APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves forged endorsements on a check. The appellant had two checking accounts at the defendant bank. The appellant forged endorsements on a check, deposited the check into his account at the bank, and then removed the proceeds from his bank account. The bank later determined that the endorsements on the check were forged and debited the appellant’s other account in the amount of the fraudulently endorsed check. The appellant filed a lawsuit against the bank, and the bank counterclaimed for the amount of the check on which the appellant forged the endorsements. The bank filed a motion for summary judgment and submitted a statement of undisputed material facts in support of the motion. The appellant did not respond to the bank’s statement of undisputed material facts. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank, and the appellant appeals. We affirm and remand the case to the trial court for determination of damages against the appellant for a frivolous appeal.

This is a premises liability case. Appellant sued Appellee for injuries sustained in a fall on an icy parking lot that was maintained by Appellee. The material facts of the case are undisputed and, on principles of comparative fault, the trial court determined that Appellant was at least 50% liable for the injuries he sustained in that Appellant (1) ignored the open and obvious danger when he undertook to walk inside the bank, (2) decided not to use the drive-through window in order to avoid traversing the ice, and (3) undertook a risk that a reasonable person would have avoided. Finding no error, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee filed its Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application in this case to determine whether Tennessee recognizes the “community caretaking” exception to the requirement that police officers have at least reasonable suspicion when they make a traffic stop. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that we cannot address this question because it is beyond the scope of the legal issue certified to this Court in accordance with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2). Rather than dismissing the appeal as being improvidently granted, the Court has decided to determine whether, under the essentially undisputed facts, Officer Jeff Tarkington acted reasonably when he stopped Tyson Lee Day’s automobile on May 16, 2004. The Court has decided that Officer Tarkington did not act reasonably. I cannot concur with this conclusion.

The Clerk and Master, a substitute Judge, granted defendant summary judgment in this case, and plaintiff appealed. The record reveals that the substitute Judge was not designated in accordance with the statutes and case decisions, and we therefore vacate the summary judgment and remand to the Trial Court.

After unsuccessfully moving to suppress evidence resulting from the traffic stop that led to his arrest, the defendant, Tyson Lee Day, pleaded guilty to third offense driving under the influence and driving on a revoked license. The plea agreement provided for reservation of a certified question of law regarding whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed.  On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that at the time the officer initiated the traffic stop, he lacked reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the trial court and, because the question was dispositive, dismissed the case. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider the question of whether the community caretaking rationale for traffic stops justified the stop in this case. After carefully examining the certified question, however, we conclude that the community caretaking issue was not included within the scope of the question reserved for review. Accordingly, our review extends solely to the issue preserved, i.e., whether the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. We conclude that the facts do not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

After the appellant pled guilty to criminal contempt in the juvenile court and received a four-day sentence, she appealed to circuit court, contending that the sentence was excessive. After being unsuccessful in circuit court , she then appealed to this Court. We found that the appeal of a criminal contempt conviction should be directly to this Court and not to the circuit court. Having resolved the appeal process issue, this Court finds that the acceptance of the guilty plea below was in contravention of constitutional standards and was plain error. The criminal contempt conviction is therefore vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

At its core, this appeal presents a dispute over whether two parties had entered into an enforceable agreement for the lease of land to be used for the placement of a roadside billboard. The trial court held that there existed only an offer from the property owner which was revocable and that therefore the property owner could freely lease the same property to a third party. During the pendency of this litigation in the trial court, which took many years, a series of corporate asset transfers and acquisitions occurred—the result of which raises the question of whether the same party is in fact now on both sides of this suit. The court below held that a live controversy still exists, and it subsequently proceeded to set damages. For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the trial court erred in its initial decision regarding the existence of a binding lease agreement. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and must, therefore, respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner has failed to establish grounds for habeas corpus relief. Although the majority has performed an admirable analysis of the present cases on the subject, I am of the opinion that the various principles derived from these opinions are in conflict and, absent a reconciliation, the Petitioner is entitled to relief. Because the record of the proceedings demonstrates that after the jury verdict, the trial court directly contravened statute by imposing a Range III, persistent offender sentence, I would grant habeas corpus relief and remand to the sentencing court for the imposition of a Range II sentence.

