APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Lauderdale County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Erica H. (“Mother”) to her minor twin sons, Jordyn and Jadyn H. (“the Children,” collectively). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on a number of grounds. Mother appeals. We find, by clear and convincing evidence, that five grounds for termination were proven against Mother and that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. However, we vacate certain of the grounds found by the Juvenile Court. We therefore affirm the Juvenile Court’s judgment, as modified, terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

The petitioner, Christopher Orlando Lyles, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time barred, which petition challenged his 2016 convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Rohman M. Harper, appeals from the Cheatham County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his aggravated sexual battery conviction and his eight-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm the judgment of the
post-conviction court.

This case concerns the restoration of voting rights of a Tennessee citizen who was convicted of a felony in Virginia and subsequently granted clemency by the Governor of Virginia. Because the voting applicant did not provide evidence that he paid outstanding court costs, restitution, and/or child support as is required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29- 202, the election commission denied his application to vote. The voting applicant appealed the election commission’s decision to the circuit court. The circuit court upheld the election commission’s decision as valid. We agree with the trial court and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Donald Johnson, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504, -13-522. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eighty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences and that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Joshua Hill-Williams, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Joshua Hill-Williams, No. W2015-01743-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1907735, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 9, 2017), perm. app. denied (Aug. 18, 2017). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and an amended petition through counsel, alleging nine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and Petitioner now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Following a bench trial, Defendant, Leavy L. Johnson, was convicted of rape, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by admitting hearsay, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Tony Light, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2017 guilty plea to attempted robbery, for which he received a four-year sentence as a Range I offender. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief because his guilty plea was involuntarily and unknowingly entered. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Demontez D. Watkins, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder; two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; second degree murder, a Class A felony; attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and two counts of employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(2) (2018) (first degree murder), 39-13-210 (2014) (subsequently amended) (second degree murder); 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery); 39-17-1324(b)(1), (2) (2018) (employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony); 39-12-101 (2018) (criminal attempt).  The trial court merged the first degree felony murder and second degree murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life plus twenty-seven years.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding probabilistic genotyping regarding DNA evidence, (3) the court erred in denying his motion to suppress his pretrial statement, (4) the court erred in admitting evidence because the chain of custody was not adequately shown, and (5) the court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Bradford Underwood III, was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal Court jury of possession of contraband in a penal facility, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-16-201 (2018) (subsequently amended).1 The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal, and (3) the trial court erred by admitting an expert report identifying the contraband. Although we affirm the Defendant’s conviction, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the conviction offense as possession of contraband in a penal facility.

The Defendant, Sidney Eugene Watkins, was convicted by a jury of alternative counts of possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of a firearm during the commission of those dangerous felonies, as well as simple possession of methamphetamine, simple possession of alprazolam, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following the jury verdict, the Defendant renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal regarding the two firearm convictions (counts 7 and 8). The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the firearm counts, finding the evidence insufficient to support those convictions. The State appeals. Because we conclude that a reasonable jury could have found all of the necessary elements of the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, we reverse the trial court’s decision to grant the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal and reinstate the convictions for those counts. We remand to the trial court for sentencing on those counts, as well as for correction of the judgment form in count 13 for the reasons stated in this opinion.

A petitioner in a divorce case moved to recuse the trial judge.  The trial judge denied the motion, and this accelerated interlocutory appeal followed.  Because the petition for recusal appeal fails to comply with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismiss the appeal. 

This appeal involves the sufficiency of a notice of appeal that arose out of one of two actions that were consolidated at the trial court. Plaintiff listed only one of the case numbers from the consolidated cases in his notice of appeal. Because he articulates no issues stemming from the dismissal of the case number he designated, we dismiss this appeal and affirm the judgment of the trial court. The cause is remanded for calculation of the attorney’s fees incurred by the defendants in defending this appeal. 

Petitioner, Kimberly Ann Scott, appeals the summary dismissal of her pro se petition for post-conviction relief.  She argues that her petition alleges a colorable claim for relief and that therefore, the post-conviction court erred by dismissing the petition without appointment of counsel or an evidentiary hearing.  The State concedes that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition.  Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings. 

Defendant, Treadence Lee Howard, pled guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and was sentenced to nine years, suspended to supervised probation after service of one year in confinement.  Following a hearing on a probation violation warrant based on Defendant’s arrest for attempted first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of the
nine-year sentence in confinement.  On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in fully revoking his probation.  In a separate case, Defendant was found guilty following a jury trial of facilitation of the sale of cocaine in an amount of 0.5 grams or more within 1,000 feet of a park and was sentenced as a Range II offender to eight years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively.  Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the guilty plea of a co-defendant at trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.  Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

In this termination of parental rights case, Father/Appellant appeals the termination of his parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to visit, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), 36-1-102(1)(A)(i); (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14); and (3) grounds applicable only to putative fathers, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9). Father/Appellant also appeals the trial court determination that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this action filed against the State of Tennessee (“the State”), alleging negligence by employees of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Claims Commission (“the Commission”) dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Determining that subject matter jurisdiction existed in the Commission, we vacate the Commission’s order and remand this matter to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

The Petitioner, Telly Lamont Booker, filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a school zone, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a weapon, as well as the resulting twenty-eight-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in the following ways: (1) by not pursuing a defense of simple possession; (2) by failing to object to the testimony of Officers Heitz and Noe regarding habits of drug dealers because they were not experts; (3) and by cumulative error. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the Petitioner relief.

A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Kevin Brazelton, of four counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years for each conviction and merged the convictions. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a court officer shocked him with a stun belt in the jury’s presence; that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge against the only
African-American member of the venire in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); and that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on “flight.” Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights.  The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that five grounds for termination were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (4) persistent conditions; and (5) mental incompetence.  The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the child.  The mother appeals.  We reverse the trial court in part and affirm in part.

Gai D. Kuot, Petitioner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the “petition”) claiming that his convictions are void because the indictment was defective, the capias was unsigned, and the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.  The trial court summarily dismissed the petition.  We affirm.

The petitioner, Larry Pittman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing entitlement to coram nobis relief on the ground that newly discovered evidence supported his claim that the warrant issued for his arrest was defective. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Michael Leon Caudle, was convicted of two counts each of selling less than 0.5 gram of cocaine within a drug-free school zone and delivering less than 0.5 gram of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, and one count of possessing 0.5 gram or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone with the intent to sell, deliver, or manufacture.  The trial court merged the two delivery convictions with the corresponding sale convictions and imposed an effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration.  In this delayed appeal,the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.  Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a provision in an employment contract executed by a professor and Nashville State Community College.  The appellant, a tenured faculty member, transitioned from a teaching position to an administrative position and back again, and asserts that Nashville State breached the terms of her employment contract when it refused to pay her 80% of her administrative salary when she returned to a faculty position.  The Tennessee Claims Commission held a trial on the breach of contract issue and determined that the contract referred to a Tennessee Board of Regents policy that did not entitle the professor to 80% of her administrative salary, and therefore, the professor’s breach of contract action failed.  The Commissioner recalculated the amount of money the professor was owed for her spring 2018 salary.  The professor appeals, asserting that the Commissioner erred in refusing to consider parol evidence in rendering its decision.  We agree with the professor that parol evidence is helpful to understanding the parties’ intent as expressed in the agreement, and we reverse the Commissioner’s decision.  The case is remanded for calculation of the professor’s faculty salary at no less than 80% of her administrative salary.