APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Following his indictment for first degree murder, a Benton County jury convicted the Defendant, George E. Burns, III, of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of 17 years. The trial court subsequently granted the Defendant’s motion for new trial. The Defendant later entered a best-interest plea to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, where the agreed sentence would be eight-andone-half years at 60 percent, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In 1998, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Derwin V. Thomas, of two counts
of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and two
counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of
life without the possibility of parole. The Defendant unsuccessfully sought review on
multiple occasions, by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Most recently, the Defendant filed a
“Motion for Life Imprisonment,” alleging that the State failed to give him proper notice of
its intention to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and a Motion for
Rule 36.1 relief1, alleging that the trial court failed to charge the jury with relevant lesser included
offenses. The trial court summarily dismissed both the Defendant’s motions, and
the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it
dismissed his motions. After review, because the notice of appeal in this case was untimely
filed and because the Defendant has offered no facts supporting a waiver of this untimely
filing in the interests of justice, the appeal is hereby dismissed

The Defendant, Sidney Eugene Watkins, was convicted by a jury of alternative counts of
possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of a firearm during
the commission of those dangerous felonies, as well as simple possession of
methamphetamine, simple possession of alprazolam, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Following the jury verdict, the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal on the firearm counts (counts 7 and 8). The State appealed, and we reversed,
concluding that the trial judge applied the wrong standard in ruling on the Defendant's
motion for judgment of aquittal. On remand, the trial court affirmed the jury's verdict in
its role as thirteenth juror and found the evidence sufficient to support the firearm counts.
The Defendant now appeals challenging the trial court's ruling. Following our review, we
affirm. We remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment in count 8 due to clerical
errors.

In 1998, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Derwin V. Thomas, of two counts
of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and two
counts of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of
life without the possibility of parole. The Defendant unsuccessfully sought review on
multiple occasions, by direct appeal, post-conviction petition, a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Most recently, the Defendant filed a
“Motion for Life Imprisonment,” alleging that the State failed to give him proper notice of
its intention to seek life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and a Motion for
Rule 36.1 relief1, alleging that the trial court failed to charge the jury with relevant lesserincluded
offenses. The trial court summarily dismissed both the Defendant’s motions, and
the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred when it
dismissed his motions. After review, because the notice of appeal in this case was untimely
filed and because the Defendant has offered no facts supporting a waiver of this untimely
filing in the interests of justice, the appeal is hereby dismissed

This appeal arose from a termination of parental rights proceeding where a mother’s
parental rights were terminated on several statutory grounds. The original adoption petition
contained no grounds for termination of the parents’ rights, and therefore, the Trial Court
used the four months prior to the amended petition, which included grounds for
termination, for purposes of the abandonment grounds. We affirm the trial court’s use of
this time period before the amended petition. We hold that the record is insufficient for us
to conduct a meaningful appellate review in this case and that the trial court failed to make
sufficient findings of fact on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, abandonment
by failure to financially support, and mental incompetence based on the statutory authority
in effect at the time of the filing of the amended petition alleging grounds for termination.
These grounds are vacated and remanded to the trial court to allow the trial court to develop
a proper record from which this Court can conduct a meaningful appellate review and to
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-
1-113(k). The amended petition seeking termination of parental rights was filed prior to
the 2018 statutory amendments of the relevant termination statutes. Because the Child was
never adjudicated as dependent and neglected, we reverse the ground of persistent
conditions under the statute in effect when the amended petition was filed. Additionally,
the statutory ground located at Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) was not pled in the
termination petition and was not tried by express or implied consent; therefore, we reverse
this ground as to the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Tennessee from the chancery court’s denial of a motion to recuse.
A new chancellor, during the course of a judicial election and shortly after the election was
held, made extremely critical comments regarding the personal and professional character
of his opponent, the incumbent chancellor. The challenger won the election, and the former
chancellor, who has returned to practice, is now representing a party before the new
chancellor. The former chancellor moved for the new chancellor’s recusal in cases in
which the former chancellor is appearing as counsel as well as recusal from cases involving
the law firm which the former chancellor joined after losing the judicial election. The new
chancellor denied the motion. On appeal, we conclude that, even in the absence of actual
bias, based upon concern about the appearance of bias toward the former chancellor,
recusal is warranted. This concern does not extend to the law firm the former chancellor
has joined. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the former
chancellor but affirm the denial of recusal insofar as it concerns the law firm.

