APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the Appellant’s petition for an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2. The Appellant asks this Court to review the post-conviction court’s November 14, 2025 order denying his motion to recuse Judge Chris Craft from his capital post-conviction proceeding. The State has filed a response in opposition to the petition. Having reviewed the petition, the supporting documents, and the State’s response, this Court has determined that additional briefing and oral argument are unnecessary. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05, 2.06. For the reasons set forth below, the post-conviction court’s order is hereby AFFIRMED.

Defendant, Martha Jane Durocher, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for reckless endangerment with a weapon. Defendant was convicted as charged after a bench trial, and the trial court imposed a two-year sentence to be suspended on probation. Defendant appeals, arguing the evidence at trial was insufficient. Because the evidence does not establish that Defendant’s conduct placed any person or persons in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death, we reverse and vacate her conviction for felony reckless endangerment with a weapon.

The plaintiffs appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their claims against two sets of
defendants. We now affirm, holding that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider
the appeal filed more than 30 days from the entry of the final orders appealed from. We
also affirm the dismissal of a counter-complaint filed against the plaintiffs.

This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence established several grounds of termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. We now affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a modification of a Permanent Parenting Plan (“PPP”), pursuant to which Randy Arnold, (“Father”) replaced Kamilah Sanders, (“Mother”), as the primary residential parent of the parties’ only child. Mother timely filed a Motion to Review the decision of the juvenile court magistrate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1- 107, which motion the juvenile court judge denied. This appeal followed. We affirm the ruling of the juvenile court and remand with instructions to set child support.

This breach of contract case involves a partnership dispute where one partner who undertook the winding down of the long-term partnership sought (1) reimbursement of loans and advances made to cover partnership expenses together with interest thereon; (2) compensation for services rendered on behalf of the partnership and attorney fees; and (3) taking into account the foregoing, disbursement of partnership funds to the partners. The other two partners disputed the claims and made counterclaims. Because we cannot ascertain whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law support the judgment, we vacate the judgment and remand it for the entry of a more detailed order that reflects that it is the product of the trial court’s individualized decision-making and independent judgment.

The Petitioner, Shun M. Ramey, acting pro se, appeals the Wilson County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. After review, we affirm.

The Defendant, John Wayne Hamby, was convicted by a Cumberland County jury of rape
of a child, for which he received a sentence of forty years’ incarceration at one hundred
percent service. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction and that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence.
Because we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed and that the
interests of justice do not merit waiver of the untimeliness, we dismiss the appeal.

In this case, two brothers accused each other of exerting undue influence on their aging mother, Latona Joyce Walsh. Timothy Walsh (“Defendant”) alleged that his brother Anthony Walsh (“Plaintiff”) had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, resulting in her deeding her home to him, naming him as the executor of her estate, and placing his name on her bank accounts approximately four years before her death. Shortly before her death, Ms. Walsh made Defendant her attorney-in-fact and Plaintiff’s name was removed from her accounts. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that Defendant had exerted undue influence over Ms. Walsh, and Defendant filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff for undue influence. Ms. Walsh died two days later. The Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) found that both sons had exerted undue influence over their mother but that Defendant had not dissipated any of her assets, unlike Plaintiff. The Trial Court accordingly ordered that Ms. Walsh’s home was part of her estate and was to be distributed by the terms of her 1991 will. The Trial Court further credited Plaintiff with receiving $49,000 in rental income from renting his mother’s home after her death. Plaintiff appeals the Trial Court’s finding of undue influence. Based upon our review, we affirm.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights for abandonment by failure to visit,
abandonment by failure to support, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an
ability and willingness to assume custody of her children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, James Lee Dennis, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication. After
a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgment ordering the Defendant to serve ten
years’ incarceration at one hundred percent service. The trial court also ordered the
Defendant to pay $113,700 in the form of child maintenance restitution pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-219. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the
trial court erred by ordering excessive restitution and by imposing a sentence above the
minimum required by law. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Petitioner, Marterious O’Neal, was originally convicted of two counts of felony murder, eight counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. He filed for post-conviction relief, alleging various grounds of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel including (1) trial counsel’s failure to file a motion under Rule 608 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence to impeach a witness for the State, (2) appellate counsel’s failure to include the transcript of the motion to suppress on direct appeal; and (3) appellate counsel’s failure to withdraw from representation in compliance with Rule 14 of the Tennessee Supreme Court thereby depriving the Petitioner of a timely application to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted a delayed appeal upon finding that appellate counsel had failed to withdraw in compliance with Rule 14, thereby depriving the Petitioner of the ability to file a timely Rule 11 appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. In the same order, the post-conviction court determined that whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Rule 608 motion had been previously determined by this court and that the Petitioner had failed to establish prejudice with respect to appellate counsel’s failure to include the motion to suppress transcript on direct appeal. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends, and we agree, that the post-conviction court erred in determining that the Rule 608 issue had been previously determined and in granting a delayed appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. With respect to the remaining issues, the Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Although appellate counsel failed to withdraw in accordance with Rule 14, we conclude that appellate counsel filed a timely application for permission to appeal from the Petitioner’s convictions in this case. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the order of the post-conviction court to the extent that it grants the Petitioner a delayed appeal. We also conclude that because the Petitioner’s Rule 608 claim challenges trial counsel’s failure to file the motion rather than the trial court’s denial of the same, this issue has not been previously determined by this court. Nevertheless, the Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel’s decision in not filing a Rule 608 motion 03/25/2026 - 2 - prior to trial was ineffective. Finally, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to include the transcript of the motion to suppress on direct appeal was deficient; however, the Petitioner failed to establish prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Thor Lucas Coleman, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. Petitioner raises for the first time on appeal two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

