APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Inmate appeals the dismissal of his "Personal Injury Suit" against the attorney who represented him in a previous criminal matter. The trial court dismissed the action finding the complaint does not state a cause of action due to the lack of any allegation of severe mental injury and that any action arising out of alleged misconduct occurring on March 9, 2001, would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Finding the inmate's suit wholly without merit, we affirm.

In this administrative appeal, a Shelby County firefighter challenges the judgment of the lower court reinstating the Fire Department’s decision to terminate his employment for a conceded violation of the county residency requirement set forth in the Shelby County Charter. The Shelby County Civil Service Merit Board (Merit Board) had modified the Fire Department’s sanction from termination to suspension without pay for the time of suspension already served. The trial court, however, ruled that the Merit Board exceeded its authority by failing to heed the Shelby County Charter’s provision mandating termination. The Appellant argues that the Charter does not mandate termination; that, even if it does, he had moved back to Shelby County at the time of his termination and should not have been discharged; and that, alternatively, he is entitled to a remand to advance an equal protection argument because he was unfairly prevented from doing so in the lower court. We affirm.

The Appellant, Pamela A. Inghram, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). Inghram pled guilty to Class E felony possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver and received an eighteen-month sentence, which was suspended. As a condition of her guilty plea, she explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of her motion to suppress evidence, specifically drugs and drug paraphernalia, found in her home. Inghram argues that the warrantless entry into her home by police in response to a burglar alarm call was without legal authority. After review, we conclude that exigent circumstances justified police entry and the subsequent seizure of the contraband, which was observed in plain view. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Rutherford County Circuit Court denying the motion to suppress.

The Petitioner, Chris Grunder, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated assault, and theft of property over $500.00. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was not afforded the effective assistance of counsel at trial. This petition was denied by the post-conviction court. Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no error and affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Tommy Roscoe, was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether a pretrial photographic identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner brought an action for mandamus in Circuit Court. The Trial Court dismissed the Petition on the grounds that petitioner did not meet the statutory requirements for maintaining an action. On appeal, we affirm.

The defendant, Michael Rodiquez Payne, was convicted of aggravated robbery, sentenced to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender, and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000. He filed a timely appeal, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient; (2) he should have received a lesser sentence; and (3) the indictment should have been dismissed because the State lost the audiotaped recording of the first preliminary hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment and sentence.

The Defendant, Victor Eugene Tyson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of second degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and felony murder. On appeal, the Defendant alleges the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury. He was sentenced to fifteen years as a Career Offender to be served in the Department of Correction consecutively to a prior conviction. In this appeal, he claims that the circumstantial proof of his guilt is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Lavon Lyn Nunnery, appeals from the judgment of the Rutherford County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of eight months in confinement followed by two years of probation. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the state’s inclusion of waiver language in his probation order violates Tennessee statute and that the trial court erred in revoking his probation and ordering split confinement. Following our review of the record, parties’ briefs and the applicable law, we determine no error exists in the court’s revocation of probation, and thus affirm the court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Benjamin Ashley Ray Dickens, was convicted of first degree felony murder. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Michael Braxton, of aggravated rape and aggravated assault, and he received an effective sentence of twenty-three years. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals that dismissal. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Bobby Rayle, pled guilty to one count of child rape in the Hawkins County Criminal Court. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a sentence of fifteen years as a Range I, standard offender to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty plea was not voluntarily or knowingly made and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief by the Lake County Circuit Court from his imprisonment for three 1982 armed robbery convictions. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he was sentenced to serve concurrent twenty-five year sentences at thirty-five percent and that because he has served that percentage of the sentences, his sentences have expired. We hold that the trial court properly dismissed the petition and affirm its judgment.

The defendant, Felicia Ann Lowery, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing or probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, James Kelley, was convicted of reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor, at a bench trial in the Shelby County Criminal Court. He was given a six-month sentence, of which he was ordered to serve thirty days in the workhouse. He appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., dissenting.
I start with an elementary and bedrock principle of Tennessee jurisprudence: when a party
timely files a complaint in circuit court, alleges facts making out a cause of action, and demands a
jury, that party has a constitutional right to have a jury pass upon the merits of its allegations. Tenn.
Const. Art. I, §6. (“That the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . .”). I fully recognize that
a party’s jury demand and its right to pursue its alleged cause of action can be legitimately thwarted
if the party sued can demonstrate, under the rubric of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56, that it is entitled to
summary judgment. Hence, if the material facts pertaining to a defense are not in dispute and if
those facts show conclusively that the defendant is entitled to a judgment, the plaintiff loses its
constitutional right to a jury trial, its case is over, and the defendant goes away with summary
judgment.

The operator of an automobile junkyard in Smith County appeals the permanent injunction issued against him by the Chancery Court enjoining him from maintaining an excessive number of inoperable vehicles within one thousand feet of a county road in violation of the Smith County Junkyard Control Act, Chapter 97 of the Private Acts of 1987. The junkyard operator contends the evidence was insufficient to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court. Finding the evidence more than sufficient, primarily due to admissions by the operator of the junkyard, we affirm.

