APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee doctor on grounds of insufficient service of process, and failure of Appellant patient to come forward with the required expert proof to refute the motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a Title IV-D child support case. Appellee father executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity and a consent paternity order. After discovering that he was not the child’s biological father, Appellee sought relief from both his retroactive and future child support obligations. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion on the ground that he was not the biological father. The State of Tennessee seeks review of the trial court’s decision. We conclude that the trial court did not have authority to forgive Appellee’s child support arrears. Moreover, Appellee has neither alleged sufficiently specific facts to challenge the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity as required under Tenn. Code. Ann. § 24-7-113, nor has he satisfied the necessary requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P.60.02 to gain relief from either the consent paternity order, or the order on child support entered in the chancery court. We reverse and remand.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case employer appeals the trial court’s findings that the employee’s injury arose out of employment, that the employee did not make a meaningful return to work, and that the employee met at least three of the four criteria set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(b) by clear and convincing evidence and thus was not subject to the six times cap. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury arose out of her employment. However, we reverse the finding of the trial court with regards to the employee’s meaningful return to work. Our conclusion that employee made a meaningful return to work therefore precludes consideration of the issue of whether the six times cap applies.

The Defendant, Annette Turner Morrow, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. The Defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at over $10,000 but less than $60,000 and identity theft. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender and ordered the Defendant to serve her sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her request for probation or other alternative sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in a personal injury case. The plaintiff, a diabetic, consumed a substantial amount of alcohol and then proceeded to drive south towards an intersection. At about the same time, the defendant was traveling east toward the same intersection. The plaintiff’s vehicle skidded, hit the curb, and then collided with a telephone pole. After the onecar accident, the plaintiff followed the defendant and his family to a nearby parking lot and accused the defendant of running the stop sign at the intersection and causing the plaintiff’s accident. After that, the police arrived and gave the plaintiff a breathalyzer test, which he failed. The plaintiff was later convicted of reckless driving and driving under the influence of an intoxicant in connection with the accident. At his criminal trial, the plaintiff admitted drinking alcohol and that his tires were in poor condition. The plaintiff nevertheless filed a negligence claim against the defendant. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that, based on the plaintiff diabetic’s intoxication and faulty tires, he was, as a matter of law, at least fifty percent at fault for his own injuries. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Brian Christian Lautenschlager, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as being time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review, we conclude that the petition for post-conviction relief was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The petitioner, Ellis S. Baucom, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, receiving sentences, respectively, of fifteen years and thirty years, to be served concurrently at forty-five percent. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial counsel had been ineffective in representing him. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. We affirm that dismissal.

The Petitioner, Eric Carter, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction proceeding. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by denying his motion without holding an evidentiary hearing and claims he is entitled to relief based upon the ruling in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007). Because the Petitioner failed to comply with the statutory requirements for appealing the denial of a motion to reopen, this Court is without jurisdiction to review the issue. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Willie R. Dyer was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant and driving with a blood alcohol level of over .08 percent. During the jury trial, the trial court dismissed the indictment with prejudice on the basis that the chain of custody for the blood sample was inadequate. Subsequently, the State appealed. We determine that the trial court abused its discretion where the evidence was sufficient to establish chain of custody of the blood sample and, therefore, reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court for reinstatement of the indictment. Further, we determine that principles of double jeopardy do not bar retrial.

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement between a nursing home and one of its patients. Although the trial court found that the patient’s spouse had authority to sign the agreement under the terms of a power of attorney, the court concluded that the spouse did not knowingly and voluntarily waive the patient’s right to a jury trial. Therefore, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. After reviewing the entire record, we find that thefacts do not support the trial court’s conclusion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

Defendant-Appellant, Frank G. Watkins (hereinafter “Watkins”), appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. Watkins contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to base its decision on a “willful” action. Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I concur with the result reached by the Court. Based on the current appellate record, there exists a genuine factual issue regarding whether Conductor Danny Martin sounded the train’s whistle as the train approached the crossing as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-12-108(2) (2004).

This case comes before us on an appeal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because the plaintiffs have established the existence of several genuine issues of material fact, we conclude that summary judgment is inappropriate. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of a defendant’s subsequent remedial measures. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

In this declaratory judgment action, the Trial Court granted defendant summary judgment on the issue of priority of liens on real property. On the Petition to Set Up a Lost Instrument, the Trial Court following an evidentiary hearing, held that defendant was entitled to set up the lost instrument by a copy of its original. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court’s decision in establishing the lost instrument, but vacate the summary judgment on the issue of the priority of liens and remand for trial on that issue.

An apartment complex owner filed a petition for writ of certiorari to challenge a decision of the Metro Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals denying the owner’s appeal of the fire marshal’s citation of the apartment complex for failure to install pull station alarms in certain areas. We agree with the chancellor’s conclusion that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction, did not act illegally or arbitrarily, and based its decision upon material evidence.

The defendant, Timmy Lee Hill, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Marshall County of three counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; one count of escape, a Class E felony; and one count of evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. The three counts of aggravated kidnapping were merged. The defendant was sentenced as follows: one nineteen-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, with a concurrent eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentence for evading arrest; one consecutive ten-year sentence for aggravated assault on the same victim as the aggravated kidnapping, with a concurrent eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentence for assault on a second victim; and one consecutive six-year sentence for escape, for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for the aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, except we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment for the aggravated assault to reflect a ten-year sentence.

When the trial court entered its divorce decree, husband, who was in prison in another state, was representing himself. Husband asserts that the trial court erred because it lacked personal jurisdiction over him and lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. We have concluded that husband waived the personal jurisdiction issue. However, because the trial court failed to rule on husband’s pending motions before adjudicating the divorce, we vacate and remand.

We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the identification of marijuana, an essential element of the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the substance was marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, the petitioner, Gerald Wayne Carter, challenges the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his petitions for both post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. The circuit court dismissed the petitions, finding that the petitioner had filed outside the statute of limitations period. After review, we affirm the judgments of the court.

This is an appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-lessee on an action to collect back rent and other expenses pursuant to a long-term commercial lease agreement with plaintiff-landlord. Lessee filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy prior to the filing of the instant action. We have concluded that the commercial lease upon which landlord relies was deemed rejected by operation of law in the bankruptcy proceedings and that landlord is therefore barred from recovering the damages it seeks. Judgment of the chancery court is affirmed.

In this divorce action, Wife contends that the trial court erred in ordering the marital home sold; finding Husband’s down payment on the marital home to be separate property; failing to award her alimony; and failing to award her counsel fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The petitioner, Bobby Lee, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The petitioner was convicted of attempted first degree murder and received a sixty-year Department of Correction sentence as a career offender. The State has filed a motion for the judgment of the trial court to be affirmed by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding merit in the motion, we grant the same and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jimmie Lee Hoyle, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel and entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Mark Alton Mayfield, appeals from his convictions by a jury in the Criminal Court for Cumberland County for carjacking, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, class B felonies. He was sentenced to ten years for each offense to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of ten years. He contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to convict for each offense; (2) the trial court improperly included language referring to the nature of conduct and the circumstances surrounding the conduct in its jury instructions; and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to more than the minimum sentence as prohibited by Blakely v. United States, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The issues in this case are whether operators of whitewater rafting ventures responsible for collecting a county privilege tax imposed upon consumers participating in commercial rafting ventures in Polk County have standing to challenge the tax and if so, whether the tax is invalid because it is preempted by federal law. Upon careful review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the operators have standing to contest the legality of the privilege tax and that the tax is preempted by federal law and is, therefore, invalid.