APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

At issue is an election commission’s decision to set an election on proposed referendum measures to a local government’s charter.  In pre-election litigation over this decision, the trial court concluded, for various reasons, that the election commission’s decision to hold the election should be reversed.  The election commission now urges this Court to reinstate its decision to hold an election and to remand this matter to it with instructions to schedule a referendum election at a future date pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-3-204(a).  As explained in more detail in this Opinion, we conclude that this requested relief is not proper under the cited statute.  Moreover, because this appeal cannot serve as a vehicle to grant the election commission any relief, we consider the matter moot.  Notwithstanding this posture in the case, we do find it appropriate, in the exercise of our discretion, to address one of the specific legal issues presented by this appeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine.  As to that issue, which concerns the interpretation of a form requirement the local government’s charter places on petitions to amend the charter by referendum election, we agree with the trial court that the referendum petition at issue in this case ran afoul of the requirement in dispute.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of a will.  Mary Bell McGraw Marlin (“Decedent”), a property owner in Rutherford County, left her farm to her surviving children.  Decedent’s holographic will provided equal acres to each heir, although a survey purporting to show how to divide the land was missing.  After years of futile discussions over how to divide the farm, Decedent’s grandson Harry Marlin, III filed suit in chancery court seeking to partition the land.  The matter was referred to the Probate Court for Rutherford County (“the Probate Court”).  After a hearing, the Probate Court entered an order dividing the land amongst the heirs.  Harry Marlin, III appeals.  He argues that the Probate Court erred by dividing the land into equal acres without regard to the economic value of the respective tracts.  We hold, inter alia, that Decedent’s will controls and it provided for equal acres, not equally valued acres.  We further find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Probate Court’s determination as to which tract each heir was to receive.  We affirm.

This appeal involves an action resulting from an alleged assault on a minor by a substitute teacher employed by the Shelby County Board of Education. The trial court granted Shelby County’s motion to dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 3 and 4.03 regarding process and service of process. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand.

The Petitioner, Benjamin Lee Pearson, Jr., pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received a total effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered.  The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Brett A. Patterson, filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis in the Montgomery County Circuit Court, contending that newly discovered evidence revealed that a vial of the victim’s blood was broken during transportation to the crime laboratory with other items of evidence, and the blood spilled onto the other evidence.  The Petitioner further contended a “tow-in receipt” for a vehicle the Petitioner had been driving revealed that the State had obtained certain items of evidence prior to the issuance of a search warrant.  Additionally, the Petitioner contended that the statute of limitations for filing the error coram nobis petition should be tolled.  After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court denied the petition.  On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the coram nobis court’s ruling.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The pro se petitioner, William Eblen, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court for Lake County, arguing the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. He insists his sentence should have expired, but the Tennessee Department of Correction “erased” sentence reduction credits he had earned. The State contends the trial court properly dismissed the petition. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

The State filed this action against the defendants for judicial enforcement of an order and assessment entered by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation concerning violations of the Water Quality Control Act.  The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State as to the defendants’ liability for upfront civil penalties and damages due under the order.  We affirm. 

Daniel Greenberg appeals the order of the Circuit Court for Williamson County (the “trial court”), enrolling a California judgment under which Mr. Greenberg is obligated to pay child support to his ex-wife. Because his brief is not in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27, Father’s issues are waived and his appeal must be dismissed.

The Defendant, Jason Matthew Campbell, appeals his convictions and effective twenty-three-year sentence for possession of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver, possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.  The Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish his constructive possession of the methamphetamine and pistol and that the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal argument by violating the missing witness rule, shifting the burden of proof, and stating a personal opinion. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm.

