APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a personal injury action. The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants based on the statute of limitations. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

It is elementary that a statute waiving sovereign immunity must clearly do so, and any statute purporting to waive that immunity must be strictly construed. Courts are to determine to what extent and in what ways the Legislature has allowed suits against the State. The statute allowing the suit herein, Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-304, authorizes de novo judicial review of the termination or suspension of tenured state university professors. The statute does not mention or refer to backpay or the award of damages. This court cannot imply such a remedy or interpret the statute so as to enlarge the waiver of sovereign immunity beyond that intended by the legislature. 

The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss based on the statute of repose applicable to medical malpractice actions. Plaintiffs appeal, asserting the statute of repose was tolled where the action was brought on behalf of their minor children and commenced before December 9, 2005.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Following termination of his employment, a professor at Tennessee State University prevailed in this protracted tenure termination proceeding. On remand to Chancery Court following a successful appeal, the professor filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from the pre-appeal judgment to assert a claim for back pay. The Chancellor granted relief and awarded back pay, which the defendants challenge on two grounds. They contend the court abused its discretion by awarding Rule 60 relief, and because back pay is not  specifically authorized by statute, an award of back pay violates the sovereign immunity doctrine. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Janalee Wilson, appeals as of right from the judgment of theMadison County Circuit Court denying her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Defendant argues that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that her constitutional rights were violated by the involvement of the federal prosecutor in the state proceedings. After review of the record, as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Petitioner’s brief fails to set forth any specific contentions in support of the issue and, therefore, the issue is waived. As to her challenge to the federal prosecutor’s involvement, this issue is waived due to the Petitioner’s failure to raise it in her direct appeal and, additionally, the argument is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court denying post-conviction relief.

The defendant, David Earl Nixon, pled guilty to two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor (Class B felony) and one count each of marijuana possession and possession of drug paraphernalia (Class A misdemeanors). He was sentenced to consecutive ten-year sentences for the two felony convictions, with the first ten years to be served in confinement and the second ten years on supervised probation. He received concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement for the misdemeanor convictions. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in requiring him to serve his sentence in confinement rather than on probation and argues that the sentence of confinement constitutes an excessive sentence. We note that the laws concerning sentencing changed on June 7, 2005, and that this defendant did not execute any written waiver to be allowed to be sentenced under the new law. A ten-year sentence on probation under the old law is unauthorized, making the second ten-year sentence on supervised probation illegal. Because the trial judge is required to consider the aggregate sentence imposed, we reverse the sentences imposed and remand for new sentencing. We found no other reversible error.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Anthony Lewis, was convicted of attempted first degree murder. He was sentenced as a career offender to sixty years in the Department of Correction (DOC). On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (3) the trial court improperly sentenced the Defendant as a career offender, and (4) the trial court committed plain error by admitting a photograph that the State did not produce in response to a defense discovery request. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Billie Joe Welch, was convicted of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) the trial court improperly charged the jury on second degree murder; (4) the trial court erred when it answered a jury question off the record; and (5) the trial court improperly sentenced him. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employee insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that he knew or should have known he had a compensable injury more than a year before the action was commenced. As discussed below, the Panel concludes that the evidence preponderates against the finding of the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We accepted this appeal to determine whether a juvenile charged with being delinquent by virtue of having committed an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult is entitled to a jury trial on appeal de novo to circuit court. We answer that question in the negative. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. On appeal, the employee contends that the trial court erred in granting the
employer’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the employee’s back injury claim based
upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. The employee further contends that the trial court
erred in dismissing her carpal tunnel claim at the conclusion of trial after finding that the claim was untimely and that the employee failed to provide the employer with proper notice. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment regarding the employee’s claim for her back injury because there are material issues of fact as to when the employee leaned of the nature and extent of her back injury and the relationship of the injury to her work activity. We further conclude that the employee met the statute of limitations and notice requirements with regard to her carpal tunnel injuries. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, David Michael Anderson, Jr., pleaded guilty to driving under the influence, first offense, and reserved, under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(i), a certified question of law dispositive of the case. The certified question of law is whether the officer in this case lacked reasonable suspicion to effect a seizure in stopping appellant and as a result the evidence seized should have been suppressed. Following our review, we agree with appellant, reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the charge.

Husband, a farmer, and wife, a teacher, married in 1992. In 1993 or 1994, they purchased an eighteen acre parcel of real property located in Newbern, Dyer County, Tennessee. In 1995, the couple secured an insurance policy from Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company through their local Farm Bureau agent. The policy covered husband’s farming operation and the house under one policy. In 2001, husband andwife separated. The couple renewed the insurance policy annually,
and the most recent renewal was set to expire on February 22, 2003. Prior to the ending date of the policy, and during the couple’s separation, the insurance company sent insurance premium notices
to a post office box established by Husband. Husband decided not to renew the policy. Accordingly, the insurance company maintained that the policy expired on February 22, 2003 due to the nonpayment of the premium. On May 4, 2003, a tornado severely damaged the home, which the wife occupied at the time. The insurance company refused to cover the damage. The wife subsequently filed a lawsuit against her husband, the insurance company, the local agent, and others.  The agent and the insurance company moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.  We affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the agent. We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurance company, and we hold that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether an insurance policy covered the home on the date of the injury complained of.

