APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The State appeals the suppression of evidence by the Obion County Circuit Court. The Defendant, Stephanie Ann Mays, was arrested for criminal trespass, and a search of Mays’ person followed, which revealed the presence of a quantity of cocaine and marijuana. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted Mays’ motion to suppress and dismissed the charges. The State argues that because the police had probable cause to arrest Mays, the resulting search and seizure of the evidence was valid. After review, we conclude that Mays’ arrest for trespass, which was based upon an erroneously generated police document, was invalid as no probable cause existed to arrest. As such, the evidence was properly suppressed. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff Lipman Brothers, Inc. purchased 1,156 cases of French wine and hired Italia Di Navigazione, S.p.A. (“Italia”) to ship the wine to the United States from France. Italia subsequently hired Defendant Arete Agencies, Inc. (“Arete”) to transport the wine to Plaintiff’s Nashville warehouses. Arete placed the wine on a train bound for Nashville but, after reaching its destination, the wine was never delivered to Plaintiff and ultimately spoiled after sitting outside in the summer heat for thirty-six days. Arete’s insurance provider, The Hartford Insurance Company (“Hartford”), denied coverage for the incident. Plaintiff later obtained a judgment against Arete and, after learning that Arete was unable to pay, issued a writ of garnishment against Hartford. The trial court subsequently quashed Plaintiff’s writ after concluding that the debt was “contingent” because Plaintiff failed to first institute a declaratory judgment action to interpret the disputed insurance contract before seeking garnishment. We reverse.

The Metropolitan Davidson County Board of Zoning Appeals ("the BZA") granted Richard A. Demonbreun ("the Landowner") a special exception permit to use his residentially-zoned property as a special event site. The Landowner filed a petition for writ of certiorari and supersedeas, challenging the validity of several restrictions imposed upon the permit. The trial court held that several of the restrictions were unsupported by material evidence, and thus, according to the trial court, were arbitrarily imposed by the BZA. The BZA appeals the trial court's determination with respect to the conditions found to be arbitrary. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The majority has provided a well reasoned opinion, based upon a strict interpretation of In
re Estate of Hume, 984 S.W.2d 602, 605 (1999), concluding that the sale and reorganization of other assets and bank accounts by the court appointed conservator effected an ademption by extinction of several of Mr. Greenamyre’s testamentary bequests. I, however, submit a strict interpretation of Hume is not required.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding the fate of specific bequests in a will prepared by a college professor without the assistance of counsel. The professor’s mental capacity declined after he prepared the will, and the Chancery Court for Putnam County appointed a conservator for the professor who, with the court’s approval, auctioned off his personal property, including property subject to specific bequests in the professor’s will. After the professor died, his executrix petitioned the trial court to construe several provisions of his will. The trial court heard the matter without a jury and, relying on In re Estate of Hume, 984 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. 1999), concluded that several of the specific bequests had been adeemed by extinction. The trial court also concluded that the parties attorney’s fees and the court costs should be paid from the intestate funds in the estate. On this appeal, one of the beneficiaries of an adeemed bequest takes issue with the court’s conclusion that she was not entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the property bequeathed to her and that she was not entitled to recover all of her attorney’s fees. The professor’s sole surviving heir at law takes issue with the trial court’s decision to award this beneficiary any attorney’s fees. We have determined that the trial court’s decision regarding the fate of the specific bequests of personal property is correct but that the trial court erred with regard to the award of attorney’s fees.

This case involves a petition to relocate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108 (2001). To determine whether the parties in a relocation case are spending substantially equal intervals of time with their child, the "time actually spent" with each parent should be computed in units of a day. The number of days to be credited to each parent should be based upon an examination of the residential schedule, additional time not reflected in the residential schedule, and adjustments for any violations to the residential schedule. To allocate a day for which both parents claim credit, the trial court should examine the hours that each parent actually spent with the child on that day, the activities in which each parent participated with the child, the resources that each parent expended on the child's behalf, and any other factor that the trial court considers to be relevant. After careful consideration of the record, we conclude that the parties were not spending substantially equal intervals of time with the child. Because the mother was spending a greater amount of time with the child, she should be permitted to relocate with the child pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-108(d) (2001). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine multiple issues including  whether the chancery court erred when it granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiff contends that there were numerous claims made in his complaint sufficient to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiff, acting pro se, filed an appeal to this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.

This case is before us after remand by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The defendant, Gustavo Chavez, pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to ten years at 100% to be served in the Department of Corrections. On appeal, this Court originally affirmed the defendant’s conviction but modified his sentence to eight years due to our determination that the trial court improperly applied a statutory enhancement factor in violation of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Subsequently, our supreme court held in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632 (Tenn. 2005) that Tennessee’s sentencing scheme constitutes a non-mandatory scheme which does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial as interpreted by Blakely. Accordingly, our supreme court remanded this case for reconsideration in light of Gomez. Upon consideration of Gomez, we affirm the conviction and sentence as originally imposed by the trial court.

A Weakley County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Alice Irene Thomas, of making a false report, a class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II, multiple offender to six years.  The appellant appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Former client appeals summary judgment dismissing his malpractice claim against former attorney and refusal of trial judge hearing malpractice case by interchange to grant recusal request. We affirm the trial court on both issues.