We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in remanding this habeas corpus case to the trial court for a hearing on Michael Dwayne Edward’s claim that his sentence is illegal. After careful consideration we conclude that, even assuming the trial court erroneously classified Edwards as a persistent  offender for sentencing, this non-jurisdictional error renders the judgment voidable, not void, and does not entitle Edwards to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court dismissing the habeas corpus petition.

This is an appeal from an award of discretionary costs. The defendant owned a rental house in an historic district. She violated the historic district’s design guidelines by having vinyl siding installed on the house. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit to require the homeowner to remove the siding. The plaintiff was granted summary judgment, from which the defendant homeowner appealed. In the first appeal of this case, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed. After remand, the defendant homeowner failed to remove the siding, so the plaintiff filed a petition for contempt. After a hearing, the trial court found that the homeowner had the financial resources to have the siding removed, so it ordered the homeowner to (1) retain a contractor and (2) remove the siding. The homeowner was required to notify the court upon completion of both steps. The siding was removed. Once the house was brought into compliance, the plaintiff filed a proposed “order closing the file.” The trial court granted the motion. Within thirty days after entry of this order, the plaintiff filed a motion for an award of its discretionary costs. The homeowner opposed the motion, arguing that the plaintiff’s motion for discretionary costs was untimely, and that the order requiring compliance was the final order, not the “order closing the file.” The trial court awarded the plaintiff its discretionary costs, and the homeowner appealed. We affirm, finding that the motion for discretionary costs was timely filed.

This case concerns the access rights of a landowner to a section of her property divided from the rest of her land by a steep bluff. The trial court held that the landowner did not have an implied easement through her neighbor’s land to access her property at the bottom of the bluff because the there was insufficient evidence that the right-of-way preexisted severance of the properties. The trial court determined that Mrs. Newman did not have an implied easement by necessity because there was insufficient evidence that Mrs. Newman would be unable build a road down the bluff for a reasonable cost. Because the evidence does not preponderate otherwise, we affirm that Mrs. Newman does not have an implied easement or an implied easement by necessity over the right-of-way. The trial court also held that Mrs. Newman lacked a prescriptive easement over the right-of-way because she failed to prove that her use was exclusive; we affirm on the basis that Mrs. Newman failed to demonstrate that her use of the right-of-way was continuous.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s complaint for specific performance of a contract for the sale of real estate, and granted Appellee reasonable attorney’s fees as provided in the contract. Appellant appeals the award of attorney’s fees; Appellee asserts error in the amount of fees awarded. We affirm.

I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority as to all issues except the issue of the Defendant’s sentence. The majority opinion modifies the Defendant’s sentence from one year of confinement followed by sixteen years of probation to one year of confinement followed by eight years of probation.

The defendant, Tamela T. Scott, was convicted of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a class B felony, and three counts of vehicular assault, a class D felony. She received an effective sentence of eight years. The sentence was ordered to be served by one year in confinement and sixteen years on probation. Among the conditions of the defendant’s probation were 200 hours of  community service per year, and the defendant was also prohibited from driving for eight years.  The defendant appeals the judgments, arguing that (1) the convicting evidence is insufficient; (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony of “retrograde extrapolation” related to the defendant’s blood alcohol level; (3) the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding blood alcohol; and (4) the trial court erred in determining the conditions of her community service, the length of her probation, and that her driving privileges will be revoked for eight years. We affirm the judgments for the three counts of vehicular assault. We affirm the conviction of vehicular homicide by intoxication, but we modify the manner of service of the eight-year sentence to one year in confinement followed by eight years of probation.

This appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. The plaintiff, a thirty-seven year old man, filed a lawsuit against the defendant Catholic diocese. His complaint alleged that, as an adolescent, he was sexually abused by a Catholic priest employed by the defendant diocese. The lawsuit alleged that the diocese was negligent in hiring, retaining, and supervising the priest, and that the diocese breached its fiduciary duty to the plaintiff by failing to disclose to him its knowledge that the priest had abused other young boys. The diocese filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations. In response, the plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations was tolled under the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The diocese was granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we reverse, finding that the plaintiff’s complaint is time-barred, and cannot be saved by the discovery rule, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, or the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

The petitioner, Author Ray Turner, appeals the circuit court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the court’s order.

