APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I agree completely with Judge Lee’s well-thought-out opinion. I write separately to emphasize what I believe is the linchpin of the reasoning in this case.

A high school student was injured when she fainted after viewing a first aid instructional video depicting simulated wounds that was being shown in one of her classes. The student, through her parents, sued Knox County and the Knox County Board of Education under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, alleging that the teacher supervising the class was negligent in allowing her to leave the classroom unattended because it was foreseeable that she might be suffering a physical reaction to the video and that she might faint. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her damages in the amount of $30,000. The defendants appeal, arguing that plaintiff's fainting was not foreseeable and that, even if the trial court was correct in its finding of negligence, the trial court awarded excessive damages. Upon our determination that the harm suffered by the student was not reasonably foreseeable, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss this case.

This is a direct appeal from a conviction on a jury verdict of first degree premeditated murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. The Defendant was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Defendant raises five issues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to define premeditation for prospective jurors through the uses of examples during voir dire; (2) the trial court erred in excluding from evidence the victim’s alleged involvement in a prior homicide; (3) the trial court erred in allowing as evidence at trial the prior testimony from an unavailable witness; (4) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of three of the State’s rebuttal witnesses; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of first degree, premeditated murder.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Saturn’s employer-funded disability plan paid the Plaintiff disability benefits
after reaching maximum medical improvement when she was placed out of work because her
physician-ordered restrictions could not be accommodated. The Plaintiff claims error in the
offsetting of these disability payments. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this termination of parental rights case, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of T.H.W. (“Mother”) and all potential fathers. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Louis Leslie Myles, appeals the denial of judicial diversion following his guilty pleas to two counts of theft of property over $1,000. After review of the record, we reverse the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court and remand for deferment of the proceedings as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (2003).

The trial court granted Respondent Father a downward deviation from the child support guidelines when setting retroactive child support. We reverse.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Plaintiff, a thirty-seven year old police officer, suffers from mild
hypertension, readily controlled by medication. He claims that the stress of his job causes his
hypertension, and relies on the presumption created by Tennessee Code Annotated section
7-51-201(a)(1) to support this claim. The trial court held that this presumption was not rebutted and found that the Plaintiff retained a 3 percent anatomical disability owing to the hypertension. We find that the presumption was sufficiently rebutted, and that the evidence preponderates against a finding that the Employee’s hypertension arose out of his employment. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed.

The Petitioner, Jeremy Catron, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction DNA testing. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because Petitioner has failed to satisfy the qualifying criteria under the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Petitioner, Andrew Ewing, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petition for post-conviction relief is barred by the statute of limitations, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The employee complained of back pain for many years, culminating in a
workers’ compensation complaint alleging disability owing to his back problems, with little
specificity. The trial court concluded that the Plaintiff’s condition was not caused by his employment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The issue on appeal is whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies in a transitory, intrastate tort action. This is a medical malpractice action in which all of the alleged negligent acts and omissions occurred in Dekalb County. Plaintiffs, White County residents, filed suit in Davidson County, where two of the four defendants have their principal offices. The two Dekalb County defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon improper venue, or in the alternative, forum non conveniens. The trial court found forum non conveniens inapplicable to this intrastate forum dispute and venue proper. We affirm.

The defendant, Susan Wallace, a special education teacher, was indicted by the Henderson County Grand Jury for fourteen counts of child abuse and fourteen counts of assault. She filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the State had not complied with the School Discipline Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-6-4101, et seq. The trial court denied the motion, finding that any procedural defects were cured by the return of the grand jury indictment, and this Rule 9 interlocutory appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss the indictment.

This is an adoption and termination of parental rights case. The maternal grandparents of the two children at issue filed this petition requesting that the rights of the children’s father be terminated and that the grandparents be permitted to adopt the children. The mother of the children joined in the petition. The petitioners alleged that the father’s rights should be terminated based on his abandonment for failing to visit or support the children for a period of four months preceding his incarceration. After a hearing, the trial court found three grounds on which to terminate the father’s parental rights: abandonment, persistent conditions, and the length of the father’s prison term. The trial court also found that the children’s best interest would be served by terminating the father’s parental rights. The father now appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in terminating his rights based on abandonment. We affirm the trial court’s decision, because the father did not challenge the other two grounds on which his rights were terminated, and the termination of the his rights based on those grounds must stand.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review (1) whether the information used to obtain a search warrant to search the defendant’s residence was provided by a “citizen informant” and thus presumptively reliable; and (2) whether the information, if not provided by a “citizen informant,” nonetheless established probable cause under State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989). The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress after finding that the information had not been provided by a citizen informant but that it nonetheless established probable cause under Jacumin. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the information was presumptively reliable because it had been given by a citizen informant and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress without applying Jacumin. After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we hold (1) that the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals properly granted the interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules ofAppellate Procedure and (2) that although the information used to obtain the search warrant for the defendant’s residence was not provided by a “citizen informant,” it established probable cause under Jacumin. The judgment is, therefore, affirmed for the reasons herein.