The defendant, James C. McWhorter, was convicted of two counts of forgery, misdemeanor evading arrest, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court imposed a four-year sentence for each of the forgery convictions, an eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for the misdemeanor evading arrest conviction, and a four-year sentence for the felony reckless endangerment conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for a Range II, effective sentence of four years.  In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his residence; (2) that the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress the defendant's statement to police; (3) that the trial court erred by denying the motion to sever the offenses; (4) that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof at trial; (5) that Count 3 of the indictment did not charge an offense; (6) that the offenses alleged were legally impossible under the facts of the case; (7) that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for evading arrest and reckless endangerment; (8) that the trial court erred by referring to his statement as a "confession;" (9) that the trial court should have given a curative instruction during a co-defendant's testimony; (10) that the sentence is excessive; and (11) that the trial court erred by denying probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether the homeowners’ suit against the State of Tennessee was timely filed. The homeowners filed a complaint with the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee for the alleged unconstitutional taking of their property in connection with the State’s issuance of a permit to the homeowners to install a subsurface sewage disposal system. The Claims Commission ruled in favor of the State, finding among other things that the homeowners’ claim was time barred. The applicable statute of limitations allows a landowner one year within which to commence an action for the taking of land after the landowner realizes or reasonably should realize that his or her property has sustained an injury that is permanent in nature.  The homeowners contend that they did not realize that they had suffered permanent injury until the State eliminated the possibility that the injury to their property could be resolved. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission upon our finding that the homeowners should have reasonably realized that the injury to their propertywas permanent over one year prior to the time they filed their claim.

In this post-divorce case, Melody D. Dickson ("Mother") filed a complaint against her former husband, Roger Lee Dickson ("Father"), seeking to modify an order of the trial court awarding her $876 per month in child support. Mother sought an increase in child support and an award of her attorney's fees. In addition, Mother requested that Father be required to pay "the educational expenses of the minor children," who she had recently enrolled at a private school. Following a bench trial, the court ordered that Father's child support obligation be increased to $913.50 per month; ordered Father to pay the children's private school tuition; and ordered Father to pay Mother's attorney's fees. Father appeals. As modified, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

The defendant, Laranda Conner, pled guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail with all but forty-eight hours suspended. As a
condition of her guilty plea, she sought to reserve as a certified question of law whether the trial
court erred in overruling her motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test taken without her consent but pursuant to medical treatment, which allegedly constituted an illegal search and seizure. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly reserve a question of law. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, Quentin L. Hall, pled guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Approximately eight years later he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. On appeal, the petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely. Because the facts of this case do not warrant tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

This matter finds its genesis in a divorce action filed by John D. McMahan ("Husband") against his wife, Katherine C. McMahan ("Wife"). The parties agreed to mediate their differences. At the time of the mediation, the parties ostensibly reached an agreement as to the division of their property and spousal support. Their agreement was reduced to longhand and, in that form, signed by both parties. Shortly after the mediation, Wife repudiated the writing, arguing that it was not a binding agreement because of (1) duress; (2) Wife's lack of mental capacity to enter into a contract; and (3) the parties' intention that the longhand document would be followed by a more formal document in which the parties would express their final agreement. Husband filed a motion to enforce the document in longhand form. The trial court granted Husband's motion, holding that the writing was a valid and enforceable contract. Wife appeals. Husband seeks damages for a frivolous appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, but decline to award damages for a frivolous appeal.

The defendant, Jeffery Lynn Anderson was convicted by a jury of one count of burglary of a motor vehicle. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted on two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). After a bench trial, the defendant was found guilty of both counts, but the trial court merged the counts into one conviction for DUI. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail, to be suspended after serving forty-eight hours in jail. The trial court also revoked the defendant's license for one year and imposed a three hundred fifty dollar fine. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle; (2) the test results from the breath-alcohol test were inadmissible because the officer failed to observe him for the requisite twenty minutes prior to the administration of the test; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Melissa Barnett, appeals the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition is barred by the statute of limitations and was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This application for an interlocutory appeal arises out of a condemnation action filed by the City of South Pittsburg. The sole issue on appeal concerns the landowners' use of an unrecorded and unapproved plat of a proposed subdivision to establish the fair market value of the property. The City filed a motion in limine to disallow the use of the plat. The trial court, relying on Davidson County Bd. of Ed. v. First Am. Nat. Bank, 202 Tenn. 9, 301 S.W.2d 905 (1957), determined that the landowners could not introduce the plat into evidence nor could their expert use the plat in his testimony to establish fair market value. The trial court subsequently granted the landowners an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 9. We concur with the trial court that this is an appropriate case for an interlocutory appeal. We also conclude that the plat may be introduced and used in ways consistent with Davidson County Bd. of Ed., and we thus vacate the trial court's order categorically prohibiting its introduction and use.

Plaintiffs driver and passenger sued the estate of deceased Defendant driver for negligent operation of his vehicle. The jury found in favor of Defendant as to both Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiff passenger appealed after the trial court denied her motion for a new trial. We affirm the decision of trial court.

The defendant, Gabrial Ayuel, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to twenty years as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant raises five issues: (1) juror misconduct; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; (3) erroneous evidentiary rulings; (4) improper disclosure of unrelated, outstanding warrants; and (5) sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Larry Joe Jones, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, David M. Olvera, was convicted of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and sentenced to concurrent terms of life and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, he argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (3) the trial court erred in allowing an intern from the district attorney general's office to participate in reading the defendant's statement to the jury; and (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury on flight. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Terry Penny, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of his motion for a corrected judgment and his petition for post-conviction relief arguing his 1976 judgment should be corrected pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 and his post-conviction petition was not time- barred by the statute of limitations. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court.