APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 22, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for aggravated rape in October 1988, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in January 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

Bryan Matthew Willis appeals his convictions in the Circuit Court of Henry County. He was convicted by a jury of three (3) counts of aggravated burglary and three (3) counts of theft of property. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient for the convictions based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Ronald Turks, a/k/a Asad E. Mujihadeen, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court which denied him post-conviction, habeas corpus and coram nobis relief from his 1979 first degree murder conviction and resulting life sentence. The trial court dismissed the petitioner's case because the postconviction and coram nobis actions were barred by statutes of limitations and the habeas corpus action failed to state a ground for relief. The following issues are presented for review:

(1) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for post-conviction relief under Tennessee law?

(2) Can evidence tending to show actual innocence of the crime for which the petitioner has been convicted be the basis for habeas corpus relief?

(3) Does the one-year statute of limitations for bringing evidence of actual innocence under Tennessee's coram nobis statute violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?

We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

This appeal involves a child support obligation. The mother and father had three minor children. When the parties divorced, they entered into a marital dissolution agreement and a permanent parenting plan, which were approved by the divorce decree. Relevant to this appeal, the parties owned a newer residence, which was their marital home, and also an older residence, which had been listed for sale. The permanent parenting plan provided that it would not become effective until the older residence was sold. The parties agreed that the mother and the three children would be allowed to continue living with the father in the newer residence after the divorce until the older residence was sold. The father would be paying several marital debts until the older home sold, including the mortgage on the older home. However, the parenting plan provided that the father’s obligation to pay child support would not begin until the older home was sold. The mother and children soon moved out of the marital home and into the older residence. Pursuant to the agreement, the father had no obligation to pay child support because the older residence had not been sold. Six weeks after the final divorce decree was entered, the mother filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree and parenting plan, claiming that the parties were not abiding by the decree and the father was not paying any child support. The mother began receiving public assistance benefits, and the State of Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a petition on her behalf seeking to modify the father’s child support obligation, claiming that the agreement relieving him of his duty to pay child support was void and that a significant variance existed between his current obligation and the Child Support Guidelines. The trial court entered a default order requiring the father to pay child support directly to the mother, but later set it aside, leaving the father with only his obligation, pursuant to the marital dissolution agreement, to pay the marital debts until the older residence sold. The State appeals. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff has operated a funeral home on its property since 1997. In this zoning dispute, the City of Mt. Juliet Board of Zoning Appeals (“the Board”) refused to allow plaintiff to establish a crematory as an expansion of plaintiff’s funeral home services. The funeral home had been a legal nonconforming use of plaintiff’s property since the City’s zoning ordinance was amended in 1998. The Board refused to allow plaintiff to operate a crematory on the same property because crematories are not permitted in the zoning district for plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Trial Court for judicial review of the Board’s decision. The Trial Court granted the writ and found that the Board’s decision was arbitrary, illegal, and capricious. The Trial Court reversed the Board’s decision and ordered defendants to allow plaintiff to build and operate the proposed crematory on its funeral home property. The Trial Court also granted plaintiff $10,000 in attorney fees and costs. Defendants appeal. We affirm. We also hold that BMC is entitled to its reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred during this appeal, not to exceed $10,000, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-37-101, et seq. Therefore, we remand to the Trial Court for a determination of the proper amount of attorney fees and costs to be awarded to BMC and for collection of costs below.

The petitioner, Glen Cook, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was sentenced improperly. Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to interview witnesses, never discussed trial strategy with the petitioner, and failed to file proper motions. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

At the conclusion of a bench trial, the defendant, Gary Lynn Sykes, was convicted of aggravated assault. The trial court required restitution of $4,421.00 and imposed a Range I, three-year sentence in the Dyer County jail; all but sixty days were suspended. In his appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

The appellant, Devito Polk, pled guilty to second degree murder¹ and was sentenced to 35 years as a Multiple Range II offender. His sentence was to be served concurrently with seven pending aggravated robbery charges. He, thereafter, filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary plea. He appeals the denial of the petition. He raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether he knowingly and intelligently entered his plea of guilty; and (2) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of attempt to commit second-degree murder and aggravated assault. After a hearing, he was sentenced to twelve years on the attempt offense and eight years on the assault offense, to run concurrently. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that his two convictions must be merged; that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial; and that his sentence is excessive.  Finding merit in the first of these issues, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault. We otherwise affirm the judgment below.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on November 12, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on November 15, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted on one count of aggravated rape, one count of incest, and two counts of aggravated sexual battery in June 1989, and was convicted of the same in October 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained a permanent injury to his lower back as a result of a fall. Employer took the position that Employee did not sustain a permanent injury. At trial, an evaluating physician testified that Employee had a 7% permanent impairment to the body as a whole; two physicians who examined Employee shortly after the accident testified that he had no impairment. The trial court awarded benefits for 33% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that Employee had sustained a permanent injury. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the decision of the trial court and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Adrian Wilkerson, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issue presented by this appeal is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding under TCA 50-6-207 (4) (B) that the employee is totally incapacitated from working at an occupation that brings the employee an income and the resulting award of one hundred percent permanent and total disability when the collective evidence of all the vocational experts was a vocational impairment ranging from 55% to a maximum of 80%. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding, and award and affirm the judgment.

The biological father of F.M.B.P.W. appeals the termination of his parental rights. He maintains that he should have been personally served rather than served by publication and that he had no notice of the final hearing. Because we have determined that the statutory requirements of service by publication were not met, we vacate the order and remand the case to the trial court.

