APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Sullivan County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Thornton Shayne Snapp, for theft of property valued over $1,000 but less than $10,000. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for theft, and instead only supported a conviction for joyriding. After a thorough review of the record, we have found the evidence to be sufficient to support the conviction and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Adrienne Hollowell, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued over $500, a Class E felony. The Shelby County Criminal Court sentenced the defendant to one year in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. At the time of her guilty plea, the defendant filed a petition to suspend her sentence; following an August 2006 hearing, the trial court denied the petition and ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in incarceration. The defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of full incarceration. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bobby E. White and Ann H. White sought judgment granting them title to a small portion of property that they claim to own by deed, adverse possession and by payment of taxes. The trial court granted Pulaski Electric System, a public electric company, summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tony Draine, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of theft of property over $10,000, a Class C felony, and sentenced to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, specifically with regard to the requisite mental state. After review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient and affirm the judgment of conviction.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Bryan Dale Farmer, of one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, and the trial court sentenced him to three years in prison, suspended after the service of sixty days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he did not use his supervisory power over the victim to accomplish a sexual act; and (2) the trial court erred by not granting him full probation. After a thorough review of the applicable record and law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I join in the results reached by the majority but write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations. The majority opinion concludes that the trial court erred in finding that the post-conviction petition filed more than five years after the entry of judgment in this case is time-barred. This conclusion is based upon the belief that the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing showed that the petitioner was misled by trial counsel regarding his right to pursue post-conviction relief under the terms of his guilty plea agreement.

The petitioner, Craig Robert Nunn, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated sexual battery convictions. The petitioner first argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that due process considerations did not toll the statute of limitations. He further argues that the post-conviction court, which also considered his claims on the merits, erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial on its merits of the petition.

A Loudon County grand jury indicted the defendant, Ariel Ben Sherman, and co-defendant, Jacqueline Crank, for child neglect. The trial court dismissed the indictment against Sherman. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded. We granted Sherman’s application for permission to appeal to consider the issues presented for review, and hold as follows: (1) When deciding a motion to dismiss an indictment, a trial court may consider undisputed facts that are clearly and unequivocally agreed upon by the parties; (2) a person standing in loco parentis to a child may have a legal duty of care, the breach of which may result in criminal culpability; and (3) the State is not bound at the outset of a trial by the legal theories espoused in its bill of particulars. Because the trial court erroneously dismissed the indictment, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstate the indictment against Sherman, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

These consolidated appeals arise out of two forcible entry and detainer suits filed in general sessions court and appealed to circuit court. For the following reasons, we have determined that one appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final order, and one appeal must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of an appeal from a general sessions judgment. The appellant purchaser defaulted on a loan from the appellee finance company for the purchase of a vehicle. The finance company then filed an action to recover possession of the vehicle. The general sessions court entered a judgment in favor of the finance company. The purchaser appealed the judgment to the circuit court. The finance company moved to dismiss the appeal for failure to file the required bond. The circuit court found that the purchaser was not indigent and granted the motion to dismiss. The purchaser appeals, challenging the circuit court’s finding that he was not indigent. We find that an appeal bond was not required under Tennessee caselaw. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Harrison Melvin X. Pearison, was denied habeas corpus relief by the Johnson County Criminal Court from his 1997 conviction for aggravated arson and twenty-year sentence at 100 percent service. On appeal, he contends that the amended judgment with 100 percent service is void and that he is entitled to serve the sentence at thirty percent as originally imposed. Upon review, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its order dismissing the petition.

This appeal involves claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress made by two family members of a child who was seriously injured in an automobile accident. In their complaint filed in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, the injured child’s mother and brother alleged that they had sustained severe emotional injuries after they observed him lying on the pavement in a pool of blood.  The injured child’s parents served a copy of the complaint on their automobile insurance company because the driver of the automobile that struck their son lacked adequate insurance. The insurance company moved for a partial summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim because neither the injured child’s mother nor his brother had seen or heard the injury-producing accident. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion, and the injured child’s mother and brother appealed to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. We granted the insurance company’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly permitted these negligent infliction of emotional distress claims to proceed. We have determined that persons who observe an injured family member shortly after an injury-producing accident may pursue a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

The petitioner, Rodney L. Tipton, was denied habeas corpus relief by the Johnson County Criminal Court from his 1992 judgments for jury convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery and effective thirty-three-year sentence as a Range I offender. On appeal, he contends that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court constructively amended the indictment for aggravated rape by including in its jury instructions modes of the offense which were not charged in the indictment and because the trial court erroneously amended the aggravated robbery indictment by allowing an amendment to include a car as an additional item taken in the course of the robbery. Upon review, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its order dismissing the petition.

