APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jerry Dale Tigner, Jr., was indicted for second degree murder, a Class A felony, and was convicted by a jury as charged and sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to seventeen years in confinement. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the sequential jury instructions on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter are unconstitutional; (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by failing to consider all mitigating factors; and (4) the State committed Brady violations with regard to a witness.  Upon review, we find no reversible error and affirm the conviction and sentence.

The defendant, Darnell Lavelle Welch, was indicted for premeditated first degree murder. A jury convicted the defendant as charged, and he was sentenced to life in prison. The defendant now appeals his conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction in two
respects: (1) that self-defense was not rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) that premeditation was not proven. Upon review, we conclude that the jury was justified in rejecting self-defense and in finding that the defendant acted with premeditation in killing the victim. Therefore,
the defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

The petitioner, Aaron T. Burton, appeals from the trial court's order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, a Class B felony, and sentenced to a Department of Correction term of ten years as a Range I offender, the defendant, Bobby Shane Hurley, appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the severity of his sentence, and the failure of the trial court to grant a sentencing alternative to incarceration.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court

The defendant, Eric Rice, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and applied for judicial diversion pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. The trial court denied the application for judicial diversion and sentenced the defendant as a standard offender. On
appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Darrell Toomes, was convicted of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to seven years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion for new trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Capital Defendant, Robert Hood, appeals as of right his conviction of first degree murder and sentence of death resulting from the 2001 murder of Toni Banks. A Shelby County grand jury charged the defendant by indictment with one count of felony murder, one count of premeditated murder, two counts of misdemeanor theft of property, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. On May 6, 2004, a Shelby County jury found the defendant guilty of both counts of homicide and guilty as to both counts of misdemeanor theft. The jury acquitted the defendant on both counts of aggravated kidnapping. After a separate sentencing hearing, the jury unanimously found the presence of one statutory aggravating circumstance, that the defendant had previously been convicted of a violent felony offense. The jury further determined that this aggravating circumstance outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and imposed a sentence of death. The trial court approved the sentencing verdict. The defendant appeals presenting for our review the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s request to proceed pro se, (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing to permit defense counsel to withdraw, (3) whether the presence of uniformed detention response team members sitting on either side of the defendant throughout trial was prejudicial error, (4) whether the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict of premeditated murder, (5) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence involving prior bad acts of the defendant, (6) whether the trial court’s instruction that the defendant’s prior offenses were offenses whose statutory elements involved the use of violence violated the United States Constitution, (7) whether the death penalty imposed in this case violated due process because the indictment failed to allege the aggravators relied upon by the state, and (8) whether Tennessee’s
death penalty scheme is unconstitutional. Finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence of death.

This is an appeal from a divorce action in which the husband argues that the trial court failed to make an equitable division of the marital estate. Specifically, the husband challenges the trial court’s treatment of certain real property as the wife’s separate property, and he challenges the valuation placed on their vehicles. Finding the appeal meritorious, we reverse and remand for a new division of the marital estate.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Christopher Lynn Hoosier, of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of twenty years for the cocaine conviction and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the misdemeanor convictions. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in sentencing him by finding enhancement factors that were not submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt and by failing to apply a factor in mitigation. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, I disagree as to the rights Dr. Russell had with regard to notice of non-renewal.

The juvenile court granted Appellee’s Rule 60.02 Motion to vacate its prior order of legitimation.  We reverse.

Plaintiff, a college professor, appeals the dismissal of her breach of employment contract action upon
summary judgment. She was employed by Meharry Medical College for thirty-three (33) years but was not tenured because the tenure program, adopted in 1984, was never implemented. She is seeking entitlement to formal tenure, or de facto tenure. She also seeks damages, claiming she was entitled to but did not receive twelve (12) months notice her contract of employment would not be renewed. The trial court found plaintiff had not attained de facto tenure and had waived her claim for tenure. It also held plaintiff’s employment contract entitled her to six (6) months notice her employment would not be renewed and she received the requisite notice. We affirm.

This appeal arises from a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant, a police officer, accidently discharged his gun while standing behind the plaintiff, startling the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the defendant was immune from suit pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-310(b) (2000). The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that section 29-20-205(2), which retained immunity for governmental entities for the "infliction of mental anguish" caused by its employee applied to both negligent, as well as intentional infliction of mental anguish. We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order granting the motion to dismiss in favor of the defendant.

The appellant, Jerry Bell, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. The appellant received a total effective sentence of twenty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the sentences imposed for those convictions. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Larry W. Timberlake, appeals his probation revocation and imposition of his original seven-year sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Ronnie Woodall, was convicted of rape of a child by a Shelby County jury and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction at one-hundred percent. On appeal, the defendant challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and (2) the trial court’s application of a sentencing enhancement. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An Obion County jury found the defendant, Shirley Annette Rudd, guilty of facilitating the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-11-403, -12-103, -17-417 (2003). Pretrial, the defendant had moved to suppress methamphetamine seized from her person. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the evidence had been legally seized. The defendant challenges that ruling on appeal. After reviewing the record, applicable authorities, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Christopher Jerome Taylor, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Taylor argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, in which he asserted that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to secure an independent mental evaluation; and (2) failing to demand a speedy trial. Upon review, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the post-conviction court; therefore, we affirm.

The petitioner, Anthony Leon Moore, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The parties were divorced based on stipulated grounds. Husband appeals the award of property to Wife. We reverse and remand.

This appeal involves a dispute between a country music songwriter and a music publishing company arising out of an "exclusive co-publishing agreement" relating to the song "Riding with Private Malone" and other works. Because of the parties' dispute, ASCAP declined to release royalties for "Riding with Private Malone" to either the songwriter or the publisher. The songwriter filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking a determination that the publishing company had breached the agreement and that he was entitled to receive the royalties held by ASCAP because all the rights to "Riding with Private Malone" had reverted to him. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the songwriter was not entitled to the withheld royalties. After the trial court denied his motion to amend his complaint to seek money damages, the songwriter appealed. We have concluded that the trial court erred by holding that the songwriter was not entitled to the withheld royalties and that the trial court properly denied the songwriter's motion to amend his complaint.

Robert Hugh Benson ("Father") sued Deborah Watkinson ("Mother") for divorce. The parties have two minor children. The Trial Court granted the parties a divorce and designated Father as the primary residential parent with Mother to have no overnight visitation due to a finding of her alcohol abuse. Mother appeals to this Court. We modify the judgment only to order Father to attend and complete an anger management course, and affirm as so modified.

The Appellant, Karl Blake, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of three counts of child rape and one count of aggravated sexual battery, resulting in an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, Blake raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in excluding a statement made by the victim at an in camera hearing; (2) whether the trial court should have granted a mistrial based on juror misconduct; (3) whether the trial court should have granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (4) whether his sentence violates Blakely v. Washington. After review of the record, we affirm.

The petitioner, William Patrick Roberson, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his statements to police were taken in violation of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court denying post-conviction relief.