Decedent’s vehicle was struck by defendants’ train at a railroad crossing, resulting in decedent’s death. The Trial Court granted Defendants’ Summary Judgment. The Estate has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court’s Judgment.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Joshua Eugene Anderson, of eight offenses involving victims Sampson Jonathan McGhee (“McGhee”) and George England (“England”). The convictions were: (1) first degree premeditated murder of McGhee; (2) felony murder (robbery) of McGhee; (3) felony murder (theft) of McGhee; (4) attempted especially aggravated robbery (by violence) of McGhee; (5) attempted especially aggravated robbery (by putting in fear) of McGhee; (6) attempted first degree murder of England; (7) attempted aggravated robbery (by violence) of England; and (8) attempted aggravated robbery (by putting in fear) of England. The trial court properly merged certain offenses and sentenced the defendant to serve an effective 25-year sentence in the Department of Correction consecutively to the life-without-parole sentence imposed by the jury. The defendant appeals on several grounds, including whether the trial court erred in: (1) failing to suppress the evidence that resulted from the warrantless search of the defendant’s home; (2) failing to suppress the defendant’s statement to police; (3) denying defendant’s motion to dismiss when the State failed to preserve his entire statement; (4) failing to exclude the defendant’s recorded statement when the entire statement could not be entered into evidence; (5) denying a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct; and (6) declining to answer the jury’s question regarding the consequences of not reaching a unanimous verdict at sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury found the Appellant, Devin Banks, guilty of the first degree premeditated murder of Kadhem Al-Maily and the Class A felonies of criminal attempt to commit first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery of Hussain Atilebawi. Following the penalty phase hearing, the jury found the presence of two statutory aggravating circumstances and imposed the sentence of death. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Banks to twenty-five years for each of the Class A felonies and ordered them to be served consecutively to one another and to the sentence of death. Banks now seeks review by this court of both his convictions and resulting sentences, presenting the following issues for review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting a photograph of the surviving victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting Banks’ statements absent a ruling on the motion to suppress; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the victim; (5) whether the trial court failed to properly certify the Arabic translator; (6) whether the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury as to lesser included offenses; (7) whether the indictment failed to charge a capital offense; (8) whether the victim impact jury instruction was coercive; (9) whether the closing argument by the prosecutor was improper; (10) whether the sentences for the non-capital offenses are excessive; (11) whether Tennessee’s death penalty statutes are constitutional; and (12) whether the death sentence in this case is disproportionate to death sentences in other cases. Following review, we affirm Banks’ convictions for first degree murder, criminal attempt to commit first degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. His sentences for the Class A felony convictions are also affirmed. We further conclude that the evidence does not support application of the (i)(6) statutory aggravating circumstance.  and the sentence of death is affirmed.
 

In 2005, the petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder and received an effective sentence of fifty years. Subsequently, he filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his plea of guilty to the latter offense was unknowing and involuntary and that counsel who had represented him at the time of the plea was ineffective. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition and this appeal followed. We affirm the dismissal.

This is an insurance case. The plaintiff insurer issued a policy of insurance for a motorcycle. The
named insured kept the motorcycle at his home, and allowed his adult son unrestricted access to hishome and the motorcycle. The adult son borrowed the motorcycle and drove it to a friend’s house. While there, the adult son let the friend take his minor stepdaughter for a ride on the motorcycle. The friend lost control of the motorcycle and the stepdaughter was injured. The accident prompted the stepdaughter’s biological father to file a petition against his daughter’s mother in chancery court for a change of custody. During the custody dispute, the chancery court appointed both a guardian ad litem and an attorney ad litem for the stepdaughter, and ordered the attorney ad litem to pursue any legal actions on behalf of the stepdaughter for the accident. When the attorney ad litem filed a claim on the stepdaughter’s behalf with the plaintiff insurer, payment was denied. The guardian ad litem then filed a separate tort action against the friend. While the tort action was pending, the plaintiff insurer filed this declaratory judgment action against the named insured and the friend, seeking a declaration that its insurance policy did not cover the friend. The guardian ad litem intervened in this action. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the insurance policy covered the friend for the motorcycle accident, and awarded the guardian ad litem discretionary costs, which included attorney’s fees for the attorney ad litem. The plaintiff insurer now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s decisions on the issue of coverage and discretionary costs, and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

The pro se petitioner, Billy Harris, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for the appointment of counsel.

This is a breach of contract case. The defendants own a commercial building that was seriously damaged by a fire. The plaintiffs entered into a lease-purchase contract with the defendants to acquire the building at the expiration of a ten-year lease. Under the contract, the plaintiffs agreed to renovate the building from the fire damage, consistent with the local city building code and the defendant owners’ approval. After some renovations were made, prior to the expiration of the contractual repair period, the defendants deemed the renovations to be not in compliance with the city code and disapproved them. The defendant owners then declared the plaintiffs to be in breach of the contract and repossessed the property. The plaintiff lease-purchasers sued the defendant owners for breach of contract, claiming that, at the time of repossession, the renovations were not yet completed and that they still had time under the contract to complete them. After a bench trial, the trial court determined that the plaintiffs had breached the contract because the renovations were not in compliance with the city code and did not meet the approval of the defendant owners. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the plaintiffs breached the contract by making repairs that were not in compliance with the applicable code; the fact that the contractual repair period had not yet expired is immaterial.