This appeal arises from a premises liability action commenced by Tammala Thompson (“Plaintiff”) for injuries she sustained while camping for the weekend at Cedars of Lebanon State Park (“the Park”). Plaintiff alleges that the State of Tennessee (“the State”), which owns and operates the Park, is liable for her injuries because the State negligently maintained an unsafe sidewalk. Relying upon the affirmative defense provided by the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), the State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that she was not engaged in recreational activity when the injury occurred because she was walking on a sidewalk; thus, the TRUS is not applicable. She also asserted that sidewalks are “improvements” which are not expressly exempted from liability under the TRUS. Finding the TRUS applicable and that no exceptions applied, the Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.

The homeowners and a general contractor commenced this action for breach of contract, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty against a brick manufacturer and its distributor. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants based on the plaintiffs’ failure to provide an opportunity to cure. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Having determined that Article 2 of Tennessee’s Uniform Commercial Code controls the sale of the bricks and that the bricks were accepted, it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to provide an opportunity to cure before filing suit. Still, we conclude that the manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment on all claims because it had no privity of contract with the plaintiffs.

In 2024, a Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, William Dangelo Penny, of felony evading arrest, misdemeanor evading arrest, leaving the scene of an accident, and driving while his license was suspended. The trial court sentenced him to nine years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that his motion for a continuance of his trial should have been granted. The State notes that the appeal is untimely. After review, we dismiss the appeal.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) sought the termination of the mother’s and father’s parental rights to their son in the Juvenile Court for Davidson County (“the Juvenile Court”). The Juvenile Court found that DCS had failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. Although the Juvenile Court found sufficient evidence for grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights, it declined to find that termination was in the child’s best interest given that the mother retained her parental rights. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) appealed, and DCS joined in filing briefs arguing that the Juvenile Court erred. Upon careful review, we find that the Juvenile Court misapplied the law in its consideration of the ground of persistent conditions and provided insufficient findings of fact addressing relevant testimony in its consideration of both persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody as alleged against the mother. The Juvenile Court also provided conclusory statements for each best interest factor that it considered in relation to the father. We accordingly vacate the Juvenile Court’s judgment and remand this case for the Juvenile Court to properly apply the law in its analysis of persistent conditions against the mother and provide sufficient findings of fact in support of its conclusory statements in its analysis of persistent conditions and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody against the mother. We also remand for the Juvenile Court to provide factual findings in support of its conclusions as to the best interest factors applied to the father.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to enforce a settlement
agreement. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the parties
had reached an enforceable agreement. We affirm.

The Defendant, Jonathan Maine Lowe, appeals his convictions for five counts of
aggravated sexual battery, one count of rape of a child, one count of rape, two counts of
incest, and two counts of child abuse or neglect, for which he received an effective
eighty-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by: (1)
denying his motion to suppress statements made at the Department of Children’s Services
(“DCS”) office because such statements were elicited pursuant to a custodial interrogation
prior to his being given Miranda warnings; (2) improperly commenting on the evidence by
incorporating the State’s bill of particulars into its jury instructions as part of the State’s
election of offenses; and (3) relative to his convictions for child abuse or neglect, providing
an incorrect statement of law by giving a jury instruction for “child neglect” rather than for
“child abuse.” Additionally, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions for child abuse, or in the alternative, child neglect. After review,
we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jacob Ray Lane, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in
concluding his guilty plea was not unlawfully induced. Discerning no error, we affirm the
post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant, Darrell Kindred Wakefield, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery in exchange for a two-year sentence. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(f)(2), asserting that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he did not fully understand the consequences of being placed on the sex offender registry. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that he failed to establish a manifest injustice, warranting the withdrawal of the guilty plea. Upon review, we affirm.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Appellant brought this action after his car was painted the wrong color. During the course
of the proceedings, the trial court ordered the parties to submit to mediation subject to
certain guidelines requiring good faith participation, denied Appellant’s motion to recuse,
granted Appellees’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Appellant’s claim for
punitive damages, and ultimately granted Appellees’ motion to confess judgment as to
Appellant’s claims for breach of contract and negligence. Appellant appeals each of these
rulings. We reverse the trial court’s ruling as to Appellees’ motion to confess judgment,
but affirm in all other respects.