APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the parental rights of a mother, Mary K. (“Mother”), to her minor children, Kailey A., Abigail K., Isaiah K., and Izzabella K. (collectively, “the Children”). The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse committed against the Children. The Greene County Juvenile Court (“the Juvenile Court”) found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had severely abused the Children and that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is the third appeal arising from a commercial construction project. Most recently, the case went to trial before a jury, which awarded the plaintiff subcontractor $1,729,122.46 in compensatory damages under four separate theories and $3,900,000.00 in punitive damages. The trial court further awarded the plaintiff pre- and post-judgment interest and attorney’s fees and costs. We conclude the economic loss rule is applicable to construction contracts negotiated between sophisticated commercial entities and that fraud is not an exception under the particular circumstances of this case. Because punitive damages and interest are not authorized under the parties’ agreement, those damages are reversed. The compensatory damages of $1,729,122.46 awarded for breach of contract are affirmed. The award of attorney’s fees incurred at trial are vacated for a determination of the attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining the compensatory damages award. No attorney’s fees are awarded on appeal. We therefore reverse in part, affirm in part, and vacate in part.

The Petitioner, Clarence E. McCaleb, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. The petition sought DNA testing of a fork found on the victim’s bedroom floor. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that DNA analysis of the fork would result in a reasonable probability that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted if DNA profiles inconsistent with the Petitioner’s and the victim’s were discovered. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Following the establishment of paternity, a father petitioned to change his child's surname. The trial court denied the petition. The trial court's order does not contain findings as to whether the name change is in the child's best interests. Therefore, we vacate the judgment and remand.

The Petitioner, Melvin R. King, III, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions and effective life sentence for first degree felony murder, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated animal cruelty. The Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to pursue intoxication as a defense; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner’s police statement because he was intoxicated when he gave it; (3) failing to adequately cross-examine a victim-witness who tampered with evidence at the crime scene and who gave an inconsistent prior statement; (4) failing to discuss the evidence tampering and inconsistent statement in closing argument; and (5) failing to poll the jurors to ensure they were not influenced by an improper communication from one of the jurors to the District Attorney General. In addition, the Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.

Appellant’s brief in this case fails to substantially comply with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.

The trial court terminated a mother and father’s parental rights to their children on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility; (3) persistence of conditions; and (4) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. The trial court also ruled that the termination ground of abandonment by failure to visit had been proven against the father. The trial court further found that termination of the mother and father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports these grounds for termination. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the termination of the mother and father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.

This is the second appeal of this case. After remand from the first appeal, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to reopen discovery concerning Appellant’s counterclaim, wherein he asserted that the guaranty he signed was void and unenforceable. In the first appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s counterclaim, finding that the disputed guaranty was, in fact, valid. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in precluding further discovery on the dismissed counterclaim. We grant Appellee’s request for an award of attorney’s fees and costs for frivolous appeal, and remand the case for determination of Appellee’s reasonable appellate attorney’s fees and costs and entry of judgment on same.

The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.  

Gary Wayne Garrett filed a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion seeking correction of clerical errors in his judgments of conviction.  Mr. Garrett claimed that he was entitled to pretrial jail credit on various counts, several of which were ordered to be served consecutively.  The trial court issued a comprehensive written order finding that the judgments correctly awarded pretrial jail credit and dismissed the motion.  We determine that this appeal is frivolous and affirm the dismissal of the motion.

In this divorce case, a father appeals the trial court’s reduction of his parenting time after the parties had co-parented equally by agreement, and then nearly equally under a temporary court order. He also appeals the award of alimony. We reverse the residential parenting schedule portion of the parenting plan entered by the trial court and remand for the imposition of a plan that better maximizes both parents’ time with the child. Regarding alimony, because the trial court did not make the required findings, its judgment on that issue is vacated.

In this negligent misrepresentation case, an insured alleges that her insurance agent made misrepresentations about the contents of an agreement she authorized her husband to sign on her behalf. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance agent, finding that the insured was “responsible for what she signs or what she has her agent to sign.” Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, James David Duncan, was convicted by a Morgan County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder), 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-102(a)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to sixteen years for attempted second degree murder and to eight years for aggravated assault, with the sentences to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to an Anderson County conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that ( 1) prosecutorial misconduct occurred during voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument, (2) he is entitled to plain error relief because the trial court failed to conduct a hearing pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding prior bad act evidence, (3) the court erroneously instructed the jury, and (4) cumulative trial errors require relief. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, John Foxx, was convicted following a jury trial of sale of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, delivery of less than .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance, and simple possession. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve an effective fifteen-year sentence after application of the criminal street gang enhancement statute. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in applying the criminal street gang enhancement statute because the statute is unconstitutional and because the evidence was insufficient to support application of the criminal street gang enhancement statute. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jayson Bryant Collier, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver within 1000 feet of a school, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, theft of property valued at five hundred dollars or less, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a revoked license, and speeding.  On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution, and that his sentence is illegal under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1.  After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.    

