APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Because Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, he has waived review. Appeal dismissed.

John Lindberg (“Lindberg”), an inmate at Turney Center Industrial Complex (“TCIX”), was convicted of introducing drugs into TCIX by the prison’s Disciplinary Board (“the Board”). After failed appeals to the TCIX Warden and Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) Commissioner, Lindberg filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hickman County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court denied his petition. He appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The plaintiffs brought an election contest and a declaratory judgment action against the defendants to enjoin the implementation of Metro Ordinance No. BL2024-427, which implements Metro’s transit improvement plan created pursuant to the Improving Manufacturing, Public Roads and Opportunities for a Vibrant Economy Act. The trial court found that the plan and ballot question complied with the Act in all respects. We affirm, except that we find that the surcharge in the transit improvement plan cannot be used for the acquisition of land for housing and parks.

Petitioner, Ernest Butler, was convicted of first degree felony murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s methods for refreshing and impeaching a testifying witness, and for failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication. He also argues cumulative error deprived him of a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In 2021, the Petitioner, Billie Joe Chapman, pleaded guilty in separate cases to multiple burglary, vandalism, and weapon charges for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen years of incarceration. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court denied him relief. This court affirmed the denial. Chapman v. State, No. W2022-01333-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 5572932, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 29, 2023), no perm. app. filed. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the trial court entered an order summarily dismissing the petition. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, filed by Christina Lemek Blackwell (“Petitioner”) seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Petitioner and finding no reversible error, we affirm.

James Anthony Andrews, Petitioner, pleaded guilty in this case to two counts of aggravated assault. At the same hearing, Petitioner pleaded guilty to additional charges in another case. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to concurrent eight-year sentences for the aggravated assault charges to run consecutively to a two-year sentence for the charges in the other case—for a total effective sentence of ten years—with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court accepted Petitioner’s guilty pleas, and Petitioner applied for probation, which the State opposed. The trial court denied Petitioner’s request for probation, requiring him to serve his ten-year sentence in incarceration. Petitioner subsequently petitioned for post-conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate the case and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied Petitioner’s amended petition. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A man sought to intervene as of right in a family member’s action for partition of real property. The trial court determined that the proposed intervenor did not have an interest in the subject property. So it denied his request to intervene and his other requests for relief. We affirm.

Petitioner, Jason Steven Molthan, appeals from the trial court’s summary denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence related to his misdemeanor convictions for stalking and harassment, for which he received consecutive sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion without the appointment of counsel and a hearing; that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentencing by finding that his history of criminal activity was extensive; and that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

Appellant, City of Memphis, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Chancery Court that was entered on June 4, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against her joint employers, asserting sexual harassment/ hostile work environment, retaliation, and other related claims. The employers filed a motion to compel arbitration. The plaintiff opposed the motion and invoked the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, 9 U.S.C. §§ 401- -402. The trial court deemed the Act applicable and denied the motion to compel arbitration. The employers appeal. We affirm.

Defendant, Jonathan Ellerbasch, Alias, pleaded guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court
to aggravated assault with serious bodily injury. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial
court imposed a sentence of three years to be served in the Department of Correction. On
appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an
alternative sentence and in ordering a sentence of confinement. Following a thorough
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A husband and wife divorced a little over two years after marrying. On appeal, the wife asserts the trial court erred when it classified five real properties as the husband’s separate property. The wife also takes issue with the court’s division of attorney’s fees and requests her fees on appeal. We find the court failed to make adequate findings related to its division of attorney’s fees. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the order relating to fees and expenses and remand the matter for the court to make additional findings. We affirm the trial court in all other aspects and decline to award the wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

In this divorce with no children, the trial court declared the parties divorced and referred the property issues and requests for attorney’s fees to a special master. The special master recommended an equal division of the marital estate and that each party pay their own attorney’s fees. The wife objected to these recommendations. After a hearing, the trial court adopted the special master’s findings and recommendations, with one small exception. On appeal, the wife challenges the division of the marital estate and the failure to award attorney’s fees. We affirm.

