APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Bobby V. Summers, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis as untimely. Following our review of the entire record, briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Defendant, Michael Joe Cunningham, pled guilty in two separate cases to one count of making a false report and one count possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine. He received an effective fourteen-year community corrections sentence that was later transferred to probation. Following a hearing on a warrant for violation of his probation based on Defendant’s arrest for new offenses, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by fully revoking his probation rather than ordering treatment for his drug addiction. Upon review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Rex A. Martin, was convicted by a Rutherford County Circuit Court jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated assault, assault, preventing another from making an emergency call, possession of a firearm while under a court order, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he was sentenced to an effective term of fifteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to seven of his eight convictions - aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, assault, preventing another from making an emergency call, and possessing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves statutory construction. Robert Bates and Laurel Diane Bates (“Mr. Bates” and “Ms. Bates,” “Plaintiffs” collectively) sued the City of Chattanooga, Individually and d/b/a the Brainerd Golf Course (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”), alleging personal injuries, loss of services, and loss of consortium stemming from Mr. Bates’ fall on Defendant’s golf course. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment relying on the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-101, et seq., which provides immunity to landowners who open their property to recreational use. The Trial Court held that Defendant, the landowner, was immune under the TRUS because Mr. Bates was on Defendant’s property to play golf, and golf is comparable to the non-exclusive list of recreational activities found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. No exception to the TRUS was found to apply. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that golf is not an activity like those listed at Section 102 of the TRUS. Plaintiffs argue further that the fact Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course means Defendant is not entitled to immunity. We hold, inter alia, that golf is sufficiently comparable to Section 102 enumerated activities, particularly hiking, sightseeing, and target shooting, such that Defendant is entitled to immunity under the TRUS. In addition, the fact that Mr. Bates paid to play on Defendant’s golf course is not dispositive because the TRUS has no applicable consideration exception. We affirm.

I write separately to address what I consider to be an erroneous reading of Article VII, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution (the “Article”), which provides, in relevant part:

 The legislative body shall not exceed twenty-five members . . . Any county organized under the consolidated government provision of Article XI, Section 9, of this Constitution shall be exempt from having a county or legislative body as described in this paragraph. 

(Emphases added). It is undisputed that Metro qualifies for the exemption contained in the Article. The obvious reason for exempting a consolidated government from the restriction on the size of its membership is to accommodate the far larger population of a consolidated government as compared to a single county or municipality.

The plaintiffs initiated this action based upon multiple theories of speech-related torts and emotional distress in response to the defendant’s statements made on her social media concerning them and their business. The defendant moved for dismissal, citing the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-17-101, et seq. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that the TPPA applied and operated to protect her right to free speech and to petition. We now affirm.

In granting appellee’s motion to amend her petition over appellant’s objection, the trial court did not consider any of the factors relevant to a trial court’s determination of whether to grant a motion to amend. In the absence of any explanation in the trial court’s order concerning the basis for its decision, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review of whether the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to amend. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order granting appellee leave to amend her petition and pretermit the remaining issues on appeal.

This appeal arises from a verified claim against an estate seeking the repayment of a purported loan made to the decedent by his mother. The decedent’s surviving girlfriend, as executrix of the estate, claimed the funds provided to the decedent by his mother were a gift as opposed to a loan. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the funds were a loan and entered an order in favor of the mother. The estate timely appeals to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A self-represented defendant moved to recuse the trial judge. This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal filed after the trial court’s denial of the motion. We dismiss the appeal because the defendant failed to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B.

The petitioner, Leavy L. Johnson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal involves a commercial lease of property operated as a convenience store in Memphis. The lease provided that it was to be construed and enforced in accordance with Georgia law. The lease was for an initial term of ten years, but it provided that the tenant had the option to renew the lease for two additional terms of five years commencing at the expiration of the initial term. Near the end of the initial ten-year term, the landlord sent a notice of nonrenewal to the tenant, notifying the tenant that the lease was scheduled to expire because the tenant had failed to timely exercise the option to renew it. One week later, the tenant sent the landlord written notice of its intent to exercise the option to extend the lease for an additional five years. The tenant’s letter asserted that the provision of the lease regarding when notice was to be provided “[did] not make any sense” and informed the landlord that the tenant was thereby exercising the option. The landlord filed this lawsuit, asking the trial court to hold that the lease had expired by its terms when the tenant did not timely exercise the option to extend it, and therefore, the landlord was entitled to possession of the property and a judgment for rent at the holdover rate provided in the lease. The tenant filed a counterclaim for declaratory relief. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the lease was ambiguous but that the only reasonable interpretation of the lease was that notice of intent to exercise the option was due ninety days before the end of the initial term. Because the tenant failed to provide notice by that date, the trial court concluded that the initial term of the lease expired, the landlord was entitled to possession, and the tenant was liable for holdover rent and attorney fees. The tenant appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

