APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant was charged in the indictment with theft of property valued between ten thousand dollars ($10,000) and sixty thousand dollars ($60,000). On September 21, 1995, she filed an application for pretrial diversion. The district attorney general denied the application on September 28, 1995. The defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the  district attorney general’s decision to deny her application. After a hearing, the trial court found that the State had abused its discretion and ordered the defendant placed on pretrial diversion. In this appeal pursuant to T.R.A.P. 9, the State contends the trial court erred in finding that the State had abused its discretion in denying pretrial diversion. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant was indicted on November 7, 1994, for the first-degree murder of Lisa C. Stewart. A jury convicted him of second-degree murder and fined him fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). After a hearing, the defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After a review of the entire record, we find that this issue is without merit, and therefore, his conviction is affirmed.

The appellant, Jackie H. Martin, appeals the order entered by the Criminal Court of Shelby County denying his petition for discharge from involuntary commitment.1 On appeal, the appellant presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding that the appellant is not eligible for mandatory outpatient treatment as an alternative to commitment; and (2) whether the trial judge should have recused himself from this case.

The petitioner, Andre Anthony, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; forgery over $1000, a Class D felony; and two counts of forgery over $500, a Class E felony. He received an effective total sentence of forty-six years. He seeks post-conviction relief and argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied relief, and we affirm that judgment

I concur with the majority opinion and also with Judge Welles’ concurring
opinion.

The trial court held that lessor was entitled to full rent for summer months although the air conditioning was inoperable. The trial court reasoned that since lessor terminated the month to month tenancy months earlier due to the fact that lessor did not intend to repair the HVAC system, then lessor should not be penalized and rent is owed for those months. We affirm.

I concur with Judge Peay’s opinion in this case. I write separately to point out that, in my opinion, a finding by the trial judge that the district attorney general did not consider all relevant factors in denying pretrial diversion does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that pretrial diversion will be granted. Even though the district attorney general may have abused his discretion by failing to consider all relevant factors, the denial may be justified after all relevant factors are considered. If such is the case, in a manner somewhat analogous to a “harmless error” analysis, the denial of pretrial diversion should be upheld.

The Appellant, Bruce Cole, appeals as of right his sentences for five convictions of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance. The Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentences and ordered them to be served consecutively. Following a careful review of the record on appeal, we remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

The issue on appeal in this medical malpractice action is whether the defendant, a Kentucky hospital, had sufficient minimum contacts with Tennessee for our courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Plaintiff contends Tennessee has general personal jurisdiction over the hospital, which is a Kentucky corporation, because annual reports filed with the Kentucky Secretary of State listed a Nashville, Tennessee, address as the “principal office address” of the corporation, the corporation’s officers and directors are located in Tennessee, and it is a subsidiary of a hospital corporation based in Tennessee. The trial court ruled that the defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Tennessee to justify the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over the defendant. We affirm the jurisdictional determination.

The defendant, Shundell L. Dickerson, was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder (Class A felony) and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years in prison. He appeals his conviction and sentence. He argues the trial court erred in: (1) precluding him from entering into evidence an anonymous letter mailed to the police in which other persons were named as responsible for the crime; (2) limiting the questioning of a witness regarding his expectations of favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony; and (3) allowing the prosecutor to make improper remarks during closing argument. Finally, the defendant argues enhancement factors were improperly applied to increase his sentence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

This case involves the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing hearsay exception. We hold that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception requires a showing that a defendant’s actions were intended, at least in part, to prevent a witness from testifying. The prosecution in this case failed to prove that a motive for the murder was to make the victim unavailable as a witness. Admission of her hearsay statements, therefore, violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6). We further conclude that the error affected the result of the trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case for a new trial.    

Decedent’s will could not be located after his death, and decedent’s widow and stepdaughters
petitioned the trial court to recognize and establish a copy of such will as decedent’s last will and
testament. The trial court denied the petition upon determining that the petitioners failed to present
sufficient evidence to overcome the strong presumption that the lost will was revoked by decedent.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

The petitioner, Claude Sharkey, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. He claims that his indictments were deficient and that his sentences were improper. After review, we conclude his judgments are facially valid with no jurisdictional defect or illegal sentences. The summary dismissal is affirmed.

Plaintiffs were granted a voluntary dismissal of their action, and defendant has appealed on the grounds that the Trial Court and attorneys were guilty of fraudulent conduct, and that he had a counter-claim pending at the time the action was dismissed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

In the Trial Court, at the conclusion of plaintiff’s proof, defendant moved for the entry of an involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41.02(2), and before the Trial Judge ruled on that Motion plaintiff moved for a voluntary dismissal which the Trial Court denied, and granted defendant’s Motion for an involuntary dismissal with prejudice. On appeal, we hold that the Trial Court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff’s Motion for a voluntary dismissal.

The trial court awarded Defendant/Employer summary judgment in this wrongful discharge action. We affirm the judgment.