The Defendant, Sterling White was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of evading arrest, a Class E felony; reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor; and leaving the scene of an accident, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603 (2018) (subsequently amended) (evading arrest), 55-10-205 (2020) (reckless driving), 55-10-102 (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (leaving the scene). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a persistent offender to six years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a continuance. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, an attorney, filed a creditor’s claim against Decedent’s estate for legal fees allegedly owed to Appellant for his representation of Decedent in her divorce action and in her challenge of the seizure of certain assets by the State of Tennessee. Appellant argued that he represented Decedent in the seizure matter under a contingency fee agreement; however, Appellant failed to produce a valid contingency fee agreement. At the hearing, the only proof of fees Appellant produced was an invoice for $3,847.51, and the trial court awarded him the full amount of that invoice. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Noel Maltese, was convicted in the Williamson County Circuit Court of conspiracy to commit theft of property valued $250,000 or more, a Class B felony, and criminal simulation, a Class E felony, and received an effective eight-year sentence to be served as forty-eight hours in jail followed by supervised probation.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine her about a codefendant’s having to serve a lengthy prison sentence for similar conduct for which the Appellant was on trial.  Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Danny Ray Lacy, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for his first degree murder conviction, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition.  We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Vernell Evans, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, asserting his sentences are illegal because the trial court incorrectly imposed 100% service requirements for each sentence.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Andrea Gonzalez Martinez, pleaded guilty to felon in possession of a handgun, and the trial court imposed a sentence of sixteen years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing.  After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

The Petitioner, Damarkus Lowe, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree murder conviction, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for advising him not to testify in his own defense. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In March of 2021, Steven C. James, Defendant, filed a “Motion for Relief from Sentence.” The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. Defendant appealed. After a review of the record, we determine Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal document and that the interest of justice does not favor waiving the timeliness requirement in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal concerns the revocation of a criminal defendant’s probation. We granted Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether revocation proceedings are a one-step or two-step process on the part of the trial court and the appropriate appellate standard of review to be employed in reviewing such determinations. Defendant in this case pleaded guilty to theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000 and received a six-year sentence, which the trial court suspended to supervised probation. A series of revocation proceedings ensued. At Defendant’s fifth and final revocation hearing, the trial court fully revoked his probation. Defendant took issue with the consequence imposed for his probation violation; however, the Court of Criminal Appeals found no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and affirmed its decision. Judge Timothy L. Easter filed a separate concurring opinion in which he emphasized his belief that a trial court, after it has determined probation should be revoked, is not statutorily required to hold an additional hearing or make any additional findings to determine the manner in which the original sentence should be served. We granted Defendant’s application for permission to appeal. While we do not agree with Defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to serve the balance of his six-year sentence in prison, we do take this opportunity to clarify and bring uniformity to the standards and principles applied by the trial courts and appellate courts in probation revocation proceedings. We conclude that a probation revocation proceeding ultimately involves a two-step inquiry. A trial court, upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated the conditions of his or her probation, must determine (1) whether to revoke probation, and (2) the appropriate consequence to impose upon revocation. On appeal, the appellate court must review both decisions separately for abuse of discretion. More specifically, if the trial court has properly placed its findings on the record, the standard of review for probation revocations is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. Considering this Court’s prior opinions establishing the appellate standard of review of a trial court’s sentencing decisions, we expressly extend the same principles to appellate review of a trial court’s decision to revoke probation. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in Defendant’s case, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Defendant, Darius Henderson, was convicted following a jury trial of one count of theft of property valued over $2,500 but less than $10,000 (Count 1) and one count of evading arrest while operating a vehicle (Count 2). Based on Defendant’s prior Tennessee convictions and a Georgia conviction, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III persistent offender to consecutive sentences of twelve years in Count 1, and six years in Count 2. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range III persistent offender because he had only four prior Tennessee felonies and the State did not submit proof that Defendant’s Georgia conviction qualified as a felony conviction in a foreign jurisdiction. See T.C.A. §40-35-107. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for Defendant to be sentenced as a Range II offender.