APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the Tennessee Regulatory Authority’s consideration of a tariff filed by BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. A group of competing telecommunications providers and the Consumer Advocate and Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General filed petitions to suspend the proposed tariff and to open a contested case proceeding because the tariff was discriminatory and anti-competitive. The Authority considered the proposed tariff and the requests for a contested case proceeding at three conferences. After BellSouth amended the tariff to meet several of the objections of its competitors and the Consumer Advocate and Protection Division, the Authority, by divided vote, declined to suspend the tariff or to convene a contested case proceeding and permitted the revised tariff to take effect. On this appeal, the Consumer Advocate Division and the competing telecommunications providers assert that the Authority erred by refusing to open a contested case proceeding regarding their objections to the revised tariff. They also insist that the Authority’s approval of the tariff is not supported by substantial and material evidence. We have determined that the Authority abused its discretion by refusing to open a contested case proceeding to resolve the contested issues regarding whether the revised tariff was discriminatory and anticompetitive.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, James D. Cooks, Jr., of assault and theft of property valued less than five hundred dollars, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days for each offense. The appellant appeals,
claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Edgar Goodwin, was convicted of domestic aggravated assault and sentenced to eight years to be served on probation. Later, the trial court revoked probation and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court abused it discretion by revoking probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Karlis Williams, pleaded guilty on January 14, 2003, to three counts of robbery and six counts of misdemeanor theft of an amount less than $500. By plea agreement with the state, the petitioner received an effective seven-year sentence, as a Range II multiple offender. The petitioner subsequently filed with the Shelby County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that as a result, his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made. He also raised a challenge to his sentence based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner brings the instant appeal challenging that denial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the employer contends that the trial court erred in finding: 1) that the employee’s pre-existing leg condition was aggravated by his work for the employer; 2) that the employee gave proper notice of his injuries; and 3) that the employee had sustained a 90% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding a shareholders agreement negotiated as part of a merger between National Health Industries, Inc. and Senior Services Corporation. The merged companies became Caretenders Health Corporation. Franklin Capital Associates, a shareholder of Caretenders, filed this action against Caretenders alleging, inter alia, breach of the parties’ shareholders agreement. Franklin contends Caretenders failed to use its best efforts to register the stock issued in the merger. The trial court found Caretenders liable for failing to use its best efforts to register the shares under any registration form available, and awarded damages of $984,970 to Franklin.  Caretenders appeals contending the trial court erred by: (1) not requiring Franklin to prove Caretenders acted in bad faith, (2) determining Caretenders must use best efforts to register the stock under any registration form available, and (3) applying a 25% “block discount” to the net proceeds, rather than the price per share. Franklin appeals the denial of their request for prejudgment interest.  We affirm the trial court on the first two issues and the denial of prejudgment interest to Franklin but find the trial court incorrectly calculated the “block discount.”

Option to purchase under lease was dismissed by the Trial Court. Consolidated action by defendant for detainer and fees was granted by the Trial Court. We affirm the dismissal of the action on option but reverse the Judgment for detainer and fees.

Father appeals the trial court's failure to grant his petition to modify custody of his three minor daughters to the extent he requested. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The dispute in this case arises out of an employment contract which provides severance pay for an employee who is terminated for reasons “other than gross misconduct, fraud, embezzlement, theft or voluntary termination.” The defendant employer ceased providing severance pay to the employee after the employer discovered that the employee had engaged in gross misconduct while still employed by the company. The employee sued for breach of contract, seeking the severance pay due under the contract; the employer responded that had it known previously of the gross misconduct, it would have fired the employee, thus absolving it of any duty to provide severance pay. The trial court granted summary judgment for the employee, after concluding that the employee had been involuntarily terminated, thus triggering the severance pay provision, and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have fired the employee had it known of the gross misconduct. The employee was awarded $795,037.35, less thirty days severance pay already paid, plus prejudgment interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that after-acquired evidence of employee misconduct need only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence in order to avoid liability in a breach of contract action, and because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee would have been fired had the employer discovered the gross misconduct, we remand the case for trial. On the remaining issues raised by the employer, we affirm the Court of Appeals: the employee did not voluntarily resign from his position but was involuntarily terminated; the payment schedule found in the “Employment Protection Plan” regarding severance pay was incorporated into the employment contract; and the severance pay provisions did not constitute an illegal penalty.