The second appeal in this case involves the effect of a previous forum non conveniens dismissal. The plaintiffs, residents and citizens of Mexico, were injured in automobile accidents that took place in Mexico. They filed multiple lawsuits against several American corporate defendants, alleging that the accidents were the result of defects in the vehicles’ tires. The corporate defendants moved for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. The trial court denied the motions, and the defendants were granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the consolidated case on the ground of forum non conveniens, based on the availability of Mexico as a more convenient forum for litigation of the plaintiffs’ claims. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed numerous lawsuits in several Mexican trial courts. These cases were all dismissed, and the dismissals were affirmed on appeal. The plaintiffs then filed new lawsuits in Davidson County Circuit Court against the same defendants, which were again consolidated for pretrial purposes. The defendants filed motions to dismiss on grounds of issue preclusion, arguing that the issues of forum non conveniens and the availability of Mexico as an available alternate forum had been determined in their favor in the first appeal. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that Mexico was not, in fact, an available forum, as evidenced by the numerous dismissals by the Mexican tribunals. The defendants were granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. On appeal, we address the effect of our previous decision and vacate the order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings on the availability of Mexico as an alternate forum for the plaintiffs’ claims.

The defendant, Gordon McGee, Jr., was indicted by the Warren County grand jury for simple assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and applied for pretrial diversion. The state denied the application and the defendant sought certiorari review by the trial court. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted certiorari and ordered the state to enter into a memorandum of understanding granting pretrial diversion to the defendant. The state appeals as of right the order of the trial court. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs brought this action seeking the removal of several Knox County officials from office on the ground that they were ineligible for their positions by operation of the term limits provision of the Knox County Charter. Six days after the plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Tennessee Supreme Court heard arguments in the case of Jordan v. Knox County. The Supreme Court in its Jordan opinion, released on January 12, 2007, decided all issues raised in the case before us. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint on the basis of mootness.

The defendant, Tryphena Nicole Jones, pled guilty to possession of cocaine and failure to appear, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent release eligibility. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a declaration of covenants for a homeowners’ association. The declaration made the developer a member of the homeowners’ association, insofar as the developer owned lots within the development. It also stated that the obligation to pay assessments on a given lot did not begin until either the lot was transferred from the developer or improvements on the lot were completed, whichever occurred first. The homeowners’ association sued the developer, seeking damages for unpaid assessments on lots owned by the developer, on which improvements were not complete. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the homeowners’ association. The developer appeals. We reverse, concluding that the declaration of covenants provides that the obligation to pay assessments on the lots owned by the developer had not yet commenced.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis and his motion to reopen post-conviction petition. The trial court properly concluded that the Appellant cannot prevail on the claims asserted in the two pleadings. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This lawsuit challenges actions by the Cleveland Municipal Airport Authority (the “Airport Authority”) and the Bradley County Commission (the “Commission”) involving the rezoning by the Commission of certain property located in Bradley County from Forestry Agricultural Residential to Special Impact Industrial. The Airport Authority intends to relocate the Cleveland Municipal Airport to the rezoned property. Frankie Lewis originally filed this lawsuit and Herbert Haney was added later as a plaintiff. As pertinent to this appeal, the Trial Court determined that Lewis lacked taxpayer standing to bring this lawsuit against the Airport Authority and granted the Airport Authority’s motion to dismiss. Lewis appeals the dismissal of his lawsuit against the Airport Authority. As to the Commission, both plaintiffs allege statutory and procedural violations surrounding notice of the requested rezoning and the conduct of the Commission in eventually granting the request for rezoning. The Trial Court granted the Commission’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the Commission was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Both Lewis and Haney appeal that summary judgment. We conclude that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Airport Authority’s motion to dismiss and the Commission’s motion for summary judgment. The judgment of the Trial Court is, therefore, affirmed.

The trial court dismissed this medical malpractice case after granting motions to exclude the testimony of both of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. Based upon our conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of either expert witness, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I concur in the result and most of the reasoning in the majority opinion. I question, though, whether we can firmly say that the victim’s saying, “No, No,” and “Mommy hit me” was sufficiently relevant and not too prejudicial in the context of the trial.