Ronald David Ballard, was convicted in the Henderson County Circuit Court of fifteencounts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court mergedall counts andsentenced himas a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-eight years in confinementfor count one. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to showhe constructively possessed the firearm.Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the Defendant’s convictionsbut remand the case to the trial court for sentencing on counts two through fifteenand for correction of the judgments pursuant to State v. Berry, 503 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tenn. 2015).

The Petitioner, Jason Henderson, Jr., appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,claimingthat he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Inthis case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the Shelby County Chancery Court (“trial court”) determined that one statutory ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

After an extended trial, the court adopted a permanent parenting plan for the child of unwed parents and determined the father’s child support obligation.  Mother takes issue with both decisions.  Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. 

In 2016, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Earnest Costosteno Woodley, of four counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder. The trial court sentenced him as a repeat violent offender to four concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Nine years later, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his criminal history did not qualify him as a repeat violent offender. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application, concluding that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. The Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, William Lloyd Smith, III, pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and received an agreed sentence of eight years as a Range I offender, to be served on probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in revoking probation rather than allowing him furlough to a residential treatment facility previously approved by his probation officer. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Michael Fiedler, appeals his Henry County Circuit Court conviction of driving ona suspended license, for which he received a sentence of 180 days’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court erred by finding that heknowingly and voluntarily waived his right to the assistance of counsel. He also argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing or to make the requisite findingspursuant to State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tenn. 2000),insupportofits determination that confinement was particularly suited to provide an effective deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses. The State responds that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a within range sentence. Following our review, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Devon D. Holloway, of theft of property, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of twelve years’incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant raises twoissues: (1) whether the evidence was legally sufficient to sustain his conviction for theft; and (2) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight.Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joshua Linebarger, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. After pleading guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to theft, reckless burning, and assault and receiving an effective ten-year sentence, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition outside the one-year statute of limitations. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was untimely on its face and that principles of due process did not toll the limitations period. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In January 2023, the Montgomery County Grand Jury issued a four-count indictment charging Miracle A’sha Bailey (“Defendant Bailey”) and Robert Jaylen Holland (“Defendant Holland”) with first degree premeditated murder (Count 1), evading arrest in an automobile causing a risk of death or serious bodily injury (Count 2), and theft of property valued at more than $10,000 (Count 3).  Defendant Holland was also charged with evading arrest (Count 4).  Following a joint trial, the jury convicted Defendant Bailey of first degree premeditated murder and the lesser-included offenses of evading arrest in an automobile in Count 2 and joyriding in Count 3, for which the trial court imposed an effective life sentence.  The jury convicted Defendant Holland of first degree premeditated murder, evading arrest in an automobile causing a risk of death or serious bodily injury, the lesser-included offense of joyriding in Count 3, and evading arrest, for which the trial court imposed an effective life sentence.

On appeal, Defendant Bailey contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting a detective’s body camera recording of a doorbell camera video; (2) the chain of custody for her cell phone and the victim’s cell phone was insufficiently established; (3) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs; (4) the trial court erred by finding that the automobile’s owner was not a material witness; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity; and (6) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight.  For his part, Defendant Holland contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity and by issuing an “inaccurate” instruction on flight; (3) his right to confront witnesses was violated when the trial court allowed an expert witness to testify who did not perform the gunshot residue (“GSR”) testing; and (4) the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs.  After a thorough review of the evidence and applicable case law, we affirm.  We also determine that there is a clerical error in Defendant Holland’s judgment form in Count 2 and remand for entry of a corrected judgment. 

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Johnny Robert McBee, of first degree premeditated murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to bifurcate the unlawful possession charge from the first degree murder charge. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Waynard Q. Winbush, appeals the dismissalof his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This is a termination of parental rights appeal. The trial court found clear and convincing
evidence to terminate father’s parental rights to the minor child on three statutory
grounds: abandonment by failure to support, father’s confinement as the result of a criminal
sentence of ten or more years when the child was under eight years old, and father’s failure
to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody of
the child. The trial court further concluded that termination was in the child’s best interest.
We vacate the trial court’s finding as to father’s failure to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume custody of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all
other respects.

This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action concerning the rezoning of property
by the Jefferson City Council. The trial court affirmed the rezoning. We now affirm the
ruling of the trial court.

The appeal concerns the scope and enforceability of a liability waiver.  The trial court determined the liability waiver applied to the plaintiff’s claims of personal injury and granted the defendant summary judgment.  We agree and affirm

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a defective petition for writ of certiorari for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the Appellee’s motion to dismiss after Appellant failed to verify and notarize the petition under the requirements set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Dickson County jury convicted the Defendant, Barry J. Zbleski, Jr., of second degree murder by the unlawful distribution of fentanyl or carfentanil and of the knowing sale and distribution of fentanyl resulting in death or bodily injury. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder; and (2) whether the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by admitting testimony from a substitute medical examiner. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal requires us to determine whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for recusal, which was brought pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02.  Because Appellant’s petition fails to comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B§ 1.01, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s modification of a residential schedule in which the
trial court awarded the parents equal co-parenting time. We now affirm.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce.  The parties were married over twenty years and had three children.  The mother was a stay-at-home parent while Father was employed. At trial, they stipulated to separate parenting schedules for their two teenagers but could not agree on a parenting schedule for their youngest daughter, a former foster child they had adopted years earlier.  The trial court designated the father primary residential parent of the youngest daughter and adopted a parenting schedule with equal parenting time on an alternating weekly basis.  The trial court denied the mother’s request for alimony in futuro and awarded her transitional alimony for a period of five months.  The trial court ordered the father to pay $6,000 of the mother’s attorney fees, but each party was deemed responsible for the remainder of his or her own attorney fees.  The mother appeals.  We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Worker employed by a temporary staffing agency was assigned to one of the agency’s clients and then injured while working. In suing the client for negligence, the worker relied on the contract between agency and client that provided that such assignees would not be considered employees of the client. The trial court granted summary judgment for the client, finding that the worker was a co-employee of the client and thus subject to the exclusive remedy provision of the Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law. Because the worker admitted all of the facts establishing his status as an employee of the client by failing to dispute them, we affirm.