APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A mother appeals a juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision that clear and convincing evidence established the existence of two statutory grounds for termination. Because the juvenile court’s order failed to make sufficient factual findings to support its best interest analysis, we vacate that portion of the court’s decision and remand for entry of an order making sufficient factual findings

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Richard Daran Angel, was indicted for one count of theft by home improvement in an amount of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. Before trial, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the contractor fraud statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-154, was unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as applied to him. After a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and entered an order dismissing the indictment. The State appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in determining that the contractor fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague at the pretrial stage because Defendant could not show that the statute was vague as applied to him. After review, we agree with the State and reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Michael Lurry, was charged by the Shelby County Grand Jury in a four-count indictment with first degree premeditated murder, theft of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, attempted carjacking, and attempted theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000. The Defendant pled guilty to the attempted theft and theft counts of the indictment, the State nolle prosequied the attempted carjacking count, and the Defendant went to trial on the first degree murder count. Following his jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder count of the indictment. He was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, ten years for the theft conviction, and two years for the attempted theft conviction. Finding the Defendant to be an offender with an extensive criminal history, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve all his sentences consecutively, for an effective sentence of life plus twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his first degree premeditated murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a prior domestic abuse incident between the Defendant and the victim, by not allowing the Defendant to introduce the victim’s complete Cellebrite cell phone records, by sentencing the Defendant to the maximum and ordering consecutive sentences, and by admitting expert testimony that was outside the scope of the witness’s expertise and when the Defendant was not put on notice of the witness’s proposed areas of expertise. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing for the trial court to consider the Defendant’s presentence report in determining whether the sentences should be served consecutively.

Plaintiff brought claims against Knox County and the County Clerk based on allegedly discriminatory employment practices. The trial court determined that Plaintiff committed serious discovery violations and imposed as a sanction the exclusion of certain evidence. With this evidence excluded, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the discovery sanction, the trial court’s conclusion under the Tennessee Human Rights Act that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply, the trial court’s conclusion that the Clerk was not individually liable, and the award of attorney’s fees against the Plaintiff and her attorney. We affirm.

Defendant, Ashley Dawn Boyce, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence following her guilty plea to driving under the influence. Defendant reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A). Upon review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the appellate record does not contain a copy of the judgment of conviction. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

The Petitioner, Johnny B. Brooks, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for driving under the influence (“DUI”), eighth offense, driving on a revoked license due to a DUI, and a violation of the open container law. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Betty Sparks, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition alleging that the post-conviction court erred in finding that she received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This case arises out of allegations that Appellees misappropriated Appellant’s inheritance funds for their own use. Appellant also alleges elder abuse based on the conversion as well as a physical altercation between Appellant and an Appellee. Appellees allege that Appellant gifted them the inheritance funds. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that: (1) because Appellant engaged in bad faith, the doctrine of unclean hands applied and barred her full recovery; (2) Appellees converted and misappropriated a portion of Appellant’s inheritance funds; (3) Appellees did not commit elder abuse; and (4) Appellant intended a partial gift of the inheritance funds to Appellees. Because the trial court erred when it sua sponte raised the affirmative defenses of bad faith and unclean hands, we reverse the trial court’s application of these doctrines to reduce the judgment awarded to Appellant. We also conclude that the trial court failed to consider the elements of elder abuse, the elements of a properly executed gift, and failed to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the same. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order as to Appellant’s elder abuse claim and Appellees’ gift claim. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment awarded to Appellant. The remainder of the trial court’s order is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Appellant’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is pretermitted.

This is an action to modify a permanent parenting plan. Mother appeals the trial court’s order finding her in civil contempt, modifying the parties’ parenting plan, and awarding attorney’s fees to Father. She also argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Father’s initial petition to establish a parenting plan. We have determined that the trial court properly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Mother’s failure to abide by the parenting plan constituted a material change of circumstance. However, Father failed to carry his burden of proof to demonstrate that modification of the 2021 parenting plan to designate Father as primary residential parent is in the child’s best interest. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment granting Father’s petition to modify. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to Father and remand for recalculation of the parties’ child support obligations. Father’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied.