A three-judge panel was convened in this case to determine the constitutionality of 2023 Tennessee Public Chapter 21. While the case was pending, the trial court temporarily stayed implementation of subsection 1(b) of the legislation, the result of which was that the deadlines contained therein were rendered moot. In considering competing summary judgment motions, the trial court unanimously ruled that subsection 1(a) of the act was not also moot. In a divided decision, however, the trial court concluded that the legislation violated two provisions of the Tennessee Constitution: the home rule amendment and a clause exempting metropolitan governments from a twenty-five-member cap on county legislative bodies. Both parties appeal. We affirm the trial court’s ruling that subsection 1(a) is not moot. We reverse, however, its conclusion that the statute is barred by either constitutional provision at issue

The Petitioner, Eddie Harris, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2016 convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery, and one count of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. On appeal, the Petitioner argues the post-conviction court erred by failing to find that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to (1) present a witness in support of his defense, (2) cite favorable law during an evidentiary hearing or make an offer of proof following the trial court’s adverse ruling, and (3) object to alleged inconsistencies in the grand jury process. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Williamson County trial court, over objection from the State of Tennessee, granted the defendant’s motion to depose a witness for discovery purposes. This Court granted the State’s application for an extraordinary appeal under Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Upon our review, we conclude the trial court erred in its decision to grant the defendant’s motion and remand the case to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A mother appeals from the trial court’s decision regarding custody of her two minor children. However, because the mother filed a motion to recuse the trial court judge on which he failed to rule before entering a final order on the merits of the case, the judgment of the trial court must be vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, Elevation Outdoor Advertising, LLC (“Elevation”), submitted six applications for billboard sign permits to the defendant, the City of Pigeon Forge, Tennessee (“the City”), and all six were denied by the City’s Planning Commission. In this action, Elevation sought a judgment (1) declaring the City’s former sign regulation ordinance and temporary moratorium on sign permits void and unenforceable, (2) declaring the City’s new sign regulation ordinance inapplicable, and (3) compelling the City by injunction or writ of mandamus to issue permits for Elevation’s proposed signs. Upon the City’s motion to dismiss, the trial court dismissed Elevation’s complaint with prejudice. The trial court determined that the proper relief for Elevation would have been via common law certiorari review, for which Elevation had not met the procedural requirements of timeliness and filing under oath. Elevation has appealed. Upon careful review, we determine that Elevation’s complaint properly stated a claim for declaratory judgment rather than writ of certiorari. We therefore reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Elevation’s complaint and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The Petitioner, Douglas E. Alvey, appeals from the denial of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his conviction of first degree murder. On appeal, he argues: (1) trial counsel were ineffective in failing to present expert testimony negating the mens rea; and (2) that he did not knowingly understand the nature of his constitutional right to testify at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court dismissed this case without prejudice after determining that the plaintiff failed to properly respond to the defendant’s discovery requests for over a year despite multiple extensions. We affirm.

The Petitioner, John Patrick Tracy, Jr., pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery and two counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed the agreed upon effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, followed by an additional fifteen years to be served on Community Corrections. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and that his guilty pleas were not voluntary. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file essential motions, failed to investigate, and misrepresented his legal experience. He also argues that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. He further contends that the cumulative effect of his attorney’s errors entitles him to relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In the Circuit Court for Scott County (“the Trial Court”), Dr. David Bruce Coffey filed a complaint alleging that Buckeye Home Health Center, Inc. (“Buckeye”) breached its lease agreement with Dr. Coffey by failing to obtain fire insurance coverage on its leased portion of Dr. Coffey’s building. The building burned down during Buckeye’s tenancy. Buckeye filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was impossible to obtain fire insurance coverage for only a portion of the building as required by the lease. The Trial Court granted Buckeye’s motion. Dr. Coffey appealed. Upon our review, we conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact and reverse the Trial Court’s order dismissing Dr. Coffey’s complaint.

Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis as “utterly devoid of accuracy.” Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, Richard Townsend, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from an order of protection issued against the appellant/defendant, Agness McCurry, in Washington County Circuit Court case 42482. Although the defendant raises numerous issues and the record contains numerous documents that pertain to other cases filed in the general sessions and circuit court of Washington County, as well as federal court, in which defendant sued almost every judge in Washington County, this opinion is limited to Washington County Circuit Court case 42482. The defendant contends the order of protection was issued in violation of Tennessee law, constitutional due process, and judicial conduct standards. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellants have filed three related lawsuits against appellee and other entities. Here, appellants claim a continuing nuisance stemming from the alleged discharge, onto appellants’ property, of e. coli-contaminated wastewater from a dismantled septic system, which previously serviced appellee’s property. In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the appellees on appellants’ claim of trespass based on our finding of an existing easement appurtenant for the septic system. As relevant here, the trial court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on appellants’ claim of nuisance, and they appeal. Because appellants have failed to meet their burden of proof, at the summary judgment stage, to show that there is leaching of contaminated wastewater onto their property, they have failed to establish the existence of the nuisance averred in their complaint. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of appellee’s motion for summary judgment.

Defendant, Cameron Henderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for sexual battery and aggravated sexual battery for which he received an effective sentence of 7.2 years of confinement as an especially mitigated offender to be served at a rate of 100 percent. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other bad acts pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b), in declining to instruct the jury on child abuse and neglect as a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual battery, and in ordering him to serve 100 percent of his sentence. Because Defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial and a timely notice of appeal, we dismiss the appeal.