APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Octavian Demetrius Reeves, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to cross-examine witnesses thoroughly and failed to file a motion for a change of venue. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Defendant Second Injury Fund has appealed the findings of the trial court, which determined that the Employee is entitled to recover permanent total disability until age sixty-six. We find that Employee is not permanently and totally disabled, and we therefore modify the decision of the trial court.

The owner of a perpetual natural gas pipeline right-of-way easement filed this Declaratory Judgement action to resolve a dispute with the fee simple owners regarding its right of ingress and egress to replace, upgrade and maintain existing underground pipelines. The trial court declared the rights of the gas company were clearly and unambiguously stated in the grant of easement, that it had the right of ingress and egress stated in the Complaint and enjoined the defendants from obstructing or interfering with those rights. The defendants appeal contending the time and manner of the exercise of the right of easement was ambiguous in the grant, and that the court erred by failing to consider the undue burden on the defendants caused by the time the work was scheduled. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Appellant, Jeffrey Owen Walters, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-three years and nine months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he has raised two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) whether the State failed to furnish Walters all of his in-custody statements in violation of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16. Following review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and, although we find that the State violated the discovery rule, we conclude that the error is harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this appeal, the employer insists the evidence preponderates against the trial court's findings that the employee’s back and arm injuries were causally related to his work The employer also insists the trial court erred in making a single award for separate accidental injuries occurring at different times. As discussed below, the Panel has concluded the judgment should be affirmed in part and remanded to the trial court for separate awards for the back and hand injuries.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellee/Plaintiff, Timothy L. Bingham ("Employee"), alleges that while on a boy scout camping trip he received a tick bite, resulting in Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever ("RMSF"). Employee was diagnosed with severe septic shock, pancreatitis, necrosis in the foot, acute renal failure, dehydration, hepatitis B, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and HIV. The trial court found Employee's medical condition of acute pancreatitis was caused by the tick bite and that Employee was totally and permanently disabled. Appellant/Defendant, Chickasaw Council, Boy Scouts of America ("Employer"), appeals challenging the ruling of the trial court upon the grounds that medical evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court. We find the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court and reverse the trial court.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court findings of fact and conclusions of law. Kenneth Bialecke was killed in a car wreck while going to work early one morning. His widow and minor children sued his employer and its insurance carrier seeking workers' compensation death benefits. After hearing the proof presented at trial, the Chancellor dismissed the cause of action, finding that Mr. Bialecke's death did not arise out of and did not occur in the course of his employment, because the fatal accident occurred as the employee was on his way to his place of employment and, therefore, he had not yet begun his work day. After carefully reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the Chancellor's judgment should be affirmed.

The Defendant, Timothy R. Bouton, pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter and reckless endangerment and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred: (1) when it failed to have him execute an ex post factor waiver with regard to the 2005 Sentencing Act; (2) in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors; and (3) when it denied him probation or other alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to have the Defendant execute an ex post factor waiver with regard to the 2005 Sentencing Act. Therefore, we reverse the case and remand it for a new sentencing hearing.

The Appellant, Jackie Glenn Allen, appeals the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. Allen pled guilty to the crimes of rape and incest and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten years and six months for the rape and five years for the incest. After review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

The defendants, Andrew L. Collins and Terrance D. Grizzard, were each convicted of one count of aggravated assault. In addition, the defendant Collins pled guilty to one count of domestic assault and the defendant Grizzard was convicted of one count of reckless endangerment. Collins received an effective sentence of six years and Grizzard received an effective sentence of eight years. In this appeal, the defendant Collins asserts (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault and (2) that the trial court erred by providing a jury instruction on criminal responsibility. The defendant Grizzard asserts (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and (2) that his sentence is illegal. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant Collins's conviction for aggravated assault, that conviction must be reversed and dismissed. Further, because the record establishes that there are clerical errors on the judgment forms relating to the defendant Grizzard, the cause must be remanded to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. Otherwise, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. In 1999 the Employee injured his cervical spine and was awarded benefits,
including lifetime medical benefits. During the succeeding years he experienced various problems with his neck. In May 2003, the Employee struck a bay pole while operating a tow motor and claims an injury to his neck as a result of this incident. The treating neurosurgeon, Dr. Zellem, testified that the Employee suffered no new injury. An independent medical examiner, Dr. George Gaw, testified that the tow motor incident was a new injury. The trial judge accepted the opinion of Dr. Zellem and dismissed the Employee’s complaint. We affirm the judgment of the trial judge.

This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying Appellant’s motion for a continuance.  We affirm.

The defendant, Yvonne B. Ragland, was convicted on her guilty plea to Class D felony theft in the Knox County Criminal Court. The trial court denied her bid for judicial diversion and sentenced her to three years on probation. She appeals the denial of judicial diversion and the length of sentence imposed. Because the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion, we reverse and remand the case with instructions for the trial court to enter an order placing the defendant on judicial diversion with appropriate conditions.

The plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction, filed a pro se lawsuit against numerous prison officials and personnel of the department pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County, Tennessee. Therein, the plaintiff complained that prison officials terminated his prison job in retaliation for his filing numerous grievances against them. The plaintiff alleged violations of the United States Constitution, Tennessee statutes, and
various policies of the Tennessee Department of Correction. In response, the attorney general, acting on behalf of the defendants, filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. In turn, the plaintiff filed what amount to numerous amended complaints to allege new allegations or to add additional defendants. The trial court subsequently granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. The trial court also held that the plaintiff could proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. On appeal, the plaintiff asks this Court to review whether the trial court erred in (1) granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss, (2) denying
the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, (3) denying the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.  The plaintiff also asks this Court to determine whether he should be allowed to proceed in form a pauperis despite the fact that the federal courts previously dismissed three or more of his lawsuits for being frivolous or failing to state a claim. We affirm the trial court’s decisions to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to deny the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. While the
plaintiff was entitled to file an amended complaint without leave of court, we find no error in the trial court’s refusal to allow the plaintiff to submit his amended complaints. Finally, we hold that his lawsuit should have been dismissed at the trial level pursuant to section 41-21-801 et seq. of the Tennessee Code, which governs lawsuits filed by inmates. Accordingly, we find that the present appeal is so utterly lacking in merit that we remand this case to the trial court for the assessment of all costs, expenses, and fees associated with this lawsuit against the plaintiff in accordance with section 41-21-801 et seq. of the Tennessee Code.

Defendant, Patty D. Layland Smith, pled guilty to two counts of failure to appear, each offense being a Class E felony. Defendant was sentenced as a career offender and ordered to serve six years for each offense, to be served concurrently, with a sixty (60) percent release eligibility date. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied probation and any other form of alternative sentencing. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that she was not eligible for probation or alternative sentencing. After a full review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A privately-held limited liability company appeals the decision of the trial court which found that the company was the functional equivalent of a government agency in its management of a publically-owned facility thus making its documents subject to the Public Records Act. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

The Defendant, Shrone M. Hill, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him, as a Range I offender, to an effective sentence of eighteen years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum of six years for each count; and (2) the trial court erred when it ordered two of the five sentences to run consecutively to each other and consecutively to the three concurrent sentences. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Hall, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery. For these offenses, the defendant was sentenced as a repeat violent offender to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments for trial; (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him under the Repeat Violent Offender Act; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand for two separate trials.

I dissent from the majority opinion in this case because, in my view, the parenting plan clearly and unequivocally designated Father as the primary residential parent. Therefore, I believe it was necessary for the trial court to determine whether there had been a material change of circumstances and, if so, whether a modification would be in the child’s best interest. Both parties sought to modify the permanent parenting plan. 

This is a post-divorce case involving child custody. The parties divorced with an agreed parenting plan for their minor child in which the parties shared equally in residential parenting time and decision-making. When both parties remarried and the child approached school age, the father filed a petition seeking to have the child reside primarily with him. The mother then filed a similar petition. After a comparative fitness analysis, the trial court designated the mother as the primary residential parent. The father now appeals. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s decision.

Because of the troubling potential for overexpansion of the “functional equivalency” rationale established in Cherokee and relied upon herein, I write separately to identify the reason for my concurrence. The key to determining when a private entity, through a relationship with a government, subjects its records to public inspection lies, in the first instance, in the analysis of whether the entity is performing a governmental function.

This is a personal injury action involving comparative fault. At a warehouse construction site, the defendant steel subcontractor cut a hole in the roof of the partially constructed warehouse. A temporary cover was put over the hole. A week later, the plaintiff employee of a roofing subcontractor fell through the hole and sustained serious injuries. The plaintiff received full
workers’ compensation benefits from his immediate employer, the roofing subcontractor.  Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against the defendant steel subcontractor.  The steel subcontractor then sought to assert fault against the general contractor in charge of the
entire warehouse construction project. The steel subcontractor filed a motion in limine to assert fault against the nonparty general contractor. The motion was denied and the case proceeded to a jury trial. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $546,000. The defendant steel subcontractor now appeals, asserting numerous errors by the trial court, including error in precluding the steel subcontractor from asserting fault against the general contractor. We reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion in limine, vacate the judgment, and remand, finding that the steel
subcontractor should have been permitted to assert fault against the general contractor.

The appellant, Calvin Austin, was charged with violating probation. After a hearing in which the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation solely on the fact that the appellant received a new arrest, the appellant appealed. Because the trial court improperly revoked the appellant’s probation without a finding that the revocation was based on a preponderance of the evidence, we reverse the revocation of probation and remand the case for a hearing in which the trial court determines whether the preponderance of the evidence justifies a revocation.

Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit under the Tennessee Declaratory Judgment Act asserting that the legislation authorizing the use of electronic voting machines in some jurisdictions violated Art.  I, § 5 and Art. IV, § 1 of the Tennessee Constitution. The Shelby County Chancery Court dismissed Plaintiff/Appellant’s complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). We affirm.

On this appeal, the Appellant, TomKats, Inc., challenges the propriety of the trial court's awarding Appellee, Shawn Humphrey, judgment for breach of an oral agreement to pay commissions due for sales of sponsorships for an event called Dancin' in the District during the year 1999, failure to pay commissions due on sponsorship and vendor booth revenues pursuant to a written agreement for same event in the year 2000, the subsequent breach of that agreement for the years 2001 and 2002 and dismissal of Appellant's counterclaim for breach of a non-compete agreement and breach of fiduciary responsibilities. Humphrey challenges trial court's findings with regard to the amount of damages for commissions awarded for 1999 and the failure to award prejudgment interest on the judgment for breach of contract. We affirm, as modified.