In 2023, the Defendant, Teresa Shinpaugh, pleaded guilty to one count of criminally negligent homicide and one count of aggravated neglect of an elderly or vulnerable adult, in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts of her indictment and pursuant to the agreement that the trial court would determine the length and manner of service of her sentence. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of two and eight years with one year to serve in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it sentenced her to one year of confinement. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Carlos Gonzalez, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Nolan T. Williams, pled guilty to rape. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve an eight-year sentence in confinement with the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in sentencing him to confinement. Following review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

Halbert Grant Law, Jr. (“Husband”) and Barbara Matthews Law (“Wife”) divorced in 2020, and Husband appealed the ruling to this Court. In the first appeal, we determined that the trial court erred in classifying several significant assets and remanded the case back to the trial court. Following a hearing on remand, the trial court re-divided the marital estate and awarded Wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido. Husband appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Hardeman County jury convicted the defendant, Randy Jackson, of indecent exposure in a penal institution, for which he received six years in confinement at 60%. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court terminated a mother’s parental rights to her two minor children after finding clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to the children’s removal persist, that the mother failed to manifest an ability to assume custody of the children, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The mother appeals. Upon diligent review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In the spring of 2023, The Metro Nashville Police Department (“Metro”) received several public records requests seeking information about a school shooting that occurred in a Nashville private school on March 27, 2023. Metro denied all such requests. The various requestors filed petitions for access to the records in the Davidson County courts, which were eventually consolidated into one action. The private school at which the shooting occurred, its affiliated church, and parents of surviving children intervened in the action as parties. These intervening parties advocated that the school shooter’s personal writings and other creative works, which Metro collected in the course of its investigation, should remain confidential. The trial court ultimately denied all petitions for access to Metro’s file for numerous reasons. The requestors appeal to this Court. Following our review, we affirm in part and reverse in part. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the intervening parents have standing to raise arguments under the United States Copyright Act. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that neither Article I, section 35 of the Tennessee Constitution, nor Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-102, bar disclosure of any public records in this case. On all other issues, we reverse the trial court. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This matter is before the Court upon the application of the Petitioner, Henry Lee Jones, for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s order denying his motion to disqualify the Attorney General’s Office from representing the State in his capital post-conviction proceeding. The Petitioner raises numerous constitutional and statutory challenges to 2023 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 182 (“the Act”), which gives the Attorney General “exclusive control over the state’s defense of the request for collateral review” in capital cases. The State has responded in opposition to the application, arguing that the Petitioner lacks standing to challenge the Act and, alternatively, that the Petitioner has failed to establish that this case merits extraordinary review. For the reasons set forth below, the Petitioner’s application is hereby denied.

Husband and Wife divorced. In ruling upon contested matters, the trial court adopted a parenting plan submitted by Husband with minor modifications, named Husband primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children, and granted Husband primary custody of his stepson. The trial court ordered Wife to pay child support and declined to grant her alimony. The court also categorized and distributed the parties’ marital property. The court denied Wife’s request to hold Husband in contempt for purportedly interfering with her parenting time. Because the parties agree there was error as to Wife’s income for purposes of the child support calculation and agree as to the number that should have been used for her income, we modify the trial court’s award of child support accordingly. We also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to value the marital property and to apply the statutory factors and make relevant findings in connection with dividing the marital estate. We conclude that the issue of primary custody over Husband’s stepson, who was nearly 18 at the time of argument in this case, is moot. We affirm as to the other issues presented in this appeal.

A landslide led neighboring property owners to jointly file suit against Metro Water Services. Further investigation complicated their understanding of what may have caused the landslide, resulting in withdrawal of their shared counsel and in one property owner bringing suit against the other while still maintaining the action against Metro Water Services. While all three parties engaged in a variety of settlement-related actions, the suit filed by one property owner against the other sat largely dormant. This sparked a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The trial court held the motion in abeyance. While the settlement-related matters became ever more mired, the case did not move forward. Fifteen months later, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute and awarded attorney’s fees. Because we are unable to determine the trial court’s basis for the award of attorney’s fees from its order, we vacate that portion of the judgment and remand for further findings. Otherwise, we affirm.

Petitioner, Shamarion Bown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to adequately review discovery materials and offer an honest assessment about the strengths and weaknesses of Petitioner’s case. Petitioner contends that because of counsel’s alleged deficient performance he did not fully understand the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan and request that Father be held in contempt for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order generally finding that the parties simply had two different parenting styles and denying Mother’s request to modify the parenting plan. The trial court also found that the contempt matter had been addressed, but the trial court’s order lacked any findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the alleged contempt. After review, we reverse the trial court’s determination that Mother had not proven a material change in circumstances to permit modification of the parenting plan. To that end, the matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct an analysis of whether a change in the parties’ parenting plan is in the children’s best interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a). Further, we vacate the trial court’s order as it relates to the civil contempt action against Father. That matter is remanded as well for additional findings and conclusions related to Father’s civil contempt.

While unclear from the record, which does not include the relevant documentation, the Petitioner, Kavaughn Jones, states that he pleaded guilty in 2022 to two counts of attempted rape and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and that the trial court sentenced him to eight years to be served at 45%. In January 2025, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his case. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Craig Taylor, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his Madison County convictions for first degree premeditated murder, attempted aggravated burglary, two counts of first degree felony murder, and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, for which he received a total effective sentence of life plus eight years. The Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel’s failure to call expert witnesses to rebut the State’s experts. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.