This is a post-divorce petition to modify custody. During the marriage, the mother and father lived with the mother's parents. The parties were divorced in September 1998, and custody of the parties' three children was granted to the mother. After the divorce, the mother and the parties' children continued to live with the maternal grandparents. In March 2000, the mother filed a petition to restrict the father's visitation, alleging that the father sexually abused the parties' two daughters. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the children. After a hearing, the allegations of sexual abuse were determined to be unfounded. Approximately a year later, the mother filed a second petition to restrict the father's visitation, once again alleging sexual abuse. The father filed a counter-petition for custody based on a material change in circumstances. The father alleged that the mother and her parents were causing harm to the children by subjecting them to persistent questioning and repeated physical examinations in an attempt to prove sexual abuse. The mother's parents were joined as third-party defendants. The mother's parents then filed a cross-petition for grandparent visitation. After a bench trial, the trial court granted the father's petition for a change in custody and allowed the mother unsupervised visitation in the grandparents' home. The grandparents' petition for grandparent visitation was dismissed. At the conclusion of trial, the guardian ad litem for the children submitted a request for $15,000 in fees. The trial court denied the request, awarding the guardian ad litem only the $1,500 she had already been paid. The mother, the grandparents, and the guardian ad litem now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court, except that we remand to the trial court for reconsideration of the guardian ad litem's fee request in light of the applicable law.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained injuries to his left shoulder while working for the employer. The trial court: (1) held that the injury was compensable; (2) awarded a 45 percent vocational disability; (3) awarded the employee 45 weeks of temporary total disability benefits; (4) held that the employer denied the claim in bad faith; and (5) awarded a bad faith penalty of 25 percent of the temporary total disability award plus 25 percent of the permanent partial disability award. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the injury was compensable. We affirm the award of 45 percent to the arm. We modify the award of 45 weeks of temporary total disability to 16 weeks. We vacate the penalty for partial permanent benefits, but affirm the penalty for temporary total benefits, as modified.

Pro se prisoner Plaintiff filed a claim against circuit court clerk, circuit court judge, district attorney general, assistant public defender, and two attorneys, alleging civil conspiracy and forfeiture. The trial court dismissed the claims sua sponte without a hearing pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff appealed and we affirm the decision of the trial court.

This appeal presents the issue of the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. The plaintiff entered into a loan transaction with the defendant mortgage corporation to obtain funds on behalf of her daughter. The loan was secured by a mortgage on plaintiff's home. Plaintiff's daughter subsequently discontinued making payments on the loan, and plaintiff filed a petition to rescind the loan, asserting that plaintiff was caused to sign the loan by defendant lender's fraud. Several months after the case had been pending, lender demanded that the case be submitted to arbitration pursuant to an agreement signed by plaintiff when the loan was closed. The trial court granted lender's motion compelling arbitration. Plaintiff appeals, arguing that the arbitration agreement she entered into is unenforceable because it is an adhesion contract and is unconscionable and unreasonable. Plaintiff further argues that lender waived its right to compel arbitration under the circumstances in this case. We hold that the arbitration agreement is enforceable, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Deceased had executed loan guaranties to claimant. Claimant filed claim in Estate based on the guaranties. The Estate excepted on the grounds that the underlying loans were not due and payable because claimant had not accelerated the indebtednesses. The Trial Court upheld the claims. We affirm.

Plaintiffs appeal the action of the trial court in granting Defendants' Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) Motions to Dismiss their challenge to a November 9, 1992, amendment to the Rutherford County Zoning Resolution. The trial court determined that the 10-year statute of limitations provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-110 barred the action and that the discovery rule did not apply. We hold that on the record before the Court, the November 9, 1992, purported amendment is void ab initio. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the Chancery Court's denial of alimony, denial of Rule 60 post-judgment relief, and the court's classification of his workers' compensation benefits as marital property. Finding Husband's appeal without merit, we affirm the Chancery Court's decision.

