APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves an employee with a pre-existing medical condition who sustained a work-related injury. The employer terminated the employee after he failed to report for work or call in after he had been released to return to work without conditions.  Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for Davidson County found that the employee had sustained a work-related injury that had aggravated a pre-existing condition. The trial court also determined that the employee had not made a meaningful return to work and, therefore, that the cap on benefits in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(a)(1) (2005) did not apply. The trial court also determined that the employee was one hundred percent permanently partially disabled. The employer has appealed. While we affirm the trial court’s finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury, we vacate the finding that the employee had not had a meaningful return to work and that the employee was one hundred percent permanently partially disabled. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Torian Dillard, was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to twenty years as a Range II, violent offender. He argues that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify with her back to him and by reseating a juror against whom he had exercised a peremptory challenge. He also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves a delivery driver who asserts that he sustained two work-related back injuries in 1999. Following surgery in 2002, the delivery driver’s surgeon assigned him a twenty-eight percent impairment and opined that the 1999 injuries had exacerbated a pre-existing back condition. The delivery driver later filed a complaint seeking benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Law in the Circuit Court for Davidson County. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the delivery driver sixty percent permanent partial disability and temporary total disability from March 2000 to September 2004. The trial court also directed the delivery driver’s employer to pay some of his medical expenses. On this appeal, the employer asserts that the trial court erred (1) by admitting the second deposition of the delivery driver’s surgeon, (2) by finding that the delivery driver had sustained a permanent impairment as a result of his work-related injuries, (3) by awarding the delivery driver temporary total disability benefits, and (4) by requiring it to pay a part of the delivery driver’s medical expenses. For his part, the delivery driver asserts that the trial court erred by failing to award him some of his claimed medical expenses and for declining to impose a bad faith penalty against the employer. We have determined that the award of temporary total disability benefits should be reduced and that the medical expenses awarded by the trial court should be paid directly to the providers rather than in a lump sum to the delivery driver. Therefore, we affirm the judgment as modified by this opinion.

County regional planning commission brought suit seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief against a mobile home park alleged to be in violation of a private act regulating mobile home parks in the county. The trial court found that the mobile home park was not protected by a grandfather provision and ordered injunctive relief to bring the mobile home park into compliance with the private act. We affirm the result reached by the trial court.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. It involves the attempt of a long-term employee of an air conditioner manufacturer to obtain benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act for an injury to her foot. She filed a claim seeking workers’ compensation benefits in the Chancery Court for White County. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that the employee had sustained a compensable injury and that she was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits resulting from a fifty-five percent permanent partial disability to her foot. On this appeal, the employer asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the injury arose out of the course of the employment and that the disability award was excessive. We have determined that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s award.

The petitioner, Raymond Belcher, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his conviction is void or his sentence illegal, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The Defendant, Glen Andrew Adams, was charged with Class C felony manufacture of marijuana. The Defendant applied for pretrial diversion, and the district attorney general denied his request. The trial court reversed, concluding that the district attorney abused his discretion and ordering that the Defendant be placed on pretrial diversion. The State appeals. Following our review of the record, the judgment of the Cocke County Circuit Court ordering the district attorney general to grant the Defendant diversion is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

After sixteen years of marriage, Linda Kay Edwards (“Wife”) sued Ronald Dell Edwards (“Husband”) for divorce. After the trial, the Trial Court entered an order, inter alia, granting the parties a divorce, distributing the marital property, and ordering Husband to pay Wife transitional alimony in the amount of $2,600 per month for twelve months. Wife appeals raising issues regarding the distribution of marital property and alimony. We modify the Trial Court’s Final Decree to order that Husband is to pay Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $1,000 per month after the transitional alimony ends, and we affirm as modified.

In this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State challenges the trial court’s suppression of the defendant’s June 23, 2003 statement to police. Because we agree that the defendant’s Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights, as well as certain statutory rights, were violated in the procuring of the statement, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Benjamin A. McAlister, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to simple possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia subject to reservation of a certified question on appeal. The Defendant then applied for and was granted judicial diversion under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. On appeal, the Defendant presents the following certified question for our review: whether he voluntarily consented to the search of his residence. As provided by our diversion statute, no judgment of conviction was entered and, as such, we conclude that the Defendant has no appeal as of right. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the appeal, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal involves modification of a parent’s status as primary residential parent. The mother and the father never married, and the mother was the children’s primary residential parent. The father filed a petition to modify, requesting to be named the primary residential parent. As a material change in circumstances, he alleged that the children had been living primarily with him for the past several months. After a hearing, the juvenile court established the father as the primary residential parent, gave the mother alternate parenting time, and set child support payments for the mother. The mother appeals, arguing that she never received proper notice of the father’s petition to modify, that there had been no material change in circumstances, and that the evidence did not support a finding that designating the father as the primary residential parent was in the children’s best interest. We affirm, finding that the mother waived her challenge to the sufficiency of service of process, and that the evidence supports the designation of the father as the primary residential parent.

