APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant is an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant filed a Title 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim against the Appellee/Associate Warden and Appellee/Pre-Release Coordinator alleging a violation of the inmate’s civil rights arising from a change in inmate’s custody status. The trial court granted the Appellees’ Tenn. R. App. P. 12.02 Motion to Dismiss. Inmate appeals. We affirm.

The Appellant, Richard D. Wiggins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. Wiggins pled guilty to attempted especially aggravated robbery and, as provided by the plea agreement, received an eight-year split confinement sentence requiring service of one year in the county jail followed by seven years probation. On appeal, Wiggins contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness in: (1) failing to have Wiggins evaluated for mental competency; (2) failing to fully investigate the case; (3) advising Wiggins how to answer the trial court's questions during the plea colloquy; and (4) failing to fully explain the nature and consequences of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this capital case, the defendant, William Glenn Rogers, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, rape of a child, and two counts of criminal impersonation in connection with the 1996 abduction, rape, and murder of nine-year-old Jacqueline Beard. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions with the premeditated murder conviction. Based on four aggravating circumstances, the jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder. The trial court sentenced Rogers to an effective sentence of fortyeight years for the other convictions. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument:¹ 1) whether the trial court erred in failing to suppress Rogers’ statements to law enforcement officers; 2) whether the trial court erred in supplementing the appellate record with mental health and social services records pertaining to the victim’s brother, Jeremy Beard; 3) whether the trial court violated Rogers’ constitutional rights by limiting cross-examination of Jeremy Beard; 4) whether the trial court committed harmful error in its instruction defining “intentionally”; 5) whether the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for first degree murder, kidnapping, and rape; 6) whether the evidence is insufficient to support the aggravating circumstances; and 7) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed these issues and the remainder of the issues raised by Rogers, we conclude that they do not warrant relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The Appellant, Simon Avalos Villagomez, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Villagomez argues that his guilty plea for felony possession of seventy pounds or more of marijuana for resale was not knowing and voluntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, James Wesley Martens, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of aggravated robbery and evading arrest. The defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fourteen years and three years, respectively, in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jason Earl Hill, proceeding pro se, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1995, Hill pled guilty to aggravated burglary and received a three-year suspended sentence. In February 2005, Hill filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief collaterally attacking the 1995 conviction. While acknowledging that the petition was filed outside the statute of limitations, Hill asserts that due process requires that the statute be tolled and that his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea be addressed. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred without addressing the merits of Hill's substantive claims. On appeal, Hill asserts that the court erred in: (1) dismissing the petition as untimely; (2) dismissing the petition without addressing the whole subject matter as to all causes of action involved; and (3) dismissing the petition because due process requires vacating the conviction due to his innocence. After review, we conclude that the facts of this case do not warrant tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of the petition.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tyler Stout Smith, was convicted of vehicular homicide by recklessness. Defendant was ordered to pay a fine of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars and was sentenced to four (4) years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the element of recklessness beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) Defendant's due process rights were violated when the trial court did not allow him to present evidence that the victim was influenced by an intoxicant which may have influenced her ability to avoid the collision; and (3) the trial court improperly increased the Defendant's sentence from three years to four years. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of defendant, Jerry Eldridge, and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his appeal, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during the revocation hearing, and that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his probation. After a review of this matter, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dorothy Pryor, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sumner County Criminal Court. The defendant pled guilty to five counts of burglary and three counts of Class D felony theft. Pursuant to the plea agreement, she received an effective eight-year sentence for the burglary convictions and an effective eight-year sentence for the theft convictions. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the burglary and theft sentences to be served consecutively to one another and consecutively to a prior eight-year sentence, for a total sentence of twenty-four years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant argues that consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Willie Wilson, was found guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery. He received concurrent sentences of nine years for each conviction. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the aggravated robbery convictions should be merged into a single conviction and the case remanded for entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Tammy Marie Wilburn, pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated arson, a Class B felony. The Blount County Circuit Court sentenced her to an eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender to be served in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in denying her alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal stems from a contract dispute between an employee doctor and her employer where the employer alleged that the doctor anticipatorily breached a covenant not to compete provision in the employment agreement between the parties. In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether (1) the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the doctor was proper; (2) the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the employer was proper; (3) the trial court’s grant of the doctor’s motion to stay discovery was proper; (4) the doctor’s voluntary nonsuit of her counter claims while the employer’s motion for summary judgment was still pending was proper; (5) the chancery court erred when it returned interpled funds back to the doctor; and (6) the chancery court abused its discretion when it denied the employer’s motion to amend its complaint. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Paul O. Dickens, Sr., was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter (a Class D felony), reckless endangerment (a Class E felony), and two counts of coercion of a witness (a Class D felony). On direct appeal to this court, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict; and (2) his convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Upon review of the record, briefs of the parties, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the Defendant was convicted of burglary, a Class D felony, and theft of property under the value of five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§39-14-402, -103, -105(1). After conducting a sentencing hearing, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to serve ten years in the Department of Correction for his burglary conviction.  He received a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail for his theft conviction. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve a mid-range sentence for the burglary conviction. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Chuncy L. Hollis, originally pled guilty to possession of cocaine greater than .5 grams with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of eight years. Thereafter, he filed and was denied post-conviction relief. The petitioner now appeals the post-conviction court’s order, claiming that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel which resulted in an unknowing and involuntary plea.