The defendant, Harold D. Noel, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. See Tenn Code Ann. § 39-13-211 (2003). The trial court imposed a sentence of six years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, Thomas Carter, was convicted of coercion of a witness, a Class D felony, and sentenced to serve four (4) years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the State did not introduce sufficient evidence to convict him of the charge of coercion of a witness; and (2) the trial court violated his constitutional rights by requiring him to wear shackles and his prison uniform during his trial. Finding the second issue to have merit, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

Petitioner Robert Dallis Payne was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree murder and received a sentence of life in prison. On December 2, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Criminal Court of Davidson County. On December 8, 2005 the trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his petition for habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Edward R. Forester, was convicted of aggravated burglary and received a sentence of eleven years in the Department of Correction. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, and the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to call two witnesses; and (2) failing to request a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Anthony M. Bond, was convicted of first degree felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1997). The jury returned a verdict of life without parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (1997). In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for felony murder because the facts and circumstances of the underlying robbery were not the proximate cause of the victim's death; (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's request for a curative instruction after the prosecution stated in its closing argument that the jury had been sequestered because of the defendant; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of testimony concerning the defendant's teeth; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to bolster an expert witness's credibility. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Anthony M. Bond, was convicted of first degree felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1997).  The jury returned a verdict of life without parole. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (1997). In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for felony murder because the facts and circumstances of the underlying robbery were not the proximate cause of the victim's death; (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant's request for a curative instruction after the prosecution stated in its closing argument that the jury had been sequestered because of the defendant; (3) the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of testimony concerning the defendant's teeth; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to bolster an expert witness's credibility. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Dewayne R. Cross, was convicted of rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He appealed, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Petitioner filed a petition and two amended petitions for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petitions. The Petitioner now appeals, contending that the post-conviction court erred when it found that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Nicholas Goff, entered a plea of guilty to one count of driving under the influence, first offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with two days in jail followed by probation. Five months later, a violation warrant was issued and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the original sentence into execution. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that he was not afforded due process of law; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) that the trial court erred by revoking his probation on the basis of a "mere arrest;" and (4) that the trial court erred by appointing an assistant public defender as his lawyer. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Nicholas Goff, entered a plea of guilty to one count of driving under the influence, first offense.  Pursuant to a plea agreement with the state, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days with two days in jail followed by probation.  Five months later, a violation warrant was issued and the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the original sentence into execution. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that he was not afforded due process of law; (2) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel; (3) that the trial court erred by revoking his probation on the basis of a "mere arrest;" and (4) that the trial court erred by appointing an assistant public defender as his lawyer.  The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

After a bench trial in Hamilton County, the appellant, Kenneth Ramsey, was convicted of speeding, simple assault and resisting arrest. As a result, the trial court sentenced the ¹ appellant to thirty days for speeding, six months for resisting arrest and eleven months and twenty-nine days for assault, with the sentences to run concurrently. The trial court suspended the effective eleven month, twenty-nine day sentence and placed the appellant on unsupervised probation. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the appellant presents the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by failing to allow the appellant to call a witness to testify on his behalf; (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to present a copy of the indictment to the appellant; (3) whether the trial court erred by denying a continuance because the appellant was not provided documents as required by law in a timely manner; (4) whether the trial court failed to provide equal access to the court by denying a continuance; and (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.  Because the judgment forms do not properly reflect that the appellant was found guilty after a bench trial, we remand the matter for entry of corrected judgment forms. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the granting of specific performance pursuant to an option to purchase contained in a lease agreement between Sam Teague and Sam Teague Chrysler, Inc., and the predecessor in interest of Harper-Wittbrodt Automotive Group, LLC. Each of the parties have made numerous assignments of error with respect to the ruling of the trial court and the relief granted by it. After consideration of each of the issues raised by the parties, we affirm, in all respects, the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Shirley Peters (Pettit), pled guilty to reckless homicide (Class D Felony) and agreed to a sentence of eight years as a Range II, multiple offender. The manner of service of the sentence was to be determined following a sentencing hearing. On July 11, 2005, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve her sentence in confinement and denied any alternative sentence. The defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in (1) overruling her motion for deferred judgment and (2) requiring confinement when she is eligible for alternative sentencing. We conclude that the defendant has not carried her burden of showing that the sentence imposed is improper, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.