The child who is the subject of this Petition to Terminate Parental Rights, A.J.H., is the latest of five children born to the mother, M.H. A.J.H. is the fourth child of D.H., the father. At the conclusion of an initial investigation by DCS personnel, A.J.H. was removed from the parents’ custody immediately after birth and has remained with his foster parents since that removal. The father appeals the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights as well as its refusal to consider the paternal grandparents’ petition for custody. We reverse and vacate the order of termination and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Basketball coach and employee association appeal trial court's refusal to order coach reinstated as a method to enforce arbitration decision under Master Contract between school board and association. We affirm.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Dolwin Deon Cormia, of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court imposed a life sentence with the possibility of parole plus a concurrent two year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the conviction, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. The Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the post-conviction petition, the trial court dismissed the petition, and this appeal ensued. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition.

In this appeal, we are called upon to evaluate the trial court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents to a minor child. The biological parents are Chinese immigrants who are presently in this country illegally and are subject to deportation proceedings. Shortly after coming to the United States, the biological parents had a daughter. Facing financial difficulties at the time of their daughter’s birth, the parents decided to place their daughter in the care of an adoption agency until their financial situation improved. The agency placed the child with foster parents who agreed to care for the child over an initial three month period. At the conclusion of the three month foster care period, the biological parents agreed to the entry of a consent order by the juvenile court transferring custody of the child to the foster parents. The biological parents continued to visit with their daughter at the home of the custodial non-parents approximately once each week for one hour each visit. However, they paid no child support to the custodial non-parents. The biological parents subsequently filed a petition to modify the juvenile court’s custody order seeking to regain custody of their daughter, which the court denied. Thereafter, the biological parents continued to visit their daughter with the same frequency as before. On one day in particular, the biological parents asked to take their daughter fora family portrait, and the custodial non-parents refused their request. When the biological parents refused to leave the custodial non-parents’ home, the police were called. After speaking with the police, the biological parents left the home and never returned to visit their daughter citing their fear of arrest. A short time after this incident, the biological parents filed a second petition to modify the juvenile court’s custody order. In response, the custodial non-parents filed a petition to adopt the child and to terminate the biological parents’ parental rights in the chancery court, primarily relying on the ground of abandonment. As a result, the biological parents’ petition to modify the custody order was transferred to the chancery court. Following a lengthy and tortured procedural history, the chancery court held a bench trial in the matter and subsequently entered an order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights. The biological parents filed a timely appeal to this Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part the decisions of the chancery court in this case. However, in light of our decisions on certain issues presented in this case, we need not remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Christopher Lawrence Milliken, pled guilty to one count of resisting a stop, frisk, halt, arrest or search; one count of simple possession of marijuana; and one count of violating the implied consent law. In conjunction with his guilty pleas, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law for this Court's consideration. Because the certified question of law is not dispositive of the Defendant's case, we dismiss this appeal.

On December 17, 1999, Defendant, Henry Martinez, pled guilty to the Class A felony offense of conspiracy to sell more than 300 pounds of marijuana. Under the negotiated plea agreement, he received a sentence of fifteen (15) years as a Range I, standard offender. Also, pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the State dismissed a charge of possession with intent to deliver seventy (70) pounds of marijuana within 1000 feet of a school, as long as he testified truthfully against his co-defendants in the case. On July 19, 2004, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The motion was denied by the trial court and defendant has appealed to this Court. The State has filed a motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the motion has merit, grant same, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

While I concur in the majority opinion on some issues, I must dissent from the affirmance of the termination of the Hes’ parental rights on the ground of willful failure to visit.1 I would instead reverse the trial court’s termination of the Hes’ parental rights.

M.D. ("Mother") filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of R.L.H. ("Father") to the parties' seven year old son. Following a hearing, the Juvenile Court held that grounds for terminating Father's parental rights had been established by clear and convincing evidence. However, the Juvenile Court made no factual findings or conclusions of law as to whether terminating Father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. The judgment of the Juvenile Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority Opinion. The issue presented for review, as stated by the Appellants is:

Whether the Chancery Court correctly held that County Charter, Article II, § 2.03(g)(the “Charter”and the “Amendment”), which provides that no County Mayor or County Commissioner is eligible to be elected to or to hold office for more than two consecutive four year terms, is valid in accordance with the third paragraph of Tennessee Constitution, Article VII, Section 1 and Tenn. Code Ann. § § 5-1-201, et seq.