APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The mortgagors filed suit, charging the mortgagee with breach of contract for failure to comply with terms of a note, deed of trust, and automatic payment service plan pursuant to which the mortgagee greed to automatically debit the mortgagors’ bank account for monthly payments. The jury found the mortgagee guilty of breach of contract and awarded damages in the amount of $250,000. The trial court remitted this damage award to $150,000. On appeal, the mortgagee argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant the mortgagee’s motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the mortgagors were guilty of the first uncured material breach of contract, by excluding evidence as a discovery sanction and by awarding the mortgagors $150,000. The mortgagors contend that the mortgagee waived all issues by not including them in its motion for new trial. After careful review, we hold that 1) the mortgagee did not waive its issues for purposes of appeal because the issues were included in the memorandum of law it incorporated in the motion for new trial; 2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence as a discovery sanction upon our finding that the mortgagee failed to explain why the excluded evidence was not timely provided to the mortgagors or to establish its importance at trial; 3) the trial court did not err in failing to grant the mortgagee’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict upon our finding that the mortgagee was guilty of the first uncured material breach of contract by failing to timely institute its automatic payment service plan; and 4) in compliance with the mortgagee’s request, this case is remanded for a new trial solely on the issue of damages upon our finding that the trial court’s award of damages in the amount of $150,000 is not supported by the evidence.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. While at work for the Employer, the Employee’s hair was caught in machinery, which violently pulled her head into the machine. Her scalp was pulled away from her skull. She received treatment at an emergency room.  In the months that followed, she had three surgical procedures to repair the wound and her scalp.  She was diagnosed with post traumatic stress syndrome, developed sleep problems, anxiety and headaches. She became fearful and anxious around machinery and was ultimately discharged by her Employer. Her physicians and vocational experts and the Employer’s vocational expert agreed that when a Social Security questionnaire was considered, she was 100% disabled. Nevertheless, the Employer contends that she is not 100% disabled. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Walter Cuozzo (“the defendant”) was found guilty of traffic violations in general sessions court. He appealed to circuit court but failed to comply with a local rule that provides “an appellant [on an appeal from general sessions court] has forty five (45) days to secure a trial date from the court.” Because of this failure, the circuit court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by basing the employee’s impairment rating on the testimony of the independent medical examiner instead of on the employee’s treating physician. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sustained an injury to her shoulder in April 2005 while working for Employer. When she returned to the office, she made a statement in the presence of her supervisor and others that she had injured her shoulder. The supervisor testified that she did not hear the statement. In the following months, Employee received occasional medical treatment for the injury. In March 2006, her doctor recommended surgery. Employee gave written notice of the injury to her supervisor on the next day.  Employer denied the claim based upon Employee’s failure to give notice of her injury within thirty days. The trial court found that Employee had given sufficient notice and awarded 7.5% permanent partial disability. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that the claim was not barred by failure to give timely notice. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the finding of the trial court and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tracey Lynn Harris, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

Zoning administrator denied a waiver of the Metropolitan Zoning Code’s landscape buffer requirement and the Board of Zoning Appeals upheld the administrator’s interpretation of the ordinance. Plaintiff contractor appealed to the circuit court, which determined that the zoning administrator’s interpretation of the ordinance was incorrect and granted the waiver. The Board of Zoning Appeals appealed. The trial court’s interpretation of the ordinance is affirmed, but the decision to grant the waiver is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to return the matter to the board for further action.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee and Employer entered into a court-approved settlement agreement in 1988. The agreement required Employer to continue to provide medical treatment for the injury in accordance with the workers' compensation law. Employee received treatment from time to time. Employer paid for the treatment. In June 2006, Employer requested an independent medical examination of Employee. The evaluating physician concluded that current medical treatment was not related to the original work injury.  Employer thereafter declined to provide further treatment. Employee filed this action. The trial court ordered Employer to continue to provide medical treatment. Employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Michael Hooper, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Rain Thomas Chesher, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his conviction is void, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The Petitioner, Sammie Lee Netters, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State's motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This appeal arises from post-divorce proceedings involving child support obligations. The original divorce and support orders were entered in Michigan. The mother subsequently moved to North Carolina, and the child support order was transferred to that state. The father moved to Tennessee and became delinquent in making his support payments. The mother began to receive public assistance and executed an income assignment assigning to North Carolina the right to receive the back child support owed by the father. Upon request by North Carolina, Tennessee then brought suit to enforce the North Carolina order. In the Tennessee proceedings, the trial court changed custody from the mother to the father and ordered the mother to pay the father child support. In the process, the trial court determined that the mother owed back child support to the father and then used this amount to setoff the obligation owed by the father to North Carolina. For the reasons stated herein, we determine that a setoff cannot be used to deprive North Carolina of recoupment of its public assistance. The judgment below allowing the setoff is therefore vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Rapheal Love, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment in the Department of Correction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the consecutive sentences imposed by the trial court.

