APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, apparently aggrieved that his sentences were too lenient, now seeks to correct the error by the remedy of habeas corpus. Because the error complained of is non-jurisdictional, I would affirm dismissal of the petition.

This is a petition in juvenile court to modify custody. In November 1997, the juvenile court issued an order granting the mother primary residential custody of the parties’ daughter, and granting the father liberal visitation. In October 2001, the father filed a petition to modify his visitation. The father’s petition was later amended to add a request for joint custody. In November 2001, the juvenile court entered an order rescheduling the matter for a later date and granting the father visitation with the child for a full week on alternating weeks, pending the hearing. The mother tried to obtain a rehearing of that order, but was unable to do so because of numerous procedural problems. In July 2004, a final hearing was conducted. The juvenile court determined that no material change in circumstances had occurred since the November 1997 order, and that the child’s best interest would not be served by granting the parties joint custody. The juvenile court slightly modified the visitation schedule for the father set forth in the November 1997 order. From that order, the father now appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Gary Timothy Lawler, pled guilty to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony; one count of attempted rape, a Class C felony; and one count of attempted sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class D felony. He received a sentence of seven years for each conviction. The sentence for the attempted aggravated sexual battery conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining two sentences, which were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. Thus, the total effective sentence is fourteen years. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him alternative sentencing and requiring him to serve the entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Clarence Bunton, of attempted child rape, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to twelve years in confinement. The appellant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronald Lee Hamby, entered pleas of guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft over $500, a Class E felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of seven years to be served in a community corrections program. Fifteen months later, the community corrections sentence was revoked and the defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his term in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the single issue presented for review is whether revocation was proper. The judgment is affirmed.

The defendant appeals his sentence of three years confinement after entering a guilty plea to theft of property over $10,000. The defendant contends the trial judge erred in failing to sentence him to full probation or other alternative sentencing. Our review reveals that the trial judge complied with sentencing procedures, and we affirm the sentence.

The defendant, Clarence Edward Johnson, entered pleas of guilty to four counts of forgery, four counts of identity theft, speeding, failure to provide proof of financial responsibility, two counts of second offense driving on a revoked license, misdemeanor failure to appear, two counts of felony failure to appear, and theft under $500. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years of incarceration followed by three years of supervised probation. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Nicholas Riendeau, pled guilty to theft over $1,000, forgery, identity theft, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, possession with intent to deliver less than .5 grams of cocaine, simple possession of cocaine, possession of a schedule IV drug (clonazepam), and theft over $10,000. The trial court imposed a Range I, effective sentence of five years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying full probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Appellant, Brandon Jerome Johnson, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court. Johnson pled guilty to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery, tampering with evidence, vandalism, and resisting arrest. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of four years and six months in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Johnson argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. After review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a Title IV child support case. The child involved in this action was born in September 2000.  The parents were never married. The child lived with the mother, and the mother began receiving financial assistance from the State when the child was born. In February 2002, the child was legitimated as the natural child of the father. In February 2003, the State, on behalf of the mother, filed a petition against the father for child support payments. In May 2003, the father was ordered to pay child support, plus a monthly amount toward his child support arrearage. The mother filed a petition for rehearing by the juvenile court judge, arguing that the established arrearage was too high, and asserting that she no longer wanted child support from the father because the two were reunited. In November 2003, a hearing was conducted. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court terminated the father’s monthly child support obligation and gave him a credit toward the child support arrearage for payments that had been made directly to the mother. The State filed a motion to alter or amend the decision, which was denied. The State now appeals. We reverse.

This case arises out of an ejectment action filed by Appellee against Appellant. Appellee claims ownership of the disputed property under a 1990 Warranty Deed and Appellant asserts that this Deed should be set aside due to fraud. The trial court found that the 1990 Deed was valid and that Appellant was a tenant at will on the property. The trial court further found that Appellant was in arrears on rent and that Appellee had a right to possession of the property and rents. We affirm.

The defendant, Corey C. Abernathy, was convicted after a bench trial of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We conclude that the defendant was not questioned, as required, before being allowed to represent himself. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.

