APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Terrance Reece, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony; unlawful possession of a firearm by a felony drug offender, a Class D felony; unlawful possession of a firearm having been convicted of a felony involving the use of force or violence, a Class C felony; unlawful possession of a firearm having been convicted of a felony involving the use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; vandalism of property valued at $1,000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. After merging the firearms counts, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective term of twenty-two years in the Department of Correction, with the first twelve years to be served at 60% as a career offender and the last ten years at 45% as a persistent offender. The Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: 1) whether the trial court erred by its sua sponte mid-trial hearing to address an allegation that the Defendant threatened a witness during a break in the trial, by revoking the Defendant’s bond as a result of the alleged threat, and by allowing evidence of the alleged threat to be introduced at trial; 2) whether the trial court admitted prejudicial and irrelevant evidence in the form of testimony about a bullet found in the Defendant’s pocket at the time of his arrest that was discarded by the police, unredacted 911 calls by one of the alleged victims, and copies of the Defendant’s prior Michigan judgments; and 3) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the felony convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, a former inmate with the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a complaint against Appellee State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission (“Commission”). Appellant asserted numerous claims based on alleged misconduct of several assistant district attorneys. The Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss based on the Commission’s findings that Appellant’s claims were not within the Commission’s jurisdiction, and were barred by prosecutorial immunity and the applicable statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Jamarces J. Watson, pleaded guilty to two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and eight counts of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years of incarceration.  The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the required jury instruction pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012) and because he failed to investigate the case; (2) the trial court improperly ruled that he forfeited his right to counsel; (3) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the cumulative effect of the errors entitled him to relief.  After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.   

In this case, which stemmed from an attack on an inmate at a county jail, the trial court granted judgment in favor of the Defendants. Among other things, the trial court concluded that the assault on the inmate was not foreseeable. We affirm.

This case concerns the trial court’s enforcement of an antenuptial agreement. Appellant and Decedent executed an antenuptial agreement five days prior to marriage. Decedent died two years later. Appellant petitioned the trial court for her elective share, exempt personal property, year’s support, and homestead allowance. Appellees, beneficiaries under Decedent’s will, opposed Appellant’s petition arguing that she waived her spousal rights in the antenuptial agreement. Appellant argued that the antenuptial agreement was unenforceable because she did not enter into it with the required knowledge and/or she executed it under duress. In enforcing the antenuptial agreement, the trial court found that both Appellant and Decedent entered into it with the requisite knowledge of the other’s holdings. On review, we conclude that Appellant lacked knowledge of the full nature, extent, and value of Decedent’s holdings prior to executing the antenuptial agreement. Accordingly, we hold that the agreement is unenforceable. The trial court’s order is reversed.

A father has appealed from an order setting his child support obligation. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within the time permitted by Rule 4(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss the appeal.  

This is an appeal by Wife from a final decree of divorce. After a thorough review of the record and the trial court’s order, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his action to set aside several alleged fraudulent conveyances. Because the orders appealed do not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Aggrieved of his Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment, the defendant, Darrell Love, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s exclusion of certain evidence, and the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on self-defense. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellants seek accelerated review of a juvenile court magistrate’s denial of their motion for recusal. Because the magistrate’s decision is not subject to an accelerated interlocutory appeal under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2, we dismiss the petition and transfer the matter to the juvenile court for the juvenile judge to review the decision under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 4.04 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-107.

In this post-divorce proceeding, a father sought to modify a parenting plan to increase his parenting time and reduce his child support obligation. He later sought to be designated as primary residential parent for the parties’ daughter due to threats made by the mother’s then-husband. The father was designated as such on a temporary basis, and the mother filed numerous motions seeking to be restored as the primary residential parent. After a trial, the court named Father primary residential parent, finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred and that the change was in the best interest of the child. The trial court entered a new parenting plan and set Mother’s support obligation. The mother appeals the designation and raises many other issues. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a subrogation action. Roberta Woody (“Woody”) accidentally backed her tractor-trailer into one driven by Darrell King (“King”). King had an insurance policy through Old Republic Life Insurance Company (“Old Republic”). Old Republic, as King’s subrogee, sued Woody and her employer, Osborn Transportation, Inc. (“Osborn”) (“Defendants,” collectively), in the Circuit Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”). King later joined as a plaintiff. The Trial Court allowed Old Republic to participate at trial alongside King’s counsel, but did not allow Old Republic to reveal its identity to the jury. After trial, the jury awarded King damages. Old Republic appeals, arguing among other things that it should have been permitted to identify itself so as to make a case for its own unique and specific damages. We hold, inter alia, that in this subrogation action, Old Republic could recover damages from Defendants only to the extent King could, and the Trial Court did not commit reversible error in preventing Old Republic from identifying itself to the jury. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

