APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from a directed verdict in a personal injury lawsuit. Glenya Cole-Jackson (“Plaintiff”) sued Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) over an incident in which she was hit by a shopping cart pulled by one of Defendant’s employees. The case went before a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The Trial Court granted the motion, finding that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that the shopping cart incident caused her injuries. Plaintiff appeals. Contrary to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Plaintiff’s brief fails to cite the record. In addition, the record contains no transcript or statement of evidence of the trial, hence we have no basis for determining that the Trial Court erred. We find that Plaintiff has waived her issues. We affirm.

The Defendant, Grover Beverly, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of two counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of eighty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Following an automobile accident, Appellant filed a complaint for negligence and personal injuries against appellees, the at-fault driver and her husband. Appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing that appellant’s claims should be dismissed because she settled with appellees’ insurance carrier and released her claims against them prior to filing suit. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Because there are disputes of material facts concerning whether appellant agreed to settle and release her claims, we reverse.

The Defendant, Forrest Scott Evans, pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of seven years and six months. The court suspended the sentence and placed the Defendant on probation. Thereafter, the Defendant committed new crimes in Virginia. When the Defendant was returned to Tennessee, the trial court revoked the suspended sentence and ordered him to serve it in full. The Defendant appeals, arguing that a full revocation was an abuse of discretion. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pro se Appellant, Michael Adams, has appealed an order of the Shelby County Circuit Court that was entered on November 1, 2024. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment. As a result, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

The Defendant, James R. Holley, appeals the Henderson County Circuit Court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing after his guilty pleas to eight counts involving drugs, weapons, and traffic offenses. Based on our review, we conclude that the Defendant failed to provide this court with an adequate appellate record. Accordingly, his appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Rickius Grant, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of attempting to traffic a person for a commercial sex act and resulting concurrent six-year sentences. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred by finding that his petition was barred by the statute of limitations because due process required that the statute of limitations be tolled. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Roger Bridges, 1 was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; sexual battery, a Class E felony; rape, a Class B felony; and rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of fifty-one years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The four victims involved were three sisters and their female first cousin, and the offenses occurred over a two-month period that culminated on June 12, 2018, when one of the three sisters divulged the abuse to her father, who called the police. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S 83 (1973), “by failing to produce information concerning the pending investigation of a male family member for sexual abuse crimes against some of the same family group.”2 Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A petitioner obtained an ex parte temporary order of protection in general sessions court. The respondent counter-petitioned to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). After a hearing, the general sessions court denied the respondent’s petition, but it also declined to extend the temporary protective order and dismissed the underlying petition for lack of proof. The respondent appealed the decision on “attorney’s fees” to circuit court. After a de novo review, the circuit court determined that the respondent was not entitled to attorney’s fees under either the order of protection statute or the TPPA. In this appeal, the respondent challenges denial of his request for attorney’s fees under the TPPA. Because the circuit court lacked appellate jurisdiction over the general sessions court’s order denying the petition to dismiss under the TPPA, we vacate in part and remand.

In 1996, the Petitioner, Alvin Dean Shaver, pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without the possibility of parole. In 2024, the Petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the charges because the statute pursuant to which he was convicted did not have the constitutionally required style, “Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee.” The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the application for the writ, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Defendant, David Edward Seickendick, appeals the judgment of the Cumberland County Criminal Court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the balance of his previously ordered probationary sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Defendant’s medical conditions in revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Nathan David Bassett, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $10,000 or more. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve the sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a sentence alternative to confinement. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se Defendant, Darrell E. Nance,1 appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal
of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence.
Specifically, the Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in concluding that his
sentence of life imprisonment was legal, (2) the State’s motion to dismiss his motion was
untimely, and (3) the trial court erred in declining to appoint counsel and hold a hearing on
his motion. Because we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed
and that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement, we
dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Kurt Franklin Luna, was convicted after a jury trial of driving without a license, driving an unregistered vehicle, and violation of the financial responsibility law. The trial court sentenced him to serve forty-eight hours in the county jail. On appeal, Defendant raises a variety of claims. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Defendant has waived his issues for failure to create an adequate record and failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

A Dyer County jury found the Defendant, Daniel McCaig, guilty of unlawfully possessing methamphetamine and a firearm. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-six years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. He also argues that the trial court erred by denying his right to represent himself and imposing consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal concerns whether a railroad employee’s negligence claim brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq. (“FELA”) is precluded by the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20101, et seq. (“FRSA”). Troy L. Rouzer (“Plaintiff”), a locomotive engineer, sued CSX Transportation, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) under FELA for injuries he sustained in a collision. Plaintiff alleged insufficient training. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that FRSA precludes Plaintiff’s FELA claim. Defendant argued that national uniformity in safety rules requires this result. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion. Plaintiff appeals. We hold, inter alia, that in view of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 134 S.Ct. 2228, 189 L.Ed.2d 141 (2014), exemplified in its statement that “[w]hen two statutes complement each other, it would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that Congress nonetheless intended one federal statute to preclude the operation of the other[,]” id. at 115, Plaintiff’s FELA claim is not precluded by FRSA as both federal statutes complement one another toward the goal of rail safety. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Defendant, Detarus Brown, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s order partially denying his motion to correct his sentence, and Defendant contends that the trial court should have treated his motion as a petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marlos LeKeith Tipton, appeals from his convictions for vehicular homicide and speeding following a bench trial. Specifically, the Defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial based on the trial court’s denial of funding for a defense expert in vehicle collisions. He further argues that the proof was insufficient to support his conviction of vehicular homicide based upon reckless conduct predicated on excessive speed alone. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Damon Cordell Parson, of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to a total effective sentence of twelve years, to be served consecutively to a previous sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted audio recordings of the drug transactions and that, without the recordings, the evidence is insufficient to convict him. He further contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it improperly sentenced him to the maximum sentence within his applicable sentencing range and did not make proper considerations with regard to alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on September 20, 2024. The envelope within which the notice of appeal was mailed reflects that it was mailed from the prison mailroom of the facility where the appellant was incarcerated on November 9, 2024, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a health care liability action. The plaintiff’s husband passed away after a complication that occurred during a medical procedure. The plaintiff provided pre-suit notice of her claim to five health care providers but ultimately filed suit against only three of the providers. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her initial action, but then she re-filed it within a year. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the re-filed suit, alleging that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) due to limiting language included in HIPAA authorizations she had provided to the defendants. The trial court also found that the plaintiff failed to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4), which requires plaintiffs to file certain documentation with their complaint. We hold that the trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(4) but did not err in finding that the plaintiff failed to comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.02 from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. We have determined that the petition must be summarily dismissed due to substantive failures to comply with Rule 10B. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

A Knox County jury convicted Defendant, D’tearius Carvell Southern, of second degree murder, aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, tampering with evidence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant received an effective sentence of twenty-three years to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction for second degree murder and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury that Defendant had no duty to retreat before using deadly force as part of the self-defense instruction. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Eugene Beard, pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated assault and one count of being a felon in possession of a handgun.  After the plea, but before the sentencing hearing, the State filed a notice to seek enhanced punishment offering exhibits showing that the Defendant qualified as a Range II offender and asking the court to impose consecutive sentences and the maximum sentence.  After the hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to eighteen years for each of the assault convictions to be served concurrently at 85% and to ten years for the handgun conviction to be served at 35% and consecutively to the assault sentences, for a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing and when it considered the State's notice to seek enhanced punishment, which the State filed after he pleaded guilty.  After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.