This is a divorce case. When the parties met in 1995, the husband was in the Philippines working for an American corporation. The wife was a resident and citizen of the Philippines and the husband was a U. S. citizen. After a brief relationship, the wife learned that she was pregnant. The husband moved back to the United States, but made periodic trips to the Philippines to see their child. In 1998, the wife obtained a marriage visa, and she and the child moved to California to live with the husband. After signing a prenuptial agreement in California, the parties were married in Las Vegas. Two more children were born of the marriage. In 2003, both parties filed for divorce. After a trial, the parties were divorced and the husband was ordered to pay child support, alimony in futuro, and all of the parties’ marital debt. The husband was also ordered to pay for the wife’s medical insurance and uninsured medical expenses as additional spousal support. The wife was designated as the children’s primary residential parent. The parties were ordered to hold the marital home as tenants in common; the husband would pay the mortgage and the wife would live in the home with the parties’ children. The husband appeals. On appeal, we affirm the trial court’s adoption of the Wife’s parenting plan except insofar as it awards the federal income tax exemptions to the wife, but vacate the child support award and remand for a recalculation of the husband’s income and his child support obligation. We also vacate the trial court’s order regarding spousal support and remand for recalculation of the husband’s income and re-evaluation of the wife’s need and the husband’s ability to pay support. We affirm as to the remainder of the trial court’s decision.

The defendant, Thomas M. Sullivan, was convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. He requested judicial diversion or probation, but the court denied those motions and imposed a sentence of two years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for judicial diversion or alternative sentencing. After careful review, we conclude no error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The Appellant, Lamont Christopher Brown,1 appeals the order of the Madison County Circuit Court revoking his probation. In January 2006, in two separate cases, Brown entered guilty pleas to misdemeanor possession of cocaine, misdemeanor possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, Class C felony sale of cocaine, and two counts of Class B sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The sentences were suspended, and Brown was placed on supervised probation. In  September 2006, a probation violation warrant was filed, in both cases, alleging numerous violations of the terms of Brown’s probation. Following a hearing, Brown’s probation was revoked, resulting in the reinstatement of his original sentences, which were ordered to be served in confinement. On appeal, Brown argues that “the trial court erred in revoking [Brown’s] probation and ordering that [Brown] serve his sentence.”  Finding no abuse of discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Maurice Lashaun Nash, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

This appeal arises from the termination of a police officer for violation of the department’s deadly force policy. While in the apartment of his girlfriend’s mother, the off-duty officer shot the unarmed husband of his girlfriend in the back and paralyzed him from the waist down. The officer was attempting to stop the enraged husband from entering a room where the girlfriend, her mother, and a young child were located. He did not warn the husband that he might use deadly force prior to doing so. The police department and the civil service commission concluded that, for various reasons, the officer’s use of deadly force was not authorized. The officer appealed his termination to chancery court, primarily arguing that the department had failed to consider a parallel burglary investigation report in the pre-termination hearing. Although the civil service commission had concluded that consideration of that file would not have altered the outcome, the chancellor remanded the case back to the commission for consideration of the entire report. On remand, the commission reviewed the entire report but declined to hear further testimony. It re-affirmed its original decision. The officer sought review in chancery court and, after an unfavorable result there, appealed the case to this Court. We conclude that, even if the officer’s assertions are correct, there still exists substantial and material evidence to support the decisions below. If there was error below, it was harmless. Affirmed.

A Marion County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Edward Poe, of one count of manufacturing a controlled substance, one count of attempted possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and one count of felony possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he alleges that a directed verdict should have been granted based on the insufficiency of evidence as a whole, as well as based on insufficient evidence for the paraphernalia charge because there was no proof of intent to deliver the paraphernalia. He also alleges that the convictions for manufacturing a controlled substance and felony possession of drug paraphernalia were inconsistent and that the court should not have excluded testimony from a court clerk regarding the filing of the January 23, 2002 search warrant. Upon review, we affirm the judgments as modified.

This appeal involves an attempt to pierce a corporate veil. The plaintiff purchased a hot tub from a corporation, paying $3,000 by check and agreeing to finance the balance of $1,178. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the two sole shareholders of the corporation had been deadlocked and involved in litigation for almost two years. After the corporation accepted the plaintiff’s $3,000 check, but before it delivered the hot tub, the litigation ended. A jury determined that one of the shareholders held a perfected security interest in practically all of the corporation’s assets, and the judge entered an order recognizing that shareholder’s right to foreclose on the collateral if necessary. Both shareholders filed post-trial motions, then submitted a proposed “agreed amended final order” that was approved by the trial judge. The agreed order provided that, “in lieu of foreclosure,” the secured party-shareholder would be awarded all the assets of the corporation outright. The corporation was left with no assets and ceased to operate. The plaintiff never received her hot tub or a refund of the $3,000 she paid to the corporation. Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit seeking a judgment against the corporation and against the two shareholders individually. The trial court entered a total judgment against the corporation of $17,663.52, which included treble damages and attorney’s fees pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. However, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil to impose liability on the individual shareholders. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

THOMAS T. WOODALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which reverses the convictions for rape of a child and dismisses those five counts of the indictment.

The Appellant, Alec Joseph Mesot, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of five counts of rape of a child and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. On appeal, Mesot challenges only his convictions for rape of a child, asserting: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions because: (a) the State failed to sufficiently corroborate his confessions in order to independently establish the corpus delicti of the offenses and (b) the State failed to prove the element of penetration; and (2) that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte provide a limiting instruction with regard to the introduction of pornographic images recovered from Mesot’s computer. Following review of the record, we conclude that the State has failed to produce independent evidence to corroborate Mesot’s confessions, which alone support the corpus delicti of the crimes of rape of a child. Accordingly, the evidence is insufficient with regard to those convictions. As such, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the five convictions for rape of a child are dismissed. Mesot’s remaining issues are without merit.