Petitioner, Eugene Franklin, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions upon his guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he received consecutive eight-year sentences resulting in an effective
16-year sentence.  Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered.  Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Petitioner, Jessie Dotson, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his postconviction petition, in which he challenged his six convictions for first degree premeditated murder and three convictions for attempted first degree murder and his resulting sentences of death for each of the first degree murder convictions plus 120 years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; (2) the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”) and the Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court improperly vacated the post-conviction court’s orders granting the Petitioner’s request for funding of experts; (3) the convictions and death sentences were the result of juror misconduct; (4) the State and the trial court committed various errors; (5) the Petitioner’s convictions and death sentences and Tennessee’s execution method are unconstitutional; and (6) cumulative error warrants relief. Upon reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs and oral arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The police seized a vehicle and commenced a forfeiture proceeding.  The Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security notified the vehicle owner that a forfeiture warrant for the vehicle had been issued.  And the owner filed a written claim and request for a hearing.  But before the hearing could take place, the administrative law judge granted the Department’s request for a voluntary dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding.  In a subsequent order, the administrative law judge awarded attorney’s fees to the owner under Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-325(a).  The Department petitioned for judicial review of the fee award.  The owner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the administrative decision was not final because the order did not address her request for attorney’s fees under a federal statute.  After denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that the fee award violated the state statute.  So it vacated the administrative decision.  On appeal, the owner argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss and in ruling that the fee award violated the state statute.  We affirm.

Defendant, Franklin Monroe McMillan, was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape of a child and was sentenced by the trial court to a total effective sentence of eighty years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the forensic interview of the child victim was erroneously admitted, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to exclude DNA evidence, and that the prosecutor made improper statements during closing rebuttal argument. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the arguments of counsel, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Bledsoe County jury convicted the Defendant, James Arthur Evans, of resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months suspended to probation after service of twenty days in jail. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a binding judicial interpretation of a contract executed by the three defendants. Plaintiffs were not parties to the contract, nor did their complaint allege that they were third-party beneficiaries of it. The three defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim based on lack of standing, which the trial court granted. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm and remand for further proceedings.

Martha Harrison Bane conveyed an approximately eight-acre tract of land to her son and daughter-in-law in 2003. Several years later, Ms. Bane sought to have the deed set aside on the basis of undue influence. A default judgment was entered against the defendants and the land was re-conveyed back to Ms. Bane by a Clerk and Master’s deed. Several years after that, the defendants had the default judgment set aside. The trial court then held a hearing on the original petition to have the deed set aside in February of 2018 and determined that the deed was valid. Ms. Bane’s estate appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Oscar Smith, a death row inmate, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition requesting analysis of evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021.  Based upon our review of the record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Malik Yelder, Petitioner, pled guilty to failure to appear, carjacking, and two counts of aggravated robbery. As a result, he received an effective nine-year sentence. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct an illegal sentence in which he argued that trial counsel was ineffective. The postconviction court treated the pleading as a petition for post-conviction relief, appointed counsel, and held a hearing. The post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This is a premises liability case arising from injuries sustained by Appellant Anthony Walker when he attempted to mow a section of ground within the common area controlled by Appellee, Rivertrail Crossing Homeowner’s Association. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm

The Petitioner, Marlon Jermaine Johnson, acting pro se, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(2)(A) and for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417(c)(1).  On appeal, the Petitioner argues his sentence is illegal because the trial court entered his judgment incorrectly, resulting in errors on the face of the judgment.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Defendant, Sonya Nale, is charged by indictment with bribery of a public servant, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-102 (2018). After the trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to disqualify the Twelfth Judicial District Attorney’s office, we granted the State’s application for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 to review the trial court’s order. We reverse the trial court’s order disqualifying the district attorney general’s office from prosecuting the case.

The petitioner, Tavares Dewayne Buchanan, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.  Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court abused its discretion by disqualifying the Twelfth Judicial District Attorney General’s office. As noted by the majority, a trial court’s decision to disqualify a prosecutor or an entire district attorney general’s office is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tenn. 2001); State v . Culbreath, 30 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tenn. 2000). A court abuses its discretion by “apply[ing] an incorrect legal standard, or reach[ing] a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining.” State v. Shirley, 6 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999); see Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 182.

The Petitioner, Marlon Sontay, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Shelby County Grand Jury issued an indictment charging Defendant, Stanley Allen, with aggravated statutory rape, solicitation of a minor, and sexual battery. Following a trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of solicitation of a minor and sexual battery. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charge of aggravated statutory rape. Defendant later entered a no contest plea to a lesser-included offense of assault by offensive touching on this charge. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective one-year sentence suspended to three years of supervised probation, and the court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for sexual battery and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying judicial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.