This appeal concerns a contempt proceeding arising from the alleged failure of the appellant to pay child support and other expenses as required by a prior court order. Neither the appellant nor counsel for the appellant appeared at the hearing below held on the issue of his contempt. The trial court found the appellant to be in contempt for nonpayment of his court-ordered obligations; the appellant was also taxed with attorney’s fees for the appellee. Because the trial court failed to find that the appellant possessed the present ability to pay and also failed to find that he was in willful noncompliance with the court’s prior order, we reverse that part of the decision below finding the appellant to be in contempt as well as awarding attorney’s fees, and we remand for further proceedings. We leave undisturbed the trial court’s finding that the appellant was in arrears on his obligations to the appellee.

Plaintiff failed to comply with the trial court’s discovery order to produce two witnesses for deposition within forty-five days, and Defendant moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37.02. Plaintiff appeals, asserting the trial court abused its discretion where there was no evidence of willful or dilatory conduct by Plaintiff. We vacate and remand.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (Supp. 2007) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  After working an evening shift at his job, the employee awoke the next morning with severe back pain. He sought medical treatment through his family physician who referred him to a neurosurgeon.  Within a few days, he had surgery to repair bone spurring and degenerative changes in his cervical spine. After the surgery, he informed his supervisor that he believed his job caused his condition.  He made a workers’ compensation claim, which his employer denied. The trial court found that his injury was work-related and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the claim is barred by failure to comply with the notice requirement of the workers’ compensation law, and that the employee did not sustain his burden of proof concerning causation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, George A. Johnson, was convicted by a Sevier County Jury of rape and statutory rape. As a result, he received an effective sentence of twenty years. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentence to this Court. See State v. George A. Johnson, No. E2003-02881-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 225025, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 31, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 2, 2005). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction review on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition, determining that Petitioner failed to carry the burden required for post-conviction relief. We agree and, therefore, affirm the denial of the post-conviction petition.

Appellant, Lewis Jeffrey Cox, was arrested for public intoxication. Appellant was a registered violent sex offender at the time of his arrest. He failed to inform the arresting officers or the facility where he was held that he was a registered violent sex offender. Subsequently, Appellant was indicted by the Bedford County Grand Jury for failure to inform the incarcerating facility that he was a registered violent sex offender under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-204(e). Appellant pled guilty to the charge. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to six years as a career offender. Appellant appeals his sentence to this Court. On appeal, he argues that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-204 carries no penal provision, and the penal provisions included in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-208 do not apply to his failure to inform the facility of his status as a registered violent sex offender. After a thorough review of the applicable laws, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Nikia Grasty, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Gerald Sanford, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court conviction on one count of first degree murder. In this appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Sarah Michelle Vinson, appeals her Lincoln County Circuit Court convictions of two counts of forgery. In this appeal, she contends that she was improperly denied alternative sentencing and that her sentences are excessive. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Plaintiff’s employment contract as a probationary teacher was not renewed. He filed a grievance under the agreement existing between the local board of education and the local professional employees’ association. As the last step in the grievance procedure, the teacher sought binding arbitration. The board filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not required to arbitrate the former employee’s grievance. The trial court dismissed that action, and on appeal this court reversed and remanded for further consideration by the trial court. The trial court then ruled that the issues raised by the teacher were subject to arbitration, and the board again appealed to this court. We hold that a locally negotiated agreement cannot be interpreted to delegate to an arbitrator the decision of whether to renew a probationary teacher’s contract because state statutes clearly give that decision to local school officials. Consequently, we reverse the trial court.

The defendant, Kenneth J. Cradic, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child (Class A felony), and three counts of incest (Class C felony). He was sentenced to twenty years for each Class A felony and four years for each Class C felony. The trial court ordered that two of the Class A felony convictions be served consecutive to each other but concurrent to the third conviction and that the three Class C felony convictions be served consecutive to each other and concurrent to the Class A felonies, for a total effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the sentence is improper, and that the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever his offenses and to suppress his statement. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

This case arises from an election for Gatlinburg City Commission in May 2007. Six candidates were on the ballot; the top three finishers were elected. Bobby C. (Clark) King received 210 votes and finished fifth, 304 votes behind the third-place finisher. Mr. King now seeks to have the election declared void, and a new election ordered, on the basis of several alleged procedural errors that he says render the election results invalid. After a bench trial, the court rejected Mr. King’s arguments, declaring some of his accusations factually lacking and holding that others, even if true, were not sufficiently serious to justify voiding the election. Mr. King appeals. We affirm.

In this appeal, a mother and father challenge an order terminating their parental rights. We affirm the order as it pertains to the mother, and we reverse as to the father.

Employer appeals the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Employee. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on Employee’s workers’ compensation claim. The agreement included language that Employee would not seek further employment with Employer. In granting partial summary judgment to Employee, the trial court found that the disputed language of the agreement did not create a contractual obligation on the part of Employee. We reverse and grant summary judgment in favor of Employer.

The appellant urges this court to reverse the post-conviction court’s decision denying him post-conviction relief based upon his allegation that trial counsel’s failure to explain to him, prior to his plea of guilty, the extent of his obligations under the community supervision provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-524 constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to undermine the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Specifically, he complains that had counsel informed him adequately regarding the requirements of lifetime community supervision, including the possible associated monthly cost of forty-five dollars, he would not have entered his guilty pleas to aggravated sexual battery and automobile burglary. The appellant claims and counsel conceded at the evidentiary hearing that this omission rendered his guilty plea involuntary, unintelligent and unknowing.