APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a Jury verdict. The appeal arises out of a commercial real estate sale and involves the alleged misrepresentation of a restrictive covenant attached to property at issue.  The Jury found that the Defendants/Appellants intentionally and negligently misrepresented the restrictive covenant that applied to the property. Finding that there is no material evidence to support the Jury’s finding that Plaintiffs/Appellants’ reliance upon Defendants/Appellees’ representation was justified, we vacate the Judgment entered on the Jury Verdict.

Petitioner, Charles Manning, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, attacking his two convictions for second degree murder. Following a hearing, the trial court denied any relief to Petitioner. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Plaintiff Johnny Collins (“Employee”) filed two complaints, one for a shoulder
injury and the second for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The complaints were consolidated for
trial by agreement. The trial court awarded Employee 200 weeks of compensation for the shoulder
injury and 200 weeks of compensation for the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. Defendants Mid-
South Uniform Service, Inc., and Zenith Insurance Company (collectively “Employer”) appeal. We
modify Employee’s award for the shoulder injury to 60 weeks of compensation. We affirm
Employee’s award for the bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome.

The trial court granted Mother’s petition in objection to Father’s proposed relocation of the parties’ minor children and amended parenting plan to award custody to Mother; ordered Father to repay prepaid child support to Mother; set Father’s child support obligation based on his current income; ordered Father to refund sums to the children’s accounts; awarded Mother the parties’ timeshare property; and ordered Father to pay $30,000 of Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm in part, modify in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Petitioner, Kimberly Greene, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 1, 2005, and counsel was subsequently appointed to assist Petitioner. A hearing was held on June 1, 2005, and, after consulting with her counsel, Petitioner voluntarily withdrew her petition. Thereafter Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal. Upon a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the trial court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal of a protracted custody dispute among the parents and an aunt and uncle of a minor child. The aunt and uncle have had legal custody since 1997. This action commenced in 2000, when the aunt and uncle filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the parents and the parents filed counter-petitions for custody. In 2002, the trial court dismissed the petition to terminate and custody remained with the aunt and uncle. On appeal this Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition to terminate but vacated the custody determination due to the application of an incorrect legal standard. The case was remanded for the trial court to determine the legal effect of the 1997 custody order on the pending custody claims. The record in this second appeal tells us the trial court failed to determine on remand the effect of the 1997 custody order. Having determined the record is inadequate for this Court to make the determination, we have no option but to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter once again.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Tennessee Supreme Court of findings of facts and conclusions of law. In this appeal the Appellant/Defendant ("Employer") asserts the trial judge erred in finding the statutory cap of two and one-half multiplier set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1) did not apply, and applying the six times multiplier set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(6). Further, Employer alleges that the trial judge erred in finding that Appellee/Plaintiff ("Employee") was unable to make a meaningful return to work as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-241. Employer further avers that the trial judge erred in allowing a co-employee to testify as a rebuttal witness when his testimony did not rebut any testimony given by Employer's proof. We conclude the evidence fails to preponderate against the findings of the trial court, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court denied continuance, awarded custody of the parties’ child to Father, and refused to grant Mother visitation until she completed a psychological evaluation and petitioned the court.  Mother appeals, asserting the trial court erred by denying a continuance and by refusing to award her visitation rights. We affirm the denial of a continuance, but reverse the denial of visitation and remand to the trial court to set visitation.

In this domestic relations case, Husband complains, inter alia, that the trial court erred: in awarding primary custody of the parties’ children, ages two and four, to Wife, in the amount of support obligations, and in failing to award his attorney fees. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

This is a custody proceeding wherein Mother offered no proof except her own testimony. When the judgment was entered against her, she argues that the trial court should have conducted a comparative fitness analysis and that the case should be remanded for this purpose. Judgment of the
juvenile court affirmed.

This is an appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner, Jonathon Christopher Hood, entered a best-interest guilty plea to felony reckless endangerment and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to one year imprisonment with a release eligibility date of 30%. The Petitioner filed for and was denied post-conviction relief. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an involuntary guilty plea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-conviction action, the petitioner, Andrew Rochester, contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to file a motion to suppress evidence taken from his vehicle after his arrest; (2) failing to object to testimony elicited from two witnesses not qualified as experts; and (3) failing to comply with the requirements of Momon v. State on the record at trial. Following our review, we conclude that counsel was not ineffective in his representation; therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

In this post-conviction action, the petitioner, Kevin Frank Mercer, contends that: (1) his plea was involuntary and unknowing; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective by providing little meaningful advice as to whether to enter a plea or proceed to trial. Following our review, we conclude that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that counsel was effective in his representation of the petitioner. Therefore, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Husband appeals the trial court’s distribution of marital property and award of alimony in futuro.  We affirm.