In this case involving termination of the father’s parental rights to his children, the Sullivan County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) determined that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In 2000, a Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner of the first degree murder of his wife and of the abuse of her corpse, and the trial court sentenced him to life plus two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court affirmed the judgments on appeal. State v. Boatfield, No. E2000-01500-CCA-R3-CD, 2001 WL 1635447, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Dec. 20, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 3, 2002). The Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief, Boatfield v. State, No. E2005-01949-CCAR3- PC, 2006 WL 2135449 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, July 31, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2005), and federal habeas corpus relief. The Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, alleging as newly discovered evidence a June 20, 2018 deposition in which the deponent stated that deponent’s brother, who was originally a suspect in this murder, admitted committing the murder. The Petitioner also alleged that a jewelry box taken at the time of the murder was found in the home of a suspect in the original investigation. After a hearing, the coram nobis court denied the Petitioner relief, and he now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Eric Dewayne Wallace, of first degree felony murder and attempted first degree murder for offenses committed in 1992, and he was sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment and fifteen years. After discovering in 2021 that the Defendant was mistakenly assigned 1,174 days of pretrial jail credit and 312 days of behavior credit to both convictions, the trial court entered an order and corrected judgment for the conviction for attempted first degree murder, removing the credits to correct a clerical error under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s order on the basis that it abused its discretion, violated his due process rights and the prohibitions against double jeopardy, and failed to comply with Rule 17 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-209. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Bruce Antione Cole, of aggravated assault and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty-five years in confinement and ordered the defendant pay $25,474.16 in restitution. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing and its restitution order. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence but remand for a hearing on the matter of restitution.

The Petitioner, Lacey Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that his convictions are void and his sentence is illegal due to various errors made at trial and sentencing, including violations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), evidentiary errors, improper sentencing, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender at eighty-five percent to be served consecutively to sentences in two other counties. After this court affirmed the judgment and the supreme court denied permission to appeal, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court granted Petitioner a delayed appeal to allow him to raise multiple evidentiary issues. In this delayed appeal, Petitioner challenges the admission of the same pieces of evidence and the testimony of three of the State’s witnesses. He also challenges the omission of evidence regarding the professional misconduct of a detective. The State contends Petitioner is entitled to no relief. The State also contends Petitioner was erroneously granted a delayed appeal because the record does not demonstrate prejudice. We are precluded from reviewing this issue based on the post-conviction court’s failure to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-111(b). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court granting a delayed appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from the summary dismissal of a negligence action filed by a plaintiff-motorist against a truck driver and the driver’s employer. The plaintiff alleged that he was injured in a single-vehicle accident on Interstate 24 in Nashville, Tennessee,when he swerved to avoid tire debris from the truck driver’s trailer. The plaintiff further alleged that the truck driver and his employer were negligent in the maintenance and inspection of the vehicle, and that the truck driver acted negligently by leaving the debris on the roadway without attempting to retrieve it, warn other motorists, or call law enforcement. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted the motion in part, finding no evidence that the tire blowout was caused by a failure in the maintenance and inspection of the tire. The court also found no evidence that the truck driver’s failure to call law enforcement caused the accident. But the court asked for supplemental briefing on whether a driver has a common-law duty to remove from a roadway tire debris that came from his vehicle and/or a duty to warn motorists of the debris. After additional briefing and a second hearing, the court summarily dismissed that claim as well, ruling that the defendant truck driver had no duty as a matter of law to attempt to retrieve the tire from the interstate highway and that there were no facts to support a finding that the defendant driver had sufficient time to do so. The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend, arguing that he was entitled to the benefit of an adverse inference for spoliation of evidence as a discovery sanction because the defendants failed to preserve the blown tire. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the plaintiff knew about the potential spoliation issue for six years and failed to raise it in his response to the motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

A Knox County grand jury indicted the defendant, David Ware, for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and simple possession of marijuana. A jury subsequently convicted the defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence suspended to supervised probation after six months of service in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm and argues the trial court erred by granting one of the State’s peremptory challenges during jury selection. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jacob Evan Coyne, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202 (first degree murder); 39-13-403 (especially aggravated robbery). He received a total effective sentence of life plus 15 years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to show (1) evidence of premeditation, (2) evidence that the victim was robbed or that the Defendant intended to rob the victim, and because (3) evidence that was favorable to the Defendant was not given appropriate weight at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael McVay, appeals the
post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding his petition untimely. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the dismissal of the petition as barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

The Defendant, Kevin Tuvarey Gilmore, pleaded guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to evading arrest creating a risk of death, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-16-603 (2018).  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant received a six-year sentence as a Range II offender, and the trial court would determine the manner of service.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.  

The Appellant, DeAngelo LeQuinte Berry, was convicted in the Montgomery County Circuit Court of first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of life plus nine years.  On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence from a cellular telephone and a Facebook account because the evidence was not admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 901, that the trial court’s failure to grant a mistrial after a witness referred to an assault rifle constitutes plain error, and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing.  Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.