This action was filed on October 3, 1996 in the Chancery Court. The Final Judgment was entered in the Trial Court on September 13, 2007. On appeal, we vacate and remand for a new trial inter alia due to the unreasonable delay by the Trial Court in rendering judgment.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of J.C. (“Father”) and B.C. (“Mother”) to the minor children S.A.C., K.O.C., and J.S.C. (“the Children”). After trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s and Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), and that termination was in the best interests of the Children. Father and Mother appeal to this Court. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Ricky Thomas Hughes, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. On appeal, he alleges that his sentence is void because the trial court failed to comply with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and cases interpreting that provision. After a thorough review of the issues and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The defendant, Samuel McAlister, pled guilty in case number 05-228 to two counts of sale or delivery of cocaine, Class C felonies, and one count of sale or delivery of more than .5 gram of cocaine, a Class B felony. In case number 05-493, the defendant pled guilty to an additional count of sale or delivery of more than .5 gram of cocaine, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and one count of possession of a weapon with intent to employ it in an offense, a Class E felony. In exchange for his guilty pleas, the defendant received an effective sentence of eight years to be served under community corrections supervision. The trial court subsequently revoked the community corrections sentences and resentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of twelve years in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the Madison County Circuit Court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Deonta Baskin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for shooting a man in the hip following an altercation. The trial court merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted murder conviction and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his attempted murder conviction, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient proof that the shooting was premeditated. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed this premises liability action for personal injuries sustained by the elderly husband who was injured when automatic doors at the entrance to a medical office building struck him causing him to fall. In the premises liability action that followed, Plaintiffs alleged that the major tenant of the office building and the property management company failed to exercise the required due care in the maintenance, inspection, and repair of the doors and/or to properly warn Plaintiffs of the dangers existing at the office building. The trial court summarily dismissed the claims against both defendants. We have determined the major tenant owed no duty to Plaintiffs and thus was entitled to summary judgment. We have also determined that the property management company did not create the alleged dangerous or defective condition, and it did not have actual or constructive knowledge that a dangerous or defective condition existed. Accordingly, we affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal involves an employer’s liability for medical benefits stemming from injuries that occurred subsequent to an original compensable injury. Following a 2001 work-related injury to his elbow, the employee and his employer settled the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The settlement obligated the employer to pay future medical bills resulting from the elbow injury. Shortly after undergoing corrective surgery on the injured elbow in 2004, the employee burned his hand while cooking at home. While recuperating from the burn to his hand, he suffered additional injuries to his hand in a fall near his sister’s home. The employee filed a petition seeking to recover medical expenses for these two injuries to his hand on the basis that the medical expenses associated with these injuries were the direct and natural consequence of the original work-related injury to his elbow. The trial court found that the medical expenses sought by the employee were the result of intervening causes, namely the employee’s own negligence, and denied the petition. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reversed, finding that the subsequent injuries were the direct and natural consequence of the original compensable injury and that there were no intervening causes. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we hold that the injuries to the employee’s hand were due to his own negligence, and therefore, the employer is not required to pay the medical bills associated with those injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the Panel’s decision and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee appeals the sentencing decision of the Maury County Circuit Court. After his probation was revoked, the defendant, Brandon Dailey, entered a plea of guilty to the sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. Thereafter, the court sentenced him to ten years imprisonment and ordered that his sentence run concurrently with his prior sentences. On appeal, the state argues that the trial court erred in imposing sentence without considering enhancement and mitigating factors and for failing to state on the record its reasons for the sentence in contravention of procedure established by the Sentencing Reform Act. Upon a full review of the record, arguments of counsel and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Tommy Lee Clark, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; and possession of a deadly weapon other than a firearm with the intent to employ it during the commission of a dangerous offense, a Class E felony.  The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years, twelve years, and six years, respectively, and ordered that each sentence run consecutively for an effective sentence of thirty-three years. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated burglary and attempted aggravated burglary because the State presented no proof regarding his intent to commit a theft; (2) the indictment for attempted aggravated burglary was defective because it did not state an essential element of the offense; (3) the trial court erred in holding that a box cutter is a deadly weapon; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Keary Lee Chearis, was convicted of five counts of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years on each count. The trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of twenty-four years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the offenses, ruling that the State properly authenticated video recordings offered as evidence, overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument, enhancing his sentences beyond the statutory minimum, and imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that it was error to deny the defendant’s motion to sever the offenses, but such error was harmless. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

The Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (“POST Commission”) decertified an officer previously given preliminary certification pending a background check based upon a plea of guilty and nolo contendere to felonies that were entered and set aside in California decades ago. In decertifying the officer, the POST Commission relied upon the position that it had no discretion under its own rules, and that decertification was required. The Chancery Court reversed the POST Commission for failing to give full faith and credit to the California judgment. We hold that the POST Commission failed to adopt criteria for exceptions and waivers as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 38-8-106. For reasons other than those used by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of  the trial court, but modify the judgment to vacate the POST Commission’s decision to decertify and remand the matter to the POST Commission to reconsider the officer’s decertification in  accordance with statutory directives.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves an employee with a pre-existing medical condition who sustained a work-related injury. The employer terminated the employee after he failed to report for work or call in after he had been released to return to work without conditions.  Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Davidson County found that the employee had sustained a work-related injury that had aggravated a pre-existing condition. The trial court also determined that the employee had not made a meaningful return to work and, therefore, that the cap on benefits in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1) (2005) did not apply. The trial court also determined that the employee was one hundred percent permanently partially disabled. The employer has appealed. While we affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury, we vacate the finding that the employee had not had a meaningful return to work and that the employee was one hundred percent permanently partially disabled. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.