The defendant, Danny Strode, was indicted by the Bledsoe County Grand Jury for one count of premeditated murder, one count of felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The State sought the death penalty. The defendant asserted he could not be put to death because he was mentally retarded within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a). The trial court held a hearing and determined that the defendant was indeed mentally retarded under the definition provided in the statute and therefore could not be sentenced to death. The State requested permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, we determine that the defendant is not mentally retarded under the definition of the statute and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Walfrido L. Rodriguez, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of second degree murder and aggravated assault, claiming that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider the charges sequentially, that the convicting evidence is insufficient, and that the trial court erred in rejecting a request for a special jury instruction. We discern no reversible error and affirm the convictions.

This is a contempt action arising out of a divorce. The parties’ final decree of divorce incorporated a marital dissolution agreement. The husband filed a petition for civil and criminal contempt against the wife for several alleged violations of the martial dissolution agreement. At the first hearing on the husband’s petition, the husband requested leave of court to amend his petition for contempt. Leave to amend was granted, and in light of the amendment, the trial court ordered a two-day continuance of the hearing. When the proceedings were reconvened, the trial court ruled that the wife had committed three violations of the marital dissolution agreement. The trial court awarded the husband $12,000 in attorney’s fees for prosecuting the contempt petition. The wife appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in granting the husband leave to amend his petition, finding that the wife violated the terms of the MDA, and in awarding the husband $12,000 in attorney’s fees. We affirm the grant of leave to amend the petition and the finding that the wife violated the terms of the MDA. However, the award of  attorney’s fees is vacated and the cause remanded for reconsideration of this issue.

The appellant, Daniel Potin, was found guilty by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the appellant to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction and imposed a fine of $20,000.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s designation of a witness as an expert, and the fine imposed. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a Title IV child support case. The State appeals from the trial court’s Order refusing to set support because the Petitioner did not have legal custody of the child at the time she received public assistance from the Department of Human Services, nor was the biological parent given notice that she would have to reimburse the Department of Human Services for moneys spent on behalf of her son when she placed him in the custody of the Petitioner. We reverse and remand.

This appeal stems from a divorce case. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred when it named the wife as the primary residential parent, when it adopted a visitation schedule requiring the children to be transported between husband and wife on a daily basis during the week, and when it declined to award husband alimony. The husband contends on appeal that naming him primary residential parent and adopting his permanent parenting plan would be less disruptive on the children. Further, he asserts that the court should have awarded him alimony as he was the economically disadvantaged spouse and has a limited income due to his medical condition. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This appeal involves the discharge of a clerical employee by the Metropolitan Nashville General Hospital. After her discharge was upheld by the Metropolitan Nashville Hospital Authority, the employee filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking judicial review of the decision to discharge her. The trial court affirmed the discharge, and the employee has appealed. Like the trial court, we have determined that the decision to discharge the employee for deficient and inefficient performance of duties is supported by substantial and material evidence.

The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of Plaintiffs in an action alleging breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and denied Defendant’s Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the judgment. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs Gary and Gail Weaver filed suit against Coldwell Banker Hoffman-Burke, Inc. Realtors (“Defendant CBHB”), Jim Perdue (“Defendant Perdue”), Thomas McCarter (“Defendant McCarter”), and Chip Hunter (“Defendant Hunter”) seeking damages resulting from a failed real estate sale. The Plaintiffs specifically sought damages from Defendants CBHB and Perdue for negligence per se, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the issue of liability for all Defendants, but reserved ruling on damages for trial. At trial, the trial court awarded the Plaintiffs damages in the amount of $134,225.06 plus attorney’s fees and held all Defendants jointly and severally liable for the entire award. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendants CBHB and Perdue assert various issues on appeal. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this case for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Earl Jerome Lee, pled guilty to aggravated kidnapping, attempted felony escape, concealing stolen property, and fraudulent use of a credit card, and he received a total effective sentence of forty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the sentences imposed were illegal. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner appeals the dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

This appeal involves a request for prejudgment interest in a personal injury case. After the Circuit Court for Cheatham County entered a $27,787.50 judgment for the prevailing motorist, the motorist filed a post-trial motion seeking prejudgment interest. The trial court denied the motion, and the prevailing motorist appealed. We affirm the trial court because prejudgment interest in not available in personal injury cases.