Tony R. Hearon ("Employee') allegedly developed an occupational disease during the
course and scope of his employment with the State of Tennessee ("Employer"). Employee
gave notice of his injury to Employer but his claim was denied. The denial letter advised
Employee that he must file a petition for benefit determination within ninety days or risk
dismissal of his claim. Employee filed his petition several months after the expiration of
the ninety-day period. Upon receiving a dispute certification notice dismissing his claim,
Employee filed a workers' compensation complaint in the Claims Commission, which is
the agency responsible for handling disputed claims of state workers. Employer moved for
summary judgment, asserting Employee failed to meet the ninety-day statutory deadline.
The Commissioner granted summary judgment concluding that Employee failed to timely
file his petition for benefit determination and therefore failed to exhaust the benefit review
process as required by statute. Employee appealed. The appeal was referred to the Special
Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel ("Panel") for a hearing and a report of findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the
judgment of the Commissioner.

In a previous appeal, this Court affirmed the probate court’s order granting summary judgment to the defendants on two separate grounds – res judicata and the statute of limitations.  On remand, the appellant filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to set aside the same order granting summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that a recent order from a circuit court necessitated that the probate court’s summary judgment order be “voided and set aside.”  The probate court denied the motion.  The appellant appeals.  We affirm and remand.

The Petitioner, Joe G. Manley, appeals from the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty-pleaded convictions for
aggravated domestic assault, domestic assault, and false imprisonment. The Petitioner
contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that he received effective
assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered.
Specifically, the Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective based upon trial
counsel’s failing to (1) communicate and maintain contact with the Petitioner; (2)
thoroughly investigate the case and speak with the victims prior to entry of the Petitioner’s
plea; (3) request a remand to general sessions court for a preliminary hearing; and (4)
explain that Corrections Management Corporation would supervise the Petitioner’s release.
Following our review, we affirm the judgment of post-conviction court denying relief.

The Petitioner-Appellant, Aaron Dodson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of first-degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping. The Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction court erred in limiting proof at the post-conviction hearing to only alleged errors of trial counsel.1 After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendants appeal from the denial of their effort to invalidate a 2017 judgment on the basis that the trial judge harbored animosity against them at the time the judgment was rendered. Because these allegations were adjudicated in an earlier Rule 60.02 action, we conclude that res judicata bars the instant effort for relief from the judgment.

In February of 2021, Defendant, Clinton D. Braden, pleaded guilty to burglary and
identity theft. In exchange, he received a total effective sentence of 16 years suspended
to community corrections. On May 4, 2022, Defendant admitted he again violated the
terms of his community corrections program and offered no proof for the trial court to
make findings of what consequences to apply. Defendant now appeals, and we affirm,
the trial court’s judgment to impose his original sentence to serve in full.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of persistent conditions
and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of the child.
Father also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in
the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying
Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require
recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.

Petitioner, Alexander Carino, appeals from the Trousdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his second petition for writ of habeas corpus.  He alleges that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily denying his petition without advising him of his right to counsel or  appointing counsel and that his judgments for second-degree murder are void because the affidavits of complaint were not “properly authenticated” because they did not contain a court seal.  Petitioner further alleges for the first time on appeal that the affidavits of complaint contain an insufficient factual basis to support a finding of probable cause.  Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. 

Defendant, Isiah J. Primm, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of first degree felony murder; two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony; and one count of conspiracy to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; and sentenced to an effective life plus forty years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the jury should have been instructed on self-defense, facilitation, and attempt as lesser-included offenses of first degree murder; (3) the jury should have been instructed on the State’s duty to gather and preserve evidence; (4) the State committed a Brady violation by waiting until the morning of trial to provide Defendant with a copy of Mr. Tidwell’s cell phone report; (5) the State knew or should have known that one of the victims introduced false testimony; (6) the trial court should have excluded evidence of drugs found in the apartment where Defendant was staying; (7) Defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right was violated because the jury venire contained no African American jurors; and (8) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, because the trial court did not sign three of the judgments, we remand the case for entry of amended judgments.