The petitioner, Deangelo Demond Johnson, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, felony evading arrest, and driving on a suspended license. He received a total effective sentence of ten years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Michael W. Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, raising as his sole issue whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly prepare and investigate his case. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Plaintiff Julie Nahon (“Plaintiff”) filed for divorce from Defendant Isaac Nahon (“Defendant”). The parties later entered into a Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) whereby Defendant agreed to obtain a loan and pay off certain marital debts. Four days later, Defendant repudiated the MDA after failing to obtain his anticipated loan. Plaintiff sought to enforce the MDA as a contract. The trial court held that the MDA was a valid and enforceable contract, and subsequently incorporated the MDA into the parties’ Final Decree of Absolute Divorce. Defendant appealed. Defendant subsequently failed to adhere to the financial obligations set forth in the Permanent Parenting Plan and MDA. As a result, Plaintiff filed several contempt petitions against Defendant. The trial court eventually entered an Order on Petition for Contempt against Defendant which granted Plaintiff final and enforceable judgments against Defendant for all delinquent obligations under the Permanent Parenting Plan and MDA. Defendant now appeals both the final divorce decree and the Order on Petition for Contempt. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse in part and affirm in part.

The appellant, Richard Gastineau, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to reckless driving, and the trial court sentenced him to a six-month suspended sentence and fined him five hundred dollars. The trial court also sua sponte ruled that the appellant had violated the implied consent law and revoked his driver’s license for one year. In this appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred by finding that he violated the implied consent law and by revoking his driver’s license. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the implied consent law violation and reverse the judgment of the trial court. We also remand the case to the trial court in order for it to clarify on the record whether the appellant should receive judicial diversion for the reckless driving conviction.

This is a divorce and child custody case. After thirteen years of marriage, the wife filed a complaint for divorce and sought custody of the couple’s two minor children, alleging irreconcilable differences and inappropriate marital conduct. The husband admitted irreconcilable differences, but argued that the wife had committed the inappropriate marital conduct. After a lengthy trial, the trial court designated the wife as primary residential parent, ordered the husband to pay child support, divided the marital property, ordered the husband to pay the wife $70,000, awarded the wife attorney’s fees, and taxed the costs of the litigation against the husband. The husband appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Darrell Braddock, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court.

In the divorce action, the Trial Court awarded wife a divorce, alimony, child support, and divided marital property and debts of the marriage, and awarded fees for the wife's attorney. The husband's issues on appeal are valuation and division of property, alimony, attorney's fees and amount of child support. We affirm the Trial Court's Judgment.

This is an action to enforce a settlement agreement. In the underlying lawsuit, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant foster care provider for the wrongful death of their daughter. The defendant had an insurance policy with “withering” limits, in which the policy limits are reduced by the amount expended in defending the lawsuit. The week before trial, counsel for the defendant sent a letter to counsel for the plaintiffs offering to settle the case for the remaining policy limits which, at the time, were $575,000. The plaintiffs asked the defendant to allow the offer to remain open for forty-eight (48) hours. The defendant agreed, but the defendant’s trial preparation continued. Two days later, the plaintiffs accepted the defendant’s offer. By that time, the policy limits had eroded to $450,000. The plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in the amount of $575,000. The trial court granted the motion. The defendant now appeals. We reverse, concluding that the parties’ correspondence does not reflect a meeting of the minds on the settlement amount.

Derrick Lawrence and Kim Lawrence ("Plaintiffs") sued Trees-N-Trends (the "Store") alleging outrageous conduct and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. While Plaintiffs were shopping at the Store, a customer reported to the Store's manager that Plaintiffs had a gun and intended to commit a robbery. The Store's assistant manager, Whitney Finnell ("Finnell"), called 911 indicting there was a possible armed robbery but then clarifying that the report was based solely on information provided by a customer. Plaintiffs purchased some items and were confronted by police officers as they exited the store, made to lie on the pavement, and were handcuffed while the officers ascertained whether Plaintiffs were armed. Plaintiffs were not armed. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to the Store, and Plaintiffs appeal claiming there are genuine issues of material fact. We affirm.

The plaintiff and the defendant were riding double on a motorcycle with the defendant in front. The parties were proceeding south on the Natchez Trace Parkway in Williamson County when a deer came from the left and struck the side of the motorcycle, causing the plaintiff to sustain multiple fractures of her left leg. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier, who was served with process in the case, moved for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s suit. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. We affirm.

The defendant, Victor Powell, was convicted of two counts of vehicular homicide (by recklessness and by intoxication), three counts of vehicular assault, and two counts of driving under the influence.  The conviction for vehicular homicide by recklessness was merged into the conviction for vehicular homicide by intoxication. In addition, both convictions for driving under the influence were merged into the conviction for vehicular homicide by intoxication. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twelve years for vehicular homicide and four years for each vehicular assault conviction.  In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a second mental evaluation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Sidney Porterfield, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Petitioner has exhausted his direct appeals and has previously pursued post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed the instant habeas corpus petition asserting several claims regarding the validity of his sentence. The trial court summarily denied the petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Trial Court terminated the parental rights of both parents to the three minor children. On appeal, we affirm.