The appellant, Stanley Adams, was indicted for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The state sought the death penalty. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, however, the appellant pled guilty to second degree murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to 45 years for second degree murder and 15 years for aggravated robbery. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently.

The defendant, Perry A. Cribbs, was convicted of premeditated first degree murder, first degree murder during the perpetration of an aggravated burglary, first degree murder during the perpetration of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and attempted first degree murder. The death penalty verdicts were based upon two of the aggravating circumstances prescribed by statute:

(1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person; and

(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing a burglary.

The defendant, Elton Donald Bowers, also known as Rashid Qawwi, was convicted of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon with the intent to employ in the commission of the robbery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-307. The trial court ordered the weapons conviction merged with the aggravated robbery, classified the defendant as a career offender, and imposed a thirty-year sentence.

This matter is before the Court upon the state’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court under Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The case before this Court represents an appeal from the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The record was filed on October 3, 1996, and the petitioner filed his brief on October 29, 1996. The petitioner was originally indicted for robbery with a deadly weapon in January 1989, and the petitioner pled guilty to the same in May 1989. In the present appeal, the petitioner, relying in part upon State v. Roger Dale Hill, No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 1996), contends the judgment entered against him is void because the indictment failed to allege the mens rea of the offense charged.

Appellant, Robert Glen Coe, appeals from the dismissal of his third post-conviction relief petition. He has been convicted of first degree murder, aggravated rape, and aggravated kidnaping. He was sentenced to death for first degree murder and received two sentences of life imprisonment for the other charges. Coe contends the trial court erred in dismissing his petition and presents to this Court the following issues for review:

(1) whether the state withheld exculpatory evidence and presented misleading testimony;

(2) whether the use of the felony-murder aggravating circumstance rendered the death penalty unconstitutional;

(3) whether the jury instruction defining “reasonable doubt” was unconstitutional;

(4) whether the jury instruction on first degree murder omitted an essential element of the offense;

(5) whether he was denied the fundamental right to a unanimous jury verdict;

(6) whether the jury instruction on expert testimony was unconstitutional;

(7) whether the jury was unconstitutionally instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity;

(8) whether the jury instructions precluded full consideration of the defense of insanity;

(9) whether the failure to instruct the jury about eligibility for parole was unconstitutional;

(10) whether the jury instructions erroneously omitted information about the effect of a non-unanimous verdict;

(11) whether he was denied effective review of the death sentence;

(12) whether he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal, including the denial of entitlement to investigative funds;

(13) whether electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;

(14) whether he was unconstitutionally precluded from consulting with counsel during trial;

(15) whether the death sentence unconstitutionally infringes upon his fundamental right to life; and

(16) whether he was arrested without probable cause.

We affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The appellant, Charles P. Grigsby, entered an Alford plea to one count of aggravated burglary in the Shelby County Criminal Court and received, pursuant to a plea agreement, a sentence of eight years as a range II offender. The manner of service of the appellant’s sentence was submitted to the trial court for its determination. Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s request for an alternative sentence and ordered that his sentence be served in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals this sentencing decision, specifically contending that the trial court erred by failing to impose a sentence under the Community Corrections Act.  After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the classification and division of marital property after a marriage of approximately thirteen years. We have determined that the trial court erred in its classification of various assets and debts, and the resulting distribution of the marital estate was inequitable. Therefore, we modify the judgment and affirm as modified.

The petitioner, Willie Claybrook, appeals the trial court's denial of post-conviction relief. In this appeal of right, two issues are presented for our review: (1) whether the petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the trial court's order denying relief met the minimum statutory requirements. 
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case arises from a contract dispute between the parties. The Appellant herein, Nashville Hockey Club, entered into a “Sponsorship Agreement” with the Appellee herein, Robert J. Young Company. Subsequently, the parties agreed to change their agreement. As a result, the parties entered into a subsequent “Letter of Agreement.” When a players’ strike occurred, Appellee wished to cancel the contract. Appellant claimed that the “Sponsorship Agreement,” and particularly the force majeure clause contained therein, were not superseded by the “Letter of Agreement.” The trial court granted summary judgment against Appellee and, following a hearing on Appellant’s counterclaim, granted judgment in favor of Appellant but did not award damages based upon its finding that Appellant had mitigated all of its damages. Appellant appeals on the issue of damages. Appellee appeals on the issue of what, if any, agreement exists between the parties. Finding that the plain language of the “Letter of Agreement” supports a finding that same supersedes the “Sponsorship Agreement,” we reverse and remand.
 

The appellant, Bobby Baker, was convicted of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, by a jury of his peers. The trial court, finding that the appellant was a multiple offender in the aggravated rape case, imposed a Range II sentence consisting of confinement for thirty-five (35) years in the Department of Correction. The trial court further found that the appellant was a persistent offender in the aggravated burglary case and imposed a Range III sentence consisting of confinement for twelve (12) years in the Department of Correction. The sentences are to be served consecutively. The effective sentence imposed was confinement for forty-seven (47) years in the Department of Correction. The appellant presents eleven issues for review. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the authorities which govern the issues raised by the appellant, it is the opinion of this Court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

This is an appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3. On January 26, 1995, Appellant was convicted by a jury of five counts of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine. As a Range II offender, Appellant received a sentence of eight years and six months for each count. All five of these sentences were concurrent to each other, but consecutive to two previous convictions he was serving on probation. In this appeal Appellant alleges the evidence is insufficient to support the verdicts, and that his sentence is excessive. Having reviewed the record in this matter we are of the opinion that the convictions and sentence are fully supported by the law and evidence and that this matter should be affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.