Petitioner, Charles Claybrooks,1 appeals the dismissal of his 2021 petition seeking postconviction
relief from his 2010 convictions for one count aggravated robbery and two
counts of aggravated assault. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court concluded
that Petitioner “failed to demonstrate entitlement to the tolling of the statute of limitations”
and dismissed the Petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns an alleged violation of the Open Meetings Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §
8-44-101, et seq. Pauline Madron (“Plaintiff”) sued the City of Morristown, Mayor Gary
Chesney, as well as Councilmembers Al A’Hearn, Chris Bivens, Robert Garrett, Tommy
Pedigo, Kay Senter, and Ken Smith (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for
Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff alleged that the city’s public notice of a
July 12, 2019 special meeting to exceed the certified tax rate was inadequate. Plaintiff and
Defendants filed crossing motions for summary judgment. The Trial Court granted
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s Open Meetings Act
claim. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the city’s notice that it intended to exceed the certified
tax rate was mere jargon that did not reasonably inform the public of the purpose of the
special meeting or the action to be taken. In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Open Meetings Act claim is moot as it arises out of a property tax rate that was passed in
fiscal year 2019-2020, which lapsed before this matter was heard. Alternatively,
Defendants contend that, while most people may not understand the intricacies of city
finances, most people do understand what “exceed” and “tax rate” mean. While Plaintiff’s
claim is moot, it warrants resolution nevertheless. We hold that the city’s public notice of
the July 12, 2019 special meeting was adequate. We affirm.

In this consolidated appeal, the Petitioner, Robert Garner, appeals from the Giles County Circuit Courts’ summary denial of his petition for relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Fingerprint Analysis Act of 2021 (Fingerprint Act) and his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the judgments of the post-conviction and coram nobis courts.

This appeal involves a personal injury case where the defendant died during the pendency
of the litigation. Subsequent to the filing of a suggestion of death by the defendant’s
counsel, the plaintiff failed to timely file a motion for substitution within the time provided
in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and, as a result, the defendant’s counsel filed a
motion to dismiss. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for substitution and
simultaneously moved the trial court to enlarge the time for filing the motion. The trial
court denied the plaintiff’s motions and dismissed the case. Upon our review of the record,
we reverse.

This appeal concerns premises liability. The plaintiff slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the defendants’ property. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appeal. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Cadarius Head, of first degree
premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder, and the trial court imposed an
effective life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient
to support his convictions. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the State’s primary
witness was not credible and that his convictions were otherwise based on circumstantial
evidence. He further contends that the State failed to convincingly prove the element of
premeditation as to his first degree murder conviction. Finally, he argues that the evidence
supporting his conviction for attempted first degree murder was insufficient because the
victim did not testify at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

A woman filed a complaint alleging she was assaulted at a retail store.  Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the woman failed to prove her assault claim, and the woman appealed.  Due to the deficiencies in the woman’s appellate brief, this Court is unable to reach the substantive issues she raises, and we dismiss the appeal.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Brendan Nathan Morgan, was convicted in the
Decatur County Circuit Court of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years at
100 percent in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting testimony that a police investigator saw search history
for pornographic material on the Defendant’s cell phone because the evidence violated the
best evidence rule and the rule against hearsay. Based on our review, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.

This appeals centers upon a challenge to a chancery court’s findings of fact that proved
determinative as to multiple legal issues arising in litigation related to unpaid repair costs
for rendering a private plane airworthy. The chancery court made the factual determination
that the plane owner did not agree to pay for the repairs performed by a mechanic. In
reaching this conclusion, the chancery court resolved the case based upon documentary
evidence in the form of deposition transcripts and exhibits rather than live witness
testimony. Given the documentary nature of the trial court proceedings, we conducted a
de novo review of the evidence presented without affording deference to the trial court’s
factual findings. We find the trial court erred in its factual finding that the owner did not
agree to pay for the repairs. Accordingly, we reverse the chancery court’s legal conclusions
for which the trial court’s contrary factual determinations had been determinative. We
conclude that the plane owner breached his contract with the mechanic and is responsible
for storage costs for the plane pursuant to the possessory lien thereupon. We remand for
further proceedings including a determination of the applicability of prejudgment interest
to the repair costs.