The defendant, Johnny E. Porter, was convicted of possession of over .5 grams of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. He received concurrent sentences of nine years and eleven months, twenty-nine days on the charges, respectively. On appeal, the defendant contests the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence on Count One from eight years to nine years based solely upon his prior criminal record. Upon review, we affirm the conviction and sentence.

The plaintiff sought workers’ compensation benefits for pain in her lower back and hip resulting from a work-related accident. We conclude that the Commissioner erred in finding the evidence insufficient to establish that the plaintiff’s injury was permanent and in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Claims Commission and remand the case to determine the extent of vocational impairment and the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses paid by the plaintiff.

The Defendant, Shirley A. Rudd, was convicted by an Obion County jury of sale of a controlled substance. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not declare a mistrial because two witnesses made improper and prejudicial statements about the Defendant’s prior bad acts; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction; and (3) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s counsel the right to question a witness about her motive for testifying. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

David Randal Smithson ("Father"), a Tennessee resident, is a pilot for a major airline and his job duties require him to fly to Bolivia, South America. During one of these trips to Bolivia, Father became romantically involved with Marie Soledad Torrico (Morales) ("Mother"), a citizen and resident of Bolivia. In April of 2001, Mother gave birth in Bolivia to the parties' son, who is a citizen and resident of Bolivia and has been since his birth. After obtaining a temporary Visa authorizing her to come to the United States, Mother filed this paternity action in the Wilson County Juvenile Court. Based on DNA test results, the Juvenile Court enter an Order establishing Father as the biological father of the child. The Juvenile Court later entered an order requiring Father to pay child support based on the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. Father appeals claiming, among other things, that the Juvenile Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter an order requiring him to pay child support when the child was conceived in Bolivia, born in Bolivia, and when both Mother and the child are citizens and residents of Bolivia. We hold that the Juvenile Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the proceedings but erred in applying Tennessee law. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is, therefore, vacated and this case is remanded for further proceedings.

Following his convictions for two disciplinary infractions, the prisoner filed a pro se petition for a common law writ of certiorari in the chancery court. While he attempted to verify the petition by stating that it constituted his first application for such writ and that its contents were true and correct to the best of his knowledge, the prisoner failed to swear to the contents of the petition under oath by having the petition notarized. The Tennessee Department of Correction moved to dismiss the petition for its lack of a proper verification and for being filed beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court granted the state’s motion on both grounds. The prisoner filed a pro se appeal to this Court. We affirm.

Billy Suddarth, Jr. and Angela Suddarth appeal the summary dismissal of their action, which was dismissed on the grounds of res judicata, collateral estoppel, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the compulsory counterclaim rule of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In the former action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois wherein the Suddarths were defendants, Household Commercial Financial Services, Inc. alleged the Suddarths breached a guaranty agreement by failing to pay a deficiency owing on the underlying credit agreement they had guaranteed. Household prevailed on the merits in the former action against the Suddarths. In the present action in the Circuit Court of Davidson County the Suddarths allege fraud, fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy against Household and two other defendants concerning the guaranty agreement that was the subject of the former action in the United State District Court. The present claims by the Suddarths arose out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of Household's action in the United State District Court; therefore, it was compulsory that the Suddarths' claims be presented in the former action. The Suddarths failed to do so. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal of this action.

The State appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's dismissal of a presentment charging the defendant, Bradley Noble, with the rape of a five-year-old child at a day care center. The presentment charged the defendant, a former employee of the center, with digitally penetrating the victim's anus on an unspecified day in March 1999. In a subsequent bill of particulars, the State narrowed the time of the offense to between 3:20 and 5:29 p.m. on March 10, 1999. During the defendant's first trial, which ended in a mistrial, defense counsel revealed in opening arguments that he intended to prove that the defendant had not been alone with the victim during the time alleged in the bill of particulars. Following the mistrial, the State filed a "Superceding Bill of Particulars," which reverted back to the general time frame of the presentment. The defendant moved to dismiss the presentment, and the trial court granted the motion. We reverse the order of the trial court, reinstate the presentment, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The defendant pled guilty to driving while under court order not to operate a motor vehicle because he had been declared an habitual motor offender. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years as a Career Offender. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in not granting him probation and in sentencing him as a career offender. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Mother/Appellant appeals from the order of the Juvenile Court at Madison County terminating her parental rights. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the ground of persistence of conditions is not supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record, and that termination of her parental rights is not in the best interest of the minor child.  Because we find clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the trial court's findings, we affirm.

Joan Oates (“Plaintiff”) was employed by the Chattanooga Publishing Company (“Defendant”) for approximately twenty-three years. In January of 2004, Plaintiff was observed on Defendant’s security camera making obscene gestures with her middle finger toward the camera and then covering the security camera with a cup for a period of time. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that she was terminated because of a disability. Plaintiff also claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and malicious harassment while employed by Defendant. Plaintiff also sued for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.