The defendant, Cordaro Hughes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction, fifteen years at 100% for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and eight years at 30% for the attempted robbery conviction, with the trial court ordering that the sentences be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The defendant raises four issues on appeal: (1) whether this court should waive his untimely notice of appeal in the interests of justice; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to police; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine to suppress evidence that he initially denied any involvement in the crimes. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We here review a trial court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. Each defendant is alleged to have been involved in the ownership and operation of a nursing home facility at which the mother of the plaintiff was a resident prior to her death. The mother had, several years earlier, executed a general durable power of attorney naming one of her daughters as her attorney-infact. Later that daughter signed a letter purporting to give another of the mother’s daughters certain powers. This daughter then secured the admission of their mother to the nursing facility in question here and in the admissions process signed an arbitration agreement. The defendants contend that her signature is effective to require arbitration of the claims raised in this suit. We conclude that the signing daughter did not possess the requisite authority to enter into a binding arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.

The appellant, Keven Scott, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, possession of cocaine, and possession of marijuana. The trial court merged the cocaine convictions and sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action. The issues presented on appeal relate to the trial court’s classification and division of the parties’ property. We affirm.

The Shelby County Assessor and Shelby County moved to intervene in a probate case in order to amend a prior order previously entered adjudicating a claim made against the decedent’s estate by the City of Memphis for delinquent personal property taxes. The would-be intervenors claimed as their interest in the case the possibility that the probate court’s decision might be deemed preclusive in a tangentially related chancery proceeding. The probate court denied the motion to intervene and ordered that the movants pay the estate’s attorney’s fees. We conclude that the movants did not possess a substantial legal interest in the litigation warranting their intervention under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.01, and we further conclude that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in finding the motion to be untimely. Accordingly, we affirm the probate court’s denial of the motion to intervene as well as its denial of a companion motion made under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. We, however, vacate its decision awarding the estate attorney’s fees.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s valuation of his closely held stock and the classification of its appreciation as marital property; the $75,000 award of alimony in solido to Wife to account for her interest in the appreciation of that stock; the award of $1,500 per month in transitional alimony for 60 months; and the award to Wife of $25,000 in attorney’s fees incurred through trial and of $1,500 in attorney’s fees incurred in defending against husband’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. We affirm.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Ray Charles Nelson, of theft and criminal trespass, and the defendant, now on appeal, challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because we hold that the evidence was sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County Criminal Court grand jury indicted the defendant, Thomas Jefferson Teague, Jr., on one count of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court accepted a plea agreement in which the defendant agreed to plead guilty to only felony possession of a weapon in exchange for a Range I sentence of two years’ confinement in a regional workhouse. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion seeking placement in a community corrections program. Adopting the State’s view that the incarcerative sentence was embraced in a binding plea agreement and was not subject to modification, the trial court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed. Although the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in denying relief, we affirm its order because the record demonstrated no factual basis for relief.

The Sullivan County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Thornton Shayne Snapp, for theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for theft, and instead only supported a conviction for joyriding. After a thorough review of the record, we have found the evidence to be sufficient to support the conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Adrienne Hollowell, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued over $500, a Class E felony. The Shelby County Criminal Court sentenced the defendant to one year in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. At the time of her guilty plea, the defendant filed a petition to suspend her sentence; following an August 2006 hearing, the trial court denied the petition and ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in incarceration. The defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of full incarceration. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Sanford Lee Parker, was convicted of felony driving under the influence (fourth offense or greater), child endangerment, violation of the implied consent law, and driving on a revoked license. For these convictions, the Defendant received consecutive terms of four years, eleven months and twenty-nine days, eleven months and twenty-nine days, and six months respectively. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for driving under the influence and child endangerment and contends that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Jim Sanders, retired from his employment with the United Parcel Service in September 2003. In February 2004, he gave notice to his employer of a workers’ compensation claim. He alleged that he had sustained gradual injuries or aggravation of his pre-existing conditions as a result of his work activities. The claim was denied, and the Mr. Sanders filed suit. At trial, the court sustained objections by both parties to medical records attached to medical depositions. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that the employee had failed to carry his burden of proof and also that the claim was barred by failure to give timely notice of the alleged injury. The employee has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in sustaining the employer’s objection to medical records, in finding that he had not carried his burden of proof, and in finding that he had not complied with the notice requirement of the workers’ compensation law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.