In this case involving termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child, the trial court found that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

After discovering that her neighbors had built a home on rural property that she owned, the property owner brought an ejectment action to remove them. The neighbors asserted an affirmative defense based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-2-103, which protects against ejectment if the defendant can show adverse possession for seven years. Following a trial, the trial court found that the neighbors had proven adverse possession and set a boundary line of the possessed area, drawing upon an exhibit produced by a surveyor. The property owner asserts that the boundary determined by the trial court was too expansive and unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. The neighbors assert that the trial court drew the boundary line in a manner too restrictive, failing to encapsulate the entirety of the area they actually possessed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Darrel Hochhalter, who is serving a twenty-two-year sentence for convictions of six counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of rape, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He contends on appeal that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In this post-divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s classification of certain property. Because the trial court’s order contains conflicting findings, we vacate and remand.

The defendant, Bath Fitter Tennessee, Inc. (“Bath Fitter”), appeals the denial of its motion to submit its contract dispute with the homeowner to arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The parties executed a written contract for the installation of a new shower for the homeowner, the parts for which were manufactured in Canada. Both parties signed the contract on the front page of the two-page agreement where the signature lines were provided; however, neither party signed or initialed the arbitration provision that appeared on the back of the contract. Although not explicitly stated in its order, it appears that the trial court denied arbitration based upon the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (“TUAA”), which, at the time of contracting, required that arbitration clauses in residential construction contracts be separately signed or initialed. It is undisputed that the materials installed by Bath Fitter were manufactured in Canada; thus, the transaction involves interstate commerce. For that reason, the FAA applies. Because the FAA does not require signatures or initials to indicate approval of arbitration clauses and preempts conflicting state laws that invalidate otherwise valid arbitration agreements, we reverse and remand with instructions to submit the contract dispute to arbitration pursuant to the FAA and stay proceedings until arbitration is complete.

Petitioner, Christopher David Hodge, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which was filed approximately twenty years after his conviction for second degree murder. Because the evidence that Petitioner claims is newly discovered does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent of the underlying crime for which he was convicted, he is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Petitioner, Vana Mustafa, appeals from the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his amended petition for post-conviction relief. He contends that, although his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was litigated in his motion for new trial and on direct appeal, he is nonetheless entitled to post-conviction relief based on new grounds of trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness. In addition, he argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to include these new grounds on direct appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Larry E. McKee, appeals his Bradley County conviction for theft of property valued at more than $1,000, but less than $2,500.  He contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by (1) prohibiting Defendant's trial counsel from cross-examining two witnesses as to the manner in which the landlord of the burglarized property received rent payments from the tenants, (2) refusing to allow trial counsel to explain the relevancy of said line of questioning, and (3) threatening to hold the trial counsel in contempt for continuing to ask the witnesses about such payment methods after the trial court ruled them irrelevant.  After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Richard Brock Hill, a former Deputy Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), brought an action for defamation against the State regarding statements made in connection with a sexual harassment investigation that resulted in the termination of his employment. The Claims Commission dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In reaching this conclusion, the Claims Commission analyzed the potentially defamatory statements and concluded that each statement was time-barred and/or failed as to an essential element of a defamation claim. Regarding statements contained in an “Investigation Summary Memorandum,” the Claims Commission also concluded that Mr. Hill’s defamation claim failed because the document was prepared by a Deputy Commissioner and was, accordingly, protected by absolute executive privilege. We conclude that Mr. Hill adequately alleged defamation such that dismissal of his claim was error and that the existent record and filings do not support a conclusion that, as a matter of law, absolute executive privilege protects the statements contained in the Investigation Summary Memorandum. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Natasha Lynn Bryant Fults, was indicted by a Warren County Grand Jury on two counts of tampering with evidence. See T.C.A. § 39-16-503. Pursuant to a plea agreement, she pled guilty to both counts with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I offender to serve five years incarcerated. Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by not sentencing her to split confinement or alternative sentencing. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Ashley Bianca Ruth Kroese, appeals the denial of her motion to correct clerical errors in her judgments. On appeal, she claims the trial court erred by summarily denying her motion and failing to enter corrected judgments to include jail credit for the time she was on home confinement pending trial. Because the record is inadequate for meaningful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.