Decedent executed a Power of Attorney document granting her son broad general powers to act on her behalf. The son executed a Trust Deed and Modification Agreement on Decedent’s property.  Decedent and later her Estate asked the Chancery Court to void these documents. The Court refused.  On appeal, we affirm.

In this case we are asked to review a juvenile’s confinement following a juvenile court’s finding that the juvenile violated the terms of his probation. The juvenile court found the juvenile to be delinquent after the juvenile entered a guilty plea to an assault charge, and the court placed the juvenile on probation. Thereafter, the juvenile was charged with other offenses, and the juvenile court entered a verbal directive placing the child on house arrest. When the juvenile violated this directive, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the juvenile violated the terms of his probation and committed him to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.  After being confined, the juvenile filed a post-commitment petition pursuant to the Juvenile Post-Commitment Procedures Act in the circuit court. The circuit court upheld the juvenile court’s ruling.  The juvenile appealed the circuit court’s decision to this Court. During the pendency of this appeal,  the juvenile was released from custody. Accordingly, we hold that the present appeal is not justiciable under the doctrine of mootness, therefore, we dismiss the present appeal.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Tennessee Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court granted summary judgment based upon notice, the statute of limitations, and the hernia statute. We find summary judgment in this case was inappropriate, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Zoning Administrator of the Metropolitan Codes Department of Nashville and Davidson County issued a permit to an elementary school to create a park on property adjacent to the school campus. The local neighborhood association appealed the issuance of the permit to the Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals. The Board revoked the permit on the basis that (1) the property would not remain in its natural state; (2) the school intended to use the property as athletic fields for the physical education of their students; (3) instructional activity is not allowed in a park; and (4) the requested use of the property would more likely be classified as a recreation center. The elementary school filed a common law writ of certiorari in Davidson County Chancery Court appealing the revocation. The chancery court reversed the decision of the Board and reinstated the permit finding that the Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, illegally, beyond its authority, and without supporting evidence in the record. We affirm the decision of the chancery court in all respects.

Plaintiffs/Appellees obtained a judgment on a detainer warrant in the General Sessions Court at Lauderdale County requiring the Defendants/Appellants to relinquish possession of the residence at 465 Maple Hill Circle in Ripley, Tennessee. The Defendants/Appellants filed a de novo appeal as of right in the Circuit Court at Lauderdale County. The circuit court affirmed the judgment of the sessions court. Appellants appeal. We affirm.

We accepted Defendant’s interlocutory appeal in this personal injury action to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-1-119, a plaintiff is required to obtain the permission of the trial court to file an amended complaint naming an additional defendant after an original defendant alleges possible fault by that nonparty. We conclude that permission to file is necessary under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01. We also conclude that, under the facts of this case, Plaintiff has substantially complied with the applicable rules. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this divorce case, Appellant/Husband appeals from the trial court’s classification of certain real property as marital property. The property at issue was Husband’s separate property prior to the marriage. The property was sold to a third party during the marriage, and a deed of trust secured the balance of the purchase price. The third party defaulted in the installment payments, and Husband purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and received a trustee’s deed in his name only.  Husband asserts that the property is separate property under either T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(A) or T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(2)(B). The trial court concluded that the property was marital property under T.C.A. §36-4-121(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

The Defendant, Robert A. Wiley, aka Jabo, was convicted by a McNairy County jury of identity theft, violation of a Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO) order, and driving while license cancelled, suspended, or revoked. For these convictions, the Defendant received an effective three-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court made several errors in instructing the jury, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for identity theft, and (3) the trial court committed sentencing errors. Finding plain error, double jeopardy principles require us to vacate the Defendant’s conviction for driving while license cancelled, suspended, or revoked. The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all respects.

The Appellant, Chivous Robinson, appeals the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. Robinson was convicted of second degree murder and solicitation to commit first degree murder and subsequently sentenced to an effective thirty-four year sentence. On appeal, Robinson argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that counsel was ineffective by: (1) not raising the issue of newly discovered evidence on direct appeal; and (2) not seeking jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide and not appealing the failure of the trial court to instruct on these lesser offenses. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Christopher Hodge, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.